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This thesis Is an attempt to study the tribal unrest 
of 1831-33 on the south-west frontier of Bengal in all its 
aspects - its origins, progress, pacification, nature and 
aftermath. There are two distinct phases of this unrest 
- the first among the Mundas, the Oraons and other tribal 
people of Chota-Nagpur, which eventually spread among the 
Bhumijes of Patkum in the east, and among the Cheros and 
the Kharwars of Palamau in the west| the second among 
the Bhumijes of the Jungle Mahals and of Dhalbhum in 
the Midnapur district. Where olarity requires the two 
phases are studied separately.
The thesis is in nine chapters. Chapter one deals 
with the penetration of the British into the jungle 
covered hills of Midnapur and Burdwan districts, and 
with the early risings and disturbances in these areas.
Chapter two is concerned with the British connection 
with the Ramgarh district. As in chapter one the 
geography, the anthropology and political history of the 
area are outlined, and the effects of a complex alien 
administration upon a tribal society are examined.
In chapter three the outbreak, progress and 
suppression of the first phase of the unrest, that in
4Chota-Nagpur, Palamatl and Patkura, is described*
Chapter four analyses the circumstances which 
led to that rising*
Chapter five turns to the outbreak and progress 
of the second phase of the unrest, in the Jungle Mahals, 
and the civil and military operations by which order 
was restored are described*
Chapter six again provides an analysis of the 
immediate origins of the rising, and traces the 
Important feuds within the ruling family*
Chapter seven examines the nature of the risings 
by a consideration of the type of victims chosen 
for attack*
Chapter eight deals with the measures taken to 
restore order and to solve the immediate problems 
created by the risings*
Chapter nine reviews the major re-organisation 
of the tribal areas into a Non— Regulation Agency*
r r  .»
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Introduction
This thesis presents a case study of the evil 
consequences of introducing into an undeveloped tribal 
area a complex, legalistic administrative system* That 
system was the regulation-bound Cornwallis system 
developed for the plains areas of the Bengal presidency*
The political9 social and eeonomio impact upon the 
Kols and Bhumijes of that system, Introduced without 
discrimination and without due supervision forms the 
major part of this study* Tribal society was already 
feeling the unhappy effects of the hinduiasatlon and 
alienation of the tribal rajas and zamlndars of the 
area| when tho British penetration began* Both impacts 
were therefore felt at once, and both introduced foreign 
notions and foreign people into the area, in an influx 
which led eventually to the economic ruin of the people*
The tribal unrest of 1&31-1833 was a crude form of 
protest against these changes and these outside influences* 
It was a gesture of despair*
In the course of their risings the tribal people 
were guilty of most heinous crimes, of banditry, murder 
and arson* But they knew no other method of effective 
social protest* "Social banditry, a universal and 
virtually unchanging phenomenon, is little more than
6endemic peasant protest against opposition and povertys 
a cry for vengeance on the rioh and the oppressors, a 
vague dream of some ourb upon them, a righting of 
individual wrongs* Its ambitions are modesti a 
traditional world in which men are justly dealt with*"* 
O ’Malley wrote in 1917 that "one of the most fascinating 
but least known chapters in the history of British rule 
in this part {Bengal Presidency) of India is the
pacification of semi-savage races and the conversion
2of restless marauders into quiet cultivators#1’
O ’Malley’s unspoken assumption was that the exasperating
phenomenon of recurrent unrest in the area was due merely
#
to some inherent tendency in the Kola and other tribal 
people to be marauders and semi-savage# He failed to 
realize that the tribal leaders, whose actions punctuated 
the otherwise smooth story of the development of British 
India, were in their own society the equivalent of 
Hobinhood or Rob Roy, rebels against landlords, 
bailiffs, merchants and usurers who were exploiting the 
tribal people* If their movements were "blind and groping"
* Hobsbawir, Primitive Rebels* 13
2
O ’Malley, Bengal* Bihatr and Orissa* slkkim* 15*1. Also 
see his History of Bengal* Bihar and Orissa under 
British rule* 668.
Vthat was because they were the movements of peasant 
protestants* extremely inarticulate* not knowing how to 
express their legitimate grievances*
But there was such a force in their totest that the 
whole machinery of government in this area had to be over­
hauled* It is this force* ferment or turmoil which makes 
this study significant and interesting*
Not much literature has so far been produced on this 
subject* Most of the 19th century British historians did 
not oven touch upon it in their books* They invariably 
painted Lord Bentluck's Governor-Generalship as a peace­
ful rogira®.1 Those who did mention it were either 
professional historians or the servants of the Bast India 
Company and later of the Crown. Naturally enough*
though they had spent a considerable time in India* and 
unlike Mill* knew some of India#s languages and peoples* 
they were concerned more with what the British did to 
civilise these so-called 'marauders! and 'bandits* who* 
they thought* put obstacles in the path of Pax 
Britannica* than to show how their own culture was 
destroyed by British pressures*
1 of. Ly a 11, Hlae and Expansion of British dominion in India
Boulger* Lord Villiar.i Bentinck
Beveridge * Comurehensive History of India* 1862•
Campbell* Modern India* 1852*
Gleig* History of the British Kmpire* 1830-1835
8Thus# Idward Thornton, who devotes less than three
ku
pages to the first phase of this unrest in the f i w t  volume
of his hook, written in lb4l, describes these tribal
people as rioters^ "These disturbances themselves#" he
asserts# "would scarcely deserve notice# were it not that
they afford additional evidence of the constant tendency
of the wilder portion of the subjects of the British
government in India to break loose from the restraints
of law and order# and to return to a state where the hand
2
of every man is against his neighbour”,
Horace Hayraan Wilson# the great Orientalist who had 
spent a quarter of a century in the Company's service in 
India# dealt with this subject in about a dosien pages in 
his edition of Mill's Hi? ory of British India,^
He also# in a typical imperialist *s or administrator's 
tone# mentions this demonstration ”of turbulence and 
disaff©ction” ”as characteristic of the temper and feelings
If. ,, I
of the people” He admits that the causes of this ^-L^cAl
Hiatorv of British India. T, 20g.
Ibid. 203.
‘ He extended the work of Mill beyond 180J,
4 Vilaon, History of British India. 5th Ed., IX, 220-221.
9are Mnot easy to tnct", and yet he thinks that "when the 
powers of tho (political! agent were curtailed, and the 
troops on the frontier reduced, the ^barbarous tribes 
relapsed into the indulgence of their former p r o p e n s i t i e s 1,1 
He does not take into account any legitimate grievances of 
these tribal people*
True, between 1868 and 1917 E*T*Dalton, V*VI*Hunter, 
Ii*H*hisley, Bradley-Hirt and O fHailey did take an 
interest in the tribal problem* Dalton, Risley and 
Bradley-Birt had served in Chota-Nagpur* But most of 
them wore interested in the ethnographical and 
anthropological aspects only* They did not consult the 
original sources, because they had no wish to present 
an historical account of the area* ?>ven Sir 1*1 *W*Hunter, 
who compiled the Imperial Gazetteer of India and the 
Statistical Account of Bengal and O fMalley who prepared
some of the Bengal District Gazetteers did not devote
more than a few pages to tills subject*
None of them went to the primary sources, not
oven to the contemporary newspapers* They had 
administrator^ prejudices against the tribal people who
A Ibid. 231-232
had occasionally revolted. Moreover, they had only the 
British readers in mind. Since they also looked at things 
with western standards and values, they lacked the sympathy 
towards the tribal agitators.
1 van the Cambridge History of India, "the most solid 
work of British historical scholarship on India", and 
V.A. Smith1 s first "adequate textbook on history of India1* 
paid attention only to the political, diplomatic and 
administrative problems.1 They were concerned only with 
what the British were doing there, and the problem as 
seen from the tribal side is conspicuous by its absence.
Some Indian writers, like S.C.Roy, have tried to 
present the tribal point of view. Their greatest 
limitation was the lack of access to the original 
records. Thus, Roy either quoted from secondary sources 
or relies on folk-lore and hearsay, which though a guide 
to sentiment, is not a safe guide to actual events.
After Independence, and especially in the wake of 
the Centenary celebrations of the Indian mutiny of 
1^57, several Indian writers have tried to discuss this
1 Philips, C.H. ’British Historical Writing on India9,
Jlstener, 8 Bee. 1955*
subject. But they have Invariably treated it as a 
political movement, and as a part of tho general freedom 
struggle against the British. None of them treat the 
tribal versua non-tribal aspect of this unrest, and by 
emphasizing the anti-British aspect of the struggle, they 
produce a lop-sided view of the unrest. None of then have 
consulted the original records and contemporary newspapers. 
Moreover, some of these, being Government-sponsored works, 
do not give adequate sprco to this subject.
Chaudhury has described this unrest in five pages 
as part of the civil disturbances against the British
rule. Ho draws analogies between the Pax Britanniea and
2
Pax Romans. He makes sweeping remarks, e.g. 'tho 
British occupation of Bingliishuia naturally generated 
tensions and fears which eventually merged with the it£ol
'3
rebellion of 1832-32”. But he never cares to distinguish 
between the tribal and non-tribal sentiments. He 
completely ignores the hindulzation of the tribal chiefs
Chaudhury*.S .B., Civil Disturbances during the British
rule. 1955.
Datta, K.K. Unrest against British rule. 1957*
- History of rreedom Movement in Bihar, vol.1,1957
biwar, R.fit. (ed. ). Bihar through the Ages. 1958.
Roychondbury, P.C., Eighteen Eiftysoven in?iuhota Nagpur. 1957
2
Chaudbury, Civil disturbances. ‘Approach to the subject*.
12
and ita repercussions* Moreovert he does not take into
(ft
account the moods and tendencies3 these simple tribal
folk, preferring to follow purely Marxist lines*
In a word, no objective and complete treatment of
the subject has been undertaken so far. This thesis
aims to present a more exact and balanced picture, in
a complete form* It is hoped that both the extremes
of derision and over-patriotisn will be avoidedt in the
British historical writing on the subject words like
’marauder’, ’lower order’, ’bandit*, chuar etc. vie with
one another, while in the recent Indian works ’gallant
story’, ’hero’, etc*, are frequently used*
It is perhaps unusual, but not necessarily improper,
to add here a personal note* My Interest in the tribal
unrest was aroused very early in my childhood, because
ray village has been a storm-centre of such a struggle
between the tribal (Santhal and Oraon) tillers of the
soil and the non-tribal landlords*^ Later in my college
2
days I became interested in the ’Jharkhand* and the Tana
3
Bhagat’ movement of Chota-Nagpur. Then during the
In 1939 several non-tribal people wore killed in a clash 
with the Santhals*
2
A separatist movement under Jaipal Singh, demanding a 
separate state*
3
It has a religious background* Another recent movement
is the Kharwar movement* Only three years back one Phetal 
Singh of the Palamau district, with an idea of forming
a separate Kharwar pocket, created terror in the area 
before he was arrested and sentenced to three years’ 
imprisonment *
13
preparation of the History of Freedom Movement in Bihar 
X came across materials dealing with the area and in 
1957“1959 i published three papers*
The period chosen* as will be seen, does not lack 
for materials t it also does not lack importance or a 
coherent unity of theme. In X83I what is now Chota- 
Nagpur did not exist p.& an administrative unit, its 
territories were parcelled out among half a dosson 
jurisdictions - and in all of them received but scant 
attention* Yet by 1831 tho grievances of the tribal 
people in all the districts were approaching flash point 
- a casual incident might lead to an oxx>lo»ion* Xn tho 
next two years, the explosion having taken place first 
in Chota-Nagpur and then in the Jungle Mahals, the Bengal 
administration was compelled not only to take action to 
restore order, but also to think about the causes of the 
unrest* In 183**, with order restored, a radical 
administrative reorganization took place, by which a 
new unit, the South-West Frontier Agency, was created 
from previously scattered districts, and a now Non- 
Regulation, paternalist government was installed*
Thereafter for soro© twenty years the area knew a 
hitherto unaccustomed peace under a sympathetic 
dministrution* Had that care for tribal interests been
14
maintained9 had the lessons of the outbreak been 
truly learnt9 the agrarian disturbances of the second 
half of the 19th century might well have been avoided.
The use of words like *aboriginalf9 'scheduled 
tribes', etc*, has been purposely avoided, because some 
of them re words of derision, while others have been 
recently coined, and cannot be applied to the people who 
rose in 1831-1833#
For the sake of an independent9 critical and 
complete study9 the Government records, private papers9 
newspapers and maf;aP5ines have been used in oombination9 
and it is hoped that a complete and satisfactory picture 
and a revaluation of the policies and events of this 
period may have emerged. It may, in course of time, 




The Jungle Mahals and Dhalbum in 
the Early British Period,
The tragic drama to he described in this thesis was 
enacted on what geographers call the Chota-Nagpur plateau.
This plateau,'1' in effect an extension of the great Vindhyan 
range, rises from some eight or ten hundred feet in the south­
east to a height of three thousand six hundred feet in the 
west, with occasional peaks such as Parasnath re aching well 
over four thousand feet. It is a temperate area of hills and
p
valleys densely clothed with forest - from which it received 
the name 'Jharkhand', the forest tract. The rugged hills and 
dense forests, the precipitous approaches to the occasional 
difficult passes^ make the country a natural fortress: "the 
approaches to it from the North, North-West, East and South, 
are exceedingly precipitous, the paths winding up defiles
1. Imperial Gazetteer of India, 3rd Ed,, X, 328-329: f,The 
word 'plateau ^ is used, for want of a better designation, 
for this tract of elevated country, and is not intended to 
imply that the area referred to forms an open table-land 
like that to the north of Cape Colony. There are three 
plateaux in the stricter acceptation of the term .... Else­
where the country is often very broken, and numerous 
ranges or grounds of steep hills are intersected by deep 
ravines and occasionally by open valleys.M
2. Sir J. HouLton, Bihar, 126: "Chota-Nagpur can fairly claim 
to be one of the most attractive parts of the Indian penin­
sula. Por five or six months of the year, from October 
onwards, the days are sunny ... and the nights cool ....
In April and May the temperature may pass the 100 mark, 
but the nights are much cooler than in the plains,.,"
3* A. Drummond in his manuscript Statistical Account of the 
Hazaribagh Division P.l, writes "These passes, inter­
secting more or less every path of approach, renders access 
to the territory extremely difficult, offering abundant 
impediment to the progress of any regular invading 
military force."
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which a handful of resolute men could hold against hosts of 
invaders.1,1
The actors on this stage were tribal peoples who had
2
here found 1 a secure asylum". Its inviolability they main­
tained throughout the period of Hindu and Muslim empires.
Thus Chaitanya, the great Vaishnava apostle of Bengal, pass­
ing through the area in 1509* described the tribal folk as 
"pirates gathered on the rivers and robbers on the land."^ 
Tavernier wrote of his journey from Rohtasgarh to Sambhalpur 
(in the 1640fs)s "These thirty Coss traverse forests which 
are dangerous, because the thieves ... attack them [the trav­
ellers and merchants] sometimes for the purpose of murdering
4 5them.1 The expeditions against the area by Sher Shah
and by Akbar and his successors never completely subjugated
£
the area. The political disorders which accompanied the 
break-up of the Mughal empire at the hands of Afghans and 
Marathas made any further attempt to subdue the plateau area 
impossible, and indeed laid the surrounding districts open 
to the depredations of the hill tribes. Thus in Ali Vardi 
Khan's day they used his preoccupation with Maratha incur­
sions to descend from the hills and interrupt the trade
1. E.T.Dalton, Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal, 164.
2. Ibid. 163.
3. 1). G, Midnap ore , 22.
4. Trans 1. V.Ball, Tavernier*s Travels,. II.
5. D. Gr.Ranchi, 25.
6. JoC.Price, Notes on the History of Midnapore, 68, 
describes the efforts of Todar Mai to curb the hill 
people. Also see G-okhale, Manbhum Settlement Report,
Para.35.
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■between Bengal and the west,"1, and as late as 1796 the 
English Magistrate at Burdwan had to ask for additional 
troops to he posted to protect the Bishnupur district 
"against banditti coining down the passes" from ohhatna
and other parganas and "jungles westward of Bishenpore
2
Districts."
As the power of the East India Company was extended 
in the late eighteenth century the first contacts were made 
with the tribal peoples of the plateau area. In 1760 the 
Company acquired from Mir Kasim the territories later to be 
known as the Jungle Mahals, and Dhalbhum in the Midnapur 
district. But no attempt was made to exert political control 
over the western part of the new acquisitions, valued though 
they were for their trade in silk, lac and other jungle 
products. Rather the chiefs, confident in the strength of 
their hills, and their mud-forts, refused to pay any revenue 
to the East India Company.
In 1765 the grant by Emperor Shah Alam II of the 
Diwani of Bihar, Bengal and Orissa confirmed the Company^ 
rights over the area granted by Mir Kasim, and added to the 
aompany's territories Chota-Nagpur with its dependent 
parganas,together with the other tribal areas, Ramgarh, 
Palamau and Pachet, which had been included within the bound­
aries of the Mughal sub.ah of Bihar.
1. In 1767 the Midnapur resident wrote that these Jungle zam- 
indars obstructed the commerce between Bengal and "the 
districts westward of the hills": Graham to Pergusson,
30 Jan. 1767, Pirminger, Midnapur Pist. Records, I, No.109.
2. Burdwan Magistrate to Govt., 12 Jan.1796, Seng. Cr.Judl. 
Cons. 27 of 5 Peb. 1796 /128n
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It was in 1767 that the British penetration of the
hill areas "began, when Graham, the Resident at Midnapur, with
Calcutta*s approval,'*' despatched a military force under
Ensign Fergusson to subjugate the jungle zamindars to the
west of Midnapur. He was instructed not only to secure repara-
_ 2
tions for robberies committed by the zamindar of Phulkusma, 
but to begin the process of assessing the jungle districts 
to revenue,^
His task was not an easy one. He had to begin by
4
attacking and capturing the fort of the Jhargram chief.
Certain of the zamindars then submitted - Ramgarh, Samkakulia
(Lalgarh, Jambani and Jatbani (Silda),^ and he was able to
push on to Balarampur thana and secure further submissions^
6from the chiefs of Amainagar (Ambikanagar) Supur, Manbhum, 
Chhatna, Barabhum, Raipur and Phulkusma, even though the last
7
two had long defied the Burdwan authorities. But though 
they submitted in the presence of military force, several of 
them had put forward a variety of reasons for not paying 
revenue. Thus the Ambikanagar Chief had pleaded that his 
country had been twice plundered, first by a freebooter
1. HoVerelst to J.Graham, Midnapur Resident, 17 March 1766, 
Pirminger, op^cit. No.60.
2* Graham to Fergusson, 4 Feb. 1767, Ibid.No. 117.
3. Graham to Fergusson, 30 Jan. 1767, Ibid.No. 109.
4. Fergusson to Graham, 7 Feb. 1767, Ibid. No.120.
5. Fergusson to Graham, 14 Feb. 1767«“TT5Td. Nos. 124-125 2 
Total revenue assessed was Rs.2814-11-6.
6. Fergusson to Graham, 20 Feb. 1767, Ibid. No.129. Fergusson 
sent Pan (betel) as a token of friendship to these
three chiefs: Ibid, No.130.
7. Fergusson to Graham, 6 March 1767, Ibid.No.139: Final 
settlement with these five zamindars.
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named Damodar Singh and then by the Company's troops which 
had been sent to capture him. The Barabhum zamindar had 
pleaded a like poverty caused by the incursion of the Com­
pany's sepoys, who, acting on behalf of his rival the Pachet 
raja, had plundered his villages. (Fergusson was in fact 
shocked to see the ill effects of the wanton plundering of 
the suspects' property by the troops which had been sent
from Bishnupur in pursuit of Damodar Singh* The ryots every-
3
where fled from their villages as he and his troops advanced). 
By the beginning of March Fergus son had reached Supur in 
safety and had secured the nominal submission of the zamin­
dars along the line of his advance* For the moment he could 
breathe easily. As he wrote to G-raham at Midnapur, "... to 
have pursued each separately would have been a work of time, 
and to have divided my force would have rendered my success 
doubtful, as none of those zemindars by our best intelligence
have less than 2,000 people in their pergunnaas whose trade 
4is war."
Fergusson was conscious, however, that the tribal 
chiefs had by no means been thoroughly subdued. Unless a 
permanent force were established in the area, the collection 
of the revenue would be difficult, even though what they had . 
agreed to pay was little more than a nominal tribute than a
1. Fergusson to G-raham, 20 Feb. [incorrectly printed as 10 
Feb.] 1767, Ibid.No.129.
2. Ibid. No.129*
3. Tergusson to G-. Vans it tart, 26 Jan. 1768, Midnapur Dist. 
Records, II, No.299.
4. Fergusson to Graham, 6 March 1767, Midnapur Dist*Records, I 
No.139.
5. Fergusson to Graham, 14 March 1767, Ibid. No.150.
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regular revenue settlement. (As the terms of their
Kabuliats show, none of them submitted any detailed accounts
of their assets before the revenue demand was fixed). He
hoped, however, that they might be persuaded to adopt a more
settled life: "by trading in these articles [forest products
such as lac], and by tilling their lands" he hoped they might
benefit themselves and lead a happier life "than by addict-
2
ing themselves to theft and robbery", as they were doing.
Once they had changed their ways he had good hopes of in­
creasing the revenue and very considerably too "to judge from 
the face of the country and appearance of the people."
Meanwhile he was faced by the refusal of the chief of 
Ghatshila (Dhalbhum) to submit*^ The chief had been busy 
preparing for a struggle, while Pergusson was advancing to 
Supur, and he had destroyed the roads and felled trees to
R
block the passes leading to his zamindari, Moreover, he 
had been joined by Damodar Singh, that Hob Roy of the area, 
and other tribal chiefs. When Pergusson sent his envoys to 
the raja they were turned back by a force of 150 bowmen. He 
had, therefore, to fight his way through some 16 miles of
1. The author of the Manbhum Settlement Report, Para.37, 
notes that "Barahathum and other estates which were first 
assessed got off very lightly, whereas Jhalda, Katras, 
Jharia, Nawagarh and other estates which were taken .up 
later on when the British control had been considerably 
strengthened, had to submit to a comparatively heavy 
assessment." This settlement was confirmed by Higginson 
in 1776.
2. Pergusson to Graham, 14 Peb. 1767* Pirminger, op.cit.I, 
No.124.
3* Pergusson to Graham, 14 March 1767, Ibid, Ho.150.
4. Pergusson to Graham, 14 Peb. 1767, No.124.
5. Pergusson to Graham, 16 Peb. 1767, Ibid. No.127.
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jungle, and storm the Ghatshila fort (22 March 1767).^ Even
then the raja did not submit, hut turned into the hills
leaving Pergusson with the difficult task of managing the
estate: "There are none of the zemindars along with me who
will undertake the charge of this purguna, notwithstanding
(from the froward ...[and] barbarous conduct of the Run-away)
2
the probability of gaining over the country people." Per­
gusson was determined not to re-install the runaway zamindar- 
he had been faithless to treaties, a great disturber of peace 
and "a great nuisance to his neighbours.
Early in April Pergusson surprised the Ghatshila zam- 
indar, took the old man prisoner and sent him under heavy 
escort to Midnapur.^- In his place he installed his nephew 
Jagannath Dhal,^ thinking the problem thereby solved. But by 
August Pergusson had to report the rebellion of the nephew, 
and the acts of social banditry of other "robber chiefs" of 
the area. He realized that strong measures would be necess­
ary, and though with the approach of the rains the grass was
1. Pergusson to Graham, 22 March 1767, Ibid No.157. On 4 
April 1767 (Ibid. No.167) he described the fort as "situa­
ted on a plain surrounded with jungle. Its area nearly 
1158 square feet* It has a rampart of very bad earth, or 
rather gravel..., but the ditch is excellent, being forty 
two feet wide and 18 feet high to the level without
2. Pergusson to Graham, 22 March 1767, Ibid. No.157*
3. Pergusson to Graham, 2-2 March 1767, Ibid. No. 158.
4. Pergusson to Vansittart, the Resident, 9 April 1767, Ibid.
No.171.
5. Ibid.No.171. On 20 Peb. 1767 (Ibid.No.129) he had reported 
that he wanted to take advantage of the rift between the 
Ghatshila zamindar and his nephew and heir. Then on 24 
March he had written that many people in Ghatshila had 
assured him that they would support the nephew if he was 
installed. (Ibid. No.159.)
6. Pergusson to Vansittart, 2 Aug. 1767, Ibid. No.235.
long through which his army and guns had to march, the bow­
men galled the soldiers, and the water in the fort-ditch at 
Ghatshila rendered an entrance into the fort difficult,^" with
two companies of troops he captured the fort, and the
2zamindar surrendered*
This surrender at Ghatshila in August 1767, had been 
preceded by the spontaneous coming in of the zamindars of 
Patkum and Singhbhum, and of the Chhatna zamindar, All three 
were anxious to secure British protection against the 
depredations of their neighbours, indeed the Chhatna zamindar 
declared that he would rather "quit the country and starve 
than become a vessel [sic] of Patchaet.""^ Pergusson was ready, 
by granting protection to promote "the plan of civilizing and 
familiarizing the country people to our Government," the more 
readily in Chhatna because the inhabitants were, in compar­
ison with their neighbours, as he put it, " a polished set,
few or no Pikes [paik or ghatwals], abundance of riots [ryots]
4
and petty merchants."
Pergusson remained settling western Midnapur for the 
rest of 1767, feeling some confidence that matters were at 
last improving. 1768, however, showed how wrong he had been.
In January he had to resettle Manbhum. In Chhatna he had 
great difficulty in collecting the revenue because there the 
taluks were full of the blood and marriage relations of the
1. Ibid.No.235.
2. Pergusson to .Vansittart, 22 Aug.1767, Ibid. No.246.
3. Pergusson to Vansittart, 7 June,1767, Ihld. No.202.
4. Pergusson to Vansittart, 26 Jan.1768, Midnapur Dist. 
Records,II, No.299.
5. Pergusson to Vansittart, 6 Jan.1768, Ibid. No.288.
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zamindar- who had rarely paid revenues, and resisted even the 
lightest assessment. The vakil, whose formal promises on the 
revenue collections had been broken, was subjected to corpor­
al punishment, the diwan had to give a written promise, the 
zamindar himself was severely admonished.'*" To cap all, in 
mid-1768 trouble was renewed in Ghatshila. The raja, in
arrears, evaded compliance with the residents* commands and
2
again prepared to bid for independence.
Two companies of sepoys were despatched to re-establish 
British authority, and remove the advisers of the zamindar,
The attempt to surprise the raja failed, the paiks remained 
in arms, while the Ghatshila chief, with all his principal 
sardars took refuge some twenty kos from his fort.^ His 
dependant chiefs followed his example, and Captain Morgan 
was soon declaring, of the most troublesome of these, ,!the 
Dampara fellow, '* a bad character by all reports, **I intend
A
his head shall grace the entrance of this fort.1*
The threat was easier made than executed. One 
sergeant's detachment sent to seize the petty zamindar of 
Chuckolea (chukulLa )found the path heavily stockaded and used 
half their ammunition in forcing the obstructions. Other 
bodies of troops were similarly harassed, and their head­
quarters, the Narsinggarh fort, was several times attacked,
1, Pergusson to Vansittart, 26 Jan.1768, Ibid. No.299*
2, Vansittart to R.Becher, Coll.General, 1 June 1768,Ibid.
No,348, ----
3. C,Morgan to Vansittart, 8 July 1768f Ibid. No.359,
4. Ibid,He also realized the difficulty of his_tasks"It is 
sill a joke to talk <?f licking th§se jungle Pellpws: they 
have not the least idea of righting, they are like a par­
cel of wasps: they endeavour to sting you with their
arrows, and then fly off. It is impossible almost to kill 
any of them, as they always keep at a great distance and 
fling their arrows at you..."
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By July Morgan was sending for one of the new six-pounders
to overawe the rebels
Neither military action, nor the supercession of the
Ghatshila Raja Jagannath Dhal by his brother Nimu Dhal,
2
ordered by Vansittart, the Midnapur Resident, proved of much 
use. The zamindars drove their cattle before them into the 
jungle, and from behind the swollen rivers were able to defy 
the troops, who found provisions almost impossible to obtain. 
By late July Morgan had to admit that he was finding it a 
more difficult job to settle the country, than it was at 
first to conquer it, and was suggesting that it might be 
better to re-instate Jagannath Dhal. His younger brother had 
not the necessary authority to collect the revenues, the sar- 
dars would not come in out of fear, and with rivers 
unfordable it was impossible to coerce them. ^ "I wish to 
God," Morgan wrote, '‘this business was over, for I am really 
tired of doing nothing, and my poor sepoys fall sick contin­
ually. I have now above sixty men ill of fever. One of my 
lascars died a day or two ago, and Mr. Plint is very ill, be
so good as to send me a large quantity of ginger, as I find
A
tea made out of it to be very good for the sickmen. "
The difficulties were very greatt Morgan rightly fore­
saw that further military operations would send the people
5
of the country running "to the Devil," and so make a revenue
1. Ibid. No.359.
2. Vansittart to Becher, Coll.General, 28 July 1768, Ibid.
No.372.
3. Morgan to Vansittart, 16 July 1768, Ibid. No.368.
4. Morgan to Vansittart, 25 July 1768, Ibid. No.374*
5# Morgan to Vansittart, 30 July 1768, Tbid. No.376.
settlement still more difficult to achieve, and that if the 
sardars were behind the old raja it would be many months1 
work, in such difficult country, to bring them in. The 
Marathas were making suspicious moves, and the Bamanghati 
zamindar, and his overlord the Raja of Mayurbhanj were sup­
porting the Ghatshila Chief,^ Nevertheless Morgan persisted 
with his military operations, ferried three of his five com­
panies over the river in a boat which leaked profusely, set
his cavalry - a shocking set of dogs - in pursuit, ignored
2the monsoon, the jungle, the difficulty with provisions, 
and by the end of September he had restored order in the 
estate. Even so when Vansittart visited the western parganas 
early in 1769 he found them very sparsely inhabited and their 
agriculture neglected.^
There followed almost a year of calm in the jungle 
parganas - a year’s lull before the storm. Towards the end of 
1769, the chug?s, (tribal people, especially Bhumijes ) living 
between the parganas of Dhalbhum and Barabhum, were in tur­
moil and Vansittart had to send Lt, Nun with three companies 
of sepoys to reduce them.^ Then the chuars of Pachet and 
Patkum in the north and of Singhbhum in the south-west also 
joined the insurgents, A body of about 5,000 chuars invaded 
Ghatshila and the zamindar (a protege' of the British) and the
1. Morgan to Vansittart, 6 Aug, 1768, Ibid. No.379.
2. Morgan to Vansittart, 11 Aug. 1768^ Ibid. No,383.
3. Vansittart to J. Alexander, Coll.General,. 10 April 1769, 
Ibid. No.447.
4. Vansittart to C. Russell, Coll.General, 14 Dec, 176 9,
Ibid. No.499.
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Company1s sepoys stationed there were obliged to retire to 
the Narsinggarh fort. Lt. Nun and Capt. Forbes with five com­
panies of sepoys and two small field pieces at last drove 
them into the hills with considerable loss.^
The resident was so much irritated by these episodes 
that he ordered the two military officers not to stop before 
the business was completed* Subla Singh, the jagirdar of
Koilapal, one of the most obstinate chuar chiefs, was to be
2seized and hanged upon the spot as an example*
In January 1770 it seemed that the area was pacified*
Lt* Nun left Barabhum for Ambikanagar, detaining some sepoys
in Barabhum to act -under the orders of the Balrampur
thanadar* Capt* Forbes, too, was ordered to leave Haldipokhar,
and the collector general was informed that the disturbances
in the jungle would very soon be entirely stopped*^
But only a few days after this, Nunfs sepoys were
surprised among the hills and jungles by the chuars* A
subadar, a sergeant and about twenty sepoys were killed and
Lt. Nun, another subadar and forty sepoys, though wounded,
only saved themselves by flight* A few days later, a party
of sepoys stationed by Captain Forbes at Kochang, two kos
from Haldipokhar, was cut off, and Capt* Forbes himself was
greatly harassed in the hills.4
Since the troops in the field were almost as hard hit
1* Vansittart to C,Russell, 24 Dec*1769, Ibid*No*503»
2* Vansittart to Lt.Nun, 8 Jan* 1770, Ibid. No*509«
3. Vansittart to Capt* Forbes, 8 Jan* 1770, Ibid* No*510.
Vansittart to C.Russell, 14 Jan* 1770, Ibid* No*511»
4* Vansittart to C. Russell, 19 Jan. l770*“T^id. No.512*
27
by sickness as by the activities of the chuars» two further 
companies were marched to Haldipokhar under a Lt* Goodyar 
to restore order there.'*’ In all six and a half companies 
were now engaged, and the chuars seemed inclined to submit, 
returning the gun and certain matchlocks seized from Nun*s 
party*
The resident, however, wanted to reduce the rebels
to complete obedience before making peace. He therefore
ordered a permanent posting of sepoys in Barabhum, and the
taking of a muchalaka or guarantee from the zamindar that he
2
would accept responsibility for any future disturbances*
He also toyed with the idea of annexing Kochang. But
Peiarce, the Assistant to the next Resident, gave this up
because it would encroach upon the overlord rights of the
independent Raja of Mayurbhanj. He persuaded the Mayurbhanj
Raja, however, himself to depose the Kochang chief, appoint-
4ing the zamindar of Bamanghati in his place. The zamindar 
was to be answerable for any incursions into Ghatshila from 
his side, while the raja was to settle and collect the 
revenuea
Certain of the sardars and jagirdars remained, how­
ever, undaunted, and the Midnapur authorities had for years 
to contend with such chuars as Subla Singh of Koilapal, with 
Samangunjan, the Sardar of Dhadka in Barabhum pargana, and
1. Vansittart to C.L Russell, 15 Feb. 1770, Ibid. No.523.
2. Vansittart to Lt. Nun, 31 March 1770, Ibid. No.533.
3. Vansittart to G. D. Goodyar, 7 Feb. 1770T""TBid. No. 520.
4. J. Peiarce [probably] to Goodyar, 8 April 1770, Ibid. 
No.536.
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with Jagannath Pater, the Dampara Sardar in Ghatshila, hacked
1
as they were hy the violent spirit of the trihal people.
In the end it he came evident that punitive expeditions alone 
could not solve the problem, and the Company turned to the 
creation of a system of forts and permanent police posts for 
a solution.
So, while small parties, strengthened perhaps hy a
couple of two-pounders pursued the chuar leaders, small forts
were constructed, from early in 1771, to hold the cleared 
(A)areas; ' This had its effect upon the rebels, and in January
1771 Suhla Singh of Koilapal sounded Lt. Goodyar, asking if
2
his life would he spared, should he surrender. Nothing came 
of his query, or of Goodyar's suggestion that he should he 
spared, because it soon became clear that the chuars were 
busy preparing an ambush for him. Nevertheless the fact that 
the building of a fort had led to parleys about peace encour-
1. Edward Baber to Goodyar, 30 Nov. 1770, Midnapur List. 
Records, IV, No.70. Jagannath Pater the Dampara chief 
was probably the father of Baijnath Singh and grandfather 
of Raghunath Singh who rebelled in 1798-1810 and 1832-33 
respectively.
2. Goodyar to E.Baber, 3 Jan. 1771* Midnapur Dist. Records,
III, No.1.
(A) Prom Doom Jure, 29 Jan. 1771 [No name, probably from 
Goodyar], Ibid. No*9~
"I have made the walls of the trunk of trees from ten to 
twenty two inches in circumference and twelve feet long 
two feet of which is sunk into the Earth in the following 
manner o oo oo o with a distance between each pile for 
o o o
pointing a musket". He also wanted to have a parapet of 
earth about five feet or more for the defendants to stand 
on and to have small barracks for the sepoys in the rains 
and to hold grain.
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Situation of the strongholds of the chuars:-
Dampara 7 Koa. South 















Dhadka 4 Kos [Samangunjan]
Doorr Brabhum 8 Kos
West
Manbhum 7 Kos.
Amaina^r five Kos 
North
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aged Baber, the Midnapur resident to propose further con­
struction. To Goodyar he expressed his conviction that in
such strong points lay the answer; Mthey will never be
quiet unless troops constantly remain in those parts and I
am strongly inclined towards building these small Tannaos
[thanas] sufficient to contain sixty seapoys [sepoys] each
who should reside there and who then be [. ..] quell any
disturbance in its infancy. But these Tannas should be
erected in such places as would keep these fellows most in
awe and that the seapoys might soon march to each others
1
assistance.,," The thanadar of Narsinggarh also expressed
his opinion to Goodyar that if new thanas were established
they would strike terror into the hearts of the chuars.who
2
were a scourge to Ghatshila, Barabhum, and Manbhum,
Even after the stockaded forts had been built, the 
problem remained of catching the rebel leaders. Baber put 
the difficulties very clearly in a letter to Goodyar: "You 
have an ambush to expect every mile you march - If it is 
possible to lay hold of the ringleaders of these disturb* 
ances I would have you do it by all me[ans] for without a 
severe example I am afraid they will never be quiet - I 
should be very loth to trust any of these men with each
1. Baber to Goodyar, 9 Jan. 1771# Midnapur Dist.Records, IV, 
No.79#
2. Goodyar to Baber, 23 Jan, 1771# Midnapur Dist. Records IIIV 
No.8.
3i
others country, as it appears to me there is not a pin to 
share amongst them - However policy often dictates that one 
scroundrel [sic] is to be preferred to a n o t h e r.Never­
theless, operating from his new bases Goodyar did succeed 
in surprising a large number of chuars - and described most 
graphically how "they began to dance and jump like furies,
to escape the shot and arrows of each other at the .same
2
time shouting and making a noise.1 Goodyar thus succeeded 
in pacifying the thanas for some time, and a party of sepoys 
were posted at Dumjiri to maintain the tranquillity.
The tranquillity was of course a comparative state, 
and one which fairly regularly varied with the agricultural 
season. Prom seed sowing to harvest the tranquillity was 
almost absolute, but from harvest until seed-time there was 
a period when adventure was tempting. This the Midnapur 
resident explained when reporting a fresh wave of disturb­
ances in Ghatshila, caused by renewed attacks of Jagannath 
Dhal upon his usurper brother (who had been installed by 
Vansittart) in February 1773.^ He said to the Governor 
Warren Hastings, "You will perhaps ask, Sir, how these 
people came not to be under better subjection after having 
been reduced so long - it is principally owing to the nature 
of the country which from its woods Wous[sic] and mountains
1. Baber to Goodyar, 11 Feb. 1771# Midnapur Dist. Records,IV,
No.85.
2. Goodyar to Baber, 24 Feb. 1771. Midnapur Dist.Records,
III, No.11.
3. Baber to Warren Hastings, 6 Feb.1773# Midnapur Dist. 
Records, IV, No.163.
is almost inaccessable [sic]. As soon as the harvest is 
gathered in they carry their grain to the tops of the hills 
or lodge it in other fortresses that are impregnable so 
that whenever they are pursued by a superior force they 
retire to these places where they are quite secure and bid 
defiance to any attack that can be made against them*
He described the western Jungles as; "an extent of country 
of about 80 miles in length and 60 in breadth. On the east 
it is bounded by Midnapore on the west by Singboom - on the 
north by Pacheet and on the south by Mohurbunge - there is 
very little land cultivated in this whole extent and very 
disproportionate part of it capable of cultivation [the 
soil] is very rocky - the country is mountainous and over- 
sprea[,..] with thick woods which render it in many places 
utterly impassable it has always been annexed in the pro­
vince of Midnapore but from its situation it was never 
greatly regarded in the Nabobs Goverment [sic] and the 
Zemindars sometimes paid their rents or rather tributes and 
sometimes not - ....This territory is divided into two 
Tannahs one called Tann[.] Bulrampore and the other Tanna 
Janpore the form[..] is subdivided into nine Purgannas and 
the latter into eight and each of these is governed by a 
Zemindar who is dignified amongst his Ryots with the title
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of Rajah - These zemindars are mere freebooters who plunder
their neighbours and one another and their tenants are a
banditti whom they chiefly emplo[..] in these outrages -
These depredations keep the zemindars and their tenants
continually in arms for after the harvest is gathered in
there is scarcely one of them who does not call his Ryotts
to his standard either to defend his own property or attack
his neighbours - the effects of this ... feudal anarchy are
that the Revenue is very precarious - The zemindars are
1
refractory and the inhabitants rude and ungovernable."
The 1773 Ghatshila disturbances were eventually 
quelled, the ryots reinstated in the possession of their
p
fields, and new troop dispositions arranged for the rains, 
with companies at Narsinggarh, Haldipokhar and Manbhum.
But early in 1774 the season for disturbances brought 
further campaigns, for Jagannath Dhal laid waste the major 
portion of Dhalbhum*^ The chuars constantly fought against 
the troops. Lt. Smith wrote from Haldipokhar on 6 May,
"I am likewise informed that the hill [..]llows in the
5
whole environs have agreed to* join [... -Jaganath Pater ^  or
1. Ibid. No.163.
2. Samuel Lewis, Resident,to Warren Hastings, 7 June 1773, 
Ibid. No.204.
3. lewis to Lt.Hawkins, 13 Aug. 1773» Ibid. No.217.
Also J.Dunn to Lewis, Manbhum, 27 Sept. 1773, Midnapur 
List. Records, III, No.219.
4. v3mith, commanding at Haldipokhar, to Lewis, 10 April 
1774, Ibid. No.325.
5. Jagannath Pater was the Sardar Ghatwal of Dampara a 
supporter and dependant of Jagannath Dhal.
act] in concert with him, to drive our sepoys out of every
part of the country , my ambition is so much exposed that
two or three enterprizing fellows, in a dark night, might
destroy it, maugre the utmost diligence of centries [sic];
(in which case this detachment must be cut off; for these
people being as brave as our sepoys their numbers must
prevail, when they cannot be kept at a distance; their
arrows being as superior to bayonets, as muskets are to
arrows), I have set about building a secure place for it;
when I shall have nothing to ...[fear] (unless being starved)
from all the numbers ...[that] may be brought against me„M^
In fact, Jagannath Dhal hung over this part of the jungly
areas like a dark cloud, so that survey parties could not
2
complete their work and the Midnapur authorities could not
realize their revenues from Ghatshila, Lt,Smith rightly
wrote: "Unless Jagarnot Doll is subdued, [,,] the Honble
Company can never receive an anna from this side [of] the
Soubonrika [Subarnarekha] river, , till he is [raja again],
he will never cease destroying this country with fire and 
■3
sword,
1. Smith to Lewis, 6 May 1774, Midnapur Dist, Records, III, 
No.339.
2. Prom 1772 to 1774 the survey operations in these parganas 
were constantly opposed, even though troops - two wEoIe 
companies in 1774 - accompanied the survey party. Even 
with such an escort the surveyor was not safe, as the 
jungle fellows attacked them at every step between Bara­
bhum and Manbhum and they could not procure provisions. 
[Young] to S.Lewis*, 2[22?] April 1774, Ibid. No,335.
3. Smith to Lewis, 6 May 1774, Ibid.No,339.
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This was a very sensible piece of advice. The attach­
ment of the tribal people to their chief, had been proved 
beyond doubt. They would not tolerate the imposition of a 
chief by the British authorities. The Midnapur authorities, 
therefore, yielded. Jagannath was re-installed on the throne 
in 1777, and he agreed to pay Rs.%000 for the first year, 
Rs.3,000 the second year and Rs.4,000 the third.^ (This
p
settlement was continued under the Decennial Settlement.)
It is, perhaps, unnecessary to give further instances 
of the political and military difficulties which faced the 
East India Company when it attempted to enforce the author­
ity it had received by the grant of the Diwani in 1765, or of 
the tedious, frequently repeated little campaigns by which 
the Company^ strength was gradually impressed upon the 
inhabitants of the Jungle Mahals. The difficulties of the 
country were obviously very great, but these practical diffi­
culties were aggravated by the many changes in the frame­
work of the administration to which the mahals were subjected, 
and by the unsuitability of the police and revenue systems 
applied to the area. In the remainder of this chapter each 
of these difficulties will be reviewed in some detail.
The topography of the whole area studied in this 
thesis has already been briefly surveyed and the mountainous, 
forested nature of the whole can be found repeated in
1. D. G-. Singhbhum, 180.
2. Beng, Rev, Cons. 19 of 27 March 1794 (53>
Manbhum Division, though on a lesser scale. Manbhum forms 
in fact the last step in the descent from the elevated 
plateau of Chota Nagpur, to the south. The highest peaks in 
the district are found in the Dalma range, in the extreme 
south, where a height of 3y407 feet is reached.'*' Dropping 
away to the north there are met in succession the Bagmundi 
or Ajodhya range, 2000 feet high, which forms the water­
shed between the Subarnarekha and Kasai rivers, then an out­
line of the Hazaribagh plateau, forming the watershed 
between the Kasai and the Damodar, and finally a double spur 
of hills running in from near Parasnath.
Though today, "thanks to the wasteful and improvident 
methods followed by the landlords and the raiyats, jungle
p
has practically disappeared, except in the extreme south," 
in the 18th and early 19th centuries, Manbhum was still 
thickly forested with sal (teak). Thus,in 1773 it was 
described as "mountainous and overspread with thick woods, 
which render it in many places utterly i m p a s s a b l e Even 
in 1800, after thirty-five years of British rule, it was 
reported that two-thirds of Midnapur consisted of jungle,
4
the greater part of which was uninhabited and inaccessible.
It has already been seen what obstacles such a terrain 
presented to the British administrators and their forces.
1. Gokhale, Manbhum Settlement Report, Para.5.
2. Ibid. Para,8.




But the natural difficulties were not the only odds. OfMalley 
has written: "What with the inroads, or the threatened in­
roads, of the Marathas and of the levies of the Mayurbhanj 
Raja, the forcible exactions of armed Sannyasis and Fakirs, 
the raids of the aboriginal tribes (generally known as 
chuars ), and the turbulence of the jungle chiefs and their
adherents, the country, more especially to the west and
1south, was continually disturbed.1 We must also note the 
constant changes in jurisdiction under the company as another 
disturbing factor* The Jungle Mahals came under the Company 
in 1767, as dependencies of the zamindari of Midnapur, then 
in the hands of a rani.^ From 1764 to 1774, therefore, it 
was the Midnapur resident who exercised control over the mil­
itary forces stationed there, and the police thanas of Jan- 
pur and Balrampur. In 1774, however, superintendence was
*31
transferred to the Provincial Council of Burdwan. When in 
1778 Midnapur was separated from Burdwan and made a separate
4
collectorate, control reverted to Midnapur* Minor shifts 
also took place within the area - thus Phulkusma and Raipur, 
though settled by Fergus son under the orders of the Midnapur 
resident, were included in Burdwan by 1772 - and to this 
district Shamsundarpur was also added. In 1783, Bogree, 
until then a part of Burdwan, became a separate collectorate,
1. Ibid. 35.
2. Price, op.cit* 29.
3. Ibid. 9.
4. Ibid.
5. TBId, 30. In Jan. 1794 Raipur and Shamsundarpur were re- 
transferred to Midnapur, See Board of Revenue to Midnapur 
collector, 7 Jan.1794, Hunter, Beng. Ms.Records,II,No.3330*
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but in 1795 it was transferred to Midnapur, though one 
thana, Chandarkona, in 1798 formed part of the Hugli 
district,'1' In May 1800, however, Bogree reverted to the 
jurisdiction of the Burdwan collector - though for judicial 
matters remaining under the Magistrate of Midnapur!
Again, early in 1800 Chhatna was transferred to Birbhum - 
for the better preservation of the peace of the country -
p
only to revert again in July to Midnapur.
Besides these changes in administrative areas, there 
were also changes being introduced in the powers of the 
various officials appointed to them. Thus in the early years 
though a diwani adalat was established at Midnapur, and the 
magistrate who superintended it could arrest delinquents, the 
powers of trial and punishment were still reserved to the 
Nawabfs nizamat adalat,^  From 1785 the magistrate was 
granted powers in petty criminal cases, but all serious cases 
still had to be referred to the nizamat adalat. It was not 
until 1787 that the collectors came to enjoy the triple
A
powers of a revenue agent, judge and police magistrate. In 
1791 the faujdari adalat (nizamat adalat) was abolished, and 
replaced by a court of circuit for the Calcutta division, 
sitting periodically at Midnapur. Finally in 1793 Corn­
wallis introduced his general re-arrangement, by which the 
judicial and revenue branches were entirely separated. The
1. Price, op.cit, 31.
2, Ibid.
3* TbTcL 10.
4. Mrminger, Fifth Report, 22.
5, DC.Midnapur, 34,
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offices of the judge and magistrate in Midnapur were there­
after united in one person, and a separate collector was put 
in charge of revenue matters.
Such constant shifts and changes made it very difficult 
for the people to understand the workings of the British 
system, and caused much inconvenience to those paying revenue, 
especially after the withdrawal of the collector from Midna­
pur in 1774* They also had the equally unhappy effect of pre­
venting the Company's officials really getting to know the 
people and the district* Harassed new officials, busy with 
investments for the Company, if not with private trade, saw 
in tribal unrest merely the acts of contumacious savages not 
symptoms of a disease requiring diagnosis. One might take as 
an example the reports upon the mahal of Nyabasan.The Midna­
pur collector in 1780 referred to it as an estate whose 
lands were mostly held by a kind of feudal tenure by sardars 
and paiks, and such indisciplined rabble, ready to turn out at 
the caprice of the zamindar.^ Next year it was said that 
these estates were "a jungle; that their rents are a kind of 
quit-rent collected from their pikes [paiks] and chuars;[that] 
they are surrounded likewise by jungle zemindars, On the 
east by Bogree and Bishnupur; on the northby Pachet [Panchkot 
or Panchet]; on the west by Singbhoom; on the south Damudar 
Bhanza the Moharbunj Rajah; that all these are more mighty
1. Midnapur collector to Warren Hastings, 2 Oct. 1780, 
quoted in Price, op.cit. 67.
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than they"?" The Midnapur collector wrote a week after this
that the inhabitants of these areas were chuars, "bred up as
much for pillaging as cultivating, and pay a kind of quit-
2
rent from the profits of both occupations,"
This officer was not the only one who showed this lack 
of sympathy towards tribal people who had reacted adversely 
to the new system of control. In fact, no officer tried to go 
to the root of the problem. They took it for granted that 
these were criminals who could be subdued only through ruth­
less measures. Naturally enough, whenever they rose, they 
were attacked by the military force. This state of affairs 
continued till the eyes of the authorities were somewhat 
opened towards the end of the 18th century,
One of the causes for resistance is to be found in the 
revenue system imposed by the Company, The area had never 
been effectively subdued by the northern empires, and thus 
had had no experience of the survey and detailed assessment 
of the Mughals, Any attempt to introduce a formal revenue 
system was likely to be ill received, and one which ignored 
tribal custom and feeling and which was operated by outsiders 
was certain to cause trouble. The difficulty of realizing 
revenues from the jungle estates was felt very early, and the 
first solution was to appoint thanadars who were to keep an
1. Midnapur collector to Warren Hastings, 23 Nov. 1781, 
Firminger, Fifth Report,P.CXXIX
Also see Price, op.cit. 67#
2. To Warren Hastings, 27 Nov.1781, quoted in Price, Ibid,67*
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eye on the zamindars, since these last were thought to he 
"very far from being so much civilized as to render it proper 
to free them from some such restraint*"^ Such a system was 
the more necessary as the zamindars of the jungle estates 
had no hierarchy of their own through which the Company could 
operate: they were described as independent chiefs, whose 
mahals were all held direct, or hazuri (paying revenue direct 
to the Government). The two thanadars in western Midnapur - 
one at Balrampur, the other at Ghatshila - were thus respon­
sible for collections from a number of zamindaiis. The total 
collections under the former were Rs.9948-1-3* and under thej '
latter Rs.4p00, In each case a proportion of the expenses of 
the thanadar was defrayed by the zamindars (Rs.50 of the 
Rs,97 at Balrampur, Rs.22-8 of the Rs.54-8 at Ghatshila),^
The thanadar system was,however,only a temporary ex­
pedient, which might gradually reveal the capacity of a 
country for which no detailed records existed. (Bayley, the
1. Midnapur collector to Board of Revenue, 9 Jan. 1789, Beng. 
Rev. Cons. 18 March 1789, P.113* /51\
2. Midnapur magistrate to Board, 4 Feb. 1789, Ibid. P.114. 
[The control of the Midnapur Rani over them was only 
nominal. In Chota Nagpur and Palamau, on the other hand, 
the maharaja and the raja respectively, because of their 
closer control over their dependants, were made responsi­
ble for the revenue collection of the whole of their areas,] 
One Marilchand was put in charge of collections in 1188 fasli, 
[1781 A.D.]. He eventually found his sadr allowance insuf­
ficient, He represented this to these” jungle zamindars,
who agreed to defray his charges. Thus arose the Mufussil 
establishment. Ibid.
3- Ibid. 115-118: A third thanadar was at Janpur. According 
ToHBayley, Memoranda oiHyiidna-pore , 2, Higginson's settle­
ment of 1776 with the jungle zamindars was at Rs.17846.
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Midnapur collector noted in 1852 that “the cultivators in 
this jungle formerly held their field (jots) in some parts 
without leases, rent papers, etc. They brought the whole 
produce to the zamindar, who gave them means of support 
during the year, "^ ) If from 1772 survey parties were at work 
in the area it has already been seen under what difficulties 
they operated* By the time when a Permanent Settlement in Ben­
gal was being discussed,there was still only scanty information 
about the jungle Mahals, which were still disturbed. In neigh­
bouring Ramgarh the collector successfully urged upon Sir 
John Shore the inadvisability of introducing any permanent 
settlement into the undeveloped areas of his district.
In the Jungle Mahals of Midnapur, an area no less un­
developed than Ramgarh, no one urged the unsuitability of the 
Permanent settlement and so the regulations of 1793 were 
applied to them* Thus, the laws meant for the more civilized 
parts of the Bengal Presidency, were blindly applied to these 
areas. As the Fifth Report of the Select Committee of the 
House of Commons noted in 1812, "Without sufficient attention 
to their [tribal people's] peculiar character, this people 
had been included in the general system of internal administr­
ation, The immediate authority over them was given to police 
—  —  2darogas, and by the operation of selling estates for revenue
1, Bayley, Ibid, 16,
2* These darogas are not less corrupt than the tannahdars. 
their predecessors", Firminger, Fifth Report,!, 130.
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"balances, many of their zamindars had "been dispossessed* The 
effects of this violence on the habits of the people were 
felt by degrees. They sided with the discarded zamindars, 
condemned the authority of the police officers, and were fre­
quently guilty of great disorders.”1
As Hunter put it, the Permanent settlement “tried to
2
suddenly substitute contract for custom." One can well 
imagine what a tremendous shock the new system of values 
must have been for tribal cultivators and chiefs who had al­
ways been guided by their own customs. The floodgates of 
land litigation were now opened - forged papers, hard swear­
ing, and the power of a party to exhaust the resources of 
the other by chicanery, delays and appeals, these now became 
the deciding factors.^ Zamindars and peasants who suddenly 
found themselves possessed, as landowners,of private property 
which was a first-class security, borrowed imprevidently. 
Their creditors, who knew how to handle the new machinery of 
the courts, used the unprecedented facilities for exacting 
the full value of their bonds. The courts, ignorant of the 
tribal land structure, indifferent to the ruinous rates of 
interest being charged, enforced decisions according to the 
letter of the regulation. Moreover, the landlords were now 
given unlimited powers for increasing the rents of the
<
1. Quoted in I) G-.Midnapore, 196.
2. Hunter, Beng. Ms. He cords, I, 89*
3» Ibid. 88.
cultivators, and rack-renting ruined many families. Eventual­
ly the public and impartial village record of rights, by 
which the cultivators had been holding land, was changed into 
a private and hostile record under the control of the land­
lords.
This new system was too much to follow for the semi- 
tribal chiefs and their ignorant and simple ryots. The Rani 
Siromani of the Midnapur estate, the Raja of Pachet, the 
Zamindar of Raipur and several others all on a sudden found 
themselves driven from pillar to post (either by the Company1s 
collectors and their subordinates or by the moneylenders) 
and they had to face unusual humiliations, e.g. arrest, 
mortgage, sale and attachment of property.
But they were not so timid as the Hindu and Muslim 
zamindars of the other parts of Bengal.1 Their tribal fol­
lowers would not tolerate the exit of their old chiefs, and 
the entry of new non-tribal zamindars. Hence, they resisted 
the British authority from 1795 to 1800 in all those estates 
which were auctioned off for revenue arrears. In the case of 
Pachet and Raipur the Grovernment had to yield (as will be 
seen later). In Bishnupur, the Bhumijes of Barabhum, Manbhum
1. According to Price, op.cit.73* The jungle zamindar was a 
sort of military chiexj ^ o  whom his ryots might look for 
protection, who might command his paiks with effect, and 
whose title should not be doubtful”.
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and other Jungle Mahals came in thousands to assist the 
family of the late Raja Che tan Singh to get back its zam­
indar i, and they showed unprecedented enmity to the new
purchasers of land there.^ They stopped all collections,
2
and the ryots had to flee to the neighbouring parganas.
Both the Bishnupur and Midnapur estates remained a scene of 
murder, plunder and rapine throughout 1799*^ Several bat-
4
talions of regular troops were employed, but to no effect.
The unrest became so general because the ghatwals, 
who traditionally provided the police authority in the tribal 
areas, had themselves been aggrieved by the actions of the 
Government. These paiks had already encouraged the ryots to 
refuse all revenue payments in the Birbhum district in 1781 - 
and, as Government recognized, they had done so as a protest 
against the extortionate demands of the zamindar and his 
agents. In that case the ghatwals, who were also the 
sardars or leaders of their tribal community, had acted 
against their own chiefs. When the Permanent settlement was 
introduced, the ghatwals themselves suffered, for the lands
1. C.R.Blunt, Actg. Burdwan Magt., to Govt*, 18 Peb. 1799, 
Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 1 of 22 Peb. 1799 /128x
2. Ibid.
3. Lt. R. Spottiswood to Lt. Coll. W.Scott, Adj. General,
23 Peb. 1799, Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons.. 20 of 8 March 1799 
/128\ Also C.R.Blunt to Govt., 11 Peb. 1799, Beng. Cr.
Judl. Cons. 11 of 15 Peb. 1799 (128^
4. Beng. Cr.Jusl. Cons. 6 of 11 July 1799 /128\ ^
v 42'
5. Home Misc. No.207(2) PP. 379-381. In 1852 the Midnapur 
collector wrote that these people "were contented, indust­
rious, brave, truthful, and confiding, much attached too 
to their proprietors, a whole village would literally in 
one night 'upstick* and off to some zamindar, whose general 
character promised them better treatment," Bayley, Memor­
anda of Midnapore , 16.
which for centuries they had enjoyed as a reward for their
1
services were resumed by Government. Their ghatwali 
(paikan) lands were resumed under the 1793 Regulations 
(clause 4, Sec.8, Reg.I) when the Government took upon Itself 
the charge of the police. The ghatwals had formerly paid a 
quit-rent, but now the total revenue of these lands rose 
from Rs.27,553 to Rs.50,138.^ Their discontent can be 
guaged from the following petition which the ghatwals of 
Bishnupur sent to the Judge of Burdwan in May 1798: "We with 
our brethren have for many generations held the office of 
Ghautwals & chowkedars. We have an allowance of lands & the 
Sardars hold from 20 to 40 Be gas at the most & our brethren 
under us hold each from 5 to 14 Be gas* We have no other 
allowance and each servant paid eighteen annas Salamy to the 
zemindar...» Since the appointment of the police Darogahs 
we give notice of everything that passes to them & always 
watch the Ghauts & attend him [sic] for this allowance. It 
is we conceive severe & heavy duty^ besides the above sums 
the zemindar and collector's Aumlah demand an increase which 
is very hard.1 ^
When they saw their chiefs* lands sold for revenue 
arrears to foreigners, they joined forces with them against
1. By Reg. 22 of 1793 the daroga system of police had been 
introduced. A daroga was the officer in charge of a 
thana and he had under him a few barkandazes.
2. Board to Govt., 8 March 1799, Beng. Rev. Cons. 32 of 
15 March 1799. (54)
3. Petition, Enclosure to collector to Board, 4 May 1798,
Guha and Mitra, West Beng. Dist.Records. Burdwan, 329.
the Company's Government. So great was their wrath that they
killed the sheristadar of Janpur thana (Rasik Lai Chose) and
1
the life of the Balrumpur tahsildar was also threatened.
The disturbances continued right through the year 1800. 
Krishna Chandra Chatterjee, the new zamindar of Kismat Midna­
pur, made repeated representation about the depredations by 
the chuars. The tahsildar of the resumed paikan lands posted
at Anandpur, reported that it was impossible to realize the
2
revenues, and that there was a grave risk to his life.
The authorities then took drastic actions. They brought
the rani of Midnapur estate a prisoner to Midnapur on 6 April
1799f and five companies of sepoys began to hunt down the
tribal people. According to J.C.Price, 1799 A.D. is.
marked in the Midnapore annals as the year of the great chuar
rebellion, ghastly with its tale of horrors and massacre;
when all the evil passions of the infuriated Sardars and
Paiks burst forth in a wild attempt to revenge the resumption
of their Jagir lands on the Government, if not to compel it
to order a complete restoration of them. All the lawless
tribes of the jungle Mahals made common cause with the Paiks
and carried slaughter and flame to the very doors of the
Magistrate 1 s Cutcherry..
In fact, the daroga system of police introduced in 1793 
had proved an utter failure in this area. The darogas from 
the more fcivilized1 areas of Bihar and Bengal were prone to
1. I.Imhcff,Midnapur collector,to Board, 30 March 1799> Beng. 
Rev.Cons. 12 of 12 April 1799. (5^)
2. Board to Govt., 16 Peb. 1800. Beng.Rev. Cons. 4 of 27 Peb. 
1800. (|*,
3. The Chuar Rebellion of 17991 quoted in DG.Midnapore♦43«
take bribes and to exploit the simple tribal people at their 
will. Thus, in 1794 G-ovind Ram, the police daroga of Chhatna 
and Panchanand, that of Manbhum, were charged with "having 
received bribes for releasing persons accused before them of 
being concerned in robberies."'1' Moreover, they were physic­
ally and mentally unfit to cope with the criminals of this 
area. The plainsmen suffered greatly from sickness in the 
hills and jungles. The barkandazos, under the darogas. 
invariably failed in apprehending refractory persons,"who
assembled in such force as to preclude the possibility of the
2
Darogas acting against them unaided by regular troops."
But the troops,like the official police, were quite ignorant 
of the jungles and fastnesses. The problems of the darogas 
became quite insuperable when the ghatwals, who had been in 
exclusive charge of the rural police, showed themselves 
hostile. In Burdwan it was reported in February 1794 that 
"in consequence of the Police arrangements now put under the 
direction of the police Darogahs these landholders [Mukarr- 
aridars or ghatwals 1 deny any obligation of service due to 
the zemindars and refuse to pay rent."^
By March 1799, Imhoff, the Midnapur collector, was
1. Beng.Cr.Judl.Cons. 4 of 29 Aug. 1794*/128\ A similar charge 
was proved against Md. Murad, the ' 13'
police daroga of Chitrapal and several others. Beng# Cr. 
Judl. Cons. 4 of 7 Nov. 1794. /128\
2. Price, op.cit. 69. They could not even prevent cattle- 
lifting, a common form of banditry in this area,; I.Imhoff 
Midnapur collector, to Board, 4 March 1799* Para.6. Beng. 
Rev. Cons. 33 <f 15 March 1799./54\
3* West Bengal District Records - Burdwan,. 102.
emphasising the need to restore paikan lands. These lands 
had been granted in the past on the ground that "the zemin­
dar was held responsible for all robberies and thefts and was 
likewise obliged to protect the country, and the ryofcts, in as 
far as his power lay, from any incursions of an enemy, in 
addition to this the Pikes [sic] always escorted the Revenue 
of the pergunnah to the treasury, and in case of any troops 
sent out to quell disturbances they acted as spies and in 
short gave their assistance in many respects and from the 
want of it no troops are at present able to act with any 
effect, more particularly as they are not acquainted with the 
roads, or haunts of the chowars[chuacs]".^
Imhoff strongly argued that these paikan lands should
be restored, otherwise, he thought, the country would become
2
a desert and a harbour for robbers and wild beasts. He also 
stressed what a saving a settlement would mean for the mili­
tary authorities because most of the sepoys sent to Raipur 
had fallen "victims to the fever which generally seizes such 
persons as are not constant inhabitants of the jungles."^ 
Indeed^ he went to the length of suggesting that the paiks 
could well be formed "into a corps of Rangers, in the same
4
manner as at Boglepore [Bhagalpur]" and at a negligent cost.
1. Imhoff to Board, 4 March 1799# Para.2# Beng.Rev. Cons. 33 
of 15 March 1799 (54)
1 •
2. Ibid.Para.3 s Since the lands were no longer cultivated, 
the fear of wild beasts had increased.
3* Ibid. Para.4*
4. Ibid.Para. 5. A similar proposal for raising a tribal 
militia had been made by Lt. Hume, Officer commanding at 
Midnapur. See Price, op.cit. 69#
These tribal people, he thought, were "in general a very 
brave and inoffensive people" unless they were driven to 
extremities.^"
Prom such particular considerations, Imhoff drew the 
general conclusion that the general regulations, meant for 
more civilized people, should not apply to the tribal people 
of the area: "it would be well worth the attention of Govern­
ment to frame separate regulations for the jungle zemindars 
and their ryotts who are almost savages, their lands also 
should never be sold to realize the revenue as it only
creates disturbances and greater loss to Government for
2
sooner or later they pay their revenue." Raipur, he 
suggested, was a striking proof of this. It was preferable , 
therefore, to compromise the business with the former 
zamindar, rather than to introduce a non-tribal purchaser who 
would "never be able to keep possession" without the constant 
help of the military.-^
The Board of Revenue came to realize the blunder 
committed by them in 1793 in ordering the resumption of 
paikan lands. In March 1799 they recorded the opinion "that 
the reinstating of the Pykes [sic] in the possession of the 
lands formerly held by them at the original quit-rent paid by 
them, is not only best calculated to restore tranquility to 
the district, but also that they are in fact the only
1„ Inhoff to Board, 4 March 1799* Para 5f Beng.Rev.Cons.33 




description of persons who can preserve the public peace in 
future, in as much as the nature of the country not only re­
quires the active exertions of officers minutely acquainted 
with its avenues, but also a much larger body of officers 
than are at present allowed on the local police Establish­
ments."'1' They also decided that the jungle zamindars ought 
again to be put in charge of these paiks, since the non-tribal 
darogas could not control them* "Considering the influence 
which the hill zemindars retain over the peasantry of every 
description", they suggested that these Jungle Mahals might be 
expempted from the operation of the police regulations, and
the zamindars might be made responsible for the preservation
2of the public peace in their respective estates.
Regarding the collectors* suggestion about preventing 
the sale of lands, the Board refrained from putting forward 
any decided opinion. But they suggested that "as the people 
are extremely wild and ignorant and to the last degree pertin­
acious of their customs, sound policy would seem to suggest
that an indulgence in those customs is best calculated to 
preserve the peace of the country and attach them to the 
English Government."^
Here was the nucleus of the zamindari or ghatwali 
police system and of the ultimate de-regularisation of the
1. Board to Govt, 23 March 1799, Para.8, Beng. Rev.Cons. 28 
of 29 March 1799. /54x
2. Ibid.
3. "Board to Govt., 8 March 1799, Beng. Rev. Cons. 32 of
15 March 1799. /54n
area in 1833-34. But for the time Being the implementation of 
a new scheme was deferred till the rehellion had entirely 
ceased, for otherwise, it was argued, it would create a sense 
of victory in the chuars,^ Imhoff suggested that the only 
means of restoring peace was !,that all the Darogahs and peace 
officers on the part of Government should he immediately 
recalled from the jungles, as they are the grand promoters
of all the disturbances and the disaffection which at present
2
exists among the greater part of the zemindars.*1 The
restored ^hatwali police should then he placed directly under 
the se zamindars
/ who should he made responsible for all outrages* Under such 
conditions these chiefs would give a hearty cooperation to 
the magistrate, especially if he, in turn, should give pres­
ents of horses etc* to them.^ Such rewards, given to the 
zamindars by the magistrate personally - who should regular­
ly tour the district to ensure close contact, - would do much 
to break down suspicion.
To prevent the recurrence of further disturbances by 
the zamindars, Imhoff again urged that "their lands should | 
never be liable to be sold to realise the balances but if any I 
zemindar should refuse payment after it had been demanded by 
the collector two or three times, and he (the collector) 
think that he was refractory and would not pay it at all, a
1. Imhoff to Board, 16 Apl. 1799, Paras.2-3* Beng. Rev. Cons. 
20 of 3 May 1799.( 54^
2. Ibid. Para. 5-
3. TbTd.
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party of sepoys should then he secretly detached to enforce
payment by surrounding his house,but no sepoys should on any
account whatever be deputed without an European officer -
that should be rigidly attended to as the sepoys are too apt
to commit depredations when they are by themselves. This
would consequently drive the zemindars to despair.
Imhoff further suggested that some superior zamindars
should be made darogas. "If these jungle Zemindars were not
irritated and harassed by the Darogahs, sepoys, Tehsildarsand
peons," he wrote, "I think they would be quiet, but so long
as the present system of the police Darogahs, who are of no
kind of use but to extort and oppress, remains in force I see
no hopes of tranquillity being restored to the country. On
the other hand if it is done away the jungle would... become
2
highly cultivated as the inhabitants are a laborious people."
To support these views Imhoff gave a number of
striking illustrations. He revealed, as examples of the
failure of the daroga police, that the 24 Sebundy sepoys
stationed at the daroga’s cute he ry in Barabhum, as well as
the darogas of Raipur, Satpatti, and Bahadurpur had all fled
from their stations in terror, and that for some months not
a single case had been sent to the Midnapur Magistrate by any
•a
Jungle Mahal daroga. He pointed out, similarly, that m
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid. Here is the best possible testimony that the tribal 
people and their chiefs, far from being habitual criminals, 
were a peaceful folk driven to violence as the only method 
of airing their grievances.
3. Ibid,Para. 6.
Midnapur and Nyabasan, where two widowed ranis were seeking 
to recover their estates, and in Bara jit and Raipur, the non- 
tribal purchasers of estates were meeting with much resist­
ance and having great difficulty in collecting revenue*
Imhoff*s suggestions, in brief, were : to render the 
jungle zamindars responsible both for the realization of the 
public revenue and for the police; to exempt the area from 
the operation of the existing regulations relative to the 
public sales; to render the persons of the zamindars liable 
to attachment and imprisonment either for non-payment of the 
public revenue or other misconduct, and in cases of emergency, 
to declare their lands forfeited, and to transfer them to 
the next of kin, or some other person best qualified for the 
trust*1
The Board of Revenue agreed in the main with Imhoff *s
analysis and proposals. They agreed that "the character and
disposition of the people, attached to their chiefs, and in
the last degree tenacious of their local customs, renders the
interference of Government in the internal management of the
2
lands a source of general dissatisfaction." But, since
people equally "blind to the beneficent intentions of their 
2
rulers" were to be found in the hill areas of the Ramgarh 
and Burdwan districts, they proposed to consult the officials
1. Board to Govt.,19 Apl.1799, Para 3, Beng. Rev. Cons. 19 
of 3 May 1799. (54)
2. Ibid* Para.6.
5b
there, before coming to any decision - which must otherwise 
result im piecemeal action*
The last-mentioned suggestions about consultations 
made by the Board was not approved by the Government, though 
they asked the Board to draft the regulation for such mahals 
of Midnapur, Burdwan and Ramgarh.1 The Board, in turn, asked 
Imhoff to prepare a draft*
Soon, Ernst, Imhoff*s successor at Midnapur, also 
emphasized the need for a new policy towards the paiks. He 
saw nothing surprising in the violent gestures of despair 
shown by these tribal chieftains: "It can hardly..* be a 
matter of surprise or indignation that, when the ancient 
occupants of the lands, without having been charged with any 
crime or misconduct, saw their supposed rights founded upon 
long possession of them deliberately invaded in order to pro­
vide funds for the charges of the police, and at last found 
themselves either stripped of all their possessions, or 
subjected to new demands of rent, which they were incapable 
of paying, should have despaired of obtaining redress by a 
proper representation of their grievances, and have seized 
the first favourable opportunity that presented itself of 
taking up arms, and of attempting to recover by force what 
they thought had been taken from them with injustice, espec­
ially when it is considered that they are a rude and almost
1. Resolution, Govt., Beng, Rev, Cons. 21 Of 3 May 1799 (^4) 
No such revenue regulations were passed, but the 3
new police miles were extended on an experimental basis, 
to Pachet and 17 other estates (except Patkum) in July 
1800: Govt, to Birbhum Magt,, 31 July 1800, B.C. 28/1987.
a savage race of men without any knowledge of the manners and 
regulations, and without any experience of the justice and 
humanity of our Government, which do not appear to have been 
held out to them as the means to which they ought to look 
with confidence for redress,
It was on 10 August 1799 that Imhoff sent the draft 
regulations for these 'Bun [jungle"] Mehals1 to the Board of
Revenue* He again emphasized the futility of the darogas and
2
the necessity of some change in the sale laws , and while 
his draft was under the consideration of the Board and the 
Government, he wrote yet another note, in December 1799, 
justifying his plan of zamindaii police.^ The police darogas 
he asserted, with eight or ten barkandazes* all strangers to 
the country, could not face the criminals* Before the troops 
were sent to the scene, the mischief was always over* The 
chuars avoided any direct clash with the troops, but they 
hit at the sepoys from behind the bushes and precipices.Many
of the sepoys also succumbed to the unwholesome air of the
4jungles. The sepoys, with no hope of gaining any distinct­
ion but yet in imminent danger, often deteriorated in discip­
line. Under such circumstances the taking over of the police
1. T.H.Ernst to Board, 25 May 1799* Para.2* Beng. Rev. Cons. 
10 of 21 June 1799* (54)
2. Imhoff to Govt. 10 Aug. 1799* Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 11 of 
22 Aug.1799* 1128\ Nyabasan, Bara jit and Raipur were then
disturbed for their sale to non-tribal people,
3. Imhoff to Board, 21 Dec. 1799*, Beng. Rev. Cons. 14 of 14 
March 1800./54%: only the zamindars of Phulkusma and
(1D)
Shamsundarpur, he thought, were of bad character.
4* Ibid. Para. 3*
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duties by the zamindars would relieve the authorities of much 
worry. Moreover, since most of these jungle zamindars were 
closely related to one another, they would certainly co­
operate with one another in repelling the aggressions of 
robbers.
Meanwhile, the zamindars of Supur, GrhatshilafAmbikan- 
agar, Manbhum, Barabhum and Chhatna£ (or their agents) ,when 
summoned by Imhoff to Midnapur, had given it in writing that 
they were ready to undertake the police responsibilities as 
they had been doing before the regulations were enforced,and 
that they were ready to execute a written guarantee 
(muchalaka)They had also requested that some guards might 
be stationed for a short time at thanas Balrampur, Jamda
p
(in Raipur), Barabhum and Ghatshila.
The Board, on 10 January 1800, after considering the 
draft, and the zamindars1 assurances, recommended a zamindari 
police for these areas, but with a limitation. The zamindars 
were to be "vested with a joint charge of the police of their 
respective estates in concert with the Darogahs" appointed 
under Regulation 22 of 1793* The responsibility of the 
zamindars would be similar to that of the landholders in 
Benares under Regulation 17<f 1795 and Regulations 2 and 8
1. Petition of Raja Gopi Nath Dhal of Supur, Motilal Dubraj, 
the eldest son of Raja Jagannath Dhal of Ghatshila, 
Birchand Hakim, Mukhtar of Gopi Nath, the minor zamindar 
of Ambikanagar, 5ratap Naraian, zamindar of Manbhum,
Bansi Naiti, mukhtar of Barabhum, and Lachmi Naraian, 
zamindar of Chhatnas Enclosure, Ibid.
2. Ibid. ----
of 1797, with an additional provision to guard against the 
chuars. They would execute a muchalaka. The paikan lands of 
the sardars would he restored on the previous quit-rents. 
Lastly, if any of the zamindars were found disqualified from 
age, sex etc. ,their manager would he put in charge of the 
police,'1'
These proposals were adopted hy the Governor General
in Council and the Magistrate of Midnapur was authorized to
invest the jungle zamindars with the management of the police
2in their respective estates.
The next important landmark in the administrative 
history of the Jungle Mahals was the formation of a separate 
district of that name. In 1805 the Government realized that 
for "the maintenance of the peace and the support of the 
General police of that part of the country", it was essential 
to station an officer in the heart of the Jungle Mahals.
1. Board to Govt. 10 Jan.1800, Beng. Bev. Cons. 13 of 14 
March 1800./54\ Already in Sept. 1799 the Board had
recommended that for the sake of restoring cultivation, 
the paiks might be restored to their former lands and 
that a remission of dues might be allowed: Beng.Rev. Cons.
11. Ibid.
2. Govt., to Board, 6 March 1800, B.C. 97/1986, P. 143* Also
Resolution,?.147. N.L.Chatterjee ['Jungle Mohals*,B.P.P* 
LXXIII, Serial 137.] says that the ghatwali polioe was 
introduced by the Regulations of July 31 of 1800. But 
Regulations passed by the G.G. in C 9 II,do not mention it, 
nor the Board's Collections and the Bengal Consultations.
3. Govt.to Register, Nizamat Adalat* 25 July 1805, Beng.Cr, 
Judl.Cons. 16 of 25 July l805(—yf).On 23 July the Adalat 
had opposed such a proposal of the Burdwan magistrate.
They therefore passed Regulation XVIII of 1805# The main aim 
was stated to be the support of the police in these jungly 
areas by the appointment of a magistrate who would be 
stationed in this area* It was admitted that the plan of 
entrusting the zamindars or their managers with a local 
charge of the police under the rules adopted experimentally 
in 1800, had been found successful in operation* The regula­
tion therefore provided for an extension of the plan to
1 2 further areas* The following mahals were included in the
new jurisdiction: Pachet, Bagmundi, Bagankodar, Taraf
Baleapar, Katras, Hasla, Jhalda, Jharia, Jaipur, Mukundpur,
Kismat Nawagarh, Kismat Chutty, Torang, Tuny (Tundi),
Nagarkeari and Patkum from the Birbhum district* Sainpahari
Shergarh and Bishnupur (except the police jurisdiction of
Kotalpur and the contiguous pargana of Bulsai) from the
Burdwan district; and Chhatna, Barabhum, Supur, Ambikanagar,
Simlapal and Bellaidihi from the Midnapur district.
The police in this new district might be committed to 
the zamindars or their managers, either with or without the 
cooperation of the police darogas* They were to maintain such 
establishments of paiks for the maintenance of the police, 
within their respective zamindaris, as might be fixed by the 
magistrate, with the approval of the government* A periodical
1* Beng* Cr* Judl* Cons. 16 of 13 Dec* 1805 /129\
2, Ibid*
3* "Formerly they were in the Ramgarh district,
list of such establishments was to be submitted to the 
magistrate.
Where darogas were appointed, the zamindars would
assist them. Moreover, the latter, after taking charge of the
police, would send all persons charged with murder, robbery 
and other heinous crimes, within 24 hours after their appre­
hension, either to the nearest police daroga or to the magi­
strate or to the officer commanding the nearest military 
detachment.
The digwars, paiks or other police officers of a 
zamindar# would not be ordinarily sent into the estate of 
any other zamindar without the order of the magistrate. It 
was their special duty to check and apprehend the chuars 
and other plunderers. "Any zemindar who may be convicted of
having connived at the assemblage or passage of choars"
would be punished.1
It was under this regulation that the ghatwali police 
functioned after 1805 in these mahals and in Dhalbhum. The 
efficiency of this police was testified to by several later 
reports. In 1810, for instance, a judge of the Calcutta court 
of circuit wrote that the improved state of cultivation and 
the decrease in the cases of a heinous nature in the Jungle
Mahals was to be ascribed to "the efficient system of police
2there". W. Blunt, the magistrate of the district, was so
1. Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 16 of 13 Dec. 18051128/18) They 
would also be responsible for all the property stolen in 
their jurisdiction.
2. D.Campbell to Govt. 27 Jan, 1810, Para.51 Beng. Cr.Judl. 
Cons. 27 of 2 Feb. 1810. ,130%
6i
impressed with the services rendered by the ghatwals, digwars 
and others that in 1810 he appointed several of them as 
guards to protect the merchants and other travellers on the 
great Benares road passing through Pachet and other parganas 
of his districts "No other description of guards is requi­
site or would be able to ensure to travellers an equal degree 
of safety and protection with that which a sirdar Ghautwal 
is enabled to afford.1,1
When in 1812 the magistrate of the district recom­
mended the abolition of the ghatwali establishment of 
Jaibalea in Bishnupur,Blunt, as the Superintendent of Police, 
Lower provinces, opposed the proposal vehemently: "It is
chiefly, if not entirely by their means, and not by the 
Thannah police establishments, that the tranquility of the
jungles has been preserved, and the police brought to its
?
present state of efficiency." He pointed out that by this 
harsh measure a class of people, who knew no other occupation 
than the use of arms and no other means of subsistence than 
the lands assigned to them for performing police duties, and 
who were active, courageous and expert in the use of arms, 
would be hard hit. Their duties, he asserted, could not be 
performed by any other description of police officers and
. .i
lj/ir .Blunt to Govt., 16 Apl. 1810, Para.6. Beng. Cr. Judl.Cons. 
16 of 27 Apl.1810.(130) Also see Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons,
43 & 45 of 8 June 1810 /130s
k~T1)
2. Blunt to Govt.,3 June 1812, Para.5* Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons, 
41 of 13 June 1812.(130)
barkandaze s, "who are generally both the most indolent and
timid class of police officers,
That the official police was quite ineffective in 
these tribal areas was proved beyond doubt. In Barabhum and 
in other disturbed estates of the new district, they could 
do nothing against the insurgents, In 1817 the Magistrate of 
Midnapur also referred to the inefficiency of the regular
police establishment. The daroga, he said* was not success-
2
ful in one out of fifty cases he investigated.
Nevertheless, new police stations were opened in 
several estates and the daroga system of police was intro­
duced to keep an eye on the zamindars. Thus, Dhalbhum, which, 
though a jungle estate, had been left in the Midnapur dist­
rict, Barabhum, Pachet and several other estates came under 
the clutches of the crafty and corrupt non-tribal darogas.
In 1814 Baleapar's zamindari police was dissolved and it was 
included in Churulia thana. There were a number of cases 
of police powers being continued upon the succession to a 
zamindari - Prithi Singh received such a sanad when he suc­
ceeded his brother Jorawar Singh in August 1814, and Digambar 
Singh was invested with police poweiswhen he succeeded his
A
father as zamindar of Bagahkodar - but the trend was away
1. Ibid. Para.6.
2. W, Enver, off. Magt,,to W.Blunt, supdt. of police. 19 May 
1817, Para.4. Beng. Cr. Judl Cons. 49 of 6 June 1o17*(132j
3. Beng. Cr, Judl Cons. 41 of 9 Aug. 1814.
4. Beng. Cr. Judl, Cons. 18 of 23 Aug. I8l4./131\ and 49 of 
6 Jan. 1818 ,133\
1
63
from the 1805 system and towards a wider use of the official 
police. With the renewed attempt to impose a non-tribal 
system there grew once more the popular discontent with ex­
tortionate outsiders, and the particular discontent of the 
ignored ghatwals. In 1832 that discontent again boiled over.
We have so far attempted a general view of the rela­
tionship between the East India Company and the tribal people 
of the Jungle Mahals, as it developed in the half century 
after the grant of the Diwani. To understand the detailed 
course of the 1832 disturbances, however, it is necessary to 
look rather more closely at the political situation in each 
of the mahals. The remainder of the chapter will therefore 
be devoted to a review of conditions in each of the important 
estates*
Barabhum:-
The largest of these estates was Barabhum, which lay 
on the western borders of the area, and was bounded on the 
west by Patkum, on the south-west by Singhbhum, on the south 
by Bhalbhum, on the east by the small jagir of Koilapal and 
Manbhum and on the north by Pachet and Bagmundi. In 1833 
much of its borders were still “clothed with dense jungle" 
though the centre, north and east was open, undulating
country producing fine sugarcane and well cultivated."1’ The 
ghats (passes or valley approaches) were ten in number, of 
which the four most important - Dhadka, Sutrakhani, Punj- 
Sardari and Tinsaya - were predominantly jungle - covered,
and maintained in that condition so as to preserve their
2strength.
Barabhum was inhabited predominantly by the Bhumijes, 
with some Kurmis, Santhals and others and "a slight sprink­
ling of Brahmins, Rajpoots, Bania traders and Mahomedans* 
Moreover, in the Raima hills two tribes called Paharias and 
Kharias lived. ^ According to a military officer, they (the 
Paharias and Kharias) were so familiar with the hills and 
jungles that like the Red Indians of America, at night they 
could guide the travellers 1 through the endless ups and 
downs of the Doolma" with the help of the stars and by feel-
15
ing the barks of the trees. The Bhumijes on the whole, 
were 1 since re and honest, and their word may be depended 
on. M But they had already given up their tribal language 
in favour of Bengali, and had also adopted several settled
7
ways of their Hindu neighbours. Nevertheless, they remained 
famous for their marauding activities even in the early days 
of the British rule, hence their common title of chuar
1. W.Dent, Jt*Commissioner, Chota Nagpur and Jungle Mahals, 
to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para 6. B.C. 1501/58886.
2. Ibid. Para. 2.
3# Tbid. Para. 3.
4. Ibid. Also BG. Manbhum. 268.
5. A subaltern"! 'Sketch of the campaign*, East Indian United
Service Journal,Noy,Part I, 480.
6. W. Sent, to Oovt. 4 Sept. 1833, Para.6. B.C.1501/58886.
7. Ibid. Para. 5.
(robber). They were "rather a turbulent and refractory race}'
showing "an alacrity to engage in choaree" a disposition
which was kept alive by the disputes in the raja's family.^
They were "short in stature, stout muscular, and not unlike
2their neighbours the Coles with whom they intermarry".
The local leaders of the Bhumijes were the sardar 
ghatwals, marcher lords, who, like the mundas and mankis of 
Chota Nagpur proper, had organised the tribal occupation and 
clearance of the land. These ghatwals, village or circle 
heads, guardians of the passes and of the local peace, occu­
pied a taraf (jagir) at a nominal rent, as reward for their 
services, and maintained a permanent body of retainers - 
digwars, ghatwals, sadials and tabedars,^  permanently under
1. Ibid,Para, 3,
2. TT5T3.
3. tabedar was on the lowest rung of the ladder, similar to 
the cbaukidar or gorait in ChotaJTagpur and other areas,
Sadials, ghatwals and fligwars were almost synonymous and 
formed a connecting link between the sardars and the tab­
edars. Thus the Tinsaya Sardar ghatwal had,in 1832, 2? 
sadials (inferiors) and 104" tabedars s' that of Punj-Sardari 
5 sadials and about 500 tabedars; that of Sutrakhani 17 
sadials and about 600 tabedars; and that of Dhadka 2 
sadials and 300 tabedars: Bussell, J.M.Magt..to Govt. 
T!TMay“l832, Para.4. , B.C.1501/58887.
According to Gokhale, op.cit, Para.185 "The lesser Mankis 
[of Chotanagpur] were "the "sadials [of Barabhum] who were 
grouped under the super Mankis known as Taraf Sardars. The 
village headmen became the village Sardars or ghatwals 
with the Khuntkattidas serving under them as Paiks or 
T a b e d a r s Also see Sifton, op.cit. Para. 26. According 
to Dalton, op.cit, 176, these Bhumij ghatwals were "the 
people (like the Mundari Bhuinhas in chutia' Nagpur, the 
Bhuiyas in Bonai, Gangpur, Keonjhur, &c, Gonds in 
Sirguja and Udaipur) to whom the defence of the country 
was entrusted."
arms. At need they could call upon the support of the whole 
Bhumij population. As has been seen, the turbulence of these 
feudal leaders and their quasi--military forces compelled the 
British Government to make a place for them in their admin­
istration as local police.
How martial these people really were was a matter of
dispute. Bradley-Birt wrote of them as "restive and
1
uncertain","wild and unkempt", and Dalton as "once the terror
2
of the surrounding districts," Risley, on the other hand, 
denied that they had ever been more than marauders: "the
circumstance, however, that they took a more or less promin­
ent part in a series of marauding attacks on an unarmed and 
unwarlike population affords no ground for a belief in the 
existence among them of any real military instinct; and in 
fact they are conspicuous for the dislike of discipline, 
which is one of the prominent characteristics of the Kolarian
r a c e s . C a s u a l  observers were just as divided as the anthro-
a
pologists - a writer in the India Gazette described them as 
"timid, cowardly, mean, despicable, fighting only in ambush", 
but a military officer who fought against them, drew a roman­
tic picture of their gallantry: "Brave as those by whom they 
were subsequently subdued [the British] - active as the leo­
pard who sports on the heights of their jungle clad hills,
1. Chota-Nagpore ,159.
2. Ethnology, T74.
3- Tribes, I, 127.
4. 25 Apl. 1833.
addicted to the delights of plunder in a far greater degree 
than to the cultivation of the soil, - the heart of every 
Bhoomij heat responsive while the slogan of their Singhboom 
and Tumar neighbours rang in their ears*'1^  Hunter noted 
that they were a stronger and more tenacious race than the 
Santhals, and in the capacity for resisting the encroachments 
of Hindus, they seemed to stand midway between the Mundas of 
Lohardaga [ChotaNagpur proper] and the Larkas or Hos of
2
Singhbhum, being hardly less exclusive than the latter race. 
But though of a turbulent and independent disposition, they 
sometimes showed a child-like simplicity*^
Over the ghatwals, and tarafdars or sardars was the 
ruling family of the raja, with its family residence at 
Barabazar. By the British period, the general Bhumij mass
A
had come to be looked down upon by the raja and his family 
because the latter had been hinduised probably in the 18th 
century. The raja, like the chief of Patkum, claimed to be
1. A Subaltern,op^cit. No.V, Part I, 474.
2. Statistical Account of Bengal, XVII, 274*
3* when "a batch of these innocent and harmless beings 
were brought into camp" and they were shown the things 
which were quite new to them, one of them said that 
"among all the wonders of the camp, there was one beat 
everything, and it was a - washerman^ Donkey I":
A Subaltern, op*cit* 480.
4* Risley, op,cit* 1, 127. "The great bulk of the Bhumij, who 
are simple cultivators and labourers, stand on a far 
lower social level than the landholding members of the 
tribe".
5* Ibid*s Risley thinks that all the chiefs of the Chota- 
fTagpur plateau were hinduized either in the 18th or the 
19th century. Mohan Singh a sardar ghatwal of Taraf 
Sutrakhani became a pseudo-Rajput in late 19th century*
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a kshatriya, descended from the great legendary emperor 
Vi&ramaditya: "The traditional origin of the Barabhum family 
connects them closely with the adjoining estate of Patkum and 
its mythical founder Vikramaditya..., their family legend is 
given by Colonel Dalton as a specimen of the skill of the 
Bhumij zamindars in making pedigrees."^ "The zamindars of 
Barabhum, Dhalbhum, Manbhum, Patkum and Bagmundi," states
Risley, "probably belong to the Bhumij tribe, though they now
2
call themselves Rajputs." In fact, all these chiefs are 
"descended from a self-elected chief or Manki of a group of 
Bhumij, or Munda villages."^
The first chief with whom the British came in direct 
contact was Raja Vivek Narain, a man "long in arms against 
the Government," who was eventually forced to abdicate in 
favour of his eldest son Raghunath Narain.^ With that in­
stallation began a long series of disputes between British 
notions of primogeniture and the tribal custom which held 
that it was the son of the chief queen, and not necessarily 
the first born, who succeeded to the zaminadri. Raghunath 
Narain, though the eldest born, was the son of a younger wife 
of the raja, and his claim was, therefore ,seriously challenged 
by Lachhuman Singh^ who, though younger in age, had a better
1. JPG. Manbhum. 264. Story of Nath Varaha and Kes Varaha.
2. Risley, op.cit. 127.
3. D.G. Manbhum, 270.
4. ieng. Rev. Cons. 4 of 22 May 1800 (5A\
VTI;
5. Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 16 of 17 Oct. 1794./128s
(T 5 )
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claim according to local custom.^ But inspite of the support
of the people, the fight of Lachhuman Singh and his brother
Bharat Singh proved in vain in the face of the military help
2
that Raghunath got from the British.
With the death of Raja Raghunath Narain in 1798 the 
same sort of struggle began between his two sons*Ganga Govind 
Singh and Madhava Singh. ^ The British authorities supported 
the former because of his seniority in age, while the latter 
was supported by the tribal sardars ^  because he was the son 
of the elder queen. Some of the neighbouring tribal zamindars 
also helped the latter, and the total strength of the chuars 
who fought for Madhava Singh rose to four thousand.
These disturbances proved the unsuitability of the 
regulations with regard to the law of succession for these 
tribal areas - and incidentally showed how useless was the 
daroga system of police. But though Strachey, the Midnapur 
magistrate, was asked to draft new regulations, he failed to 
grasp the basis of tribal succession customs, though the 
Government did legislate in 1800 for an undivided succession,
1. Lachhuman Singh opposed Raghunath Narain after he attained 
his majority; Petition, Pubeen Singh and others. Enclosure 
No.3. to W.Lent to Govt. 4 Sept. 1833, B.C. 1503/58886#
2. Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 2 of 1 Aug. 1794./12b\; 26 of 11 
March 1796/128x ; vT3'
\ 27 *
3 & 4 of 15 July 1796 (^||) . 51 of 10 June 1796(^|g>5
69 of 23 Sept. 1796^128 ;^ Lachhuman Singh eventually died
in the Midnapur Jail. His son Ganga Narain was the leader 
of the tribal insurgents in 1832-33*c/
3. Beng. Rev. Cons. 20 of 3 May 1799, (^)
4. I.Imhoff to Board, 21 March 1799* Beng.Rev.Cons. 10 of 
12 Apl. 1799. (2|)
5. Beng.Cr. Judl Cons. 5 of 31 Oct. 1799.
which was good tribal custom,1 So when the case came up in
the Sadr Diwani Adalat in 1803 it was laid down that the
Barabhum estate should go to the eldest son "no matter
2whether his mother was first or second wife", and Ganga 
Govind Singh was duly installed.
So the disturbances continued in Barabhum, with much 
bloodshed and plunder.^ The tribal sardars combined to sup­
port Madhava Singh, though Ganga Narain, the grandson of 
Raja Vivek Narain, son of the excluded Lachhuman Singh, and 
uncle of the two contenders,came over to Ganga Govind Singh*s 
side.^ The situation became so serious that the Midnapur 
authorities found themselves helpless, and the Government was 
forced to order the arrest of Madhava Singh if he refused to 
rest satisfied with the allowance sanctioned to him by the 
court.
In July 1800 the important step was taken of institu­
ting the ghatwali (zamindari) police system in Barabhum, as 
in the other jungle estates, an experiment confirmed in 1805 
by Regulation XVIII. At the same time the Jungle Mahals 
were made a separate administrative unit, though the district 
remained under the supervision of the Birbhum authorities
1. Regulation X of 11 Dec. 1800.s Regulations Passed by the 
G.G.in C. II, 207.
2. W.Dent, to G o v t . 4 Sept.1833,Para.10. B.C.1501/58886.
3. Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 4 01 27 June 1805. /129\
4. Ibid.
5. Beng. Cr. Judl.Cons. 2 & 3 of 11 July 1805./129\
V“I?'
6. See p.£9 of this chapter.
for some time. The change was not, however, entirely satis­
factory, for the control which could be exercised over Bara­
bhum from distant Bankura was necessarily nominal, and the 
raja used his new powers in the most arbitrary way. In 1811 
he went so far as to attack a sardar ghatwal who had helped
Madhava in 1805, burning his village and killing and wound-
1
ing several people. For this criminal act he was arrested,
2
tried and sentenced to three years1 imprisonment. Yet, 
after his release he was continued in nominal charge of 
the ghatwali police, because, as the magistrate pointed out, 
the estate was "one of the wildest and least civilized of any 
one of the jungle Estates, the inhabitants consist chiefly, 
if not entirely of the people who are known under the denom­
ination of chooars, and are completely subservient to the 
will and pleasure of the zemindar, and their respective 
surdars."1 However a police thana was established at Bara- 
bazar to keep a vigilant eye on the raja.^ The raja was 
treated as a zamindar of Grant’s second class, i.e. one made 
tributary by conquest, treaty or convention, without either 
full political or proprietary rights and yet not a mere
5
official revenue collector. The Permanent Settlement was in 
theory applied to the estate in 1800, but in practice, because
1. Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 14 of 6 March 1811.
2. Beng, Cr.Judl. Cons. 41 of 29 Apl, 1814. (131\
3* A.B.Tod to Judges of the Court of Cirouit, 9 Apl, 1814.
Beng. Cr, Judl. Cons, 48 of 29 Apl. 1814. (^3^)
4. Ibid; at a monthly expense of Rs.96, ^
5. t). Gr.Manbhum, 194.
A 4  ^
of the inaccessibility of the area, and the attachment of the 
tribal people to their chief, the control of the Bankura 
authorities remained very slight* Their contact with Bara­
bhum was limited to a very occasional tour and the ceremonial 
installation of the chief, Naturally enough, the raja and his 
diwan remained free to do very much as they liked*
His diwan was his half brother Madhava Singh who, 
being a cunning man, had realized the futility of any further 
attempt to resist the British military force, had composed 
his differences with the raja and eventually had secured 
this key post. In that way he was able to deprive Ganga 
Narain, his personal foe, of the revenue of taraf Punj- 
Sardari, which he "had been permitted to hold after his 
father's death. These developments had a direct bearing on 
the unrest of 1832-33.
A word on the character of the raja, the diwan and
Ganga Narain, a cousin of both, is necessary here. The raja
2became imbecile in later years, and was under the uncon­
trolled influence of his crafty diwan. Both the diwan and his 
foe Ganga Narain were cunning, but while the former, because 
of his moneylending business and several oppressive acts,
1. Lent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.11, B.C.1501/58886. 
Por Punj-Sardari (or Panch-Sardari) see p. of this 
chapter.
2. In 1824 the question of his insanity and imbecility was 
raised by the Midnapur authorities. But the Sadr Liwani 
Adalat decided in the rajahs favour (vide Beng. Rev. 
Cons. 17 of 14 May 1824./ 60\. But by 1833 he became 
worse etill and had ^
to be replaced by his son.
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became extremely unpopular among the tribal people, the 
latter, making play with his destitution and showing great 
organizing capacity, won over the whole tribal mass to his 
side. Madhava, the diwan, was "far superior in intellect and 
energy to the remainder of the family," but he employed his 
intellect to amass personal wealth and power. Ganga Narain, 
on the other hand, was able to combine a campaign to relieve 
the people of Madhava's oppressions with his own personal
p
plans for revenge. As a result, long after his death, 
people remembered him with esteem for his gallantry, exploits 
and organising capacity.^
Dhalbhums-
The estate of Dhalbhum (or Ghatdiila), to the south of 
Barabhum, comprised fifty or sixty miles of the central 
valley of the Subarnarekha river, which divided the pargana 
into two almost equal parts. The ground falls from over 1800 
feet in the south to rather more than MOO feet in the north, 
is flanked by the rugged mass of hills on its southern 
boundary, and separated from Barabhum in the north by an al­
most continuous mountain range called Balma.
1. Bent to Govt,, 4 Sept. 1833, Para.11, B.C.1501/58886#
2. A.Subaltern,' op.cit. No.V, Part I, 479.
3# E.Thompson, Lire of Metcalfe, 306.
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It was inhabited by Bhumijes, whose manners and habits 
were much the same as those of their kinsmen in Barabhum and 
other Jungle Mahals, The Dhal chiefs, the zamindars of the 
estate, were of the Bhumij tribe, but like the Chota-Nagpur 
rajas had been provided by the Brahmans with a fictitious
i
noble ancestry, Reid, in his Settlement Report of 1912, 
states that "it is tolerably certain that the founder of the 
dynasty was a member of the primitive Bhumij race of the 
country* He was probably selected by the other Bhumij chiefs, 
the ancestors of the Ghatwals, as their feudal lord to rep­
resent them in their dealing with other potentates, to repel
aggression from without, and to preserve some semblance of
2order within."
It has been seen how. the Dhalbhum chief Raja Jagannath 
Dhal after a decade^ defiance, agreed to pay tribute to the 
British authorities in 1777. This settlement (by Higginson) 
was confirmed under the Decennial Settlement of 1793. The 
gross rental of the 14-5 villages of the pargana had been 
estimated at Rs, 4,596, but that seemed obviously to be under
4
stated,
1, Dalton believed the rajafs ancestor was a washerman!,
2* J,Reid, Dhalbhum Settlement Report* Para* 11,.
3. The Midnapur collector in 1794 wrote that the mahal was 
"the property of the hill zemindar, and has been held at 
a fixed jumma from the time of Mr*Higginson in the year 
1194 [1184?] which having been approved of by you as
the standard for fixing the Decennial jummah, has accord­
ingly been adhered to in the formation of the present 
settlement": Collector to Board, Para,7, 25 Beb* 1794, 
Beng, Rev, Cons, 20 of 27 March 1794. ^ 3 ^
4. Reid, op.cit. Para.10.
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The Permanent Settlement could not he extended to this 
estate before 1800 because of a dispute regarding succession, 
finally in 1800 it was settled with Jagannath Dhal at a rev­
enue of Rs.4267.^ The next raja was Ramchandra Dhal who 
was suspected of protecting Baijnath Singh, the rebel chief
of Dampara, in 1810. After his death in 1822, Baikunth Dhal
2succeeded, but he died only three years after. His brother 
and heir, the minor Chitreswar Dhal, who succeeded in 1825, 
lived till 1863, was in jail for some time in 1833, £tfid was 
popularly called "the Buddha Raja.
B e y o n d  fixing the terms of the revenue settlement the 
British authorities interfered as little as possible in the 
internal affairs of the estate - warned perhaps by the long 
resistance they had met before 1777 to their penetration.
They laid down, in the settlement, that the raja should not 
collect any abwabds from the ryots, nor resume any debottar, 
brahmottar, mahtran or other tenures without the permission 
of the Government, should not give shelter to the thieves and 
robbers, and should produce offenders before the faujdari
4
court when required. He was also made responsible for the
1. D. G. Singhbhum, 180. This was probably another Jagannath 
T)Kal, not the one whom the British had installed in 1777.
2. Dent, to Govt,, 4 Sept. 1833,Para.41, B.C.1501/58886.
3* D» G.Singnonum, 180.
4. ” "Reid, op.cit. Para.9. The first two were grants of 
lands for religious purposes(e.g. the upkeep of the ’ 
temples and the maintenance of the priests); the third 
was a service tenure.
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safety of the travellers and traders. But owing to the in­
accessibility of the area and the turbulent disposition of 
the tribal inhabitants, the British authorities could not 
exercise any effective control over this estate. Thus the 
zamindar was "left, as was his compeer of Chota Nagpur[proper] 
pretty much to his own resources, and he administered the 
country, as best he could, according to his own lights.
In 1793, under Regulation XXII, a company police 
thana was established at Narsing-garh, but the non-tribal 
daroga, who was posted there as a representative of British 
authority, proved very corrupt. He was dismissed in 1794 and 
prosecuted in the diwani adalat for taking bribes from
p
smugglers of salt. In 1800, therefore, the decision to 
recognise the ghatwali police of the jungle areas was applied 
to Dhalbhum, and on 24 March the raja was formally vested 
with the powers of a police daroga. He undertook to keep 
under his orders all the paiks, digwars, sardars, mahafazans, 
etc, of his estate,^ He was to protect the travellers and 
to prevent robbery, murder and other heinous crimes. He was 
required to send all miscreants to Midnapur forthwith, and to 
obey all the orders of the magistrate.
In 1805, though this estate was not included in the 
newly created Jungle Mahals district, the rules for a zamin- 
dari police prescribed for the mahals under Regulation XVIII
Para. 12.
2. Sesolution of Govt. Beng. Cr. Judl Cons. 9 of 6 June 1794
3 * l 8 'The official P°lice
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of that year, were applied to this estate also* Raja Ram
chandra Dhal was put in charge of the police.’*’
In 1810, however, following a revolt by Baijnath Singh
of Dampara, the Midnapur magistrate suggested that the police
2
thana at Narsing-garh should be revive d*, and that was done*
But the futility of the arrangement was soon realized, and in 
1814 the Midnapur magistrate reported that the official 
police might be f,dispensed with" and the police officials 
recalled "without any apprehension for the future good man­
agement or welfare of the purgunnah as the Zumeendar, in 
common with other Jungul Zumeendars in this district is in­
vested with the powers of police."^ It is to the superin­
tendence of the zamindar, he went on, "and not to the vigi­
lance or exertions of the police officers stationed at 
Nursingurh that I attribute the tranquillity that reigns in
4
that extensive jungul estate*"
The raja exercised his police functions, under the 
zamindari police system, through an establishment of paiks 
or ghatwals. These men, of whose names and remuneration, 
lists (isanavis) were furnished to the magistrate, were paid
1* Register, Nizamat Adalat,to Govt.,3 July 1805, Beng. Cr. 
Judl. Cons. 6 of 11 July 1805 /129\
2. Midnapur Magt. to Govt.,20 Feb. 1810, Para. 7. Beng. Cr. 
Judl. Cons. 6 of 23 March 1810. /13P\
3. H.Hodgson to Govt. ,12 Aug. 1814, Para. 4, Beng. Cr. Judl. 
Cons. 22 of 16 Aug. 1814. (131)
4. Ibid. Para.5.
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"by grants of land at easy quit-rents (panchak). They were in 
fact,the descendants of the raja's vassals, who had assisted 
in the original settlement on the land and had formed the 
raja's militia. The lands they held were held hy tenures as 
old as that of their chief, and it was only with the intro­
duction of British legal notions and with the hinduization 
of the raja that the notion arose of the raja Being the real 
owner of the whole pargana, and of the ghatwals Being his 
servants, holding lands By service tenures*^
Two important developments in this estate during the 
early decades of the 19th century deserve mention* The first 
was the revolt in Dampara under Baijnath Singh, and the 
second the mismanagement and undue influence of Thakur Jugal
Kishore, during and after the raja's minority.
2
Dampara was the stronghold of Baijnath Singh, a 
sardar ghatwalt who in the 18th century defied the British 
authority for about a decade. Towards the close of that 
century he took possession of the lands of several neighbour­
ing zamindars and levied contributions from many more, under 
a variety of threats.^ In May 1800 he was attacked and
1. Reid, op.cit. Paras. 85-86. In 1837 there were 284 ghatwali 
tenures m  14 tarafs of Dhalbhum with 516-J Hals (ploughs) 
of land and 665 sardars, sadials and tabedars; Ibid.
Para. 87.
2. It was on the border of Barabhum, 40 miles west of Midna­
pur: Beng. Cr. Judl.Cons, jyj of 19 Jan. 1810. (^ Q )
3. Ibid.
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driven out by British troops,^ Dampara was thereupon handed 
over to Ramchandra Dhal, the Dhalbhum (Ghatshila) raja, even 
though he seemed favourably inclined towards the rebel,
The raja did, in fact, soon permit the return of 
Baijnath Singh, who resumed his depredations. So widespread 
did these become, that British troops were again called in
p
against him in 1809-10, On this occasion, the Dhalbhum raja 
was arrested for his supposed complicity, but it later became 
apparent that Baijnath was being supported by Goman Gunjan 
(the sardar ghatwal of Dhadka in Barabhum), by Sham Sardar 
of Kasipur (in Pachet), Bir Singh Mahapater, the Jagirdar of 
Koilapal, and by several other chiefs. So, after the seizure 
of Baijnath, his brothers, sons and associates, the Dhalbhum 
raja was forgiven and released, and Dampara again entrusted 
to him.
The operations in Dampara, besides revealing to the 
British authorities the natural strength of the country,
1. Strachey, Midnapur Magt., to Govt,, 17 May 1800, Beng,
Cr. Judl. Cons. 43/3 of 19 Jan. 1810 /130w
<~H'
2. Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 21 of 15 Dec, 1809 /130\ *
40 of 19 Jan. 1810 /130x 9
3. Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons, 6 to 8 and 12 of 6 Feb. 1810 (130).
6 of 13 Apl. 1810 /130s . 17 of 29 June 1810 ,130's
'"""I?' ’
The Barabhum raja, who helped in his apprehension, was 
rewarded. Baijnath died in jails Beng. Cr, Judl, Cons.
5 of 13 Apl. 1810 /130\ Also see Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons,
• 18 of 29 June 1810, 130x
History repeated itself in 1832 when ' 18'
Ragunath Singh, the nephew of Baijnath, revolted in 
Dampara and was reinstated by the Dhalbhum raja in his 
jagir.
opened their eyes to the existence of a network of ties 
between the jungle zamindars. Thus the zamindar of Barabhum 
was found to be nearly related to the Dhalbhum chief, while
the latter was closely connected with several other zamindars
1
of the area. Not only that, the wide influence of the 
Dhalbhum chief over his tribal ryots was proved beyond doubt: 
"The zemeendaree of Ghutseela [Dhalbhum] is of great extent 
and the zemindar possesses very considerable influence. The 
success with which that influence has been hitherto exerted 
in the protection of Bydenauth Sing for such a long time, 
notwithstanding the efforts repeatedly made either to appre­
hend or expel him, seems to point out the necessity of inter­
posing an authority to control it and to serve as a check on
the conduct of Ram Chander Dhole or any other person who may
2hereafter possess the estate." The Midnapur magistrate 
later pointed out that "it was not until the person of Ram- 
chunder Dhol the zemindar was placed under restraint, that 
the apprehension of the notorious chooar Bydnath Sing was 
effected.
But inspite of these lessons, nothing was done to 
provide any closer supervision over Dhalbhum affairs. As a
1. Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 6 of 23 March 1810./130% ;
5 of 13 Apl. 1810 /130% K~T5}
2. Midnapur Magt. to Govt., 20 Feb, 1810* Beng. Cr. Judl 
Cons. 6 of 23 March 1810 /130%
3. H.Hodgson to Govt., 25 Aug. 1812. Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons.
1 of 26 Sept. 1812 (131)
consequence, after 1825 Jugalkishore Dhal, the guardian of 
the minor Chitreswar Dhal, was able to become a tyrant in thv 
zamindari, An intriguing and unprincipled man, he grossly 
mismanaged the estate, stopped paying the revenues of the 
Government, dismissed the old and trusted diwan and his 
assistants, and with the help of a few non-tribal adventurers 
exploited the pargana for his own benefit.^* He dispossessed 
several tribal tenants, increased the rents of the ryots and 
established new cesses. He also engaged in trade and took a 
share in the profits of the salt daroga and merchants.
Even when Chitreswar attained his majority in 1829, 
things remained much the same because he was weak and incap­
able: "the weakness of the young Rajafs intellect and his
utter unfitness for all business, rendered him still the tool
2
of his crafty and designing uncle", When he did try to 
assert his authority, it only led to a family feud, and 
eventually to the unrest of 1833*
One might ask how this state of affairs was allowed 
to continue inspite of the supervisory function of the Mid­
napur authorities. The answer is that the control over this 
pargana was only nominal^ and that the company's immediate
1. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1333, Dura.42, B.C.1503/58886„
2. Ibid. Para. 46. It was almost at this very time that the 
Raja of the ChotarNagpur estate gave a foothold to the 
Sikh, Muslim and Hindu adventurers and f or tune-seeker s. 
Madhava Singh,the diwan and brother of the Barabhum Raja, 
was exploiting that estate in the same period, in much the 
same way as Jugal Ki shore Dhal in Dhalbhum.
3. The British authorities had no interest beyond the realiza­
tion of the annual tribute and attending to the installa­
tion ceremonies.
interest in Dhalbhum disappeared with the eclipse of the 
Marathas, against whom it had been a barrier. As late as 1817 
the Midnapur collector opposing the proposal of appointing 
qanungoes in this and other jungle estates under Regulation 
XIII of 1817, pointed out the natural aversion of the tribal 
people towards such innovations,and the obstacles offered by 
the face of the country.
Pachet and Jhalda:-
Pachet, which lay to the north of Barabhum, was an 
estate "of a considerable extent, but only partially culti-
p
vated. " Some open and well cultivated land was found in the 
eastern and southern parts, but there were extensive jungles 
near Kesargarh, the residence of the raja, and on the north­
west frontier towards the Ramgarh district. These, with the 
Panchkote hill, a massif, some three miles long and 1600 feet 
high, from which the estate derived its name, provided a 
confusion of "mountains, rocks, fastnesses and jungles, where 
the most inconsiderable banditti may lurk, secure against 
the attacks of regular troops."-^
1. Beng. Rev. Cons. 70 of 16 Jan. 1818 (57\
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2. W. Dent, to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.30. B.C. 1501/58886. 
3« Ramgarh spl. Commr. to Govt., 17 Jan. 1799* Para.7,
Beng. Rev. Cons. 20 of 20 May 1799 (54)
The population of the pargana was almost entirely 
Bhumij, and lived by cultivation and hunting, enlivened by 
occasional raids on neighbouring areas. Only with the opening 
of the great Benares road through Pachet, late in the 18th 
century, did the first non-tribal traders and other 
adventurers visit the area in any numbers. The Pachet raja 
was also a Bhumij, though the family, by the 18th century, 
had been hinduised and provided with a genealogy linking the 
first raja with the twelfth maharaja of Ujjain. The Pad- 
shahnamah of Shah Jahan described the raja as a commander of 
only 300 horse, but within the hill area the raja was a very 
considerable figure, "co-ecqual to the highest, and superior 
to almost all the others upon the company's frontier and in 
the Maharatta frontiers, which border upon it, many of whom 
in consideration of that circumstance, receive the Tillock 
[Tilak] or installation, upon their accession to their res­
pective Rajes [estates] from him, and with many of whom he
2is connected by intermarriages.1
Over their own people the rajas for centuries had 
exercised a sovereign authority, wielding powers of life and 
death. "These circumstances would naturally beget in the un­
civilized people of the country whose minds could scarcely
1. The Manbhum District Gazetteer (P.282) instances this 
genealogy as typical of klthe manner in which fanciful and 
mythical traditions, mainly complimentary to the family, 
have made it impossible to trace with any sort of accur­
acy the real history of any one of the great zemindari 
families." Also see Dalton,'Notes on a tour in Maunbhoom,1 
J.A-.S.B.my, Part I.
2. Ramgarh spl. Commr.to Govt., 17 Jan. 1799, Para.9, Beng. ' 
Rev. Cons. 20 of 20 May 1799 (.54)
conceive any idea of superior greatness a high degree of awe
and veneration f for their ancient lords *
On the north and north-west of the estate were a group
of twelve minor marcher lords, called the Panchakote petty
zamindars, subordinate to the Pachet raja. Of the twelve -
Bag mundi, Bagankodar, Jaipur, Mukundpur, Hasla, Torang,
Katras, Nawagarh, Jharia, Tundi, Pandra and Jhalda, the last
was brought into dependent status only in the mid-l8th 
2
century.
With the British penetration of this area, the raja 
gradually lost his independent and superior status. Pachet 
was joined for administrative purposes with Bishnupur and 
Birbhum under a single supervisor.^ This estate also found 
itself more heavily taxed than ever before. Prior to 1765 
Pachet, as a Peshkashi or tributary state, paid only 
Rs.16,000 a year to the Mughal authorities. In 1766 the 
Company, through Muhammad Reza Khan, raised the revenue 
demand to Rs. 30,000. In 1770 Pachet, like the rest of Bengal, 
suffered a terrible loss of inhabitants during the great
4
famine of that year. But in 1771, pursuing a policy of 
squeezing blood from a stone, the Company levied a special 
demand of Rs.144,954. The next year, after disturbances
about revenue farms, a separate supervisor was appointed for
1. Ibid.
2. Trokhale, Manbhum Settlement Report, Para 188.
3. I). Gr.Manbhum, 56*
4* Home Misc. No.206, (2), 147-148.
5. Pirminger, Pifth Report, 399.
Jhalda and Pachet - the Manbhum District Gazetteer records
that none of the revenue farmers had heen ready to renew his
lease for fear of a decrease in the revenue yield Mas there
had been a wholesale desertion of the land by the ryots in
1
consequence of the oppression of the superior farmers.1'
The man who eventually secured revenue farmers, a certain
Ram Kant Biswas was appointed diwan as a reward for his pains, j
j
In 1774-1775 further attempts were made to increase the 
revenue.  ^ \j
i
No sooner were these troubles over than the tribal j
1
people of Jhalda, Patkum and other neighbouring estates I
broke into rebellion, presumably as a protest against the ]
tightening of the British control over this area. A separate 
officer (known from 1781 as the Collector of Pachet),^ was 
thereupon appointed to keep a closer control over this danger 
spot. The measure had no effect. In November 1782 the Com­
mittee of Revenue admitted that the zamindar of Pachet "for j
want of some sepoys stationed in the district, is exposed to 
daily depredations from the petty Mahals of Jelda [Jhalda], 
that the zamindars of Nowaghur and Jerrea [Jharia] have 
lately plundered the villages of Cottapulta and Potagee, and 
that the Chokeedars had been attacked and two of their people 
wounded.....We understand both the zemindars of Jerrea and 
Patcoom are [so] little subordinate to the authority of
1. D.G. Manbhum, 56.
2. Home Misc. 206 (2)pl48.
3. Ibid. 563*
i
Government that the latter has not paid any revenue for four
1years, and that the former now withholds his rents." To deal
with the critical situation, the Government sent Major James
Crawford, commanding in Ramgarh, to quell the disturbances in
2Jhalda and to take charge of the revenue collections there.
In March 1783 Mangal Shah, the tribal leader of 
Jhalda surrendered on a promise that his life would be 
spared.^ Crawford was asked to keep him in confinement until
A
he gave security for his future good behaviour. By July 
Jhalda was on the way to a settlement and Jharia, too, had 
been pacified. Crawford then recommended that the people of 
this area and also of Chota-Nagpur and its dependencies on
5
the west and of Pachet proper on the east should be disarmed 
(a suggestion which was quite impracticable). By December, 
the whole area was pacified, and Crawford was asked by the 
Government to enter upon a revenue settlement of Jhalda 
immediately. But they did not take into account the violent 
reaction of the tribal people to the British encroachment on 
their tribal system by the courts and the military authori­
ties, though the rebels of Tamar, like those of Jhalda, had 
surrendered only on condition that they should not be
1. To G.G. & C.,17 Nov. 1782. Home Misc. No.207(2), p,431.
2. Hunter, Bengal MS. Records, I, No.269* Also Soo G.G.& C., 
20 Nov. 1782, Home Misc. No,207, P»432$ Also Soq Rev. 
Letter from Bengal, 6 Feb. 1783, Ibid. P.433*




delivered over to the faujdari adalat for trial.
It was unlikely, indeed, that Pachet would long remain
quiet. The raja felt the encroachment on his independence
very sorely, for British rule both curbed his marauding
activities in the neighbourhood, and led to an enhancement of
the revenue demand, which he found himself unable to meet*
The introduction of non-tribal officials and revenue-farmers
was also an irritation, and one felt by the raja and people
alike. The raja, fa very extravagant debauch*, became heavily
2involved in debt, while the tribal chieftains found them­
selves at the mercy of the naib diwan (on the part of the 
collector), whose removal was twice prevented by the col 
lector. Matters were made worse by the Company's unwise 
administrative measures. Pachet and its neighbouring estates 
were placed under the collector of Ramgarh, whose headquarters 
were 75 Kos (150 miles) distant from Raghunathpur,^ where 
the naib diwan of Pachet lived, and who was already over­
burdened with the affairs of a large and unwieldy district.
The collector was not even allowed servants conversant with
A
the local language in which the accounts were kept. No 
wonder, therefore, that Jhalda was seriously disturbed in 
1789-90.5
Yet in 1791 a decennial settlement of the estate was
1. Ibid. No.578.
2. If.' Leslie,Ramgarh Collector, to Board, 3 May 1787, Beng. 
Rev. Cons. 18 March 1789. /51\ P.126
3. Leslie to Board, 3 May 1787• Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Hunter^ op.cit. No.1613 (Report of the naib diwan of 
Jhalda).
concluded and in March 1793 / Permanent Settlement was 
introduced.^- These settlements "brought with them a whole new 
complex of revenue methods - the issue of pattas, measure­
ment of land (rakababandi) and so on. But as Raja Garur 
Narain Deo wrote in 1793, such a system was novel and quite 
unsuited to the locality. "My country abounds in hills and 
woods, and the villages were never measured; if now I make 
the measurement the ryots will run away and the villages will 
he depopulated. A Mahatto [Mahto] takes a Pottah for a vil­
lage, and then divides the land into 16 parts to the ryots, 
who cultivate it and pay the revenue yearly to me; there
never has been a Ruckbabundy in my country; nor do we know
2
what a Ruckbabundy is".
The Ramgarh collector, although cross at what he 
believed was pretended ignorance, had to admit that many of 
the landholders could neither read nor write, and that they 
kept their accounts by notching a stick or tying knots on a 
string. "Thus plunged in barbarism", he wrote, "it will be 
difficult to induce them to comply with the Regulations of 
Government, and force or compulsion might be of none or
Cr.Manbhum, 196.There were 1280 villages (404 mal or 
rent-paying, 49 khas khamar or retained in the zamindar^ 
hands, 388 brahmottar, 68 debottar, 2 bhatottar, 2 maha- 
trans and 180 nagirs held on quit rents called moghull, 
"ialaEi or panchakiTT (The revenue was fixed at Rs.53,51: 
W.Dent, to Govt., 4 Sept.1833. Para.30,B.C.1503/58886)
2. Petition, enclosure to Ramgarh coll. to Board, 17 Aug.1793 
Beng. Rev. Cons. 82 of 27 March 1794 copies of the
pattas unwillingly granted by his ^14 
shikdar and by the zamindar of Jhalda were enclosed.
little avail - a race of uncivilized people inhabiting
(though thinly) a large tract of country, interspersed with
mountains and almost impregnable woods and fastnesses, are
not easily subjugated, and much I fear that should the
Board’s orders be carried into rigorous execution, and their
ancient and favorite [sic] customs set aside, many of them
would be alarmed and fly to their strongholds; and tho1 they
might not engage in the hazard of acts of open rebellion, yet
as subjects they might for ever be lost to the state.”'*’
The collector also admitted that the pattas recently
granted by Pachet, Jhalda and other chiefs did not correspond
with the regulations. But such was their aversion to the
measurement of lands and such was their inability to meet its
expenses that he recommended that they might be exempted from
these innovations: "Indeed such is the nature of the district
altogether, that ... it ought to be an exception to general
2
rules and orders." He expressed a fear that the tribal 
cultivators, being even less informed,would flee the country 
wholesale, with a consequent considerable loss of revenue, 
should their chiefs be driven to abscond.
The same objections were put forward against the 
establishment of the patwaris provided by the regulations.
In June 1794 the raja wrote, "The villages are scattered 
amongst mountains and extremely small and pay a very trifling
1. W. Hunter to Board, 17 Aug. 1793* Para. 3* Ibid.
2. Ibid. Para. 4.
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revenue; whence then, if Putwarries he established, can they 
receive a monthly salary and whence can money be collected 
for this purpose? There has never been an establishment of 
Putwarries in this District, when you came here, you informed 
yourself of the condition of the country and of the villages 
and have beheld the wretched state of the Ryots. The new 
establishment which has been ordered will impede and injure
the cultivation as the Ryots will consider it a burthen upon
1 2 them,1 The Jhalda zamindar also made a similar statement.
The collector, therefore, recommended "the suspension of the 
Regulations regarding Patwaries and Pattahs in the Bengal 
portion of this [Ramgarh] District,"^ The Government, agree­
ing, passed a regulation in 1794 providing for such an 
exemption.
Very soon it became apparent that the regulation 
(Sec,3, Regulation 45 of 1793) with regard to the sale of an 
estate for failure to pay the revenue was also most unsuit­
able. In 1795 when the raja fell much behind in his payments 
it was decided to put up the estate to public auction.
Several Bengali Hindus purchased portions of this estate, but 
the real purchaser was the Government diwan of the district 
Ram Sundar Mitra.^
1, Petition, N.D.,!Brng. faev.Cons, 2i of 25 July 1794 /$3\
2, Petition, Ibid.
3, Collector tcTBoard, 29 June 1794, Para.5, Beng.Rev.Cons.
4* ! A . vt.17 Jan. 1799:,Paras, 16 to 29,Beng.
Rev.Cons,20 of 20 May 1799 /51\. He purchased it in the 
name of his sons Nilambar, Bhagwati charan, Harish-
chandra and Bhairo and of his ’stooges* Radhaath Roy, Nil-" 
ambar Bose, Jonkiram Chatterjee, Bhagwan Banerjee, Raja 
Lokath, Jagannath Chat ter jee and others.
21 of 25 July 1794 (5 
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This was a good example of that misuse of official 
influence hy Indian subordinates in the civil service, who, 
as B. S.Cohn has shown, "were able through illegal means to 
force lands to be sold for the arrears of revenue, and were 
able to purchase very profitable estates under fictitious 
names."^ Since Ramsundar, who had served as a diwan for more 
than a decade (1785 to 1798), knew all the legal maneuvers 
possible under the British system and since he had the pat­
ronage of the collector, he could harass the jungle chiefs
2
in any way he liked.
But there was a limit to their patience. Once they 
felt that the very means of their subsistence, the land, was 
slipping from their grasp, they rose in rebellion. Prom 
October 1797 to October 1798 Pachet and its neighbouring 
estates were seriously disturbed.*^ All the tribal sardars of 
the jungle areas with their followers assembled in Pachet and 
began to coerce the peasants neither to pay revenue nor to 
cultivate land. By July 1798 the movement had taken the form 
of a people's war against the outsiders, and the officer 
commanding the Ramgarh battalion admitted that "the service 
of Pachete will require the whole battalion even at the
1. 'The Initial British Impact on India', Journal of Asian 
Studies, Aug. I960, p.425*
2. Be extorted Rs.39,520-15-3 from the Ramgarh zamindar, 
Rs.62,300 from the Pachet Raja whom he also made his 
debtor, and he was instrumental in securing a present of 
Rs.5,000 to the collectors Beng. Rev. Cons. 20 & 41 to 43 
of 20 May 1799 (5^^
“  /128x




proper season."^ The collector continued to enforce the sale 
laws for some time longer, but by September 1798, when the 
tribal rebels had begun to "kill all the Bengalees [the new
purchasers and their employees], and disarm and strip the
2Hindoostanies", his eyes were opened. Welsh, the officer 
commanding in Pachet, admitted that "the whole district is on 
the brink of ruin. The revenue Cucheries were sacked, the 
postal services disrupted, and the tahsildars and others
A
threatened with death.
The Collector of Ramgarh realized that the disturbances 
were entirely due to the sale of the lands of the raja, "a
5
measure never before resorted to in this district,"^ All 
the landholders, who feared that they might similarly suffer, 
had joined the raja. He reported the wide influence of the 
raja, now proved beyond doubt. "The Estate having been ... 
about 60 generations in the family and they being connected 
through marriage with most of the principal inhabitants in 
Pacheat and iis neighbour ho od, Singboom, Maunboom, Burraboon, 
Chatna and Nagpore, his influence is most extensive and which 
[sic] has enabled him to incite his adherents to throw the
1. Major D. Marshall to W.Hunter, Ramgarh Magt., 13 July 1798, 
Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 16 of 27 July 1798 /128n
2. Beng. Cr.Judl.Cons. 19 of 12 Oct. 1798. /128\"37.
3« Lt.T.H.Welsh to Major B.Marshall, 11 Sept. 1798, Beng. Cr. 
Judl. Cons. 20 of 12 Oct. /128\
{~J5l
4. Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 10 to 12 of 12 Oct. 1798. /128s
5. W. Hunter to Board, 26 Sept. 1798, Para.2, Beng. Rev.
Cons. 2 of 12 Oct. 1798. /53s
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country into the present commotions, from an idea that Govern­
ment will he induced to restore it to him and which they do
i
not hesitate declaring to he their object* " He, therefore, 
recommended some modification in the regulations with regard 
to the sale of lands*
While the collector was urging Government to reverse 
their policy the raja had brought serious charges against
the collector and against the diwan who had been intrumental
2in his ruin. The Government took a serious view of the 
matter, recalled Hunter, transferred the diwan, and deputed 
David Vanderheyden to enquire into the causes of the dis­
turbances.-^ After a prolonged enquiry, it was proved that 
the disturbances were solely due to the dispossession of the 
raja, and that that dispossession was "ascribable to the 
united effects of fraud, of peculation, of violence, and 
chicanery, and to the practice of all these vices to the
A
greatest extent that the field admitted of." It was rec­
ommended that the general regulations should not have force 
in Pachet, and that land should not be sold for arrears of 
revenue.
So much attached were the tribal people to their chief 
that they had provided all the necessities of life for him 
and his family while he was dispossessed of his estate, and
1. Ibid.Para. 3- All th.e tribal sardars of the area, Gopal 
Manjhi, Chunik Singh, Mohan Manjhi, Deobhag, Sham sardar 
and others were fighting for the rajafs cause. [Para.5.]
2. Petition, Enclosure, Ibid.
3. Minute, G. Gr& Resolution, Board of Rev, Beng.,Rev, Cons. 3 & 
4 of 12 Oct. 1798 /53n
they considered his restoration "as the remedy for all the
"i
evil, which they have lately endured,,"’1 Every villager whom
the Special Commissioner contacted, frankly told him that
"there could be no sultanut or regular government in the
2
country until the Rajah was re-established." The same devo­
tion to his cause was shown by the lesser rajas on the western 
borders of Pachet, "who in the event of the permanent dispos­
session of Guroor Narain, would probably make a common cause 
with him in any commotion that arose in the country, and 
these united with the Jaqueerdars[sic] of Pachete, the greater 
part of whom are situated in that quarter, would cause end­
less trouble, expense, and loss of lives, and baffle the 
efforts of any force that could be sent against them. More­
over, in any case of disaffection the tribal jagirdas (later 
called ghatwals) would no longer prevent the incursion of 
the bandits from Tamar, Silli, Patkum, Barabhum, Manbhum 
and Chhatna; the combination of all their forces, coupled 
with the climate of the area, would lead to the destruction 
of every corps that might enter that area.
The special Commissioner, in his salutary report, made 
clear the inexpediency of applying the sale laws for recovery 
of balances of revenue to any part of the Ramgarh district.
He also suggested a redrawing of administrative boundaries so 
that Pachet, a Bengal mahal, might be attached to Burdwan or
1. Ibid. Para. 9*
2. Tbid.
3. Tbid. Para.10.
Birbhum, But he also stressed that for an unsophisticated 
people it was necessary to have some obvious centre of auth­
ority near at hand, and he therefore argued that the head­
quarters of the Ramgarh district should he moved from Chatra 
to Hazaribargh, 40 miles nearer to Pachet. That would lessen 
the confusion caused by "a multiplication of authorities 
amongst a set of people altogether untaught, and little con­
versant in our forms of administering justice."***
The Government adopted the main suggestion, the raja
2
was restored to his patrimony in May 1799, and the diwan. 
inspite of his representations,-^ lost his purchase money. 
Pachet and Chhatna were annexed to the Birbhum district.^
But since the balances of the estate began to accumulate
5 6again^ and the law and order situation deteriorated, it was
made a part of the Jungle Ilahals district in 1805 with an 
over-all control by the Birbhum authorities.
The raja, like other jungle zamindars, was put in 
charge of the local ghatwali police. Initially the authori­
ties were pleased with the result, recording that the admin­
istration of law and justice had been "put on a better footing
1. Ibid. Para. 50.
2. Board to Govt., 24 May 1799* Beng. Rev. Cons. 1 of 21 June
1-799 /54n
3 /54^
3. Petition, N.D. , Beng. Rev.Cons. 2 of 21 June 1799 "3.
4- Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 12 of 19 Sept.1799 /128\ ; 6 of
10 Oct. 1799- /128\
5* Hunter, Beng. Ms. Records, Nos.9876 & 10088.
6. Beng. Cr. Judl, Cons. 2 of 21 May 1801. /128\ : Asman
Roy, Nean Singh and the other tribal  ^ 54 
bandit leaders created havoc in the whole area.
than was the case before"1. But in 1805 they made a disillu­
sioning discoveryi "On a complaint of robbery being preferred 
to the police officers, and the property being forthcoming, 
it was restored to the complainant on his paying a sum equal 
to one third of its computed value. Thus, the zamindar, if 
not the instigator of theft or robbery, derived profit from 
the commission of the crime, and the poor sufferer, taught to 
regard the zamindar with awe, submitted to the extortion, and
would not seek redress in the court owing to fear and the
2
evident inconvenience of quitting his home and family.1 
(The Company authorities need not have been so perturbed by 
their discovery - it did not represent any particular turpi­
tude in the raja, but a custom found regularly enough under 
the Mughals). The shift in emphasis was perhaps inevitable in 
Pachet for the passage of the great Benares road through the 
estate made necessary the establishment of several police 
thanas and chattis (police outposts) along its line.
So an exception was made in the zamindari police rules 
so far as Pachet was concerned, because of its large area  ^
and also probably because the raja was suspect. The zamindari
police system was replaced by a thana system, the cost of
4 owhich was provided by the zamindar. By 1831 there were four
1. N. L. Chatter jee, 1 Jungle Mohals 1 op.cit. "The Judge and 
Magistrate of Birbhum was to remove his court to the most 
convenient situation within the limits of Pachete, for at 
least four months in the year./.."
2. Ibid.
3. D. G-.Manbhum, 61s There were also small military estab­
lishments at Jhalda and Raghunathpur.
4. Ibid.
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police thanas, three of which were under the magistrate and 
the fourth at Kesargarh under the raja***"
Naturally enough, the whole hody of ghatwals who were 
entirely responsible for the rural police in other neighbour­
ing joarganas but who were ignored here, felt aggrieved and 
looked forward to the day when they could subvert the new 
encroachments on their age-old system*
After the death of Garur Narain in 1817, his eldest
2son Raghunath succeeded to the estate. But this raja soon 
became an imbecile.^ The undue hold of his wife and a young 
Brahman diwan was resented by the raja's brothers and other 
relations* As the raja got deeply involved in debt, while 
this family feud was goin on, the ground was prepared for the 
unrest of 1832.
Kasipur.
This was a Bhumij pargana in Pachet to the east of 
Bagmundi* The chief in 1832 was Anandlal Singh, the son of 
Kunwar Satrughna Singh who had received it as a grant from his 
brother, Raja Garur Narain of Pachet, at a fixed rent. The 
validity of this grant was later challenged in the diwani
1. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.30, B.C.1501/58886.
2. Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 37 of 29 July lo!7./132\ ; 16 of 
23 Dec. 1817 /133\
 ^ 4 He was presented an honorary dress
and a rifle worth Rs.400.
3* Dent, to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.30, B.C.1501/58886.
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adalat and the expenses of this suit involved Anand Lai in 
serious pecuniary difficulties. This led him in 1832 to join 
the discontented members of the Pachet raja's family in in­
viting the Barabhum insurgents.^ But since he was unpopular 
among the ghatwals because of his attempts to increase their 
rents, they remained aloof.
Patkurn:-
Patkum in 1833 was described as "a moderate-sized
estate of about 300 villages in the western part of the
2
Jungle Mahals District adjoining Tamar ." It was situated 
astride the Subarnarekha river, above Dhalbhum, and was 
bounded on the west by the Tamar mountains and separated from 
Singhbhum, to the south, by a considerable tract of jungle. 
The rest of the pargana, along the Subarnarekha was open, 
productive, and well cultivated.
The population was again mainly Bhumij, but with 
strongly marked influences from the Mundas of Tamar and Chota 
Nagpur to the west. (Risley even held that they were pure 
Mundas)^. Like their kinsmen in the neighbouring estates, the 
Patkumias had also enjoyed absolute independence for 
centuries committing acts of * social banditry' at their will.
1. Ibid. Para.29*
2. Ibid. Para.27p
3* bes, I, 117. Their titles of course vary. Thus, the 
Manki in Chota Nagpur becomes natkum in Dhalbhum and mura 
in Manbhum and sardar in Barabhum. Vide Appendix, Ibid.-,
II, 12. ------
In 1794 they were described as "a turbulent and ungovernable 
race of men who, proud in their ideas of independence, and 
confiding in the strength of their fastnesses," frequently 
rose in arms against their immediate superior, the Maharaja 
of Cho tar Nagpur or against the rival tribal chieftains*"^
Such was their violence that the estate was laid waste, the
fields "overgrown with grass from 1 to 4 feet high, and
2
filled with wild beasts." At the behest of their leaders, 
these Bhumijes were ready to do or die and they did not hesi­
tate to commit the most heinous crimes: "Their inroads are 
not only marked by robbery and plunder, but by murder, and 
[in] such a continual state of warfare are these people that 
a ryot is not to be met unless armed with a matchlock, a bow 
or a broad sword. Thus accoutred they are always ready to 
attend the call of their chief, either for defence or attack 
as circumstances may require or his enmity or passions may 
lead him*
The raja, the overlord of these tribal people and 
their chieftains, was a Bhumij by origin, and his family was
4
at one time closely connected with the Barabhum raja’s family* 
But, in course of time, the family was hinduized, the usual 
stories connecting it with the legendary Emperor Vikramaditya 
invented, and three names - Vikramaditya, Udayaditya and
1. W.Hunter to Board, 10 Apl. 1794* Para.3* Beng. Rev. Cons.
2 of 30 May 1794 (53)
2. Ibid. Para.4. ^
3. Ibid. Para.3.
4. I). Cr.Manbhum, 264.
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1
Satrughnaditya - adopted, in rotation, in the family.
After their conversion, the rajas persecuted the local 
Pators (Bhumij chieftains), who in the late 18th century in­
vited Mahanti Brahmans from Orissa to support them, killed 
Raja Udayaditya and drove away his son to Saraikela in Singh-? 
bhum, There he won over Panchanan Das, a Bhuiya chief, who, 
with his tribal force, surprised and massacred the Mahantis, 
As a reward Panchanan got Naro pargana consisting of 16 
villages.^
Patkum became a British territory after the grant of 
the diwani, But for some time it was treated as an appanage 
of the Chota-Nagpur estate.^ Thus, in 1792 the demand on the 
Chota-Nagpur chief was suspended because of the loss he had
4
suffered in Patkum due to disturbances.
Prom the very early days of British rule, the tribes­
men resented the British encroachments upon their tribal 
system. They were found resisting or supporting their
5
brethren of Tamar and Jhalda in rebellion. Nor did 
their raja welcome the British administrative innovations. 
Opposing the regulation with regard to the measurement
1. Sifton, Barahabhum and Patkum Settlement report, Para.17- 
Also see DG.Manbhum, 269-270j VikramAitya is said to 
have come to Patkum during his conquest of Bengal, 
married a Bhumij girl and built Ichagarh, a few tanks 
and tamples etc.
2. Sifton, op.cit. In 1794 Panchanan deposed before the 
Ramgarh collector about the depredations committed by the 
insurgents and in 1807 his son helped in the apprehension 
of Mukundit and got a reward.
3*. W,Hunter to Board, 10 Apl, 1794, Para.3, Beng. Rev. Cons, 
2 of 30 May 1794 /53n
\Tr
4* Hunter, Beng. MS.Records, No.2501.
5* In 1783-54 an3~a^in in 1789.
of land, he stated, "Our country is nothing
more than woods and mountains, and has never been measured,
nor have we any Ruckbabundy, We are even unacquainted with
Begahs and Cottahs; we know not what they are. The villages
in our Purgunnahs are very much dispersed and we farm them to
the Manjees and Mattoos fmahtos or village headsmen] upon
Ticka Pattahs. But in these Pottahs no particulars of the
quantity (T.ydaad) of the lands are mentioned. But they take
possession of the village according to its ancient boundaries
and having divided it into 16 Raik or share, let them to the
ryots and settle with them for the revenue,"^ As much land
2
as could be sown with one fmoory1 of seed, would be known
as one 'noory1 of land, and revenue would be collected on
that basis. Naturally enough, people used to so simple a
system were frightened by this new and complex method: "We
are very apprehensive the Ryots will desert the very hour
the measurement is begun.
Again, the introduction of pattas under the Decennial
Settlement was similarly disliked by these people who did not
know how to write, and whose "accounts are settled, and the
4.
revenues received according to the knots on the string."
1. His joint petition with the neighbouring zamihdars, Beng. 
Rev. Cons. 82 of 27 March J.794 /53\
2. Ibid: One maund of seed kept in a 1 moory1 made of straw. 
[In my own area also the Santhals and the Oraons use this 
moory1.
3. ibid.
4* DepositionfPatkum zamindar, Enclosure, Hunter, Ramgarh 
collector, to Board, 10 Apl. 1794* Beng. Rev. Cons. 2 of 
30 May 1794. /53n
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These legitimate objections were supported by the Ram- 
garh collector who wrotes "to abolish immemorial custom and 
usages, which must be the result of the introduction of Pot- 
tahs, will require much time, labour, and vexation and the 
confusion which may arise from the inconceivable Ignorance 
and stupidity of the people cannot be foreseen*
The Board of revenue also admitted the impossibility of 
introducing pattas "and giving currency to the Regulations in 
general, in the present rude and uncivilized state of the in­
habitants of Patcoom". They hoped, however, that these "daring
p
and licentious" people would gradually accept "the general 
code of Regulations in common with the rest of the natives of 
the Company1s territories*All the same, they asked the 
magistrate to explain to them the advantages of these meas­
ures to reclaim them "from their present disorderly and
a
vicious habits."
At last Regulations 4 of 1794 suspended the earlier 
rules under Regulation 8 of 1793 regarding pattas and 
patwaris for the Bihar portion of the Ramgarh district which 
included Patkum. But no attention was paid to the unsuita­
bility of other rules and measures.
1. Hunter to Board, Ibid. Para.11*
2. Board to Govt.* 29 Apl. 1794, Para.2, Beng.Rev*Cons. 1 of 
30 May 1794 (22)
3* Ibid. ±(
4# Ibid. Para.3. They recommended that the general regulations 
should not be enforced there at the moment, and that the 
tribal people should be appointed police peons.[Para.4]. 
They also suspended the sale of the estate, See Beng.Rev. 
Cons. 20 of 25 July 1794 /53\
kT 5 )
5. Regulations Passed by the G.G.in C. I, 400-401.
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Consequently the unrest among the tribal masses con­
tinued to grow. Prom 1792 to 1807 the unrest was intensified 
by a struggle for succession to the throne, in which the 
village and circle leaders - the mundas and mankis - not only 
of Patkum, but also of the neighbouring estates soon became 
involved as partisans.’*'
The tribal insurgents even hated the zamindar who had 
concluded the Decennial Settlement with the Government, as
"merely an officer of Government," who could not challenge
2their "proprietary and indefeasible right" in the land.
Indeed they showed a peculiar disdain towards the British 
authorities. Gajraj Singh and his supporters threatened the 
peons of the collector with the loss of their life: "Consid­
ering the insolence in serving them with a summons they might 
deem themselves extremely fortunate in being permitted to 
depart alive, but if they or any others dared to return on 
such a message they might be sure of leaving their heads 
with the summons."-^
The result of this continued unrest was the ruin of 
the peaceful peasants. According to a report of 1794 "in
1. Gajraj Singh, one of the claimants in 1792-93 was helped 
by Madan Munda, Bayar Singh and others (Beng.Rev.Cons. 14 
of 29 March 1793 (53\ ^and later Mukunditya, another
pretender, by ' }
Bishun Manki of Tamar and several others: Beng. Cr.Judl.
Cons 16 of 25 July 1799 fl28\ ; Beng. Rev* Cons. 44 of 21 June
(54n
~ s j
2. Hunter to Board, 10 Apl. 1794. Para.8. Beng. Rev. Cons. 2 
of 30 May 1794. /5i\
3. Ibid. 17
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every direction Patcoom presents to your view villages ruined 
and lands laid waste by the violence and destructive incur- 
sions of Guzeraje Sing, the Mankies and their followers*1
It was in such a state of things that the estate was
p
permanently settled in 1798 at a quit-rent of Rs, 885# But 
nothing was done to solve the internal problems of the estate. 
The British authorities recognised a minor as the raja, and 
they ignored the claim of Mukunditya the brother of the late 
Raja Satrughnaditya, Consequently they had always to support
7 A
the minor zamindar by troops.^ British troops hunted down 
the tribal rebels year after year, and yet Mukunditya (like 
lachhuman Singh and laterMadhava Singh in Barabhum in the 
same period) with the help of the tribal chieftains, loomed 
large on the Patkum horizon till 1807 when he was seized and 
hanged.
Naturally enough, the estate was deserted and deso­
lated as a result of these commotions. A report of 1808 said, 
"The Pergunnah of Pautcoom for a series of years past, has 
experienced scarcely any interval of freedom from the out­
rages of the late Mokindeet [sic] and his adherents... the 
late disturbances caused by Ducanny Sahye and Mokendeet have
4
1. Ibid. Para.3
2. Sifton, op.cit. Para,14: The gross income of the zamindar 
from 218 villages was Rs.10,457, out of which Rs.4,088 
was remitted for debottar (religious grants) brahmottar 
(grants to Brahmans), chakran (grants to servants etc.) 
and khorposh (maintenance grants to the raja's relations.)
3. Beng, Rev, Cons, 44 of 21 June 1799 (54)
4. Beng. Cr,Judl.Cons. 16 of 25 July 1799 fl28\ 5 18 of 29 
Aug. 1799 ,128%
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deprived him [the raja] of the small resources that remained, 
the inhabitants of the country, after having been plundered 
of their cattle and property and having seen their villages 
burnt and destroyed, have sought protection with their 
families in other estates, and the zemindar himself incum­
bered with private debts incurred in the payment of his rev­
enues,..., was even distressed for the means of providing 
daily subsistence for his family and dependants,
This estate had remained a part of the large and un­
wieldy district of Ramgarh until the end of the 18th century, 
and then of the Birbhum district till 1805 when it became a 
part of the Jungle Mahals, and the new rules regarding 
ghatwali police were applied here. But the raja's financial
difficulties resulting in the accumulation of balances still
2obstructed any improvement. Inspite of several remissions 
the raja again fell into arrears in 1813.^
In fact, the greatest curse of the estate was the long 
minority of the rajas, which continued until 1832. It was in 
this period that the ghatwali tenures and the maintenance 
grants increased tremendously at the cost of the resources 
of the zamindar. In 1816 the list of ghatwals showed them as
1. W.Blunt, J.M.Magt.,to Govt., 28 June 1808., Para.2* Beng.
Rev. Cons. 21 of 1 July 1808 (jp)
2. Beng. Rev. Cons. 7 of 29 Apl. 1808 (55 \ and 22 of 1 July
1808 (g }
3. Beng. Rev. Cons. 15 of 14 May 1813 (56)
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holding only 15-J maunds of land - that is to say 126 bighas, 
one maund of seed being taken as sufficient to sow eight 
bighas - as reward for their police services. But in five 
subsequent lists, prepared between 1816 and 1832, the grants 
to the ghatwals can be seen rising to 400 bighas (50 maunds) 
in 18 villages and 1,420 bighas (177i’ maunds) in 189 vil­
lages.1 Besides this increase in ghatwali tenures, a large 
portion of the zamindarfs lands came in the hands of the 
khorposhdars (maintenance grant ees)The raja was left with very 
limited resources, upon which the Government demands pressed 
heavily. To improve matters, the sazawal of the court of 
wards enhanced the rents of the khorposhdars and of the
other tribal chieftains who had always been paying quit-rents.
2But this created discontent among them.
It was also in this period that the non-tribal money­
lenders got a foothold in this estate, soon to become obnox­
ious to the people. Lastly, the establishment of an official 
police station early in 1832 created discontent among the 
ghatwals. All these factors contributed to the developments 
of 1832,
1. Sifton, op.cit, Para. 19.
2. Lent, to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.27, B.C.1501/58886.
107
Bagfaundi:-
This estate had Patkum on its western and southern 
boundaries, and its southern limits also touched Barabhum 
over a short distance. To the east and north it was hemmed 
in by an extensive range of hills; on the west it had the 
Subarnarekha as its boundary* Along the river valley the 
country was open* flat, well-cultivated and productive, else­
where there was much jungle, famous for lac.^ *
This estate had been formerly a dependency of Pachet, 
forming with Jhalda, Hasla and Bagankodar, "a line of defen­
sive posts against the Raj as of Chota Ragpoor and Ramghur 
whose countries are immediately to the west and north of 
them.
The population was chiefly Bhumij. Like their kinsmen 
in the neighbouring estates, they were also of an independ­
ent disposition, and opposed the British encroachments on 
their tribal system tooth and nail* In 1793 they opposed the 
introduction of pattas and the measurement of land because 
these measures were too complex for them.^ In 1798-99 they 
opposed the sale of the estate in lieu of revenue arrears, a 
sale engineered here, as in Pachet, by Diwan Ram Sundar Mitra. 
On the latter occasion, they became so violent that British
1* Ibid. Para.28.
2. l¥id.
3* Joint petition, Raja Mahadeo Singh and others, Beng. Rev. 
Cons. 82 of 27 March 1794 ,53\
troops were employed against them for several months.^
On both occasions the authorities had to yield. By Regu­
lation 4 of 1794 the estate was exempted from the rule regard 
ing the issue of pattas, while in 1799 the Special Commission 
ner for Ramgarh noted, "The general objection to the sale of 
Estates in the District of Ramghur cannot in any instance 
apply more forcibly than in the present if the remote situa­
tion of the lands, their inaccessibility, the unhealthiness
of the climate, and the small amount of the revenue be
2
considered."
It became clear that the people of Bagmundi would never 
allow any non-tribal adventurer to succeed to the position of 
their chief by the mere purchase at auction of the raja’s 
estate. The special Commissioner argued, in terms of exped­
iency, against the selling up of Raja Anand Singh, pointing 
out that "circumstances may greatly alter the nature and 
motives of such acts [as the raja’s rebellion], and that 
when from such causes as must prevail in a rude, mountainous 
and frontier country even the most salutary orders of Govern­
ment cannot always be so regularly enforced as might be 
desired, or where the object in view is not worthy of the 
effort necessary to enforce the accomplishment of it, the 
failure of occasional attempts at force, with adequate means,
will invariably tend to lessen the respect for the
1. Beng,Cr.Judl.Cons.il & 12 of 4 May 1798 /1 2 8 5 & 6
of 11 May 1798 ,128^
33 of 10 Aug. 1738 /128x
2* Ramgarh spl.Commr. to Govt., ' 37
9 Feb. 1799, Para.2, Beng. Rev. Cons. 49 of 20 May 1799(54
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constituted authorities, whilst a moderate spirit of concil­
iation, governed by a consideration of the circumstances and 
habits of the people to be controuled [sic], will as necess­
arily tend to increase it." ^  When Government came to investi­
gate the way in which Biwan Ram Sundar Mitra had provoked 
the sale - and then had himself "purchased the estate in
another name", they found justice allied to expediency, and
2restored the estate to the raja.
This estate was first a part of the Ramgarh district 
and then of Birbhum till 1805 when it was transferred to the 
Jungle Mahals. But this change,with new police rules, did not 
improve the condition of the people. Both the raja and the 
mankis became involved in debt and their lands were mostly 
mortgaged. The Government jama was Rs. 2,266 , and the 
estimated assets Rs.6,500, though "in this as in all the 
other Jungle Mahals the resources of the estate are greatly
4
absorbed in providing for the younger branches of the family,r
1. Ibid. Para. 11.
2. Tteng, Rev, Cons. 20 of 25 March 1799 (54\ . Rajkumar,
Natbar Singh and others were the
fake purchasers: Beng. Rev. Cons. 27 of 5 Oct, 1798 (5^)
3. Bent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.28, B.C.1501/58886.
4. Ibid. Mahta (Matha), an estate of 19 villages and about 
20 sq. miles, was a part of Bag mundi till 1805, when it 
was recognised as a separate zamindari. Thakur Bayar 
Singh, its jagirdar, was a notorious chuar in 1798-99*
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Manbhum:-
This was a large estate, open and cultivated, to the 
east of Barabhum. Manbazar, a large village, later became 
the headquarters of the Manbhum division in 1834. Its chief 
had been hinduised in course of time, and the family had 
begun to claim that they came originally from Rajputana. But 
in the absence of any authentic proof, the Manbhum Gazetteer 
argues that "in all probability like other zamindars of the
district, they are actually of Bhumij or possibly in this
—  2case of Bauri origin."
Prom 1805 this estate was a part of the Jungle Mahals 
district , and the police power was vested in the raja, aided 
by an extensive establishment of ghatwals. The Government 
jama was Rs. 1,595, while the nufassil assets, according to 
the raja*s statement in the court, Rs,l6,000.^
In the 1820*8 there was a serious family feud, and the 
raja was compelled by the civil court to give separate main­
tenance grants to his brothers. He was also hostile to his 
eldest son born of his first wife. Moreover, he was deeply 
involved in serious financial difficulties because of his 
improvident expenditure.
When in 1832 disturbances broke out in Barabhum con­
ditions were ripe for their spread to Manbhum whose raja was 
related to Ganga Narain, one of the noted leaders of the
1. D» G.Manbhum, 276, incorrectly says that this was the headr 
quarters of the Jungle Maha3s District.
2. Ibid. 276.




The main part of this estate lay to the east of 
Manbhum, but a small portion bordered the south-eastern angle 
of Barabhum. Generally speaking the land was open and well- 
cultivated, lying on the south bank of the Kasai river.
Politically it formed part of the zamindari called 
Khuttura Dhalbhum (to distinguish it from Ghatshila Dhalbhum) 
and had itself been originally called Dhalbhum.^
During the early days of the British rule the zamindar
of this estate was considered to be defiant and its people
2
turbulent. That was why it was several times transferred 
from one district to the other for the sake of effective 
control. In the early 19th century several rajas died very 
young, and on the eve of the 1832-33 unrest the raja was an 
idiot and the estate was under the court of wards in trust 
during the minority of the imbecile fs son.
1. Ibid. Para. 32. Koilapal was formerly under this
estate: Pirminger, Midnapur Dist, Records. IV, No.71.
2. Ibid. Nos. 2 & 70.
3. “Bent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.32, B.C. 1501/58886.
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Koilapal;-
Koilapal was a small estate (jagir) consisting of a 
jungly tract adjoining the Dhadka ghat of Barabhum.'*'
The inhabitants were all Bhumijes. They were always 
ready to go on marauding expeditions at the orders of their 
chief who was a noted cattle-lifter in the early days of 
British rule. In 1783-84 this estate was in recurrent 
unrest. In 1784 the chief, Sanpal Singh, was captured with 
all his family, and for some time was held in jail.^ Later,
A
when he was released by the Magistrate of Midnapur, he 
asked for some means of subsistence, and he was allowed to 
have one head of cattle per day, in turn, from every zamindar 
of the area. Later the zamindars made terms with him by 
granting him a few villages for his maintenance in return for
p;
his promising to spare their villages.
Bir Singh, the son of Sanpal, stepped into the shoes
of his father, and from 1798 to 1809 he was the Rob Roy of the 
6 7
area. In 1809 a reward of Rs.500 was offered for his arrest.
1. Ibid. Para. 33* There were only five villages in it.
2. Por Subla Singh See p.^c of this chapter.
3- Hunter, Beng. MS. Records, Nos.677 and 678.
4. Ibid.
5. Gokhale, op.cit. Para.203. The name here is Shab Lai.
6. In 1799 he had 5 00 chuar followers, and his associates 
were Lai Singh of Suri, Punj -Sardar of Chelyama, Goman 
Gunjan of Dhadka (all three in Barabhum) , Baijnath Singh 
of Dampara (Dhalbhum ),Bindaban Bhuiya of Kursal (Sham- 
sundarpur )and Baijnath Singh Bhuiya of Jamda (Raipur) : 
Beng. Rev. Cons. 14 of 14 March 1800 /54\ and 20 of 3 May 
1799 /54x
7. Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 21 of 15 Dec. 1809 /130\
(— 5 )
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Blunt, the Jungle Mahals Magistrate, admitted that it was out 
of his power to adopt "decided measures" against him without 
a much more adequate force than he then had.'*'
At long last in January 1810 Bir Singh surrendered* 
Since he helped in the apprehension of his old colleague 
Baijnath Singh of Dampara, he was pardoned, and the estate 
was left in his possession.
Bahadur Singh, like his father, at first took a 
leading part in the disturbances in 1832, and then he sur­
rendered and helped the authorities.^
Shamsundarpur and Phulku ana s -
These two estates were the two parts of the former
estate of Tungbhum, which had been divided among the heirs
long before Regulation X of 1800, prohibiting such divisions,
was promulgated. The north-western part of it, adjoining
Koilapal and Dampara, was full of jungle, but the south-
15
western portion was open and cultivated. To the east of 
these estates were Raipur, Bhellaidih i and Simlapal, to the 
north Supur and Chhatna, all considerable in size and
1. Ibid.
2. Seng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 39 of 19 Jan* 1810 ^130)
3* Ibid.
4. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833> Para.33» B.C.1501/58886.
5. Ibid. Para. 34.
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formerly dependencies of Pachet.
Prom the very early days of Eritish penetration into
this area, these zamindars had opposed any encroachment on
their age old independence, and for that reason these estates
were transferred and retransferred to Midnapur and Burdwan
several times during the last quarter of the 18th century*
Yet Sundar Narain,the zamindar of Shamsundarpur,and Burp
Narain of Phulkusma committed depredations several times
during this period. In 1799, the year of the great chuar
rebellion in this area, they helped the dispossessed Rani
of the Midnapur estate and Burjan Singh of Raipur with their
arms and men* Again, in 1809 they were found harbouring
*
the chuars and instigating depredations*
The constitution of the new district of the Jungle 
Mahals with new rules regarding the tribal police, did not 
restore order in the two estates* As the zamindars, who paid 
Rs.2 65 and Rs.210 revenue, from estimated collections of 
Rs.4,000 and 3>600 respectively, had granted much of their 
lands to their dependent relatives and to the ghatwals* 
their resources were never large. In the early 19th century 
both zamindars got themselves heavily involved in debt to 
non-tribal moneylenders and were forced to alienate still 
more of their lands in payment. By 1832 their only way of
1. cf. In 1783-84; Hunter,Beng. MS. Records Nos. 539, 1933• 
Also in the period 1767 to 1772 they had been noted 
marauders,
2. Beng. Cr. Judl, Cons.5 of 11 July 1799 /128%
3. Jungle MahaHs Magt. to Midnapur Magt.,14 Sept. 1809. Para.5. 
Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons, 21 of 15 Bee. 1809 ^130)
H d
escape seemed to them to he to raise a revolt and to wipe 
out the moneylenders."^
Raipur :-
This estate on the hanks of the Kasai and to the east 
of Manbhum and Phulkusma, was one of the most disturbed 
jungle estates of Midnapur in the later part of the 18th 
century. The village of Raipur was situated on the southern
p
bank of the Kasai, 36 miles south of Bankura. The people 
were Bhumijes. The chief, after his hinduization, declared 
himself a Rajput,
After its subjugation by the British, Raipur formed
part of the Nadia district, but in March 1794 it was
transferred to Burdwan,^ Then in September of that
year it was transferred to Midnapur district.^ Next year
this estate was sold in liquidation of arrears of 
5Rs,3,145, whereupon widespread disturbances began.
Durjan Singh, the ousted zamindar, was suspected of 
having instigated them. In 1798 he voluntarily made his 
appearance before the Magistrate of Midnapur and denied the
1. Bent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.34, B.C. 1501/58886.
2. B. G.Bankura. 172,
3. Beng. Rev,Cons. 35 of 27 March 1794
4. Beng. Cr,Judl,Cons. 1 of 3 Oct. 1794/ 128\
15
5. West Beng, Bist.Records. Burdwan, 212-213: The question 
of the irregularity of The sale procedure was raised.
6. Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 5 of 7 July 1797 /128\
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charge. Since there was no evidence against him, he was set 
free on giving a security.'1' Still the estate remained dis­
turbed till 1799. At one time a body of 1500 chuars set fire
2
to the bazar and cutcheri, and overran the whole tract.
Bodies of troops conducted operations in the area, but to no 
effect.^
At last in March 1799 the Collector of Midnapur, while 
recommending separate rules for the jungle zamindars and 
their ryots "who are almost savages," wrote that "their lands 
also should never be sold to realize the revenue as it only 
creates disturbances and greater loss to Government... Roy- 
pore which is happily the only Estate which has been sold in 
the jungles [of the Midnapur district] is a striking proof 
of what I have asserted and ... it would be far more prefer­
able to oompromise the business with the former zamindar, 
than dispute it, as the purchaser ... will never be able to 
keep possession unless a company of seapoys are constantly
A
stationed in the pergunnah. " Even if the outsider got 
possession, he went on, "which is supposing that which never 
will be, the Ryotts will not cultivate the land as Doorjun 
Sing the former proprietor has forbidden them."
1. Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 16 of 1 June 1798 /132\ , But
D. G.Bankura, 38,notes that "he was 37
apparently once captured after he had attacked, plundered 
and burnt some 30 villages; but when he was put on trial 
he had to be released because no one dared to appear 
against him."
2. D. G.Bankura, 37.
3. Seng.Cr.Judl. Cons. 15 of 10 Aug. 1798 /128\ ; Beng. Rev.
Cons. 18 of 22 Feb. 1799 /53)
4. Imhoff to Board, 4 March
1799, Beng. Rev. Cons. 33 of 15 March 1799 ^54^
In fact, Bur j an Singh, with the help of the retainers 
of almost all the neighbouring zamindars, felt secure in his 
fort at Jamda, while the whole estate was deserted and lay- 
waste#*1" So the Midnapur collector requested the Government
to suspend the rules with regard to the sale of estates so
2
far as this area was concerned# Hira Lai, the purchaser of 
the estate, had never got any foothold in the estate, while 
his servants were murdered as soon as they entered it.^
Though late in 1800, with the adoption of new rules 
regarding the police, the situation changed and the ghatwals 
of other estates became quiet, it was still thought best to 
rescind the sale of Raipur. Fateh Singh, the eldest son of 
the old and infirm Bur j an Singh, was installed as zamindar 
of the estate with police powers and an enhanced jama 
(of RS.3,500).4
Under the new district of the Jungle Mahals since 
1805, this estate remained quiet for some time. But by 1809 
the tribal sardars of Raipur had become restive# The zamin- 
dar, it was believed, was instigating them#-'
However, when in January 1810, Baijanath Singh, the 
bandit chief of Jamda in Raipur,was apprehended,^ the main
1. Beng# Rev. Cons. 20 of 3 May 1799 /54\ ; Beng. Cr. Judl#
Cons. 25 of 20 May 1799. 7128%
'■TI.
2. Beng. Cr#Judl. Cons. 11 of 22 Aug.1799. /128\
3. Beng. Rev. Cons.14 of 14 March 1800 ^ 54) ^42
4. Beng. Rev. Cons. 1 & 2 of 16 Oct. 1800 /54\ ; Beng# Cr. 
Judl.Cons.12 of 26 Feb. 1801. ,128% KT 5 }
'52
5. Beng. Cr. Judl Cons. 21 of 15 Bee. 1809 1^30^
6. Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 38 of 19 Jan# 1810
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reason for the late unrest was found to be the defective
state of the police, and the financial stringency of the
zamindar.^ Indeed, his land-revenue had been increased from
Rs.2,400 (in 1174 fasli or 1767A.D.) to Rs.2,509 (in 1199
fasli or 1792 A.D.) and then to Rs.3,509 in 1800-1801. At the
recommendation of the Jungle MahaDs Magistrate, the Government
2
then restored the former jama of Rs.2,509. Prom that point 
on the estate remained quiet until 1831.
1. Beng. Cr. Judl Cons. 5 of 13 Apl. 1810 (~^^)
2. Beng. Cr. Judl,Cons. 6 of 13 Apl. 1810
CHAPTER II.
Chota-Nagpur, Palamau and Singhbhum 
in the Early British Period,
The second region with which we are concerned, is 
Chota-Nagpur proper, with its ancient gateway, Palamau. 
Chota-Nagpur is a high, rolling, well-wooded tableland, in 
parts very fertile, and well peopled. Palamau, to the west 
and north of Chota-Nagpur, consists of the lower spurs of the 
Chota-Nagpur-Hazaribagh plateau, where it borders them, and 
further west still of "a tangled mass of isolated peaks and 
long irregular stretches of broken h i l l s . T h e  valleys of 
two rivers, the North Koel and the Amahat, which run north­
ward to join the Son, provide the only level stretches of any 
great extent, and the main lines of approach. For convenience 
sake Palamau will be discussed first.
With Japla, Belaunja and Tori , Palamau district was
2 365 miles in length and nearly 5,000 square miles in area,
most of it involved hill ranges, often of sharp and irregular
outline, rising at their highest to some 3,000, feet. Hunter
said of Palamau, MThe face of the country is wilder and more
y z  A
broken by rock and jungle than in Chutia Nagpur.'1 Its south­
1. W.W.Hunter, Statistical Account of Bengal, XVI, 234.
2. W.Hamilton, East India frazetteer, 355*
3- D.E.Sunder, P al amau 5 e 11 le me nt fie port, Paras. 1 and 3*
Prom 1771 to 1635 Palamau was a part of the Ramgarh 
district, and Tori was a dependency of the Chota-Nagpur 
estate. Pamalau proper was 100 miles long and forty broads 
Cuthbert to G-ovt., 15 Apl.1830, Para,50, Beng,Cr. Judl.Cons. 
27 of 11 Llay 1830. ^139)
4. Hunter, op.cit.234.
western corner, the Chechari valley, is an almost complete 
basin, but for the narrow outlet carved by the river on its 
way north. M0n the south it is overlooked by the range of
✓ x / ✓
hills in pargana Barwa; on the west the Jamira pat, a high 
plateau in the tributary Mahal of Sarguja”, rises like a wall 
to a height of nearly 4,000 feet, confronted on the eastern 
side of the valley by the Nethur-hat pat, of 3,600 feet; 
while a lofty spur from the Jamira^Pat, crowned by the natu­
ral fortress of Tamolegarh, overhangs the valley to the 
north.
The forests, hills and rivers, admired as grand and 
beautiful scenery, provided security and seclusion for the 
tribal inhabitants of Palamau, for the approaches were cov­
ered by "many ghauts or passes of various degrees of f
p
strength." The Kharwars and Cheros, the principal tribes, 
were always a powerful people, and as late as the 16th cent­
ury were described as "a race of border robbers, chiefly 
known by the daring raids which they made into the open 
country at the foot of the h i l l s . N o n e  of the invasions 
of Palamau, whether that of Sher Shah's generals in 1538, or 
of the Mughals ^  or of the Marathas in the 18th century ever 
thoroughly subjugated it.
Nevertheless the tribals were not immune to outside 
influences, and the process of hinduization was well under
1. Ibid. 236-237.
2. TEH.
3. B. G-.Palamau, 18.
4. Hunter, op.cit. 455-468, Also see D. G. Palamau, 18.
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way by the 16th century. The Chero chiefs in other areas of 
south Bihar, where they were found ruling till that century, 
erected numbers of temples. From south Bihar the process 
spread into Palamau to the landowning Cheros there. They bor­
rowed Brahmanical gotras in support of their claims to Raj­
put status, and by the close of the 19th century, the Palamau 
Cheros were wearing the sacred thread."*"
Their right to wear it was dubious, for their origin 
was almost certainly non-Aryan. The anthropologists - Dalton, 
Risley, Henry Elliot- agree in believing them to be the kins­
men of the Mundas and Oraons: 'convincing proof of the non- 
Aryan affinities of the cheros is derived from the fact that 
the Chota-Nagpur members of the caste [i.e.those of Palamau], 
whose poverty and social insignificance have held them aloof 
from Hinduising influences, still retain totemistic section- 
names similar to those in use among the Kharias, who are
p
beyond doubt closely akin to the Mundas."
There is some doubt as to how far the Cheros and 
Kharwars had intermingled. Risley held that the Cheros, sacred 
-thread wearers, living strictly as Rajputs, had intermarried 
with Kharwar families. Sunder and others held that the two 
tribes maintained their separate identity. Thus the Bhogtas, 
themselves a sub-tribe of the Kharwars,while admitting that 
the Cheros are a sub-tribe of the Bhogtas, refuse to eat with
1. Risley, Tribes. I, 199. Also see Dalton, Ethnology, 127*
2. Risley, op. c i t 199; Two sub-tribes of the Cheros are 
Baraha j aria & Te rah-haj aria.
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them or to accept them as social equals. Nevertheless, despite
their Dravidian origin, hoth Cheros and Kharwars, by their
martial habits and pride, fully lived up to the Kshatriya
status they claimed. According to Forbes, "the Cheros are a
proud race, and exceedingly jealous of their national honour.
They have never forgotten that they were once a great people,
and that their descent was an honourable one."^ *
Palamau, as part of the Bihar Sub ah, passed under
British administration with the rest of the province, by the
grant of the Diwani in 1765. But if Palamau was not "the
absolute terra incognita that further Chota Nagpore so long 
2
remained" , the difficulty of the terrain, and the reputa­
tion of the inhabitants were sufficiently discouraging to the 
Company. Not until a civil war broke out among the Cheros in 
1770 did Captain Jacob Camac, the commander of the southern 
frontier detachment, think fit to enter the country. Even 
then he marched only after one of the claimants to the Pala­
mau estate had negotiated with the Patna Council for aid.^
In January 1771, Camac attacked Palamau in support of 
the claimant's forces and by June the insurgents, who had 
occupied the Palamau fort, had been defeated. However,the
resistance of the Bhogtas and other tribes had been so stiff
A
that it was thought necessary to occupy the fort, and two
1. Ibid. 203.
2. ‘Bradley-Birt, Chota Nagpore, 205.
3. Bridge, Palamau Settlement report, Para.41.
4. The 1ight guns ojTCamac at first made ‘no impression on 
the solid stone of the forts's Hunter, op.cit. 469.
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other outposts on the Sarguja border with Company troops so 
as to ensure effective control of the territory. The candidate 
supported by the Company, one Copal Rai was then installed as 
the raja, on a promise of Rs.12,000 revenue a year to the 
East India Company, Even then the precarious nature of the 
British control was emphasised by insurrections which broke 
out soon after Camac had returned to Patna. (Camac fell ill 
after his return and rumours spread that he was dead). The 
combined efforts of the Company's forces were required to 
save the fort and to defeat and drive off the Chero claimant
2
Jai Nath Singh and the Marathas who had come to his support.
Further risings in 1773> though suppressed, emphasised 
the power of the southern chiefs, whom "it was deemed ex­
pedient to conciliate".^ In October Warren Hastings decided 
to transfer Palamau (with Ramgarh and Chota-Nagpur) from the 
charge of the Patna Council to that of the Presidency, and to 
entrust both revenue collection and the administration of 
justice to the zamindars* In 1774 conciliation was carried a 
stage further by a remission of Rs.6,800 in the Palamau
4
demand, on account of severe floods.
In 1731 civil and criminal courts were established at 
Chatra, the officer in charge of them also being responsible 
for supervising the collection of revenue. But the centre for
1. J.C. Jha, 'Early British penetration into Chota Nagpur, 
1769-73’. J.B.R.S. XLIII, 331.
2. Bridge, op.cit. £ara.42.
3* Ibid. Para.43.
4. TbTcI.
Camac's south-western frontier detachment - later the Ramgarh 
battalion - was Hazaribagh. In 1799 the Ramgarh magistrate 
strongly opposed the proposal of shifting the sadr station 
from Chatra to Hazaribagh because of "the necessity of 
watching closely the people of Palamow, a more hardy and 
bolder race of men than the other inhabitants of this 
district."’*' Despite the establishment of the courts, and 
the abolition of the posts of thanadar and f aujdar in this 
pargana, however, the zamindar was allowed to retain many 
concurrent powers, while the fau,jdari darogas reported in­
dependently of the adalat through the Remembrancer of the
2
criminal courts to the Governor-General.
The policy of indirect rule through the raja or the 
zamindar - for such in effect was the system followed by the 
Company in Palamau - depended for its success upon the qual­
ity of the chiefs. Gopal Rai, however, proved an unfortunate 
choice. Himself hinduised, he was at odds with his tribal 
chieftains, whose jagire he sought to resume,and with the 
representative of the Company, the qanungo Udwant Ram. There 
followed, inevitably, "a series of iniquities which probably 
have no parallel in the whole revenue history of the Company's 
provinces," J and which ended with the treacherous and brutal 
murder of Udwant Ram by the raja, and the latter 'a trial in
1. T.Palmer to Govt., 17 Aug. 1799# Para.3. Beng. Cr. Judl.
Cons. 30 of 29 Aug. 1799 /128x
2. Bridge, op.cit. Para. 44.
3. Ibid. Para.45.
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1776 and life-imprisonment at Patna.^
Gopal Rai had come increasingly under the influence 
of Shiva Prasad Singh, a nephew of that Jai Nath Singh 
expelled from Palamau by Camac, and the estate was torn by 
the factional struggles of the supporters and opponents of 
Shiva Prasad Singh. During those struggles British troops had 
several times to be sent into Palamau to restore order. Yet, 
though Shiva Prasad appeared to be implicated in the death of 
Gopal Rai's father Raja Jai Kishan, it was to him that the 
guardianship of Gopal Rai*s son, Churaman Rai was given in 
1786 (the year in which Gopal Rai died in Patna prison)* That 
position he retained even after he had been proved to be the 
instigator of disturbances between 1800 and 1803. The Com­
pany^ policy was one of pure expediency: Bridge, the settle-
p
ment officer, rightly called it a Mhand to mouth policy*1 
Shiva Prasad used his position to further his own factional 
interest and to destroy that of his ward. "Such was the man 
to whom was delivered the administration of the estate, and 
the care of the minor grandson of Jai Kishan, his foe. It is 
perhaps not to be wondered at, that the Thakurais [the jag- 
irdars] recovered all their lost property and added to it, 
while Churaman Rai grew up neglected and incompetent, the 
owner of a smaller property than many of his own principal
*5
under-tenure-holders,
1 . Soughsedge to Govt. ,6 March 1814, Para. 14, Beng.Rev. 
Cons. 15 of 2 April 1814 , /56x
KT 5 )
2. Bridge, op.cit. Para.48.
3. Ibid.
The destruction of the raja’s estate thus begun by 
his guardian was completed by the Company's Decennial Settle­
ment. Sheristadar John Grant in 1787 had classed Palamau with 
Cooch Bihar, Chota-Nagpur and Ramgarh as a zamindari of the. 
second class, that is a chieftainship the exact territory and 
revenue of which could not be ascertained because it was so 
hilly and so covered with jungle.^ But though the Government
had decided in 1789 that the settlement of this pargana
2would "continue as at present", Leslie,- the Ramgarh col­
lector, who from 1789 onwards made the Decennial Settlement, 
proceeded to make detailed awards which ignored any doubts 
and difficulties. Certain of the old jagirdars were allowed 
by Leslie to pay their revenue through the raja, but he also
confirmed many new men in estates which had been acquired in
the most dubious ways. Thus Sugand Rai, who had long been 
refractory, was confirmed in Deogan which he had recently 
acquired in a doubtful way; Chhatrapati Rai, whose father 
Gajraj Rai was still in jail, was confirmed in Bisrampur, 
while his brother Dharni Rai was confirmed in Baraon jagir; 
even Ram Baksha Singh, the son of the defeated Jai-Nath,was 
confirmed in the tenure of all the land that he could lay 
his hands on.^
The result of Leslie’s settlement was an abrupt fall
1. J.Grant, Chief Sheristadar, to Board of Revenue, 8 March. 
1787, Beng. Rev, Cons. 18 March 1789 /.51\ P.355.
V33'
2. Resolution, G. G.in C.,18 Sept. 1789/ Para.38, Beng. Rev.
Cons. 41 of 2 Jan. 1824 ,59n
3. Bridge, op.cit. Para.49.
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in the income of the raja and in his prestige vis-a-vis his 
jagirdars. Most of the district officers over-estimated the 
raja's income and cpiite failed to realise that after meeting 
the cost of the police and the revenue collections he was 
left with very little. It was only long afterwards that it 
was realised that as a matter of fact he never succeeded in 
collecting the greater part of the koa [tussore silk worm 
cocoons] and kath [catechu] charges at all, nor most of the 
contributions from the tribes, as "they never would agree to 
pay it."1
In 1793 Baja Churaman Rai came of age. His position 
was already gravely impaired by the Decennial Settlement, and 
by the commutation of the rents payable by seven under­
tenure holders which had been arranged by Shiva Prasad Singh. 
(Shiva Prasad, as a jagirdar.took good care not to commute 
the services and dues payable by others to himself and his 
fellow jagirdars.) There had also been practised upon the 
raja more outright frauds. Captain Roughsedge noted in 1814 
that "as the Dewan and all the head servants of the Raja were 
themselves the principal jageerdars, their interest was at 
variance with their duty, and each took advantage of the 
youth and incapacity of the Rajah, to reduce the rent of his 
own lands, and increase their extent, whenever feasible, by 
placing on the list of jageers, villages that were held at
1. Roughsedge to Govt. ,6 March 1814, Para.8* Deng. Rev.
Cons. 15 of 2 Apl . 1814 /5_6\
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will."'*" The raja, with his assets thus filched or unwisely
capitalised by his guardian, found it impossible to meet gov-
2
ernment demands from his ordinary income, and even after 
coming of age, had to continue the bankrupt policy of com­
muting rents for lump sum payments. By 1812 his annual in­
come had sunk by some Rs.2,564, and when on three occasions 
he did resume jagirs, the collector or the courts compelled 
him to restore them. His only remaining remedy was to put 
pressure upon the body of tribal cultivators, and to resume 
their lands - and from 1789 that process was steadily tried.
The result of this shifting of the burden from the 
strong to the weak was a growth of general discontent. This 
flared up in 1800 in a revolt which needed the employment of 
two battalions of company troops and of the forces of Raja 
Fatah Narain Singh of Deo to cope with it.^ The situation 
was complicated by "the intimate and immediate local connex­
ion of Palamow with the Maratha frontiers",^ and not until 
1802 were the last embers of revolt stamped out.
One feature of the unrest was that the insurgents also 
turned against Shiva Prasad Singh, who, as diwan, had ruined 
many of them, attacking his house at Ranka, and showed their 
hatred of the collector's sazawal, too. At one time in Feb­
ruary 1801 as many as twelve to fifteen hundred armed Oheros,
1. Ibid. Para.14.
2. To make matters worse, in 1795 the raja had to pay Rs.5,00C 
to the Govt, as an investiture-fee; Ramgarh collector to 
Board, 23 June 1795* Hunter, Bengal MS.Records. No.4855.




with, auxiliaries from Sarguja, Chota-Nagpur and Tamar, armed 
to the teeth, were in the field against the oppressors.^"
The Company, alarmed for the moment by the violence of 
the outbreak, abolished the post of sazawal. But no other 
measures were taken to eradicate the causes of distress. 
Indeed, a series of administrative changes occurred which 
made it less likely that remedies would be applied. The reve­
nue jurisdiction of Palamau and other adjoining tribal areas 
was in 1800 transferred to the remote authority of the Collec­
tor of Bihar. The civil and criminal jurisdiction, nominally 
remaining in the hands of the Ramgarh magistrate, in practice 
was divided between him and the commander of the Ramgarh
battalion. Special officials were appointed to get in the
the
arrears of revenue from Palamau. In 1808/Government appointed 
a register at Ramgarh to facilitate ’’the collection of the 
revenue of the hill and jungle estates on the western front­
ier of the provinces of Bengal and Bihar,” and in 1810 R.
2Walpole was specially deputed to Palamau to realize arrears.
One officer showed an awareness of Churaman's diffi­
culties - Parry, who succeeded Walpole early in 1811. He 
reported that it was Akhauri Sheo Char an Ram, the qanungo and 
a relation of the late Udwant Ram,who ’’was the author of the 
distress and misfortunes of the Raja, and the distracted 
state of affairs in the pargana”^  and to restore the raja's 
position Parry annulled all recent settlements and took
1. Ibid.
2. Bridge, op.cit. Para. 57.
3. Ibid. Para. 58.
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written undertakings from all the jagirdars to pay regularly 
according to the Decennial Settlement. Bikramajit Singh of 
Chainpur and Bahu Chhatrapati Rai of Bisrampur, "two of the 
most wealthy hut least respectable jagirdars" actively op­
posed Parryfs efforts to get hack to the Decennial Settlement, 
stirring up "the most refractory and turbulent natives.
Their efforts Parry crushed, and he imposed his new settle­
ment on the district. But in doing so he went far beyond his
instructions, he was recalled, and his settlements were 
2
annulled.
That outcome of Parry's efforts was due not only to 
the resistance of the local jagirdars, but also to the oppo­
sition of Captain Roughsedge, the Commandant of the Ramgarh 
Battalion, and "the most influential adviser of [the *] Gov­
ernment on political questions affecting this part of the 
3
country." Roughsedge wished to see Raja Churaman1s estate 
sold for arrears of revenue ^ partly from annoyance at the 
raja's failure to provide supplies for the troops engaged in 
operations in Palamau, partly from a wish to favour the loyal 
Raja of Deo, who had campaigned with him in Sambhalpur against 
the Pindaris, and in Nawagarh, Sarguja, Rewa and Nepal, by 
securing the estate for him.
The Government, rejecting Parry1s attempt to save the 
dynasty, followed Roughsedge fs advice. In 1813 Palamau was
1. Ibid.
2. ’Sut in practice his settlement continued to be in force 
in many cases.
3. Bridge, .op^ cit. Para.62.
4. Board to GovT7«30 Oct. 1812, Beng. Rev.Cons. 10 of 14 Nov. 




put up for sale and purchased by the Government, and the 
ruling
/ Chero dynasty came to an end. Churaman Rai was described in 
1820 as ,fa mere cipher in its management [of his estate], and
nearly an ideot [sic] in understanding, dissolute, extrava-
2
gant and thoughtless," but even if that interested descrip­
tion of him be accepted as true, though written in justifica­
tion of his deposition, it may still be asked whether any 
very serious efforts had been made to improve his qualities 
as a ruler. As a minor he had been entrusted to the care of a 
man of the most dubious character known to have been hostile 
to the young raja's family. The British Government did little 
to check the mismanagement practised by the diwan, and when
the raja came of age, did nothing to help him restore his
the
position. After his deposition /Government was ready to ack­
nowledge the difficulties of his position, admitting that so 
wild was the nature of the country and so lawless the inhabi­
tants, that'the realisation of the revenue partook more of 
the nature of voluntary contribution1 than of an active and 
punctual enforcement of the rights of the Government^ but 
Parry's attempt to take account of those difficulties was 
scarcely welcomed. Certainly little attention was paid to 
tribal feelings when Roughsedge»s policy was approved and the
1. Board to Govt.,15 June 1813, Beng. Rev. Cons. 8 of 26 June 
1813. (56)
2. W.Hamilton, Description of Hindustan, I, 287.
3. Bradley-Birt~Cihota-Nagpore»221-222.
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1Chero's hereditary ruler sold up,
Churaman - and his son Ran Bahadur Rai after him - was
2
given a life pension of Rs.300 a month, hut when the son
sought to take possession of his ancestral village Shahpur,
he was ejected hy Cuthhert, the Collector and Magistrate of
Ramgarh.^ Ran Bahadur made no other move against the Company;
indeed he took part on its side against the Cheros, his own
people, in the unrest of 1832.
But though Ran Bahadur thus forgot the injustice done
to him and to his father, his tribal people did not. Indeed,
they ascribed all their misfortunes to their raja having
accepted a pension and thus wilfully renouncing his claim
4over the zamindari.
The Company had, in fact, half anticipated that they 
would prove hostile. In September 1813 the Bihar Collector 
had warned the Government against attempting the direct .
1. In 1814 the Ramgarh assistant collector had rightly sup­
ported Raja Churaman*s petition to have the estate re­
turned to him on payment of his dues, urging that thereby 
"many troublesome consequences of transferring Palamau to
a stranger will thus be avoided": H, Robertson to Board,
18 Dec. 1814, Beng. Rev. Cons. 55 of 29 July 1815 /56n
2. Board to Ramgarh Asstt.Collecotr, 14 June 1816, Para.6, 
Beng.Rev. Cons. 48 of 31 July 1818 (JLZ')
Board to Govt. ,26 March 1824, Para.2, Beng* Rev, Cons. 39 
of 9 Apl. 1824 (60)
3. Cuthbert to Board, 13 Apl. 1827, Para,50, Beng.Cr.Judl,Cons. 
54 of 14 June 1827 (1|8)
4* Ramgarh Magt. to Govt* ,9 May 1817* Para.2, Beng. Cr. Judl. 
Cons. 4 of 16 May 1817 (l|*j)
management of a pargana with notorious inhabitants.^- When 
the Raja of Deo was installed in the estate, he was warned 
not to disturb the existing tenures, nor to enhance the rents, 
fixed so far back as the year 1789.
But Ghanshyam Singh, the son and successor of the Deo 
raja, as soon as he had been installed by Captain Roughsedge, 
at the head of a battalion,^ found himself faced with Chura­
man's old problems of inadequate revenues and overgrown sub­
ordinates. He attempted, more vigorously than the Chero raja 
had dared to do, to solve these problems by protesting against 
the usurpations of the Palamau jagirdars and by resuming some 
107 villages,^ (Had he been able peacefully to pursue such 
policies, Roughsedge^ prophecy that "the character of Futteh 
Narain [the father of Ghanshyam] will do wonders, and I expect 
to see Palamau from the worst, become the best managed
1. Vide Board to Govt.,26 Oct. 1813, Para.3, Beng. Rev.Cons*
11 of 6 Nov. 1813 /56\
K 9
2. Resolution, Govt., Beng. Rev. Cons. 54 of 29 July 1815 /56\ 
"It will be advisable," said the Resolution, "to 33 
instruct Major Roughsedge to endeavour to impress in
the strongest manner on the Raja's mind, the obligation 
and necessity of maintaining the settlement formed with 
the j agee dars..."
3. Roughsedge to Govt., 6 Apl. 1816, Para.2, Beng. Rev.Cons. 
42 of 26 Apl.l8l6 (56\ Raja Ghanshyam Singh had 
requested for such
an exhibition of military support because he was "appre­
hensive from the extreme ignorance and foolishness of the 
inhabitants that unless supported by your [of the Commander 
of the Ramgarh battalion] presence they may resist my 
authority." His petition, N.D., Beng. Rev.Cons. 3 of 
6 Jan. 1815 /56n
4. W.Blunt to Govt.,18 March 1818, Para.17, Beng.Rev.Cons.48 
of 31 July 1818 ,51\
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pergunnah in your district"'*' might have been proved
correct). But in fact Ghanshyan Singhfs vigorous action
2
caused a great Chero rising in 1817.
It was at first believed that the attack upon the
non-tribal outsiders, the officers of the Deo raja, who had
resumed the Chero holdings, was the work of the petty Chero
r
tenure holders of ijaradars who had not been given the 
protection provided for the jagirdars in the sanad to the 
raja. But it was later discovered that the outbreak, which
A
laid waste much of Palamau, had been mainly fostered by 
the very same jagirdars who had made Raja Churamanfs 
position untenable.
Lindsay, the magistrate, who was ordered in May 1817 
to investigate the grievances of the Cheros, believed that 
it was a peopled rising. "The cheroos [cheros] and the 
kairwars [kharwars] are undoubtedly the persons who have 
perpetrated the outrages in Palamow, ... the most distant 
suspicion cannot be entertained for a moment against the
1. Roughsedge to Fleming, Magistrate, 14 Jan. 1814, Beng.Cr.
Judl.Cons, 6 of 16 May 1817  ^132\
' 58' ^
2. Board of Rev,, Bihar & Benares, to W. Money, Bihar collect
or, 8 Sept, 1818, Para.l, Beng. Rev. Cons. 5 of 26 Feb.
1819 (58)
3. Ramgarh Magfc. to Govt., 21 Apl. 1817, Para.2, Beng. Or, 
Judl. Cons. 16 of 2 May 1817 /132\
55
49 Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 17-18 of 2 May 1817 /132\
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Ex-zemeendar or jagheerdars.Roughsedge and other 
military officers, however, suspected that the jagirdars 
were implicated. Lieutenant Brett, for example, reported 
that^- "the commotions in this district have heen caused 
by the success which has uniformly attended Chutterputtee 
Rai in warding £off] the processes of the court of Ramghur, 
in the artful designing and malignant nature of the 
jageerdar of Chainpore Ram Buksh Sing, and his son Becker- 
majeet Singh; and the lawless spirit prevalent amongst the 
petty cheroo chiefs, the most notorious of whom are 
Puhlwan Singh of Chundoo, Jeet Sing of Obra, Suraj Singh 
of Koorka, Poorun Singh of Lohurseimee, and Aokloo Manjee
p
of seedook," In the vigorous campaign to restore order 
such jagirdars as Bikramajit Singh and Ram Baksha Singh 
accordingly suffered much, and after the rising had been 
suppressed, W. Blunt, the Superintendent of Police of the
1. Lindsay to Govt., 9 May 1817, Para.2, Beng. Cr. Judl. 
Cons. 4 of 16 May 1817 ,132n
' 58'
2. J, Brett to Roughsedge, 19 May 1817, Para.2,
Beng, Cr.Judl, Cons. 3c of 30 May 1817 /132\
V )
Lower Provinces, was specially deputed to give a correct 
picture to the Government.^"
Blunt proved conclusively that the late commission­
er^ view that the commotions were caused "principally, 
if not exclusively", by "the machinations and intrigues 
of the ex-zamindar, & certain jagirdars and others, in
combination with dissaffected persons in Sirguja" to
2expel Raja Ghanshyam, was wrong. Now the oppressions 
of the raja, who wanted the landholders to execute a 
fresh agreement with him to pay more revenue than 
they had been paying since Leslie's days, was conclusively 
proved.
1. The Commission formed by Lindsay and Roughsedge was 
dissolved on a representation made by some jagirdars, 
though Roughsedge protested against this;
Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 4 of 20 Ja. 1818 /133\
1 2(5}
2* Blunt to Govt., 18 March 1818, Para.2, Beng. Rev. Cons. 
48 of 31 July 1818 ,57n
TS*
3« Ibid. Para.4.
The experiment of entrusting the estate to the man-
was
agement of an outsider (Raja GhanshytvjiJtherefore abruptlyA
terminated,despite the efforts of Roughsedge to protect the 
interests of his friend the Deo raja. Moreover, the proper­
ties of Bikramajit Singh of Chainpur, of Shiva Prasad Singh 
of Ranka,of Chhatradhari Singh of Lokeya, Gajpati Rai of 
Bisrampur, Jit Singh of Obra, Sheoraj Singh of Koorha, of 
Pahalwan Singh and Puran Singh were confiscated, "for 
various periods, mostly of short duration", while Sheoraj 
Singh and Jit Singh were condemned to life imprisonment in 
Alipur jail.2
The activities of the very jagirdars who had been pro­
tected against the Chero Raja Churaman by the Company were 
thus in 1818 declared to have been injurious, and many who 
had risen by usurpations and extortion during his minority 
were now deposed. But the further step, of recognising the 
rights and sentiments of the Chero people, was not taken. 
Rather loose phrases about the "vile, rebellious and intrig­
uing" nature of the people of Palamau continued to be used.*^  
Nor was much attention paid to the fluctuating and 
inefficient pattern of the British administration, though 
this had contributed over many years to the mismanagement of
1% Bridge, op.cit. Para.70. Also see Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons.42 
of 1 NovTTSHY, /138n
2* Bridge, op.cit. Para.72.
the estate. Something has already been said about the various 
changes in that system. It should be noted that changes con­
tinued. From 1809 to 1816 an assistant collector, stationed 
alternately for six months at Chatra and six at Sherghati, 
acted for the collector at Bihar. From 1817 he was placed 
under the Board of Commissioners for Benares and Bihar. Then 
in 1819, after a lapse of nineteen years, the Ramgarh collec- 
torate was re-established, to which Palamau was attached.
Such constant changes in such distant control necessarily 
precluded any continuity of policy and the growth of any sym­
pathetic understanding of the problems of Palamau.
If the machinery was inadequate, the policy enforced 
was inappropriate. In this wild tribal area the rules and 
regulations of settled areas were freely introduced. Though 
the Raja of Palamau had protested as far back as 1793 against 
the introduction of a land revenue system based on measurement 
(rakababandi) and the paraphernalia of formal pattas, etc., 
into villages which, he said, were 1 farmed. ..by conjecture 
and ancient customshis cry went unheeded. Again, non- 
tribal amlas - amins, qanungoes, police darogas and the like - 
were freely appointed in the pargana, though they all too 
often abused their authority. Of this, the history of the 
qanungoes appointed to Palamau provided ample proof. Much of 
the deplorable decline in the chiefship could be attributed,
1. Enclosure, Ramgarh collector to Board, 17 Aug. 1793> Beng.
Rev. Cons. 82 of 27 March 1794 ,53 s
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as has been seen, to the activities of the first two qanungoes,
*
The third qanungo, Silwant Ram, proved as bad a bargain. His 
fault was complete idleness, so that in 1823, after two years 
in office, he had to be dismissed,^ His successor, who lasted 
until 1832, was more active, but mainly in concocting reports 
whose falsity was proved in the enquiries of that year.
Differences of opinion (between successive collectors) 
only made matters worse. N.Smith, the Ramgarh collector, after 
the suppression of the rising against Ghanshyam Singh, ordered 
collections to be made according to Leslie's Old Decennial 
settlement, but he also suggested to Government, on 23 Sep­
tember 1823 that the Company, as the zamindar of Palamau 
should examine not only all tenures created since Leslie's
Settlement [of 1197 fasli3> but even those of earlier crea-
2
tion. He proceeded to classify all under-tenures in the 
estate into jagirs and ijaras, rent-free tenancies (minhai), 
mortgages, religious grants, mukarraris and so on, and upon 
that basis produced another settlement, to run for five years 
from 1824-25* He also sold up Tarhasi estate, the jagir of 
Bisrampur (on the grounds that the proprietor "was always 
drunk with opium and nototiously incapable of managing his 
estates") and was only prevented by a last-minute payment of
A
dues from attaching Ranka estate.
These actions and proposals of Smith's were strongly
1. Bridge, op.cit. Para .74.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. Paras. 75-76.
4. Ibid. Para. 76.
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objected to by his successor as collector, Cuthbert, He dis­
approved of the idea of an enquiry reaching as far back as 
1789y he protested against the practice of selling up rather 
than attaching the holdings of under-tenure holders. His own 
view was that the jagirdars and others "who possess no 
greater rights than subordinate Talookdars and Putteedars 
Cpatnidars"] in other parts of the country" had forfeited all 
their privileges when the estate was put up for sale.’*' But 
since the Government had acknowledged their rights after that 
sale, they could not, he thought, "with propriety depart from
p
its former line of conduct." He, therefore, opposed Smith's
proposal of taking legal measures for the dispossession of
the se j agirdars.
In 1828, A.Prinsep, appointed special Commissioner in 
2
Palamau, raised the question of alienation of villages by
jagirdars, and quoted several cases which had occurred since
1813. This led to a request from Government for a further
report. Prinsep thereupon began more enquiries, and by 1830
most of the tenure-holders had filed lists of their properties
A
with Prinsep - who thereupon died, and so put an end to the 
matter for the time being. The whole question of tenures, 
revenue, alienations etc. remained in a state of flux.
1. S.T.Cuthbert to Board. 13 Apl.1827, Para.3, Beng. Rev,
Cons. 54 of 14 June 1827 /138>
V. 22
2. Ibid. Para. 4.
3* ^ide Board to Govt., 25 Sept. 1827, Para.35, Beng. Rev. 
Cons. 48 of 25 Oct. 1827 ,61s
v25;
4. Bridge, op.cit. Para.80.
The Board of Revenue had expressed in 1824 their fear 
that Palamau would never he peaceful until all agrarian 
questions had heen set at rest.1 The changes of authority 
and opinion, outlined above, made it impossible for those 
questions to be set at rest. The risings of 1832 followed 
almost inevitably.
Chota-Nagpur;-
To the east and south of Palamau lies Chota-Nagpur and 
its dependent parganas, a high, rather isolated table-land 
approached on all sides by passes (ghats or pats) which are 
easily defended and which in the 18th century were rarely fit 
even for bullock carts. Within this hill region there are two 
distinct plateaux, that to the north-west, on average some 
2,000 feet above sea level, rising to 3,600 feet, and a lower 
plateau to the south-east at about 1,000 feet. Both stand 
high above the surrounding provinces, and as S.C.Roy has said*1 
remarkably refreshing is the contrast its blue hills and 
rugged ravines, green sal jungles and terraced fields of 
yellow paddy, limpid hill-streams rushing down their narrow 
beds of rock and sand, and picturesque waterfalls, leaping 
over abrupt precipices, present to the monotonous stretch upon 
stretch of Bengal plains, broken here and there by some muddy 
meandering creek or khal or by some mighty river tardily
2rolling down with its load of loam and silt into the sea."
1. Ibid. Para, 81.
2. ^oy.Mundas and their country, 354-355.
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As with Palamau, the difficult, heavily wooded 
approaches to the area have made Chota-Nagpur a refuge 
for tribal people* Hamilton, in 1828, commented on 
the extensive hilly tracts^ "much covered with forest; 
formerly fostered with great care by its chiefs, as a 
protection against invasion from without; indeed, the 
nature of the country is such as would render it 
extremely difficult either to penetrate or subdue, on 
account of the unhealthy jungles, so deleterious to 
troops not born on the spot."^
The tribal inhabitants of this area are called by
2a variety of names - Mundas, Oraons, Mahalis etc*, and 
early ethnologists such as Dalton described them all 
as Kolarians, distinguishing among the Kols the Munda 
Kols in Chota-Nagpur proper, Larka Kols in Singhbhum, 
and Bhumij Kols in Manbhum and Dhalbhum. In fact, the
East India Gazetteer, I, 415*
2* Cuthbert, the c olle ct or of Ramgarh, wrote in 1827
that there were three kinds of kols - Rumeen [kumea?], 
oorawun [oraon] and Moonda TMunda]: S. T. Cuthbert to
Govt*, 21 Apl* 1827, Para.46, Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 53 
of 14 June 1827 /138s
3* Ethnology, 152, In !Kols of Chota-Nagpore1 J. A. S.B. 
Vol.35, Part II, 154, Dalton had also included Oraons 
in this definition. W.W.Hunter, however, says that 
"the word kcl is really a generic term, including the 
two tribes of Munda Kol, and Larka or fighting Kol 
Statistical Account, XVI, 266. Those of Chota-Nagpur 
proper were also called Dhangar Kols. Even today the 
Oraons are called Dhangars.
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the word Kol is a very loose term, used by the Hindoos 
of the plains as a word of derision. (De Meulder thus 
describes it as an Indian equivalent of the word 'nigger1 
in the United States).'1' A military officer, writing in 
1833, provides the key to how the various names were applied 
at that time when he reports "the Cole is always a Cole, 
and a Bhumij a Bhumij, but when a Cole takes service as 
a labourer, he is styled 'D'hangar', when he takes to
plundering, the Cole is called *Lurkaf, and the Bhoomij
2 3*chooar Dalton himself was forced at a later date
to admit that only the Mundas and other kols could
4properly be described as Kolarian, and that the Oraons, 
as a Dravidian race, had to be treated separately. It 
is clear indeed that though the Mundas and Oraons live 
in the same area of Chota-Nagpur and though both are
1. Tribal India Speaks. 39. Dalton in 'Kols of Chota- 
Nagpore1, J.A.S.B. Vol.35, Part II, 154, says that 
"this word is one of the epithets of abuse applied by 
the Braminical races to the aborigines of the 
country,.."
2. A Subaltern, 'Sketch of the Campaign1, East India,
No,III (old series) 184, footnote.
3- Ethnology, 152.
4. I5r. Griffiths comments, "the word 'kol' was once used 
in a generic sense to describe 1Munda-Speaking1 tribes 
and the term 'Kolarian* is still frequently found, 
especially in older text books of Ethnology. The word 
was originally used by Max Muller in a linguistic 
sense: ' W. G-. Griffiths, Kol tribe of Central India, 
Preface,
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cultivating classes, yet their customs and habits
are quite distinct.
These tribal people were, and are, remarkable
for their physical strength and hardiness. Roy comments
that the oraon has a "better physique than many of his
neighbours who pride themselves on their ’higher caste1.
The Oraon 1b sturdy in his limbs and erect in his bearing,
2
His account of their exceptional physical endurance can 
be matched by the much ealier comments of men like 
Drummond who in 1841 wrote "They undergo with patient 
endurance the most incredible fatigues; extremely active, 
their movements are accomplished with the utmost celerity, 
... No obstacle, however great, is capable of subduing their
1. Oraons, 88.
2, Ibid. 91 • "In repose an average Oraon adult can 
abstain from food for about twenty-four hours, and 
in exercise for about twelve hours without much
inconvenience On occasions of their periodical
socio-religious ceremonies, Oraon young men and 
women usually spend two, three or more consecutive 
nights in dancing and singing and indulge in very 
little sleep. The Oraon can bear cold very well,
as well as exposure to the direct rays of the sun, - 
with his head uncovered ....In the youth of both 
sexes, [there is] exuberance of health and spirits, 
a delight in all physical activities, and taking 
life easy ..."
14 1)
utmost courage and perseverance in the attainment of any 
desired object."*^
The reputation of some of these hardy hill folk (es­
pecially of the Mundas of Tamar) was that of a fierce bar -
barian crew, to be compared with Maratha or Pindari marauders
2
- "a set of blood-thirsty yet cowardly wholesale murderers", 
Indian equivalents of 'Bob Roy and his worthy fellows",^ 
criminals "prodigal in blood," But such a picture was based 
upon that drawn and displayed to the outer world by intruders 
whose presence in Chota-Nagpur was usually most justly re­
sented, that is by the Hindu and Muslim merchant and money­
lender, the alien thikadar, jagirdar or nilamdar (auction 
purchaser) who were so often "the greatest eyesores to the 
Munda.
With a closer acquaintance British opinion changed.
Thus Dalton, while admitting that the Mundas were less truth­
ful, manly and open than the Hos, added "but then the Mundas 
have lived for ages under conditions ill-calculated to deve- 
lope the good qualities for which I have given the Hos credit. 
There has been a continued struggle to maintain what they
1. Drummond, MS. Statistical Account, 33~34.
2. 'Tee-to-Tum,1 Bengal Hurkaru, 8 March 1832.
3. A Subaltern, op.cit. 18$.
4. Boy, Mundas, 53&.
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consider their right in the land against the adverse interest
of the landlord or his assigns They live among a people
who look down on them as a degraded race, and one of whose 
favorite [sic] theories is, that the Kols were created to
serve them. This, no doubt, must be as demoralising as it is
1 2 aggravating*..". Davidson, writing in 1839, described them
as an agricultural people1 deriving their subsistence from
tilling the earth, either on their own account or as servants
to others. They are generally a very innocent and simple race,
with little proclivity to crime, except, when impelled by
superstition,^ which leads to the perpetration of violent
crimes, or by hunger which impells them to theft, robbery etc*
1. Ethnology, 206.
2. J.Davidson to J.R.Ousely, 14 Aug. 1839, No.235. Misc. 
Dispatch Book, Gr. Gr.Agent1 s office, Patna Archives.
3. One crime to which the Kols were addicted was the murder 
of witches - in whose powers, as Hoy says, even present- 
day Mundas often believe. [Mundas, 486]. Neave, the second 
judge of the Patna Court in 'Cornwallis1 day was surprised 
to find village courts in the wildest part of the Chota- 
Nagpur hills, condemning to death those convicted of witch­
craft, generally old women. In 1809 a case was reported by 
Walpole, the Ramgarh Magistrate, of a man killing a woman 
because he firmly believed that she was a witch and that 
her incantations had destroyed two of his children (Even 
the Maharaja was accused of such a crime in 1819) and 
similar cases were reported by Cuthbert in 1826-27. Such 
murders were scarcely crimes, however, but rather execu­
tions approved by the tribal society of Chota-Nagpur as 
they had been legally approved and put into force in 
tribal Scotland until the reign of George I, The murders 
occasionally committed by tribesmen on the orders of their 
rajas and chieftains may also be put in the same category 
of crimes "that naturally grow out of a demi-barbarous or 
infant state of society." Walpole for one recognised that 
such acts were quite acceptable to a tribal society wherein 
loyalty to the chief was of paramount importance". Ramgarb 
Actg. Magt. to G.Dowdeswell, 15 Jan. 1810, Beng. Cr. Judl, 
Cons. 5 of 2 Peb. 1810 /130\ Also see Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons
62 of 29 Dec.1809. "^"12'
{Selection of Papers from Records at East India House, II,
11.3)
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..•..With few exceptions, there are no people who subsist en­
tirely by committing depredations on property, nor is there
any class of hereditary thieves and robbers... as is believed
found
is frequently/in the more civilized parts of India. n News­
paper correspondents reporting what they found in Chota- 
Nagpur during the risings of 1832, often commented in like 
manner upon the hardworking peaceable nature of the Kols;
"The Dunga [Dhangar] Coles are an industrious, hardworking 
race and by no means warlike, who would have preferred, had 
it been in their power, appealing to the law instead of the 
sword for protection against their oppressors.Another 
report described them as pursuing "the occupation of cultiva­
tors, and when sowing time is over that of Bhangy-burdars 
[load-bearers], classes [khala^sis], and bullock-drivers, to
all who may give them employ We have seen a good deal of
the Danghas [Dhangar Kols] and to us they have ever appeared
a quiet, hard-working, and simple race of people, and the
2
last in the world likely to get up a foray,"
That the Kols were a peaceful agricultural people ^  
rather than marauders from the hills and jungles was again 
impressed upon the British during the campaign of 1832 when 
many officers were evidently much surprised by the fertility 
of Chota-Nagpur, and the high state of cultivation of many
1. Jassoos, 4 March 1832, Bengal Hurkaru, 14 March 1832.
2. Govt. Gazette, Cal., quoted i n Bengal Hurkaru, 1 Peb. 1832.
3. The Oraons and Santhals in my own village are most hard­
working cultivators. But the former as compared to the 
latter, are considered more hardworking and peaceful.
areas. Lohardugga, Pitoria, Barkagarh, Grovindpur and Tamar
were found to be extremely rich and fertile. One officer's
journal thus records that at that time the sixteen miles of
open country between Pitoria and Churia were in "the highest
state of cultivation.Prom Tikoo to Churia again there
was another great belt of cultivation, fifteen miles in
breadth and fifty in length, with Lohardugga, its centre, "an
2extensive and populous place." On that side the country 
was bounded by a line of hills commencing about seven miles 
north of Tikoo and running south as far as Palkote, backed 
by the Jamari jungle. Again, as one turned east there was an 
open view from Korambi for some fifty miles, and the country, 
intersected by the river Koel and smaller streams, was finely 
cultivated until dense jungle supervened between Armai and 
Maharajganj. To the south of Armai, beyond Palkote, there 
were again jungles and the hills which marked the southern 
boundary of Chota-Nagpur. Towards the western borders of 
Chota-Nagpur the hills and jungles increasingly dominated 
even in the river valleys, though there were further pockets 
of good cultivation round Jurga, in the Kasir pargana and in 
the Barwa plain.^ A correspondent of John Bull summed up the 
unexpected situation by saying: "So far from Chota-Nagpore 
being so poor a pergunnah as he [Dawkstager, another corres­
pondent] describes, it is the most fertile and best cultivated
1. Topographical sketch of Chotanagpore, Appendix A, Jt. 






pergunnah that it has fallen to my lot to see, and there are 
few on this side of India through which I have not passed* It 
is a fine, open and flat country, with a rich, moist soil, 
and the cultivation extends to the very feet of the hills.
j
I Every one here is astonished at the beauty and fertility of
1
a country which we expected to find a perfect wilderness.1
The dependant parganas of Chota-Nagpur - Tamar, 
Baranda, Rahi, Bundu, Silli and Barwa - were less well-culti­
vated. They had been loosely subordinate to Chota-Nagpur
before British rule was imposed, and thereafter were perma-
pnently incorporated with Chota-Nagpur. In 1809 Roughsedge 
described them as mostly jungly,^ and the hill tract (to the 
east of Sonepur called the Hasda chaurasi of Tamar) which 
formed the boundary with Singhbhum to the south was only cul­
tivated in the valley plots immediately surrounding the scat­
tered villages. Their inhabitants, entirely kol, were as
1. !P* to John Bull, camp Pitouria, 29 Feb. 1832, Bengal
Hurkaru,8 March 1832. Another correspondent "A looker-on1 
[camp”Tn Chota-Nagpur, 18 March, Bengal Hurkaru,30 March 
1832] wrote, "A rich soil, capable of the highest culti­
vation, well wooded and beautifully undulated with all 
the variety of hill, dale and rock - watered by many 
streams rippling from the pure spring, and may be rather 
called the nursery of many rivers than said to contain 
one of fullgrowth." Spry, (Modern India, I, 326-327) 
wrote in 1837, "The soil of Chota-Nagpur is in many parts 
a peculiar kind of red earth, which is extremely fertile. 
In this soil cotton thrives luxuriously. The declivities 
consist of a very rich loam, and from the circumstance of 
the existence of innumerable springs, a few feet below 
the surface throughout the whole year, rice is abundantly 
produced with little labour to the husbandman."
2. Cuthbert to Govt., 21 April 1832, Para.20, Beng. Cr.Judl. 
Cons. 53 Of 14 June 1827 /138n
V. 22 *
3* Drummond, op.cit. 23.
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uncivilized and lawless as the Larka Kols of Singhbhum.^ But 
nearer Chota-Nagpur proper, the parganas on the east had a 
fine open well-cultivated stretch of country along the banks 
of the Subarnarekha. This country was cut off from Chota- 
Nagpur itself by a line of hills running north and south, and 
formed marcher lordships against neighbouring Pachet.
One other estate was linked with Chota-Nagpur - Tori, 
below the ghats to the north-west of Chota-Nagpur proper*
This was a large estate of some 700 villages, the ruler of 
which, loosely subordinate to the maharaja of Chota-Nagpur, 
had been attempting to assert his independence in the late 
eighteenth century. However when the Tori Raja Durgavijaya 
Sahi died without heirs in 1804, the British came to support 
the claims of the Chota-Nagpur maharaja against those of
Durjavijaya!s widow, and in 1819 was declared escheated to
2him*
It is necessary at this point to describe the position 
of the Chota-Nagpur maharaja and his relationship with his 
subordinates and tribesmen, and to describe the land system 
of the area. In the early years of the Munda and Oraon occupa­
tion of Chota-Nagpur, there seems to have been no individual 
ownership of land. The tribesmen cleared their village lands 
under the leadership of their headman or munda and village 
priest or pahan, who were responsible for re-allocating lands 
and collecting such dues or services as were owed to the
1. Topographical sketch of Chota-Nagpore. Appendix A, Jt. 




community. In such parganas as Tamar, Rahi and Baranda, 
which were difficult of approach and strongly fortified by 
nature, something of this village organisation survived even 
into the nineteenth century. Cuthbert, the Ramgarh Magistrate, 
described the way the headmen and village priests transacted
tthe village business, calling the villages together in May 
and distributing to those wishing to cultivate their different 
portions of land.1 No patta or written document was given; 
the extent of the cultivators* jote or field was shown before 
witnesses, and a piece of earth as a token of acceptance was 
taken from the headman or mahto. as he was called in some 
are as.
Above the village was a wider tribal division, the 
purha or patti under a circle headman called the manki. The 
mankis had much influence over the tribal masses and at fest­
ival times, when the members of the purha assembled "to hunt,
amuse themselves and decide disputes,” the mankis exercised
2
considerable authority. Each parha had its distinguishing 
flag, "the attempt to make use of which by the Coles of 
another purha at their festivals immediately leads to serious 
quarrels*
In the early middle ages there was no raja ruling over 
the country which was divided into purhas of 15 to 20 or even 
25 villages, each under its manki and local mundas5 These
1. S.T.Cuthbert, 21 Apl. 1827, para.36, Beng, Cr. Judl. Cons. 
53 of 14 June 1827 /138x
2. Davidson to Ousely, 29 Aug. 1839, Para,3, No.247, Misc. 
Dispatch Book, G. G.’Agents* office, Patna Archives.
3♦ Ibid. Para.3.
4. Ibid. Para. 2.
local leaders probably received no rents but only assistance 
in war and a salami at festivals.
Then at some time between the 6th and 10th centuries
A.D. the manki of Sutiambe, Phani Mukut Roy, was chosen as 
chief manki or raja by all the mankis and mundas. It was said 
that between that installation and the year 1839 some sixty-
2
two rajas of the family had sat upon the Chota-Nagpur throne.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Chota- 
Nagpur-Kokrah or Coira Orissa as it was then called - 
attracted the attention of the northern empires of the 
Afghans and Mughals, who coveted its supposed riches in ele­
phants and diamonds. In 1616 Raja Burjan Sal was seized by 
Mughal forces and was for some time held prisoner in Gwalior 
fort. This enforced contact with the Mughal empire in its 
heyday, enlarged the pretensions of the ruling family who 
changed Rai into Shah and took the title of Maharaja.^ At 
much the same time the raja and his court were converted to 
Hinduism. Por the maharaja the Brahmans produced a hitherto 
unsuspected ancestral link with Pundarika, the mythological 
king of the Nags or snakes - the first raja was said to be . 
the son of Pundarika by a Brahman girl - so that the dynasty
D* G.Panchi, 24, says 6th century A.D., while Ranchi Settle­
ment Report, Para.28, puts it in the 10th century.
2. Davidson, to Ousely, 29 Aug.1839, Para.2. No.247, Misc.
Dispatch Book, G. G. 1 s Agent's office, Patna Archives.
3» Cuthbert wrote in 1827 that the title of Maharaja Chhat- 
radhari was obtained from the Delhi Emperors, *67 years 
ago.' Cuthbert to Govt., 21 Apl. 1827, Para.6, Beng. Cr. 
Judl. Cons. 53 of 14 June 1827 /138\
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came to be called the Nag-Vansi.**" Both raja and nobles
claimed Rajput or Kshatriya status, and the royal family,
prospering, managed, as Davidson reported, "by force to get
married to the Rajpoot families of Puchnete [Pachet] and
Singhbhum, and eventually into others" and so came to pass,
2
in Davidson!s day, "for as good Rajpoots as any in India," 
Chota-Nagpur, in fact, provides a classic example of that 
process of incorporation of non-Aryan tribes into Hindu 
society which Risley has analysed - an example complete, as 
Risley put it, "with family miracle and all. The complet­
ion of the process, though not its beginning, can be dated 
from the temples known to have been constructed by the Chota- 
Nagpur rajas. The Borea temple was built between 1665 and 
1682, that at Doisa in the years 1683-1711, that at Chutia 
in 1685, at Jagannathpur in 1691, and that at Tilmi in 1737.^ 
By the end of the 17th century it is clear that the dynasty 
had been hinduized. The temples in turn imply the presence of 
large establishments of priests, and as a corollary the grant 
of tribal lands for their support, ■under the title of
1, Ibid, Para. 6, N.Smith, the Joint Magistrate for Chota- 
Nagpur, wrote [to Govt. 19 June 1823, Para.8, Beng. Cr. 
Judl, Cons. 21 of 26 Jan,1826 (237x1 that the Maharajas
"for the last two generations  ^38^3 
had "adopted the religion of the Rajpoots", and that they 
worshipped Durga and Lakshmi and had a serpent temple with 
a flag with the ensign of three snakes .on it.
2. Davidson to Ouseley, 29 Aug. 1839, Para.2, No.247, Misc. 
Dispatch Book, G.G. fs Agentfs Office, Patna Archives.
3* Tribes, I, Introduction, P xvi,
4* D. G.Ranchi. 27.
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brahmottar, debottar and britt lands. "The dazzling splendour 
of the Muhammadan Emperor's court., the pomp and pageantry, 
the wealth and power, which he had witnessed in the courts 
of the Hindu Rajas of Northern India whose acquaintance he 
had made, revolutionised the Nagbansi Raja's ideal of royalty. 
And the Rai Raja, now a full-fledged 'shahi Maharaja, soon 
gathered about himself a pompous retinue of Brahman priests, 
Rajput and pseudo-Rajput courtiers, and amiaha and place- 
hunters belonging to various Hindu and Hinduised castes."’*
The Mughal example of regal grandeur and Brahman 
assurances of social superiority worked upon the minds of the 
Maharajas and their courtiers, weakening the sense of tribal 
solidarity. By the 18th century the 'kshatriya' ruler was 
looking down upon the unconverted tribesmen, of whom Hamilton 
wrote "the Dhanggar are still impure unconverted mlechchas
p
or barbarians," and Bishop Hefcber (speaking of the
aborigines in general), "they have no castes, care nothing .
3
for the Hindoo deities, and are even said to have no idols". 
£a correspondent, writing to the Bengal Hurkaru in 1832, said 
"What struck me particularly, in this singular people, was 
their Jew-like propensities to eat pork, dogs, tigers, bears, 
cats, rats, snakes, or any other stray dead animal that they 
might chance to find.....).^ By the late 18th and early 19th
1. Roy, Oraons, 42.
2. East India Gazetteer, I, 415-
3- Narrative. TJ 25bt He was speaking about the people of the 
hills between Sikrigali and Burdwan.
4* *A White Jew', Sambhalpur, 12 March 1832, Bengal Hurkaru,
20 March 1832.
IfLJ ' ■«o d
centuries the maharaja was largely alienated from the great 
mass of fellow tribesmen, even to the point of seeking outside 
assistance against them. Davidson pointed out that on the 
hinduization of the royal family and on their regularly inter­
marrying with neighbouring Hindu families "it became a great
1
object with them to induce other Hindoos to settle in Nagpore, 
The royal administration came to be staffed not by Kols or 
Oraons but by Kayasths from outside. Men such as Jay Kishore 
Roy, Sadasiva Roy, Din Nayal Nath (who was responsible for 
several criminal acts in the years 1807-09), Jonkiram and 
Basaharan were appointed diwans, tahsildars etc. others, such 
as Lachhaminath Roy, Jay Kishun Roy acted as priests (mahan- 
thas or pandas, i.e. heads of temples and priests of places 
of pilgrimage respectively), and yet others such as Akhauri 
Behari Lai, Akhauri Bhairo Datta, AkhaiLri Lai Kishan, Mohan
Lai and Akhari# Basant Lai were found enjoying service vil-
2
lages. Some of the newcomers, Baraiks, Rajpub, Rattteas even 
held jagirs at fixed rents which were granted for the perform­
ance, as Davidson reported, of military services - services 
used to cow the tribal subjects of the rajas they served. A 
no less important group of non-tribal dependents of the maha­
raja and subordinate rajas was formed by the Brahmans, whose
1. Davidson to R.Ouseley, 29 Aug.1839, Para.5. No.247. Misc.
Dispatch Book, G. G. 1s Agent*s office, Patna Archives.
2„ See Appendix B, Jt.Commissioners to Govt., 16 Nov. 1832, 
B.C. 1502/58891.
3. Davidson to Ouseley, 29 Aug. 1839, Para.6, No.247, Misc. 
Dispatch Book, G.G.fs Agents* office, Patna Archives.
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1influence over the new converts was very strong. They sec­
ured very extensive grants of land, especially in the Khukhra 
and Doesa parganas, near the maharaja1s residence. Davidson 
described the "Brahmins [sic] and individuals of other castes 
who have come from below the Ghauts & got grants of lands 
generally by purchase at fixed rents from the different Rajas,
sometimes also rent-free, and also grants of rent-free lands
2
for religious purposes, in the mode usually given by Hindoos* H 
All these outsiders - including even Muslim merchants^ 
and servants of the maharaja and the dependent rajas - were 
provided with land at the expense of the tribal cultivators.
So were the members of the royal family who received extens­
ive grants to support their dignity - again at the tribesmen's 
expense. Since this expropriation was accompanied by much
disdain or even hatred of the still unconverted masses on the 
part
/of the new landowners, and much exploitation, sharp cleavages 
occurred in Kol Society, leading in time to violent unrest.
1. Gosain Jai Sree Sree Sankha Ramnath Deo, for instance, had 
32 villages in Khukhra, Guru Ramdeo had li, Purohit 
(Priest) Maniram 13, Guru Boohram 5%, Pathak Shambhunath 2, 
Deogharia Mahe shram 1, Pramanik Krishnaram 4, Mishra Mohan 
Roy 4, Pathak Anandram 1, Kalyan 1, Ram j an am Panda ■&$ and
a hundred other Upadyayas, Pandas, Shuklas, Tcwaris,
Dubeys, Pandeys,, Mahapatras, Mishras, Chauleys and other 
Brahmanas from Orissa and Bihar were enjoying grants. Vide 
Appendix^ ^ .Jt.Commissioners,' 16 Nov. 1832, B.C. 1502/58891.
2. Davidson to Ouseley, 29 Aug.1839, Para.10, No.247, Misc. 
Dispatch Book, G.G. 's Agents' office, Patna Archives.
3. "These men were Mussulmans, Sikhs, and some others, who 
came to the country as horse-dealers and shawl and brocade 
merchants, fetched enormous offers for their goods from the 
Nagvanai chiefs, and obtained farms of villages instead of 
cash, of which latter the chiefs were always in want." 
Rakhal Das Haidar, First Special Settlement Commissioner, 
Supplement to CalcuttaJGovt.] Gazette, 1 Dec. 1880.
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Here and there, it is true, local conditions enabled 
the mankis and mundas to survive, and to protect tribal 
institutions - as in remote Tamar, Rahi and Baranda, or in 
Sonepur where the original heads of villages were strong 
enough to inspire fear. Elsewhere however, the headmen "were 
entirely dispossessed and replaced by Suds (foreigners) or 
their villages [were] resumed by the Raja himself*""*’ How far 
the process of alienation of originally tribal land had gone 
by 1832 can be seen from a table of grants prepared in Nov­
ember 1832 by Bent and Wilkinson, the Joint Commissioners
2for Chota-Nagpur:




1. Kunwars and Thakurs 1156 2985 - 2 - x
2. Biwan, Bufturea, Mutsuddies
and the Jagirdars* grants
to Biwans, clerks and
pensions connected •
therewith. 122 1344 - 11 - X
3. Thakurs for service when
called upon to do so. 139i 3163 - 1 - 9
4. Jagirdars and Ghatwas
:
or military jagirdars 760 8842 - 14 - x
5* Omnuk and others 57 1371 - 6 - x
6. Huzoor Bhittiifea or Personal
attendants of the Raja. 83 1157 - 7 - x
7* Bhiturea or Personal attend­
ants of the Raja, 66f 1168 - 12 - 6
>1
1, Bavidson to Ouseley, 29 Aug, 1839, Para.8, No.247, Misc. 
Bispatch Book, G. G. fs Agent*s office, Patna Archives.
2. Appendix B to Jt. Commissioner to Govt., 16 Nov. 1832, 
B.C. 1502 The spelling of this statement has been
modernized.
Description of \ Total No* of
Tenures. Villages.
8* Dudh. Bhaee or grants 
to foster brothers of 
the present & former 
Rajas*
9. Kush and Brahmans (grants 
to Brahmans on very 
moderate rents
10. Debottar Khas j
11. Jagirdars (people who j 
received grants for 
services performed)
12. Jagirdars and Baraiks j 
(Brittadars) hereditary ' 
jagirdars on condition of 
performing military service
13. BhandaV Elaqa (literally, the 
granary from the rents j 
being principally collected 
in kind, corresponding to 
Khalsa villages in other 
area^.
14* Bhandar Elaqa Kunwaran |
1
15. Khairat villages j
16, For service grants held j 
on service tenures [
I











18. Brahmans & Kusha '
Britta grants for 
support of Brahmans i
i
19* Deori Mahal-Sree Sree j
Pati Mahadeo-Maharanee !
assignments for the 
support of the Ranee and 
other inmates of the 
palace 1
20* Thakurais etc. pensioners 
or grants for the support 
of the widows of the 






Total Jama of 
Malgurzaree
224 - 10 - x
175 - 3 - 2  
456 - x - x
2641 - 1 - 6
4206 - 1 - x
585 - x - x 
304 - X - X
2218 - 11 - x 
143 - 14 - x
41 - x - x
1




Total No, of Total Jama of
V illages Malgur zarqg,
21. Por Mu saham (allowance 
for support) 5
22. Khas Bhandar villages
in the Raja's khas
management. 24
Total 4,288£ 33,877 - 13 - 3
1, Drummond^ MS. Statistical Account, 20-2l) asserted a decade 
later that the item Deoree Mahal was a glaring instance of 
inconsistency in this table. In Heatly's time [date not 
given], he said, the total revenue was discovered to be 
upwards of a lakh and a half of rupees, and even that sum 
was probably much understated. As an explanation of these 
items, Drummond wrote the following: The lands derived 
their names from the rank of the holders. A kunwar was the 
older brother of the royal family next to the raja. The 
younger brothers were called Thakurwur. The raja's sons 
were called Tikaits during the father's lifetime and when 
the elder brother succeeded to the Raj ship, the remainder 
became the older a kunwar and the other Thakurwurs. Thus 
the Raja's uncle, grand uncle and great grand uncle, should 
there be one, were kunwgts. The Thakurwurs naturally would 
be more numerous. So the lands called kunwar an and Thak- 
urwan were held of these people of the Raja's family.
Ihid. 22-23: Nos. 3 & 20 were the subordinate branches
oi the family, and their dependants; No. 5 villages given 
by the raja to a number of dependants, one having i of a 
village, another a half etc.; No. 6 villages divided 
amongst the immediate attendants of the raja; No.7# vil­
lages generally given to the attendants on the raja's 
family provided they lived in the same dwelling, viz. the 
Rani, the raja's sisters etc.; No.8. villages given to the 
Foster brothers accumulated from generation to generation, 
as it was the custom for every raja to give such grants. 
This included foster sisters or Dudk BaMm also; No.9 
for the maintenance of the Brahman priests and for the 
performance of sacrifices, worship etc. to remove all 
dangers from the raja's path [Drummond here incorrectly 
says that Kush is a sect. In fact, it is a sacred grass 
with which the Brahmans perform sacrifices]. The raja 
could not put his foot into a kush Brahman village "so 
that if a public road lay through it, he would be obliged 
to go round the village till he came to the road again."
continued on p.\fco
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Footnote 1 continued from p,\5^
No.10 villages granted to Brahmans "who are attached to 
the native places of worship; a tradition is current, that 
in one of these is a large diamond of a crooked shape 
which, if any other but the Raja and priest see, he will 
die;" No.11 villages given for particular services, but 
liable to be resumed, when the services are no longer 
required; No,12, Britdafe differed from the jagirdars in as 
much as the latter received villages perpetually settled 
on them, for their own and posterity's service when 
required by the raja; No,13 villages for the raja's own 
cattle, stores etc.; No.14 villages allotted for a like 
purpose to Kunwars; No. 15 villages given away by the raja 
as presents; No.lS villages bestowed much in the same 
principle as No. 191 No.22 much the same as No, 13, but 
yielding no revenue.
16i
Quite apart from such alienation of land, the maharaja 
imposed heavy burdens of his own upon the people. Though he 
received some Rs.338,077 from his jagirdars, and further 
amounts from Tori pargana and from a number of Bhandar vil­
lages (lands of which were under his direct possession and 
cultivation) he also imposed a number of abwabs or cesses.*^ 
Whenever he bestowed a jagir or confirmed a sanad to the heir:-; 
of a deceased jagirdar he expected a nazarana of from 1,000 
to 1,500 rupees. He raised other sums, as a sovereign,by the
YVsale of titles such as a raja, kuwar, thak&r, manki and so 
on. At the maharaja's own accession every village throughout 
Chota-Nagpur had to pay one rupee shahkharch (prince's expen­
diture) towards the cost of the investiture ceremony. At his 
marriage another cess was levied under the title of haldiyapun 
and for his journey to the sadr station, for his pilgrimages 
to Gaya, Puri or other holy places yet another abwabs were 
imposed called madad (assistance) and mangan (gift or contri-
p
bution). Since the revenue officials who collected these
dues certainly extorted more than was due, so as to fill
their own pockets, and since the subordinate rajas also
adopted similar customs, the total burden on the peasant was
very heavy. Cuthbert, in 1827, even hazarded the guess that
"under such a system of feudalism, giving rise and colour to
1. Cuthbert, to Govt., 21 Apl. 1827, Para.11, Beng. Cr. Judl. 
n c:> ','1 T”"“ ■,ao'7 About Rs.80,000 came from
2.   _ _  eric is considered auspic­
ious; so haldiyapan was probably levied on auspicious 
c e re monies, e.g. marri age.
every species of extortion and plunder, it is not to be won­
dered at that the population of the province is so limited
1
when compared with the extent of the area,"
The chiefs, jagirdars and other superior tenure-holders
had no right under tribal custom to increase the rent of the
village lands, nor could they turn out the old cultivators so
long as they paid their rent. But these age-old customs came
2
to be frequently violated by the non-tribal farmers. Again, 
where the rent had been paid in service - three days* plough­
ing, three days work with the spade, three days of rice- 
planting and three days of harvest work and so on - the new
3
owners came to demand far more work than custom had permitted-. 
Thikadars or revenue-farmers came to cultivate considerable 
areas by forced labour exacted without limit from the tribal 
ryots. Davidson admitted in 1839 "the poor Coles have all 
this time been submitting to be plundered of their labour,
A
because they did not know how to get redress."
The bhuihars (the original clearers of the land, e.g. 
the munda and the manki ) had a hereditary interest in the 
land, and even when they fled the village, they had a right 
to reclaim the land on their return. But the new farmers not 
only refused to recognise the right of their heirs, but also 
took possession of the land on their leaving the village.
Not only that, but by lodging false complaints against them,
1. Ibid, Para.17*
2. ‘Davidson to Ouseley, 29 Aug. 1839, Para. 14* No.247, Misc. 
Dispatch Book, G-. G. *s Agentfs office, Patna Archives.
3. Ibid. Para.15.
4. Tb'id. Para.15.
they induced the hhuinhars to leave the village. The poor '
man could not go to the court, and even if he did, there
was no chance of his success,^*
If the new proprietors proved oppressive, so did the
moneylenders, the mahajans or sahus, who advanced money at
2an interest of one anna per rupee [per month] . The most 
degrading aspect of this moneylending business was that a 
borrower, when unable to repay the principal and interest, 
became a bondsman. There were three species of bondsmen - 
firstly, a borrower executing a sewakpatta (or sewak-patra 
or deed of slavery) that he would become the lender*s bonds­
man or sewak for life - a bondage from which he could never 
be released, though his children would not be affected by 
it; secondly, a person, when borrowing, stipulated by a deed 
to serve the lender for a specified time or until the princi­
pal and the interest were cleared; thirdly, a person who hire 
himself for field labour, generally from the month of magh 
(January) to the end of Paus (December).^ This usury turned 
many cultivators into virtual slaves. When they found culti­
vation unprofitable on account of exactions by the money­
lender, and when they found the land slipping from their 
hands, they began to emigrate in large numbers to other parts 
of Bihar and Bengal where the indigo planters especially pre­
ferred them on account of their performing more work and at 8
Ibid, Para.19s "In nine out of ten cases the powerful 
“zumeendar will thereby be able to defeat the poor 
Bhoonyar," [sic],
2. S.T.Cuthbert to Govt., 21 Apl. 1827, Para.41. Beng. Cr. 
Judl. Cons. 53 of 14 June 1827 /138x
3* Ibid. Para.44.
lower rate than other labourers,^
Such exactions, and the grant of so much tribal land to
oppressive foreigners led to conflict between the kols of
Chotg,-Nagpur and their maharaja. In that the people were ofte:o
aided by their more warlike brethren, the Larka Kols of Singh-
bhum. In the 18th century the maharaja therefore attacked the
Larka Kol country (Kolhan). There, however, he was defeated,
and to add to his troubles the subordinate rajas of Tamar and
the neighbouring parganas revolted and he became involved in
a feud with the raja of Ramgarh.
To strengthen his position and standing the maharaja
took the opportunity provided by Camac* s presence in Palamau,
campaigning against the Cher os to solicit his aid. In 1772
2Camac and the maharaja exchanged turbans, and Camac recom­
mended to the Patna Council that they should enter into poli * 
tical relationship with the raja, pointing out that his estate 
would form an effective barrier to the incursions of the 
Marathas, and would give them the command of the passes into 
the Deccan, Since in Camac's Kharakdiha campaign of 1769-71 
Raja .Durpnath Salu of Chota-Nagpur had rendered essential 
service and since he now offered to pay Rs.12,000 to the 
Company instead of the Rs.4,000 hitherto paid through the 
Ramgarh Raja, the Patna Council readily agreed to the maha- 
rajafs request to be taken under direct British protection.
1, Ibid. Para.45.
Cr.Ranohi, 29s (footnote). There is an anecdote that the 
maharaja*s was1 a jewelled turban of great value* which thus; 
went to Camac. So exasperated was the maharaja that he 
vowed never to see any British officer again.
3. Deputy Secy. J,Thomason*s note, 12 Apl.1832, Para.8.
B.C.1363/54227. This Maharaja Durj^nath Sahi# died in 1791 
when his son got the khillat on his accession.
In 1771 the first direct settlement was therefore concluded 
for three years, at Rs.12,000 per annum, and the raja receiver 
a khillat from the Company.
At one blow the maharaja had thus increased his pres­
tige within his own country, and ended his subordination to 
the raja of Ramgarh. In 1772 he had the satisfaction of 
assisting the British troops in the reduction of his hated
1
rival, the Ramgarh chief. However, his own control of Tori,
and the five parganas of Tamar, BunduiS&'was not very complete,
and he could seldom collect much revenue from them, while
Chota-Nagpur was also subjected to many Maratha incursions.
He, therefore, had some difficulty in making his stipulated
payments to the Company. Nevertheless, after the clearance of
2
his dues, a fresh settlement was made in 1774 for three years, 
and in 1779 a further settlement was even concluded at the 
higher rate of 15,001 sunat rupees a year (Rs.11,001 mal and 
Rs.4,000 nazarana).^
Little attempt was made by Capt, Camac in these early 
years to interfere in the internal affairs of the estate, In 
1780, it is true, a judge-magistrate and collector were app­
ointed to the newly-formed Ramgarh district, which included
1. The maharaja requested Camac to restore all the districts 
recently seized by the Ramgarh raja, bx^ t the Patna Council, 
in view of conflicting claims, ordered.,,the pargana of Tori 
to be restored: Camac to Revenue Council, 10 Dec.1773>
Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 22 of 26 Jan. 1826 /137\
^“ 3 5 ;
2. The revenue was not increased because Chota-Nagpur being a 
frontier country, the maharaja might"be prompted to wish a 
change" in suzerainty. Camac to Rev.Council, 10 Dec. 1773 
and Rev.Council to Camac, 3 May 1774, Beng.Cr. Judl. Cons. 
22 of 26 Jan.1826 /137^
' 3B'
2. Thomason's note, 12 Apl.1832, Paras.10-11, B.C.1363/54227*
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Chota-Nagpur, but for all practical purposes, Chota-Nagpur
owed only "a loose allegiance as a tributary Mahal, administ-
2
ered by its own chief."
The Ramgarh collectors for their part made no very 
serious effort to make contact from their side. They never 
visited the area personally - whence such curious notions as 
that of Ram#us that Chota-Nagpur was "an entire plain, well- 
peopled, and well-cultivated"^ - and from ignorance, perhaps, 
were without understanding or sympathy. Twice, therefore, they
A
suggested that the maharaja be deposed.
However the maharaja was not deposed, but, unvisited,
virtually independent, continued to administer "justice and
the police under the feudal system that had previously pre -
vailed,working through his vassals, some of whom were Rajas
like himself of the old race, holding extensive estates, some
of whom were brethren of his own in possession of maintenance
grants, and some, persons on whom he had conferred jagirs on
5
condition of their supporting him. By the kabuliat or 
agreement of 1787 the maharaja had agreed to maintain law and 
order, and to desist from exactions, and in 1790 he was even 
granted a reduction, at the Decennial Settlement, in his rev­
enue payments, on the grounds that certain old cesses had
1. Regulations passed on 6 April and 5 July specifically 
placed Chota-Nagpur in the zilla of Chatra for the admin­
istration of civil justice.
2. Hunter, Statistical Account, XVI, 19#
3. Reid, Ranchi Setilemenii fie port, Para. 32.
4* Thomasonfs note, 12 Apl.1832* Para.13, B.C.1363/54227.
Also, Hunter, Bengal MS.Records, Nos.1009, 1136.
5# Reid, op.cit. Para.35- There were six dependent rajas in 
Chota-Nagpur, rulers of the estates of Tamar, Bundu, 
Baranda, Silli, Rahi, BarweL. and Tori.
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since 1787 been given up, but we have already seen how 
lightly such promises sat upon the maharaja and his hinduised 
chie:©. In fact, the British overlordship, since it was never 
effective in practice within the estate, acted as a cloak to 
the encroachments upon tribal life made by the chiefs and 
jagirdars. Even in Bengal proper the Permanent Settlement of 
Cornwallis had the effect of defining, even creating, the 
powers of the zamindars, but of blurring or destroying those 
of under tenure holders. In Chota-Nagpur, where the collector 
never set foot within the maharaja's territories - and. where, 
even if he had, he would have been too ignorant of the lan­
guage and customs of the people to understand their problems 
- the growth of the zamindar1 s power at the expense of the 
tribal headmen and ryots was even more marked.
In fact, as an anonymous contributor to the Calcutta
p
Review later pointed out, the English could not think in 
terms of peasant proprietorship, the right of the original 
dearers of the land and so on; "Feudalism so pervades Eng­
lish opinion and the English constitution since the Norman 
Conquest, that it is very difficult for an ordinary English­
man to understand what is familiar to other parts of the 
world.1 The Cornwallis system, with its zamindari bias, its 
standardized administrative forms, and its code of regula­
tions was therefore applied to Chota-Nagpur, with little
1* Copy of the Kabuliat and the patta, 1790, Beng. Rev. Cons. 
43 and 44 ofrT7an^l824.
2. 'The Kols of Chota Nagpore *, Calcutta Review, 1869* XLIX* 
124.
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questioning of its suitability.
Isolated attempts were made by some British officers 
to exempt this area from the general application of the reg­
ulations. But even these attempts were thwarted either by 
their successors in Office, by their superiors or more often 
still by the subordinate non-tribal civil servants* Leslie, 
for example, on 20 June 1789, opposing the extension of the 
Permanent Settlement into this area, expressed an apprehension 
that "the extending these Regulations to this district 
[Chota-Nagpur] will be attended with very bad consequences."'*' 
John Shore concurred with his argument that "the people who 
are jealous and uncivilized, may suppose the taking an account 
of their villages, and sending a person to collect the sayer 
duties, is a prelude to some more serious innovations, and may 
therefore be induced to make a resistance in the first
instance, by which a very heavy expense may be incurred, but
2
no advantage reaped*"
So the Resolution of the Bengal Government, 18 September 
1789* which confirmed the Decennial Settlement in Bihar, pre­
cisely mentioned "that the Regulations do not extend to this 
district [Chota-Nagpur], but that the Settlement be continued 
on the present footing and be extended to a period of ten 
y e a r s . B u t  though the Permanent Settlement and the regula­
tions were not formally extended to this estate, the
1. J. Thomason's note, 12 Apl. 1832, Para.14, B.C.1363/54227*
2. Firminger, Fifth Report, II, 498.
3. Resolution 18 Sept. 1789, Enclosure. Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 
22 of 26 Jan. 1826. ,137\
Government, whenever asked on this question, later on, de­
cided that they should he held applicable to this estate."^
Consequently, all the pernicious effects of the Perma­
nent Settlement - rack-renting, resumption, sub-letting - 
were felt by the tribal peasantry. Their ancient tillage 
rights were merged in the "all devouring recognition of the
zamindar’ s permanent property in the soilM, which left the
2
zamindar free to make settlements at his will.
Shore’s warning about innovations in this area was 
totally forgotten, and non-tribal subordinate officers and 
laws were blindly introduced in this area. Some of the innova­
tions were opposed by the maharaja as well as by the people. 
Thus when the revenue official, the patwarif was introduced, 
the maharaja protested ’violently against their activities, 
such as land measurement, the issue of revenue demand agree­
ments and receipts, and so on. ’’The people”, he wrote, "take 
the ground unmeasured, the extent of which is known only by 
its name.... .Pott ahs particularizing the quantity of ground 
cannot be given. On this occasion the Ramgarh collector, 
Hunter took note of the complaint. He wrote to the Board of 
Revenue testifying to "the simplicity of character and ignor­
ance of the generality of the people," and pointing out that 
no pattas had ever been granted and no patwaris ever employed
1. In 1799 and 1823.
2. ’Zamindar and the Bengal Ryot1, Calcutta Review,VI, 319»
3. Petition, Maharaja Deonath Sahi Seo, N.lD. Beng. Rev. Cons. 
82 of 27 March 1794. /53\
CT4}
here,'1' and in 1794, by section two of Regulation VI a modifi­
cation was introduced to meet the needs of the Bihar portion 
of the Ramgarh district. It was recognised that the ryots 
were "unable to read or write" and were "accustomed to culti­
vate the lands under verbal agreements, and terms entirely 
dissimilar to those which prevail in other parts of the prov­
inces. In 1800, Regulation X similarly modified the rule of 
inheritance to suit the special needs of the chiefs of the 
area.
In these two cases, however, the government had yielded 
to the combined opposition of chiefs and people. Where the 
ill-understood interests of the tribal people alone were con­
cerned, the British did nothing. So the traders, settlers, 
and alien administrators were permitted to push forward their 
frontiers, encroaching steadily upon what had been the tribal 
people's sanctuary of custom. And when the people rose in 
protest^ they were treated as marauders or rebels and hunted 
down by the troops.
On such occasions the non-tribal subordinate officers
1. Hunter to Board, 17 Aug. 1793, Paras.6-8. Beng. Rev. Cons. 
82 of 27 March 1794. (53\
2. Extracts from Harrington's Analysis of the Bengal Regula­
tions. H 5 t  Footnote7
3. There were revolts in Tamar in 1783, (crushed by Crawford), 
and others in 1789 which went on until 1795* In 1789 about 
three thousand insurgents assembled: M.Leslie, Ramgarh 
collector, to Board, 20 June 1789*
Beng. Rev. Cons. of 1 July 1789 /51\ p.496.
\S3 -}
would exaggerate the criminality of the tribesmen,^" the Brit­
ish officers usually were quite out of touch with the tribal 
rebels, and so hundreds of tribal people were killed. Even 
when the Chatra collector felt that this unrest resulted 
'•more particularly from the universal oppression, mismanage­
ment and want of method which prevails throughput Naugpore
p
I Chota-Nagpur ]M he could find no means of getting in touch 
with the rebels, still less of finding a solution to their 
problems.
In 1793? when the Tamar rebels were joined by their 
brethren from Patkum, Silli and Singhbhum, the situation 
called for the employment of troops under Major Parmer for 
about a year.^ Parmer, at the end of the campaigns, admitted 
that "on an attentive investigation into the causes of the 
general disaffection," he had had to change his opinion formed
1. Chiragh Ali, who led the troops against Bishnu Manki and 
Mangi Manki, the tribal leaders of Tamar, reported, for 
example, that the rebels had ordered the heads of the
sepoys killed by them, to be cut off and affixed at the
corners of the village: Leslie to Board, 12 June 1789, 
Beng. Rev. Cons* 24 June 1789 f51\ p.152.
The sazawal in Chota-Nagpur (Bhola Nath Singh, the nazir 
of the" Uhafra court (Amar Singh), the hurkaras (peonsf) 
of the Court (Shakurulla Khan, Rahimulla Khan and others) 
and the hinduized Raja of Tamar (Govind Sahi) and his new 
non-tribal farmers represented to the Ramgarh magistrate 
that these bhuinhars (tribal rebel leaders) were very 
turbulent and rude, and not amenable to reason: Beng. Rev. 
Cons. 19 Aug. 1789, Part III, /51\ pp.1731-1741.
2. . Leslie - to Board, 14 July 1789, Beng. Rev. Cons.
19 Aug. 1789, Part III, _^|1^  p.1724.
3. Beng. Rev. Cons. 15 of 29 March 1793 / 53 \ ? 18 of 24 May
1793 ^
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"from the insidious representations of the zemindar of
Nagpore's vakeel."^ ffSo rapacious and unrelenting" had "been
the conduct of the revenue collectors of the maharaja, "that
the resistance charged upon them as a crime" Farmer came to
see as "the natural consequence of licentious power exerted
2beyond human sufferance." He proved that the young zamindar 
of Chota-Nagpur, fallen under the guidance of selfish and 
very profligate non-tribal servants (\x*akils or diwan etc* who 
claimed that the maharaja had a right to collect his revenue 
direct from the people of Tamar in any way he liked), wanted 
to cow the bhuinhars of Tamar into paying much more than was 
stipulated by custom. Setting aside the authority of the 
raja of Tamar, these rapacious servants of the maharaja had 
seized the tenants1 cattle, burnt their villages, and even
A
threatened them with further vengeance. As soon as Farmer 
had become aware of the real causes of the unrest, and had 
taken to conciliatory methods exempting the people "from arb­
itrary exactions",^ he was able quickly to bring the campaign 
to an end, the tribal people tamely submitting.
Moreover, once Farmer began to question the correctness 
of the reports and to pursue his own investigations, he
1. S.Farmer to Ramgarh collector, 15 May 1793* Beng. Rev. 
Cons. 38 of 9 Aug. 1793 (53)
2. Ibid.
3 »  I b i d .
4* Farmer to M.Leslie, 27 May 17939 Beng. Rev. Cons. 26 of 
18 Oct. 1793 (53)
5. Beng. Rev. Cons. 38 of 9 Aug. 1793 /53\
uncovered a whole series of other outrages and abuses. Thus
in Rahi he found that the servants of the maharaja had set
aside the authority of Narendra Sahi, the raja of the pargara,
1and had robbed the ryots of their cattle. The murder of
twenty people by the raja of Bundu had been hushed up by
bribes to the maharaja and his officials. In the subordinate
rajadorn of Silli, bribes to the servants of the maharaja had
enabled an uncle to oust the real heir to the pargana and
2
seize it for himself.
The policy of indirect rule through the hinduized
maharaja and his chiefs, it is clear, had proved to be a
curse for the tribal people of this area. The sadr station of 
I
the district was situated far away at Chatra and the magist­
rate seldom visited the area personally because of the un­
healthiness of the climate and the turbulence of the people. 
The state of affairs was very well described later: "no police
had been hitherto established in Chootah Nagpore and the auth-
•
ority of the Courts was very imperfectly maintained. Whatever 
power the Magistrate could exercise was made use of by the 
Rajah [Maharaja] to oppress any who opposed his will, whilst 
his creatures and dependants [rajas, jagirdars and diwansl 
were upheld in any act of oppression they might commit and
1. Beng. Rev. Cons. 26 of 18 Oct. 1793 (53\ 5 Los Lai 
Munda, one of the rebel leaders,
paid his dues and said that the only crime committed by 
his family was the saving of "a little money" which "the 
Nap>oor collector (vakil) wanted to rob . "
2. Ibid. Also, Petition, Narain Singh, heir of Silli, Beng. 
■HevT Cons. 57 of 11 Apl. 1794. ,53\
(T5]
protected from the consequences."^ Even when the Ramgarh 
authorities proposed some action against the maharaja, the 
Government rejected it on the ground that he was "only nomin­
ally subject to their authority", and that the situation of
2  ^that part of the country was peculiar. The proposals J to
move the sadr station from distant Chatra to Hazaribagh was
similarly turned down. No wonder, therefore, that Chota-
Nagpur became "a receptacle for murderers, robbers, and all
4breakers of peace, vagabonds &ca. "
The oppressed tribal peasantry, therefore, had no other
means of ventilating their grievances than through unrest. But
every time the people revolted the maharaja and his non-
tribal henchmen gave to the Chatra authorities an exaggerated
account of the trouble, and every time troops were marched
5
against the rebels. In Silli, Ha jam Banta and Palma, Tamar, 
Rahi, Burwa and other disturbed pockets between 1797 and 1799
1. J. Thomasonfs note, 12 Apl.1832, Para.21, B.C.1363/54227.
In 1794 the maharaja justified the action of the raja of 
Bundu as a retaliation by 1 blood for blood1 and he showed 
his inability to apprehend him: Petition, Deonath Sahi, N.P 
Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 27 of 6 June 1794. /128\
v 12;
2. Resolution, Govt., Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 28 of 6 June 1794
3* Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 12 of 20 June 1794 /1 2 8 \ ; 6 of 8
Aug. 1794 /128  \ ; 30 of 29 Aug. 1799/128 n V"T2;
13 *
Beng. Rev. Cons. 20 of 20 May 1799
4. W.Hunter to Govt. 13 July 1793, Para.3, Beng. Rev. Cons.
24 of 18 Oct. 1793
5 . cf.Capt. R.Simond to R.Abercrombey. C.in C., 31 March 1795, 
Beng. Rev. Cons. 21 of 17 Apl. 1795 / 5 3 \
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the loss of life and property was considerable.^ In the first
the unrest was primarily due to a family feud, in the second
to the imposition of an outsider (Radhanath, probably the
diwan of the maharaja) as its auction-purchaser, and in others
to the different types of oppressions we have described. The
disturbances in Pachet, Patkum and other neighbouring parganas
against the sale - laws of the Government gave encouragement
to these tribal protesters, but their real grievances were
local in origin, the oppressions and injustices perpetrated by
Radhanath and Basantlal, the managers of the maharaja. Even
when these oppressions were proved (as in the case of Dukin
Sahay nrunda in Burwa) the Ramgarh authorities could not take
any action because the maharaja had "absolute authority with
2respect to the internal Regulation of his own country", and 
he had "never seen an European" and declared "his determina*- 
tion of never doing it."“^
After 1800, with the abolition of the Ramgarh collector- 
ship, and the removal of the sazawal from Chota-Nagpur, things
1. Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 4 of 24 Nov. 1797 /128\ ; 6 of 8 Dec. 
1797 /128 s ;
6 and 7 of 6 Feb. 1798 /128 s ; 16 of 25 July 1799 /128s
'“35;  ^42 J
In Burwa detachments of troops were repeatedly sent to cow 
the jagirdars iniosubmitting to the maharaja, but without 
success: Ramgarh collector to Board, 31 Dec.1799, Beng. Cr. 
Judl. Cons. 22 of 26 Jan. 1826 1^37)
2. J.Miller, Ramgarh magistrate, to Govt. 18 Oct. 1799, Beng. 
Cr. Judl. Cons. 19 of 24 Oct. 1799 /128x
H r )
3. W.Hunter, Ramgarh collector, to Board, 26 Sept.1798,
Para. 15, Beng. Rev. Cons. 2 of 12 Oct. 1798 ( )
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became worse. Now, the diwan, the sheristadar, the mohurir 
and other non-tribal subordinate officers of the maharaja and 
of the chatra court connived to oppress the tribal people, and 
did so with impunity.
In 18 01 the maharaja and his agents effected the treach­
erous and cruel murder of the raja of Barwa, thus rendering 
ineffectual "the protection accorded to this person by the 
chief local officers of Government (Col. Jones of the Bamgarh 
battalion and Magistrate Smith). ^  After 1804 Tori also was 
disturbed because of the interference of the maharaja. In 1806 
the widow of the late raja of Tori was attacked, and a crisis
was only averted by the timely march of troops, and the refer-
2ence of the matter to the court.
The weaker tribal peasants, however, could not even go 
to the court. Those who did, were disillusioned at Chatra. 
Blunt, the Acting magistrate of Ramgarh, rightly pointed out 
in 1806, "All persons, therefore, having any complaints to pre­
fer are compelled however great the distance to repair to 
Chittra [Chatra] for redress[$] and it must frequently happen 
that the peon deputed by the court for the apprehension of the 
persons complained against returns without having been success­
ful. The prosecutor is [thus] reduced to the necessity,
[either] of foregoing any further attempt to obtain redress 
or to incur the expense of using a second time the same
1. Capt. Roughsedge's report, quoted in Reid, Ranchi Settle­
ment Report, Para. 38.
2. J.Thomason’s note, 12 Apl. 1832, Para. 21. B.C.1363/54227*
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process with no better prospect of success♦ On the other hand 
should the peon deputed by the court have succeeded in appre­
hending the persons complained against, it is [as] frequently 
happens that the prosecutor wearied out with attendance, has 
previously returned to his home, and is not forthcoming."^
Indeed, the coming of the British rule over this area, 
with its courts to enforce complex regulations, its magistrates 
ignorant of the local language and custom, and its non-tribal 
ami as (subordinate staff) open to corruption, meant the whole­
sale ruin of the tribal peasantry, "The poor man in the prose­
cution of a suit having no presents to give, and worn out by 
litigation and chicanery, at length became obliged to yield it 
up; there was in fact no law at all for him; and the Omla j
being well practised in their vocation had all their proceed-
2
ings veiled, as at the present day, in profound secrecy.1
To improve the law and order situation in Chota-Nagpur, 
the Government, at the request of Blunt, sanctioned the intro­
duction of the zamindari police under Regulation XVTII, 1805, 
and a sanad was offered to the maharaja for his acceptance,^
He wavered for some time, but even when he accepted it in July 
1807, nothing could be done for some time, probably due to the
1. W.Blunt to Register, Nizamat Adalat, 8 Apl. 1806, Beng. Cr, 
Judl. Cons. 25 of 26 Jan. 1826, /137\
2. Drummond, op.cit. 83*
3. Thomason's note, 12 Apl. 1832, Para.22, B.C.1363/54227.
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family feud between the maharaja and his brothers."*"
It is necessary at this point to say a few words about 
the feud, for not only did it delay the introduction of the 
new police system, but it was itself the occasion of various 
crimes and acts of oppression. The original feud was over the 
division of the inheritance, the making of maintenance grants 
to the younger brothers etc., but it was complicated by the 
maharaja1 s taking part in a similar dispute over the pargana 
of Udaipur to which there were two claimants, one of them, 
Dukhan (Dukani?) Sahi being supported by the maharaja, the 
other by the maharaja’s brothers. The prime mover in these 
disputes and in the resulting violence was the maharaja’s
Cu “5
diwan, Dindayal Nath, Kayastha. There was almost universal 
complaint about the man’s undue influence over the maharaja, 
but as Thomason records; "in accordance with the oath of the
1. Ibid.Para. 21. In March 1806 Maharaja Deonath Sahi died, 
and was succeeded by his son Govind nath Sahi, a young man 
of 25, who got a khtllat from the commandant of the Ramgarh 
Battalion on the occasion of his installation.
2. In his petition [reed. 2 May 1808, Beng. Rev. Cons. 11 of 
22 July 1808 (55\ Maharaja Govind nath Sahi stated that
m 3'
after the death of maharaja Deonath Sahi, he, being the 
eldest born, succeeded to the estate, and "in conformity 
to the usage of the f a m i l y h i s  younger brothers Gopinath 
Sahi and Mangee Lai got some parganas as jagir; but they 
were not ready to pay the revenue fixed at Rs.4,000 and 
3,000 Rs. respectively. Moreover, Gopinath, while trying to 
,rtake forcible possession'1 of five more parganas, had col­
lected a large force, attacked Numda pargana, imprisoned 
and harassed the renters, beat the sazawal and other offic­
ials of the maharaja and driven them away. ^
3* Both these cases went to the Chatra Court, and Raaanath, 
the dismissed jliwan, worked against the maharaja in both.
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family [not to see any British officer] the Rajah [maharaja]
continued to preserve his invisibility and thus there was
little check upon Been Dial who affixed his master's seal to
1
whatever orders it suited his purpose to issue."
Whenever any reference was made to the Government, they 
advised the Ramgarh authorities to maintain the party in poss­
ession and to refer the complaint to the civil court. But the 
maharaja by his own power and authority, dispossessed any 
party opposed to himself or his diwan, and then referred the 
injured party to the civil court, knowing full well that the 
process of redress there was tardy, and out of the reach of 
the simple tribal folk, (if perchance the decision was adverse 
to his claims, he looked to circumstances and chance for his 
revenge.) An injured party could not prove possession, but 
when they pleaded previous possession, and the recent outrage 
on them, their opponents, supported by the diwan, totally re­
jected these claims. Very often, indeed, the defendants re­
fused to appear in the court, and derided the attempts of the
2magistrate to enforce the civil process against them.
While the diwan's power was unchallenged there could be 
no hope of redress. Worse still, the failure of the Company's 
court to ascertain the truth, or if ascertained, to act upon 
it and enforce their decision led to a hatred of that court by 
those whom it had failed to protect* In the winter of 1808-09
1, J. Thomason's note, 12 Apl. 1832, Para.25, B.C.1363/59227*
2. Ibid. Para,25.
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it was decided therefore to end an intolerable situation, and
Roughsedge marched into Chota-Nagpur with his troops. Bin
Bayal fled to Calcutta where he was apprehended and put on his
trial, and the maharaja, when detached from his evil genius,
paid his arrears and submitted his disputes to arbitration.^"
The zamindari police were now introduced in this area
o
on 4 June 1809 after the declaration of a general amnesty.
But from the start it seemed unlikely to succeed. The maharaja 
was totally averse to a measure which involved him in the ex­
pense of five thanas,later six, an expense of Rs.5,400 and 
one which tended to keep him continually embroiled with the 
magistrate if their pay was not punctually discharged or his
'i
orders readily enforced. Moreover, while Regulation XVIII of 
1805 contemplated the employment of no other than the indig­
enous village police (e.g. ghatwals, goraits, etc.) under the 
mundas and mankis "here was introduced a new and very expens­
ive machinery, the very titles of which would not be acceptable 
to the people, and which could not be otherwise than offensive 
to the R a j a h . I n  the words of Drummond, "here was an exten­
sive establishment of Darogahs, Jemadars and Mohurirs with all 
the other paraphernalia attached to this licensed banditti."^
1. Ibid. Paras. 27-28.
2. Seng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 5 of 2 Peb. 1810. /130\* Din Dayal
also was released, vide Beng. Cr. Judl. ^
Cons. 14 & 15 of 5 July 1814 ,131\
v~4l'
3. Thomason's Note, 12 Apl. 1832, Para. 29,: B.C. 1363/54227• 
Radhanath Panda, his former diwan, was instigating the 
maharaja to thwart it.
4. Ibid. Para. 32.
5. Drummond, op.cit. 96.
Naturally, therefore, neither were oppressions checked
1 2nor disturbances averted. In 1810 Burwa and Tamar were ser­
iously disturbed, Between 1811 and 1813, the tribal people of 
Nawagarh under Buktour Sahi and Mandal Singh threw such a 
challenge to the authorities that even the Hamgarh battalion 
had to suffer a defeat.*^  Even though the Ramgarh authorities 
realized that these disturbances were due to the continued
A
oppressions perpetrated on the peasantry by their chiefs, 
they persisted in employing troops, presumably for the sake of 
prestige.
The new police of Chota-Nagpur, which so evidently 
failed to bring order, was invariably criticised in this
1, Beng. Cr. Judl.Cons. 10 of 23 May 1817. Roughsedge admitted 
the inefficiency of the police in this pargana: Beng, Cr,
Judl. Cons. 79 of 19 Jan. 1810 ,130%
2, Beng. Cr. Judl, Cons. 8 of 14 Sept, 1810 ,130x ; 28, 29 &
30 of 13 Nov. 1810 /I30x ;
'‘“23'
3 of 24 Oct. 1810 (130); 1,2 & 4 of 24 Oct. 1810 (130).
The leader of the Tamar revolt, Raghunath Singh, was impris­
oned for life. The following episode connected with his con­
viction is worth noting: When the officer commanding in 
Tamar reported to the Ramgarh magistrate that the disturb­
ances which had occurred were entirely due to the oppression
of the Tamar raja on his vassal, "Raghunath went to the 
Coiirt then sitting at Chatra. rThe evidence kept in readi­
ness against him by the Tamarh zamindar caused his committal
to the court of circuit, and the result was his condemnation
to transportation or imprisonment for life.*" Vide Dalton, 
Ethnology, 170,
3* Beng. Op. Judl. Cons. 20 of 27 Jan.1812 /130\ 5 39. of 21
March 1812 /130x ^~4?;
4# cf. Acting Magt. Ramgarh to Govt., 5 Sept. 1810, Para#4, 
Beng, Cr. Judl. Cons, 6 of 14 Sept. I8l0./130\5 The Tamar 
raja attempted to raise the quit-rent, ' 2l^"and even 
endeavoured to dispossess some of the Mankees and Moondas, 
who have been obliged to have recourse to arms in defence 
of their possession,."
p e r i o d B u t  strangely enough, it was never realized that 
their inefficiency was due to the employment of outsiders as 
police officers. The mixture of the daroga system and the 
zamindari system of police had made the situation anomalous. 
The trihal watchmen (e.g. the gorai~fe and ghatwals), who had 
always obeyed their own chiefs, did not feel inclined to obey 
the non-tribal, greedy and corrupt darogas and .jamadars. They 
had, moreover, a particular hatred against the barkandazes 
attached to the thanas.
It was never realized by the authorities that "a man 
ought to know the turnings, windings and intricacies of his 
own house better than a stranger to it" and that "the peculi­
arities of any country must be much better known to those who
have been born and reared on it than to strangers or those of
2
recent importation. " Drummond rightly points out, "It is
also obvious that the village and indigenous people by the
possession of such knowledge, would be enabled to overcome
physical obstacles and avoid impediments which to strangers
might seem impossible,"^
The only step taken to improve the situation was the
to be
annual tour in Chota-Nagpur and other jungle parganas/ under-
1. Beng. Cr, Judl. Cons. 5 of 4 Apl. 1812/ 130\ ; 2 of 3 March 
1812 / 130\ 5
46
9 and 38 of 23 May 1817 /132x ; 39 of 29 July 1817 /132x
2. Drummond, op.cit. Chapter V.
3* Ibid.
1
taken by the Ramgarh magistrate from 1817. But this casual
visit, with a large establishment, did not check the oppressive
conduct of the landholders and subordinate officers, nor did
it secure discipline and effectiveness in the zamindari police.
Late in 1818, a woman named Adhar Dai and her family
were murdered by the barkandazes of the Chota-Nagpur maharaja
on the suspicion that she was a witch and that she had harmed
the children of the maharaja. Though the fact of murder was
proved early in 1819, no one came forward to depose against
2the maharaja.
Soon after this, the ftundas of Tamar rose en masse 
under their two leaders, the two nrundas Rudun and Kunta.^
1* Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 9 and 11 of 23 May 1817 /132s ;
34 of 2 Dec. 1817 (133)
It was laid down that there should be an annual tour. But 
the main reason for avoiding the constant presence of an 
European officer in Chota-Nagpur was the fear of an 
unhealthy climate: G, French, Ramgarh Magistrate, to 
H, Douglas & others, Judges of the Court of Circuit,
10 Apl, 1817, Para. 11, Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 9 of 23 May 
1817. /132x
2. B.C. 746/20327 : Reports of Jan. to Apl. 1819: 
maharaja’s son and daughter died of fever and small pox
in July 1818 and in Aug. or Sept. the murder was committed, 
But the Ramgarh magistrate only began investigations in 
January 1819.
3. E. Roughsedge to G, French, Magistrate of Ramgarh, 2 Nov, 
1819, Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 35 of 10 March 1820 (134)
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Troops were employed for several months, but the leaders,
who first took refuge in the jungle and then in Singhbhum,
could only he apprehended with the help of the Singhbhum
chiefs,, Colvin, the Magistrate of the jungle Mahals, and
Roughsedge remained busy in Tamar for several months. The
immediate cause of the rising was found to be the superstition
of the people and their desire to lay hold of one Tribhuvan 
iuManj 10 and others whom they accused of preventing the rain-
2fall through their magical powers. But the insurgents were 
also found to be conniving with the brother of Raghunath Singh 
of Sindri, the leader of 1810 rising, whose family had been 
dispossessed of its jagir of Chaurasi,*^
1. seng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 28 of 24 March 1820 /134 \ ; the 
inaccessibility of this area was proved  ^ l8' 
beyond doubts "the only paths from village to village in 
this wonderfully strong country, hinder it in marching 
impossible to avoid Ghauts or passes which are keys to some 
man's possessions and he at once resists or flies to his 
Coora, on the appearance of an armed body": Roughsedge to 
Colvin, 2 March 1820, Ibid.
Moreover, most of the insurgents were found to be 
"solely actuated by the blind obedience which the lower 
classes of the inhabitants of the pergunna are in the habit 
of paying to their immediate superiors" [the mundas and 
mankis]: Colvin to Roughsedge, 29 Feb. 1820, Beng. Cr. Judl, 
Cons. 36 of 10 March 1820
2. Colvin to Govt., 16 Jan. 1820, Para.7, Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons, 
39 of 4 Feb. 1820 /134\
3. Ibid. Para. 10.
"Raghunath, a mahto#. (a superior manki) was still in jail, 
and his brother, for whose apprehension a reward had been 
offered by the Magistrate in 1813, was still at large.
Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 9 of 8 Feb. 1820 (134\ 5 Beng. Cr. 
Judl. Cons. 16 of 8 June 1821 /134\
”"33 * Though an amin had 
investigated the cai_ims of the raja and the mahto, and the 
diwani adalat had decided the matter in formerfs favour 
in Jan. 18177 $the tribal people were not satisfied.
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In the affrays that took place, several people were 
killed, and many houses were burnt. At last Dukhit, Sugun and 
other leaders, who surrendered, were pardoned*^ Rudun and 
Kunta, after their apprehension, suffered imprisonment.
These two events - the murder in Chota-Nagpur proper 
and the Tamar disturbance - proved beyond doubt that the con­
trol of the British authorities over these areas was only nomr
inal* Now it was realized that a closer supervision was necess- 
2ary. Colvin who had been specially deputed to investigate the
causes of the Tamar disturbances and Fleming the magistrate,
both put forward the same view* In April 1821, therefore,
S.T.Cuthbert was appointed the judge and Magistrate of Ramgarh
A
and in June W.Smith was appointed the Register of the district
1. G-ovt* to Colvin, 4 Feb. 1820, Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 43 
of 4 Feb. 1820 /134\
 ^ 16
2. In his long report to the Govt, of 10 Apl. 1821, Paras. 
53 to 63, (Beng# Cr.Judl. Cons. 16 of 8 June 1821, /134\ 
he discussed the nature of the tribal people and '53 
the control of the maharaja and his subordinate rajas 
over them. He criticised the levy of Rs. 300 on these 
rajas by the maharaja for the maintenance of a tahsildar 
and the mismanagement of the police at his hands. Still 
he admitted "no thana Establishment, however large, 
would be sufficient to inforce [sicj the processes of 
the Magistrate in many parts of the Pergunnah (for 
instance the southern and western parts of Tamar) or 
even to effect the apprehensions of common offenders 
amongst the hills and jungles to which they have resort 
and ,., the only police which is adapted for that part 
of the country is the zemeendaree," Like^ the mundas 
and mankis of Patkum and Bagmundi, in the Jungle Mahals, 
he wanted their counterparts in Chota-Nagpur also to be 
responsible for law and order. At the same time he was 
in favour of the overall control of the maharaja and the 
rajas with a closer supervision of the district author­
ities over them,




and Joint magistrate and assistant collector in Chota-Nagpur,
It was expected that Smith would visit the area once a year in 
a favourable season, would establish a more vigilant superin­
tendence over its affairs, and would submit to Government some
2
proposals for the improvement of the police. As ill luck 
could have it, W,Smith died a few months later in October 1821, 
and N. Smith took his office.
In the decade 1821 to 1831 N.Smith and later Cuthbert, 
both of whom had a knack of making experiments^ tried by various 
methods to secure the full enforcement of the regulations in 
Chota-Nagpur, Thus in 1822, during a tour of Chota-Nagpur,
Smith chanced to see some stills, and he recommended that the 
excise tax should be extended to the area, ^ Next year he 
wrote to the Government that the road cess (rahdari) should be 
collected. The Government agreed to introduce the excise sys­
tem, but abolished rahdari altogether.
There was much opposition to the new excise duties, 
both from the maharaja and the people. But Smith made light of 
its 1 it may be necessary to premise that the same farce will 
be acted over again as on a former occasion. We shall be told 
that the kols are going back to Rohitasgarh; that the pargana
1. By -Regulation I of 1817 the authority of the Commissioner 
of Bihar and Benares had already been extended to this arear 
The maharaja of Chota-Nagpur had also been divested of his 
police power and a native superintendent of police appointed 
in Chota-Nagpur in 1819. Moreover, the collectorship of 
Ramgarh had been revived.
2. Memorandum of Judl. Secy. Shakespear, 20 Jan,1826, Beng.Cr. 
Judl. Cons, 31 of 26 Jan. 1826 /137\
V 3 § ;
3# Reid, Ranchi Settlement Report, Para.43? Also see S.T.Cuth­
bert to Govt. 15 Apl. 1530, Beng. Rev, Cons. 46 of 25 May
1830 ,61x
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will fall into decay; that the public revenue will likely he 
endangered, nay, more than this, thousands of kols will prob­
ably at the last extremity appear at Chatra, peaceably to 
gubrau and dumkau [Dhamkau or threaten] the authoritiesM\  
Accordingly official distilleries were set up, operated by 
non-tribal farmers of the excise. These distilleries, which 
spread the use of spirits, brought degradation among the 
tribal people and the influx of the non-tribal excise-farmers 
led to their harassment. Moreover, this prepared the ground 
for a tax on the milder, much less injurious and more nutrit­
ious pachai or hanria (rice-beer) brewed by the tribal people 
for their own consumption.
The tribal people felt the innovation very keenly, the 
more so because of the oppressions of the excise-farmer. In 
1825 they arrived in large bodies at the sadr station and 
lodged numerous complaints against Karam Ali, the thikadar 
of abkari in Chota-Nagpur. On enquiry, Cuthbert found that 
the thikadar had "sent his Myrmidons into every part of the 
pergunnah, making the people enter into engagements with him,
wholly disproportionate to their means, thereby threatening
2the pergunnah with general misery and distress." The greedy
1. Reidr op,cit. Para. 43*
2. S.T.Cutnbert to Board, C.P. 11 Jan. 1826, Beng. Rev. Cons. 
46 of 7 Sept. 1826 (61\ • In 1825 the thikadar let the 
pargana of Bus£a  ^ 1'
(84 villages) to Lohar Singh Baraik at Rs. 300, but in 
1826 he himself collected more than Rs.1,200 from 36 
villages. Now he was coercing the mahtog and pahaU of the 
villages to pay him at the rate of one Rupee per home, and 
on their not agreeing to this, he maltreated them.
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foreigners who took excise farms, associated the non-tribal
police daroga and the munsif/ of the pargana in the lease to
get their support in the act of extortion. Cuthbert very aptly
remarked, "It must come home to the mind of a child, that
farming out the Abkarry to a stranger in such a Pergunnah must
necessarily give rise to abuses which the strictest surveill-
1
ance on the part of the collector will not altogether prevent."
Soon W. R. Gilbert, the political Agent of the Grovernor-
General on the south-west frontier, was reporting that as a
result of the tax on hanria, a flourishing hamlet in BtXrwa had
become a jungle with a herd of wild buffaloes and tigers in
the course of only two to three years. The tribal people of
several villages had emigrated to a man, and large tracts of
2fertile land were now lying waste. The nazir of Ramgarh also 
found many houses deserted in Chota-Nagpur as a result of this 
taxation.^ In 1826 Cuthbert strongly recommended the
1. Ibid.
2. (rilbert to Cuthbert, 20 July 1826, Beng. Rev. Cons, 47 of 
7 Sept. 1826 /6l\ % "Three-fourths of the cultivators of 
Chota-Nagpore
are of that tribe of Coles called Dhanghars [sic], and that 
it is on these industrious people alone the Handee [sio] 
tax falls."
3. Cuthbert to Board, 29 July 1826, Beng, Rev. Cons. 46 of 
7 Sept. 1826 (61) • Method of preparing hanria :- Roots
of certain  ^ 1'
trees were "mixed with rice, and then steeped in water and 
this mixture by being exposed a certain number of days to 
the sun produces a beverage of a spiritous quality; it is 
manufactured by the Dhangers and Coles in their own houses, 
and [may] be termed a kind of domestic brewery necessary 
for the health and support of the lower orders in a climate 
uncongenial even to the natives."
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abolition of this tax. Now it became clear how far from the
mark had been Smith’s scoffing remark of 1822. At last, at the
2
recommendation of the Board of Revenue this tax was 
abolished.^
For a few years, only the general Abkari was levied in 
Chota-Nagpur.^ Then in 1830 Cuthbert proposed that a house 
tax on account of the home brewing of these tribal people 
should be levied. He saw "no reason why the people of Chota 
Nagpore should be exempt from it, indeed I am of opinion that 
even the lower orders should be made to pay, for they are 
great drunkards, and cases have not been unfrequent lately, in
1. Ibid; Method of Settlement and oppression:- "On a person 
receiving a lease from the Thecadar he sends his Peadas 
into the different villages within his division, these his 
people immediately summon before them, the Mahtoon or head 
Ryot’.t, get from him the number of houses in the village, 
and the number of residents in each house when they make 
the settlement of the village by laying a tax on every home, 
varying from 8 annas to one Rupee 8 annas; a putta is then 
furnished to the Mahtoon and a Kuboolent taken from him and 
the inhabitants are called upon to pay down one half year's 
rent which they have generally been compelled to do, and in 
many instances without receiving receipts; moreover indepen 
dent of the tax, money is extorted from them in the shape 
of Tulhana, salamy &ca &ca, besides which they have to pro­
vide entertainment for the Peadas. Some of the Kutkenadsfs 
have in this manner, put into their pockets four times the 
amount of what they have paid for their lease."
2. Beng. Rev. Cons. 45 of 7 Sept. 1826 (^)
3. Beng. Rev. Cons. 47 of 7 Sept. 1826 (£1)
4. Beng. Rev. Cons. 46 of 25 May I83O (61\ * Rs. 9122-10 in
that year. 'k'5T!r
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which people have lost their lives in drunken brawls."'*' Thus 
was introduced the house tax which nullified the salutary 
effect of the abolition of the hanria tax.
Another grave mistake of Cuthbert was the introduction 
of poppy cultivation. In 1827 he complained that this had not 
yet been attempted by the opium agent, "though there are many 
parts of the Pergunnah in which it might perhaps be success-
p
fully introduced." Later, in 1830, he reported with pleasure 
that since 1828 he had doubled the yield of opium in the dis- 
trict, There was opposition to the new crop, but he dis.~ 
missed it. The unwillingness of the peasantry was described 
by him in the following words almost as lightly as Smith had 
dismissed their opposition to the excise tax: "The introduc­
tion of a new branch of agriculture amongst the natives is 
always attended with infinite trouble and it will be some time 
before the husbundry [sic] of Chotanagpore will be spirited 
enough to convert any great proportion of land to this valua­
ble cultivation."^ He admitted at the same time that the
1. Cuthbert to Govt, 15 Apl. 1830, Para.34, Beng. Rev. Cons.
46 of 25 May 1830 /61\ : He proposed that 404,584 houses in
2,636 villages
of Chotanagpur should be assessed at five annas per annum, 
yielding 12,663 Rupees, an excess of about three thousand 
rupees on the existing returns from the stills,
2. Cuthbert to Govt., 21 Apl. 1827, Para.49, Beng. Cr. Judl. 
Cons, 53 of 14 June 1827 /138\ : He also wanted the
management of opium  ^ 22^
production of the district in his hands,
3. Cuthbert to Govt., 15 Apl. 1830, Para.37, Beng. Rev. Cons.
46 of 25 May 1830 /6lx
4. Ibid.
rural economy of the pargana and the lack of irrigation facili 
ties were the two factors responsible for the opposition of
Some useful points were no doubt made in this period
by both Smith and Cuthbert. The former on 19 June 1823 wrote
that the turbulence of the people in this area was sufficients
ly indicative of the hostility of the people to the judicial
system by which they were governed: "It is upon the system
itself, as inapplicable to these parts, that I would cast all
2the odium implied in my position."
race of people" inhabiting this area - "a people differing in 
manners, customs and language from the inhabitants of other 
parts of the country", urged that they should be governed by 
"a system of jurisprudence adapted to their actual condition
suggested, might be placed under the management and superin­
tendence of an able and experienced commissioner, assisted by 
about four assistants, possibly military gentlemen, acquainted
About the police also some useful suggestions were made 
On 17 July 1824 Cuthbert had opposed the idea of re-intro due ii: 
the zamindari police system. But on 21 April 1827 he admitted
1. Ibid.
2. N.Smith to Govt., 19 June 1823, Para. 10, Beng. Cr.Judl. 
Cons, 21 of 26 Jan. 1826  ^ ^
3. Cuthbert to Govt., 15 Peb. 1823? Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 19 
of 26 Jan. 1826  ^ ^
the people to this cultivation. 1
Cuthbert, adverting to the "distinct and uncivilized





that the non-tribal police officers had to face serious physi­
cal obstacles in this area.*** Again, in I83O he emphasized 
these difficulties and admitted that the non-tribal police 
officers "who had no natural tie to bind them to the interests 
of the people, who are little acquainted with the country, who 
go into [Chota] Nagpoor with a full conviction of the climate 
disagreeing with them, and of their being obliged to fly from
the purgunna on the approach of the rainy season," were most
2unsuitable to the tasks with which they were beset. But with­
out realizing the real problem, he decided to invest all the 
jagirdars with police powers, and at the same time to retain a 
part of the official police.
Though Cuthbert admitted in 1827 that ghatwals still 
collected rahdari (road-cess) from the traders, though it had 
been prohibited, he added, "A personal experience of the 
length and steepness of these defiles convinced me that no 
regular police could possibly afford protection to people
travelling through passes which give such facility to robbers
3
and whose escape is so easy and detection so difficult.” He was 
convinced that the ghatwals were "the natural and indeed the 
only^ effectual guardians of travellers in such places," and 
that if they were "deprived of the customary remuneration,
1. Cuthbert to Govt., 21 Apl. 1827, Para.76, Beng. Cr* Judl.
Cons. 53 of 14 June 1827 /138\ 5 He admitted that nogur-
officer had visited -opean
the pargana for a period of about seven years.
2. Drummond, op. cit. Chapter VI.
3. Cuthbert to Govt., 21 Apl. 1827, Para.92, Beng. Cr. Judl.
Cons. 53 of 14 June 1827 /138x
V 22
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instead of being the guardians of the public peace, they might 
become its assailers."^ Still the Government did not do any­
thing to restore the legality of the road-cess or to abolish 
the official police altogether*
Another useful proposal turned down by the Government 
was to move the sadr station nearer to Chota-Nagpur from
p
Chatra to Hazaribagh. The Board of revenue was also in 
favour of Hazaribagh, but the Government preferred the view of 
the Patna Provincial Court and the sadr station was fixed at 
Sherghati, further still from ChotaKagpur. Thus this area was 
left all the more at the mercy of rapacious non-tribal adven­
turers, subordinate officers and others, and the faggots were 
ready for lighting in 1831*
Kolhan, Saraikela, Kharsawan and Porhat (Singhbhum):-
Singhbhum, the home of the Hos or Larka Kols, was de­
fined in 1821 as being bounded on the north-west and north by 
Chota-Nagpur and Tamar, on the north by Patkum, to the east by 
Barabhum and Dhalbhum, to the south-east by Bamanghati, to the 
south by Mayurbhanj and Keonjhar, to the south-west by Bonai, 
and to the west by Gangpur and Chota-Nagpur.^ On all sides 
it was defended and enclosed by rocky hills and dense jungles.
1* Ibid. Para.92.
2. both Smith and Cuthbert made this proposal. Courts were 
held alternately at Chatra and Sherghati: Cuthbert to Govt., 
6 March 1824, Beng, Rev. Cons, 12 of 2 Apl. 1824 (^)
3, Roughsedge to Lt. Col . Richards, 2 Apl. 1821, Para.3>
Home Misc. No.724.
On the south in particular the hills formed a continuous
harrier, (Saranda pir or pargana was picturesquely called
Saranda of the seven hundred hills),"*" all clothed in forest.
There were two main divisions of the area - Kolhan, the main
home of the Hos, a tract of open undulating country some sixty
miles from north to south and thirty five to sixty miles in
hreadth, and to the north the tributary estates, sometimes
called Singhbhum proper, "fine, open arable land,1 above forty
five miles from east to west and eighteen miles from north to 
2
south. The two areas were divided by the river Sanjai.
Thanks to the inland position of Singhbhum, and the barrier of
hills which intercepts monsoon winds blowing up from the south-
east, the climate is peculiarly dry. All the rivers - the
Subarnarekha, Baitarni, Brahmani and Sanjai - are fordable
throughout the year, except for the few hours after rain, when
4
they rise and then fall suddenly. There are extensive and 
very fine sal forests, and in parts of Kolhan scrub jungles of 
palas and asun, famous in the early 19th century for their
5
production of tussaie silk.
Within this wild and rugged country, walled in by hills 
and covered by dense patches of jungle, the Hos successfully 
maintained their independence, "their military prowess earning
g
for them the sobriquet of Larka Kols, i.e. the fighting kols"
1. D. G.Singhbhum, 5.
2. Lt, Tickell, :The Hodesumr, J.A.S.B. IX, Part.II, 1840.
3. Bo G.Singhbhum, 19.
4. Ibid. 5.
5. Lt. Tickell, op.cit. Silk was manufactured at Saraikela, 
Bankura and Midnapur.
6. B.Go Singhbhum, 26.
Several attempts had "been made to subjugate them - such as the 
formidable, but abortive attacks of the Maharaja of Chota- 
Nagpur, assisted by the Raja of Porahat, about the middle of 
the 18th century, by the latter again in 1770 and by the zam- 
indar (the Mahapater) of Bamanghati in 1800.^ All the attacks 
were repulsed by the Hos, who retaliated by frequent raids 
into the territories of their neighbours. Kolhan was thus 
jealously guarded from any incursions of outsiders - not even 
the pilgrims bound for Jagannath (Puri) in Orissa being per­
mitted to pass through. "A traveller would as soon think of
venturing into a tyger's [sic] den as of traversing any part
2
of Lurka Coles." In the tributary estates of Porahat, Khar-
-eA
sawan and Saraikda some non-tribal people did infiltrate and 
settle, but in Kolhan only the herdsmen (gwalas) carpenters 
(kamars) and some other artisan castes, whose skills the Hos 
required, were allowed an entry. As Dunbar commented in 1861, 
"it appears to have been their constant aim to keep themselves 
as distinct from other tribes as possible, and with the ex­
ception of a few low caste Hindoos, such as those inhabiting 
Jugernathpore, these districts are possessed by Coles alone.
The Hos were part hunters, part agriculturists, though
1. E.Roughsedge to G-ovt., 9 May 1820, Paras. 16-17, Home Misc. 
No.724.
2. Ibid. Para. 15.
3* Tbid.; they had no veneration for Brahmans and cows, and no 
Brahman, Rajput or Musalman could be found in their well- 
inhabited villages. The artisans were tolerated as they 
provided them with cloth, pots, ghee etc. and acted as 
their interpreters and accountants.
4. W.Dunbar, 'Some observations', J.R.A.S. of Cr.B. & Ireland. 
XVIII, Dalton, Bradley Birt and several others emphasise 
this point.
until the British penetration of the area it was not realised
1
just how much open land was under cultivation within Singhbhum
They were noted hunters - of all the tribal people of the
Chota-Nagpur area theirs were the heaviest game-bags - and
excellent archers. "Prom childhood they practise archery;
every lad herding cattle or watching crops makes this his sole
pastime; and skill is attained even in knocking over small
2birds with blunt arrows." To this, Tickell thought, was due 
their fine physique - the use of the bow, even in childhood, 
expanding the chest, their pursuit of game over steep and 
rugged hills bringing "their lower limbs into a state of 
training which the best 'Phulwan* [wrestler] of the plains of 
India might envy. With physical strength went zest and 
courage: "The pluck of the Hos displayed in their first en­
counter with our troops and former wars, I have seen exempli­
fied", wrote Dalton, "on minor occasions. In competitive games
they go to work with a will, and a. strenuous exertion of their
4.
full force, unusual in natives of India." Tuckey, writing 
in 1920, likewise commented upon their independence, good
1. Roughsedge in 1820 described his wonder at the amount of 
cultivated land. "The mind is so accustomed to associate 
with the idea of predatory and lawless tribes, their resis­
tance in the fastnesses and in the strongholds of woods and 
mountains that it was with difficulty I could bring myself 
to believe that the smiling hamlets in view contained, 
inhabitants so ferocious and sanguinary as we found them to 
be." The Hos were living rather luxuriously, their villages 
abounding in sheep, goats, fowls and pigs. Roughsedge to 
Govt. 9 May 1820, Paras. 17-18, Home Misc. No.724.
2. Dalton, Ethnology. 195.
3. Lt. Tickell, opvcit.
4. Ethnology, 206.
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spirits and smiling faces, and the high position of their
women, ^ while Dalton commented upon such traits as "a manner
free from servility, hut never rude, a love, or at least the
2practice, of truth, a feeling of self-respect...1
Since to strength and courage in the Hos was added a 
warlike temperament - Dalton noted that they were "very impul­
sive, easily excited to rash, headstrong action, and apt to 
resent imposition or oppression without reflection"*^- they 
often proved a danger to their neighbours. The early British 
records are full of reports of their inroads into the neigh­
bouring areas. In 1817 the Ramgarh Magistrate reported five 
predatory incursions into Sonpur, in June and July, made by 
parties of 60 to 80 Hos, armed with axes, spears, bows and 
arrows.^" The attacks were made at night, and the cattle which 
they seized were driven to Singhbhum by the morning.
A^gain in 1820, Major Roughsedge, Commander of the 
Ramgarh' battalion and the political Agent of the Governor- 
General in this area, reported that "the bordering pergunnahs 
of Sonepore, Belreaghur [Barkagarh?] and Bussea in Chotanag- 
pore had been ravaged by the inroads of those savages for many 
years past to such a degree as to cause considerable desola-
5
tion and abandonment of villages." He found more than forty
1. Tuckey, Kolhan Settlement Report, Para.19*
2* Ethnology, 205.
3. Ibid. -
4. Ifeng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 39 of 29 July 1817 /132\ ;
14 of 28 Oct. 1817 /133n K b l Jv" i v
5. Roughsedge to Govt. 9 May 1820, Para. 11, Home Misc. No.724.
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hamlets deserted in Sonpur in consequence of these plunder^. 
Usually they deported cattle, more especially buffaloes. But 
sometimes they attacked and destroyed whole villages, murdering 
all who fell into their hands. Such was the rapidity of their 
attack that no one could resist them.*^
But the chief region of their depredations was the ---
northern portions of Mayurbhanj and Keonjhur and the north­
eastern portion of Bonai in Orissa. Roughsedge found 84 vil­
lages in that area completely ravaged by these inroads. "The 
fine pastorage and the abundance of water in these mountains," 
he wrote, "render them a favorite [sic] resort of cowherds and
the quantity of buffaloes carried off by the Lurkas of late
2years is almost incredible." Small wonder that Roughsedge 
represented the Hos as "a dreadful pest to the civilized part 
of Singbhoom and to all the adjoint zemindars excepting Tamar, 
Patcoom and Burraboom where they did little comparative mis­
chief.
In view of such evidence it would be wrong to agree 
with Tickell* s view that "their forays were never marked by 
cruelty and unnecessary violence"^. Raiding was an accepted 
part of their life ("Cold-blooded murder for the sake of gain, 
robbery, even pilfering, lying, deceit, dishonesty, even of 
the most venial kind," were, however, unknown and despised
1. Ibid. Para.12.
2. Ibi'd. Para. 13 s Within a month 80 of 100 cattle seized in 
one case had been devoured by them.
3. Ibid. Para. 14. The great barrier was the estates of 
Eharawan and Saraikda.
4. Lt. Tickell, op.cit.
-1 J. O  t/
among the Hos. ) The most common occasions for raids were 
either the pressure of want and famine, or more frequently the 
prompting of their own rulers, or even of neighbouring chiefs, 
who incited them to attack their enemies. Dalton and Bradley 
Birt comment on this latter occasion for forays. ’’Some of the 
raids on the southern districts”, writes Dalton, "were undoubt­
edly instigated by the Singbhum Raja#» It was usual indeed for 
these chiefs, when they wished to annoy a neighbour, to incite 
the Kols to make a raid on him Whenever there was a row,
they eagerly entered into it, and all malcontents invariably
2sought their assistance." Bradley Birt writes in similar 
vein, "They were a splendid fighting race and the Rajas made 
full use of them, as pawns in the game, in their quarrels with 
each other,Killings of witches, killings in family feuds, 
which might be handed down for generations, killings in the 
course of raids, these were honourable enough.
It is necessary at this point to give some account of 
the poliiical structure of Singhbhum, The Hos were a people 
totally distinct from the Hindus in religion and language. In 
1820 Roughsedge wrote "With the exception of four or five in­
dividuals met with on the southern borders of Lurka Cole 
[Kolhan] I did not find a single Cole who understood a word of
A
the Hindoo or Oorea language," The tribes-people cleared the 




4« Roughsedge to Covt., 9 May, Para.20, Home Misc. No.724.
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The munda was obeyed "more through prescription and attachment,
however, than fear, for no means of enforcing authority are
apparent, the influence of character prevails here as it does
not everywhere else and some headmen of villages regulate the
motions of a dozen others without having any recognized or
1
established authority over them," The reference by Rough- 
sedge, here, to superior headmen, is, in fact, a reference to 
the manki, or divisional headman, whose position has already 
been discussed on pages IS'O-15*^ of this chapter. As the Singh- 
bhum Gazetteer points out, the "indigenous village system,,., 
based upon a federal union of villages under a single division­
al headman," which decayed in Chota-Nagpur proper, survived,
2
and was preserved in Singhbhum. The area under the division­
al headman or manki» which among the Mundas was called a pur ha, 
and among the Bhumijes a taraf, was in Singhbhum called a pir. 
There were twentysix such pirs in the Kolhan,
Above the mankis came various tribal chiefs or rajas. 
Those of Porahat, Saraikela and Kharsawan in Singhbhum proper, 
were respected rather than obeyed. They were said, in a local 
legend, to have occupied the country in the time of Akfcar, and 
to have been associated with Raja Man Singh, the great Rajput
A
general of the Mughal. The main body of Hos, however, so
1. Ibid. Para.19#
2. b. Gk Singhbhum, 94-95
3. ffickelir op.cit. Ajodya, Asantalia, Aula, Burkela, Burburia 
or Burwar pir, Burpeer or Jayant pir, Charai, Chainpur, 
Gumra, Gov in dp ur, Gopinathpur, Jamda, Kainua, Kuldiha, 
Kotegarh, Lota, Natua, latgarh, Puliong, Rajabasa, Unchdee, 
Rengra, Rela, Sath Buntria, Toee and Saranda. Also see 
A.D.Tuckey, op.cit. Para.3.
4. B. G. Singhbhum, 26 .
Dalton reported, "honored [sic] and respected the Singh chiefs 
hut regarded them till they quarrelled rather as friends and 
allies than as rulers."1 (Saraikela and Kharsawan, until the 
middle of the 17th century, had been part of Parahat, but had 
then been granted as fiefs to younger brothers of the Raja.) 
From about 1770 the control over the tribal people of Singh­
bhum had been slipping from the hands of the rajas of Parahat.
This loss of control was probably occasioned by the 
hinduization of the rajas and thakurs. They came to claim a 
blood connection with the Rajput chiefs of Marwar and other 
states of Rajputana. The Saraikela Settlement Report thus 
records the belief that the founder of the Parahat raj was "a 
Rathor or Kadambansi Rajput of Marwar who migrated from Kanauj 
and established the Singhbhum or Parahat Raj about 54 genera­
tions before the advent of the British Government into this 
part of the country."^ With this claim went another designed 
to show the subordinate status of the Hos, as latecomers from 
Chota-Nagpur: "According to the annals fabricated by Brahmans
in glorification of the Singh family, the Hos first appeared
/
in Singhbhum as part of a marriage procession, ' barat1, with a
1. Ethnology, 180.
2. TTTWiS.Connolly, Settlement Report. Saraikela & Kharsawan, 
1904-1907, Paras. 1 to "About 2^0 years ago" Jagarnath 
Singh governed Parahat and Singhbhum Pir; his eldest son 
Panchanan Singh succeeded his father end the second son 
Kuar Bikram Singh got Singhbhum Pir,and he chose Saraikela 
as his headquarters. It was Bikram Singh who brought most 
of the adjoining areas under his control. He "gave the Khar 
sawan, Asantalia, Dugai and Bangsai pirs to his second, 
third, fourth and fifth sons, respectively, as their main­
tenance .these men were the ancestors of the present 
Thakur of Kharsawan and of the present KhorposhdSs of Dugin
3. ^a^im^faralkela Settlement Report, Para.9-
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bride from Nagpur for the Singh Raja, hut however they came, 
they obtained possession of the best part of the country and 
have never yielded an inch of the territory they then approp­
riated#
The hinduized chiefs came to look down upon the Hos#
While using them in their feuds they also came to fear them#
Their fear increased after Raja Jagannath Singh of Porahat,
the Chota-Nagpur maharaja, and the chief of Bamanghati had all,
in the 18th century, suffered defeats at their hands# On the
first occasion the Larkas drove the Chota-Nagpur men out of
Singhbhum with immense slaughter, in the second hundreds of
men of the Porahat raja were either killed or died of thirst
during the pursuit by the Larka Kols for ten miles, and on the
third the Bamanghati chief was completely defeated and lost
so many men thax, as Roughsedge said, "he has cautiously cul-
2tivated their good graces ever since." In fact all other 
zamindars of the area were thoroughly demoralised by the out­
come of these attempts to subjugate these tribals: "Those 
successes had taken away from the Rajah of Singbhoom and all 
the neighbouring zemindars all inclination to molest the . 
Lurkas on their own ground#"-^ Thus these tribal people,
"living in a primeval and patriarchal manner," had continued 
to maintain "a sort of savage independence, making themselves 
dreaded and feared by their more powerful and civilized
A
neighbours."
1# Dalton, Ethnology, 179*




This independence the Hos more than maintained against
the chiefs even in the 19th century# In 1816-17 the Raja of
Porahat, Ghanshyam Singh, reported to the Ramgarh Magistrate
that "his house was surrounded by a body of armed men of the
Lurka Kole tribe who were daily plundering him of his cattle
and making rapid encroachments on his villages which prevented
him from quitting his house"'1'—  and his report was confirmed
by Bikram Singh of Saraikela and Che tan Singh of Kharsawan.
In 1820 the Raja of Porahat was still in difficulties with the
2Hos, who had revolted and overrun his territories. The two 
other chiefs "had by good management and firmness continued to 
prevent any recent encroachment on their possessions#"^ But 
all three remained in dread of what the; Hos might get up tos 
even when accompanied by Roughsedge!s forces in 1820 they 
could not forget their fears. "The Rajah & Zemindars who are 
in attendance upon me have so formidable an opinion of the 
power & ferocity of these savages that notwithstanding the 
considerable force under my command they are evidently much 
alarmed and have made formal protests against the danger of 
the march#
With Roughsedge marching for the first time through the 
Kolhan, accompanied by his nervous chiefly allies, it is time
1# Ramgarh Magistrate to Govt#, 30 Jan, 1817, Para,7, Beng#
Cr# Judl. Cons. 39 of 29 July 1817 /132x
2# Petition to G.G., 1 Peb. 1820, Home Misc. 724, P.487.
3. Roughsedge to Govt,, 9 May 1820. Home Misc. No.724.
4. Roughsedge to Govt., 23 March 1820, Para. 2, Home Misc.724,
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to consider how the British relationship with Singhbhuan had 
developed. The first reference to Singhbhum coming into con­
tact with the British dates back to mid-1767 when Fergusson 
was engaged in subduing the jungle zamindars of western Mid- 
napur. The zamindar of Singhbhum appealed through Fergusson 
to the Midnapur resident to take him under British protection. 
Vansittart, the Resident, wrote to the Government in December 
1767 from Balrampur, "Since my arrival here Petumber Singh, 
[Pitambar Singh] uncle to Jugganaut Singh [Jagannath Singh] - 
the present Raja of Singboom (who is now kept under confine­
ment by his cousin Sowenant Sing [Subhnath Singh], has waited 
on me on the part of his nephew, who supplicates the Company1 
assistance, and is desirous of putting his territories under 
their protection and paying them an annual revenue."^ From 
Pitambar Singh*s account Vansittart sent the following des­
cription of Singhthums "... it stretches itself in length 
from North-East to South-West between 40 & 50 Coss and in 
breadth from North-West to South-East about 8 or 10. It form­
erly contained near 14,000 villages, but only about 500 are 
at present in the Raja*s possession; of the others some are 
gone to ruin and the rest are in the hands of the Coles, a 
tribe of plundering banditti. The face of the country is in 
general plain and opens it contains only a few stragglily 
[sic] hills, has very little jungle in it, and no fortresses
1. Vansittart to H.Verelst, 13 Dec. 1767, Firminger, Midnapflr# 
Dist.Records, I, No.279.
of importance. The Raja is by marriage a distant relation of 
the Sumbulpore Raja; there is a constant correspondence be­
tween the two districts, and an uninterrupted intercourse of 
merchants. They are situated from each other about 90 Coss,
and there is tollerable [sic] good road the whole way between
the
them. Singboom was never reduced under/dominion of the Muguls, 
but for 52 generations been an independent district in the
possession of the present family If you propose of taking
the country under the Company’s protection, four compands of 
sepoys I beleieve[sic] will be <^ uite a sufficient force, and 
it will probably open an easy intercourse with Sumbulpore.
But, being anxious not to stir up the Marathas by any 
forward move, the Resident only sent two sepoys into Singh­
bhum - and they were turned back within a kos or two of the 
border. They did report, however, that the Raja, residing at 
Porahat, about 30 kos from the borders of Ghatshila, and 60 
from Sambhalpur, was a mere tool in the hands of Sheonath
Singh, and they brought back some knowledge of Singhbhum 
2
geography.
In 1770 action on the southern frontiers of Singhbhum 
was contemplated, which would have avenged the losses inflicte 
on Lt. Nun by the zamindar of Kochang. In the end, the over­
lord of the area, the raja of Mayurbhanj, was prevailed upon
y\
to displace the Kochang zamindar in favour of the Bamabghati 
chief, and military action was not taken. Still later Abhiram
1. Ibid.
2. 6,Vansittart to Verelst, 6 Peb. 1768, Pirminger, Midnapur 
District Records, II, 303.
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Singh of Saraikela took Kochang.
In 1773 British authority infringed directly on Singh­
bhum, for the raja, who had been encouraging the merchants to 
bring salt from the Maratha instead of the British districts, 
so as to avoid the heavy duties levied by the East India Com­
pany, was compelled by Lt. Porbes to "execute an obligation 
never to harbour either Riots [ryots] or merchants in future."
Twenty years later in 1793> the thakur of Kharsawan and the
a 2
Kunwar of Saraikela were compelled to give/similar guarantee.
In this way possible loopholes for salt from Maratha terri­
tory of Orissa were effectively blocked.
After the annexation of the greater part of Maratha 
territory in 1803 and after the stationing of a political 
Agent with troops at Hazaribagh in 1817, the need for a more 
direct and solid relationship with the Singhbhum rulers was 
realized.
In August 1818, therefore, the Bengal Government 
ordered Roughsedge to recognize and confirm Babu Bikram Singh 
of Saraikela, Babu Che tan Singh of Kharsawan and Raja 
Ghanshyam Singh of Porahat in their actual possessions. Thus 
the raja was prevented from enforcing his earlier authority 
over the other two chiefs whose independence was secured, and 
all three were reduced to a direct dependence upon the Company*
1. Porbes to S.Lewis, 30 May 1773, Midnapur gist. Records.Ill, 
ManJjovind, o&ief of Silda^and Jagannath Poster, Sardar 
ghatwal of Dampara.were the main smugglers of salt.
2. L.G.Singhbhum, 32.
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They did not ask for tribute, and made no claim to control 
the internal administration of the estates* The only positive 
measure they took was to ask Roughsedge "to take engagements 
from them calculated to prevent these districts from becoming 
an asylum for fugitive offenders, or being otherwise turned to 
the injury of the public peace, the maintenance of which is 
indeed the primary object of the proposed connexion with 
Singbhoom. "2
The orders given to Roughsedge took effect early in 
1820 when the three chiefs entered into written agreements 
with the Company’s Government* The raja of Porahat agreed to 
obey all orders of the Government and to pay an annual peshkash 
of Rs.lOl. But he received no written assurances in return, 
though he had asked for the Company’s support in the recovery 
of his household goddess’ image from Saraikela, in the re­
establishment of his authority over Saraikela and Kharsawan, 
and in checking the harassing inroads of the Larka Kols, and 
had received Roughsedge ’s verbal promise of aid for the first 
and third enterprises.*^ (The second aim was contrary to the 
Governor-General’s order to "leave the three chiefs in secure 
enjoyment of their actual possessions independent of each 
otherj under the supremacy of the British Government)*
But when Roughsedge informed the Government of his
1* Govt* to Roughsedge, 29 Aug* 1818, Para.3> Home Misc. No.724
1 "The exaction of tribute from the chiefs of Singhbhum 
forms no part of the views of His Lordship in Council."
2. Ibid.
3. T. Wilkins on, Political Agent on the S.W.F., to Govt. 12 Jan* 
1833, Para.3* B.C.1503/58904. Also, E.Roughsedge to Govt.
2 Peb. 1820, Home Misc. No.724.
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verbal agreement, they asked him to desist from meddling with 
the internal affairs of the chiefs. He was particularly asked 
to disassociate himself from the image affair, and not to take
p
steps against the Larka Kols. (In 1819 Roughsedge had asked 
his assistant to go to Porahat, to contact the chiefs and to 
collect all possible information about the country and "espec- 
ially of the extraordinary race called Larkas", but he could 
not penetrate far enough to contact them).^
However, the Major had meanwhile taken actions which 
precipitated a clash of the British with these tribal people* 
Persuaded by the chiefs, Roughsedge had decided both to demon­
strate British might to the Hos, and to help Raja Ghanshyam
Singh reestablish some portion of the influence over them
4which his ancestors had possessed." Encouraged by the concil­
iatory mood of the tribal leaders of northern Singhbhum, to 
whom presents were given, Roughsedge marched south into the 
Kolhan. Por a while all went well, then while Roughsedge him­
self was attacked, the pro-British leaders of northern Singh-
5
bhum were set upon the Hos of Baridia and Gamharia. In 
November 1820 he had also to report that the Karaikela chief 
had shown "for the last four months a spirit of unprovoked and 
contumacious disobedience."
1. Roughsedge to Govt., 9 May, 1820, Para. 3* Ibid.
2. Govt, to Roughsedge, 3 June 1820, T.Wilkinson to Govt.
12 Jan. 1833, Para.4* B.C.1503/58904.
3* D* 0-Singhbhum, 32.
4. Roughsedgeto Govt., 9 May 1820, Para.22, Home Misc. No.724*
5. Roughsedge to Govt., 19 June 1820, Para.11, rbid.
6. Roughsedge to Govt., 14 Nov. 1820, Para.2, karaikela was a
jagir of 84 villages in North-west Singhbhum, to the north 
and north west of Chaibasa. Ibid.
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Nevertheless Roughsedge was able to reduce the Hos to 
obedience, and some hundred barkandazes were used to enforce 
the restored domination of the Porahat raja* The success was 
shortlived* By February 1821 the Hos were attacking the partiei 
of barkandazes» and Roughsedge was appealing to Calcutta for 
permission to take strong measures against "this intractable 
tribe of ferocious savages," and for the establishment of 
military posts in Singhbhum*** For the military posts he re­
quested that a force of 500 men might be allotted, a number 
difficult to find since the Ramgarh battalion had been reduced 
to 1200 men, but one necessary, he argued, in view of the 
"dangerous situation of Rajah G-unsham Sing and Takoor cheetan 
Sing [Chetan Singh] and the civilized inhabitants of Singbhum 
in general, who having been so recently admitted within the
palgr of British protection will naturally look up to 
2Government*"
In all this Roughsedge gave no hint that the Hos might 
have reasons for their hostility, brushing aside any such 
view with his references to their ferocious savagery* Yet, as 
we have seen, the Hos had been independent of the rajas of 
Porahat for fifty years, and could rightly object to the use 
of the Company's strength to reimpose their rule. Moreover, 
the raja, unable to pay for the Company barkandazes, had 
attached them to his revenue collectors with orders to collect 
sufficient for their pay, and they had been seizing the goods
1. Roughsedge to Govt., 17 Feb, 1821, Para*5, Ibid.
2. Ibid. Para,6.
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and animals of the Hos - as the Kharsawan thakur deposed - and 
had molested the daughter of Ghasi Singh, one of the village 
headmen.'*' (Even when Roughsedge became aware of the Hos1 com­
plaints he accepted the testimony of one of the raja's servants
2that they were false, showing to the Porahat raja the same 
sort of favour as against the tribesmen, as he had done to the 
Deo chief in Palamau - even though in Palamau such action had 
led to the rising of 1817).
Meanwhile the ravages of the Larka Kols increased. The 
parganas of Kera, Chakradharpur and Chainpur were sacked, the 
estates of Porahat and Kharsawan brought 'to the brink of ruin, 
and the people, despairing of safety, were fleeing in all dir­
ections.^ Roughsedge submitting his plans to the Government, 
in March 1821, admitted that the season was far advanced and
4
that there was a grave risk of general sickness.
Even so it was decided in April to continue with large 
scale military operations. As they proceeded, the real nature 
of the land and the people - the inaccessibility of the former 
and the martial spirit of the latter - was revealed. Prom 
Gurga, the north-west extremity of Singhbhum to the Dttlma hill 
in Barabhum at the north-east corner was found a chain of hills 
divided into three ranges, varying in breadth from 12 to 20 
miles and in height two to three thousand feet. This chain
1. Ibid. Para.2. Also Roughsedge to Govt., 7 Aug. 1821,
Para.2, Home Misc. No.724.
2. Roughsedge to Govt., 23 Peb. 1821, Para.2. Ibid.
3. Roughsedge to Govt., 1 March 1821, Ibid.
4. Roughsedge to Govt., 6 March 1821, Para.5. Ibid.
Roughsedge to Lord Hastings, 18 March l821,~THId.
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made "all access from Chota-Nagpur and Tamar into the per gun- 
nahs of Porahaftt [sic], Seriekela, Kera and Cusawa [Khasawan] 
in Singhbhum proper extremely difficulty while from the south­
west and west the regular troops could not penetrate the 
"masses of inaccessible mountains."^
Much information was also for the first time acquired 
about the nature of the Kols and their relationships with the 
various chiefs of the area. Roughsedge's long report of 
2 April 1821 to It. Col. Richards, the officer commanding in 
Singhhhum, provides the first detailed knowledge of the Kolha3ft. 
He discussed each estate in turn, starting with Gurga in the 
north-west, a mountainous, heavily jungled district, partially 
obedient to the Porahat raja, but a constant nuisance to
Chota-Nagpur into which the Hos were "perpetually making in-
2 1 roads." East of Gurga was the tafruk of Hurnor [Hurnee] or
Burgaon, 84- villages under jagirdar Brijmohan Singh. The jag-
irdar was a Bhuiya, but three-fourths of the ryots were Hos,
and so "under very little controul [sic]".^ Their plundering
grounds were Chota-Nagpur and Tamar.
Next came the pargana of Karaikela, still further to
the east. This too was under a Bhuiya, jagirdar Khandu Pater,
4
whose Larka ryots were "sufficiently wild." The zamindar was 
"more attached to the Seriekela zamindar than to his legiti­
mate master the Raja", who had made several complaints against
1. Roughsedge to Lt.Col .Richards, 2 April 1821, Para.4. Ibid.
2. Ibid. Para.5-
3. TBIH. Para. 6.
4. Ibid. Para. 7 See his role in 1832.
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him.
Then there was pargana Kera, east of Karaikela and
about 14 kos north by west from Chaibasa. Its zamindar, a
relation of the Porahat Raja, was "very well-disposed, decent
2
young man, but reduced to great weakness and indigence."
Its Ho inhabitants (three-fourths of the total population)
were "much connected by blood and marriage” with the Kols of
Tamar.^ Kera, like Karaikela, was one of "the strongest and
4most difficult parts of Singhbhum for military operations."
Kharsawan, with 84 villages, was "less infested with 
Coles than any: other" and belonged to "an intelligent and 
powerful Zemindar named Takoor cheeton Sing [Thakur chetan 
Singh]", He had not only punished the Larka plunderers, but 
had also conciliated their headmen, and had thus secured pro*- 
tection for his non-tribal ryots (mostly Brahmans) in the open 
plain near the Sanjai river. Though the Larkas believing that 
he was the cause of the arrival of the British troops in Singh­
bhum, had commenced a vendetta against him, the strong stock­
ades of the town of Kharsawan, and Chetan Singh1 s firm resis­
tance had so far secured him.^
In the parganas (Dhangae and Gurae) east of Kharsawan 
and forming the north-eastern corner of Singhbhum, jfchere were
1. Ibid.
2. ibid. Para. 8.
3. Ibid. It was why they had given shelter to Rudan and Kunta, 
the Tamar rebel leaders of 1819-20.
4. Ibid.
5* Ibid. Para.9s See his role during the unrest of 1831-33 as 
a supporter of the Government.
6. Ibid.
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no refractory Hos. In neighbouring Kochang, however, only
i*r
lately acquired by Kunar Bikram Singh of Saraikela, and a bone
of contention between him and the raja of Mayurbhanj, Kol
depredations had be gun * Bikram Singh, though a very powerful
and wealthy chief, could not prevent the inroads of the Larkas
whose territories (Kolhan) bordered his estate to the west for
about 15 kos. ^ The town of Saraikela, like Kharsawan, was
well stockaded and populated. Moreover, there were a few small
guns mounted on the wall of the Kunwar1s house. These factors
had no doubt deterred the Larkas from launching an attack
against him. But a spirit of great animosity existed between
his family and those of Raja Grhanshyam Singh and Chetan Singh
2
of Kharsawan, Bikram Singh1 s authority was pretty well es­
tablished to the north-eastern side of his estate. But the 
direct road from Saraikela to Bamatlghati to the south-east was 
impassable for travellers, nay for armed men too, 1 on account 
of the dread entertained of the Lurkas of the Mohurbunge 
pergunnah, of To^ ee or Toypier, who defeated the zemindar of 
Bamunghakttee with great slaughter*.. about 18 years age, and 
had ever since defied his and all other authority.11^
Of the country between Dugpusa and Jayantgarh (an 
estate of 120 villages), Roughsedge secured no adequate inform­
ation, though he reported that the Larkas of this area were
A






between Jay ant gar h and Sunudgegarh on the south-west and west-^ - 
ern face of Singhbhum were Saranda and Kolgarh, "the former 
containing 250 reputed villages," most impervious mountains 
and jungles inhabited exclusively by independent Larkas, who 
had expelled their chief, a feudatory of the Porahat Raja.^“
The central parganas from north-west to north-east were 
Porahat, Chakradharpur and Asimtoria - the first being hilly 
and woody, and the other two open and level. But there were no 
refractory Hos in them. On the other parganas of the plain, 
lying to the south of Chakradharpur and Asimtoria, and like 
them thickly populated, Roughsedge had nothing definite to say
- except that these were Larka parganas.
most
Finally, in the southern/parts of the Kolhan lay a
"very extensive and broad range of mountains containing within
them many villages inhabited by refractory Lurkas and running
from north to south to the extent of 10 or 15 coss east is the
populous pergunna of Goonila a small portion of which to the
southward only is jungly, beyond that the southern [part] of
Cherrie and then the Mohurbunge pergunnah of Josepoor [Jushpur]
2which I believe to be very extensive* " The inhabitants of 
these regions were among the most refractory of the Larka Kols
- noteably those of Toipir and Burndia [Burburia] pirs.^
It was to the warlike inhabitants of this difficult 
country that Roughsedge then proposed to administer "a signal
1. Lbid.Para. 15 s It was a custom among them to expel the 
cliief "when the freak takes them."
2. Ibid. Para. 16.
3. Ibid. Para.18.
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chastisement."'*' He expressed the firm belief that "after an
•unavailing trial of kindness and conciliation terror alone can
2be expected to operate efficaciously and permanently." To 
that end he asked that some of the leaders might be executed 
in a particularly gruesome manner by being blown away from the 
mouth of a gun. "This mode of carrying the sentence of the 
drumhead court martial which Government would probably author­
ize the institution of, appears to me," he wrote, "to be cal­
culated to make the deepest and most salutary impression on 
the minds of the Lurkas, and ... would tend greatly to deter 
them for a long time, from a repetition of their late miscon­
duct."^ Such an exhibition of force would, he hoped, effect­
ively efface from the memory of that "untamed and impatient" 
tribe all "recollection of their new [now] long enjoyed inde-
A
pendence."^ It would also prepare them for the positive civi­
lizing programme he had prepared - the learning of Hindustani
customs and languages, and of a new life as useful coolies or
5
labourers, like the Dhangar Kols of Chota-Nagpur.
Such were Major Roughsedge's plans. The chiefs who had
suffered at the hands of the Hos of the Kolhan had their plans,
too, mainly for wreaking reprisals and securing a share in
such booty as the advance of the Company's troops made avail­
able. This last enteredj indeed, into Roughsedge's plans, for 
he thought that many cattle and much grain which would escape
1. Roughsedge to Govt., 14 Apl. 1821, Para.4, Home Misc. No.724.
2. Ibid.
3* Ibid. Para.5.
4. Ibid. Paras. 12-13*
5. Ybid. Paras. 10-11.
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the notice of the regular troops not much acquainted with the 
country would be discovered by the roving parties of the zam­
indar s and their followers. He threfore allowed them to take
n
part in the operations.-1"
The campaign in Singhbhum lasted till May 1821. After 
the first phase of the campaign, it became necessary to call 
in a considerable body of infantry, cavalry and artillery to 
complete the subjugation of Kolhan. The campaign was no easy 
one, for the Hos showed great dash and courage and very consid­
erable tactical skill. Dalton and Bradley-Birt both comment 
upon the fierceness with which the Hos fought, rushing in with
battle axes when their bows and arrows were of no use, showing
2
?,a degree of rashness and hardihood scarcely credible."
" Nowhere in Chota-Nagpore had the British troops experienced 
a resistance so spirited and courageous."^
Nevertheless the issue could not long remain in doubt. 
The well armed Company's troops inflicted on the Hos a 
terrible slaughter, and forced them to surrender. The Larka 
Kols, agreed to submit to the rule of the chiefs and zamindars, 
to pay a quit-rent of eight annas per plaugh, and not to 
molest travellers. Most important of all, they were forced to 
agree "to allow persons of all castes to settle in [their] 
villages and afford them protection," and to learn the Uriya
1. Roughsedge to Lt. Col. Richards, 22 Apl. 1821, Para.5, 
Home Misc. No.724.
2. Dalton, Ethnology, 181.
3. Bradley-Birt. Chota-Nagpore, 92.
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and Hindi languages.
Singhbhum and, more particularly, the Kolhan were thus
subjected to the hinduized chiefs and zamindars, and laid open
to the incursions of non-tribal peoples. Tickell, in 1840,
could still hope that the opening of the country might not
have any ill effects, writing "among this simple race, the
reputed evils of civilization have not yet commenced to be
felt; and fervently is it to be trusted though, alas, the hope
may be utopian, that the introduction of our courts of justice,
in checking the lawless tendency of the Koles, may not destroy
those virtues which are inherent to a primitive state of 
2society.1’ But the evils of civilization had in fact begun 
to work, from 1821 onwards. The silk merchants, who bought up 
the tussar silk cocoons collected in the forests, the Sundis 
or Hindu manufacturers of spirits, the gwalas who herded the 
cattle, once allowed freely to enter the Kolhan, could begin 
to exploit the Hos. The Brahmans began to establish their hold 
over them, and by persuading them to marry only within their 
kilis or septs, to introduce the curse of caste. The Bamanghati 
and Mayurbhanj chiefs, their hold strengthened, began to 
harass the Hos bringing salt from Puri in Orissa, exacting 
numerous tolls. As the Kolhan Settlement Report records, the
1. E.Roughsedge to Govt. 8 May 1821, Home Misc. Ho.724: Some 
of the terms of the agreement had important bearings on the 
later development and on the unrest of 1832-33 - for example 
the imposition of the control of the Mahapai^#’ of Baman­
ghati over four important pirs of (Toeepir, Aolapir, Lal- 
garhpir and Barbariapir); and the reward of Chainpur jagir 
to Raghunath Bisi for his services to the troops.
2. Lt. Tickell, op.cit.
tantis (weavers) '‘began to use their greater cunning to 
effect* and as Dakuas, touts and thieves they first obtained 
money and position, and then got hold of land, usually for an 
inadequate consideration, and became cultivators*
These developments, of course, took time to take effect, 
and for some years the Hos remained quiet. Gilbert, who suc­
ceeded Roughsedge as the Agent on this frontier, was so much 
impressed during his tour by the faithful fulfilment of their
engagements by this "wild race of people", that in 1822 he
2requested the Government to reward them. All the Larka Kols 
showed their satisfaction with the conduct of the sepoys 
posted in the area, and their gratification at receiving pres­
ents from the Agent. In 1826, when the question of extending 
the agreement with the Larka Kols for another five years came 
up, Gilbert impressed by their continuing good behaviour, 
despite a succession of bad harvests, secured for them the 
same revenue terms as before, eight annas per plough.^ That 
stipulated sum was regularly paid by the Kols of Singhbhum 
until 1830.
Such disturbances as did take place after 1821, were 
nearly all the result of squabbles and rivalries between the 
various chiefs and zamindars of Singhbhum, who involved the 
Hos who had been placed under them. One such dispute has
1. A.D.Tuckey, op.cit. Para.56.
2. Gilbert, PolTXgerrE, to Govt., 14 Dec. 1822, Para.2, Home 
Misc. No.724,: Beads, plain, coarse clothes, spiritous 
liquors etc. worth four to five hundred rupees.
3. Gilbert to Govt., 18 Aug. 1826, Ibid.
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already been referred to - that of the Porahat raja with Ajam- 
bar Singh of Saraikela over the stolen Porahat goddess. In 
this the Hos of Saraikela had a particular interest, for they 
had not forgotten the oppression committed by Bikram Singh, 
the father of Ajambar Singh, and they feared that if Ajambar 
Singh retained possession of the goddess Puri Devi, he would 
become as powerful - and oppressive - as his father had been.’*' 
In 1822, to allay their fear, and to satisfy the Porahat raja 
and his hereditary diwan, Raghunath Bisi, Gilbert sought Gov­
ernments permission to compel the Saraikela thakur to surren­
der the image. Permission was at the time refused, but the 
Agent continued to press the Government for sanction, and in
March 1824, force was used to secure the handing back to
2Porahat of Puri Devi.
No sooner had this dispute been settled than the thakur 
of Saraikela was involved in another dispute, this time with 
the kunwar of Kharsawan. The dispute was over rights in the 
pargana of Asantala, The Agent decided it in 1826 in favour 
of the thakur of Kharsawan, who was naturally supported by fhe
*3
raja of Porahat.
The death of the Porahat raja, Ghanshyam Singh in 1827 
did not cause any disturbance, He was quietly succeeded by 
Achet Singh, who confirmed the agreement signed in 1820 by his
1. The Hos of Saraikela refused to pay their plough-tax through 
the Saraikela zamindar, paying it instead through the Sub a- 
dar of the Ramgarh battalion stationed at Chakradharpur :
Gilbert to Govt,, 14 Dec. 1822, Home Misc. No.724.
2. Gilbert to Govt., 10 March 1824, and 24 Apl. 1824, Ibid.
3. Gilbert to Govt., 11 July 1826, Ibid.
father, adding only a promise not to give shelter to thieves 
and murderers, but to apprehend them, and report their seizure 
to the British authorities,*^ The Company, for its part, so 
far departed from its policy of not intervening in the 
internal affairs of the estate, as to insist that the office 
of diwan should not be given to the new raja's favourite, 
Krishna, but to Ghasi Bisi and Kunwar Chakradhar Singh. How­
ever, Krishna was subsequently permitted to become diwan, on
the advice of Major Mackenzie, the political agent on the
2
south-west frontier.
Another succession caused far more trouble. In May 1826 
the zamindar of Bamanghati, Niranjan Mahapater died. The raja 
of Mayurbhanj, overlord of Bamanghati, thereafter tried to 
evade recognition of the heir Madho Das Mahapater, and to 
seize the zamindari for himself. This was resisted by the kols 
of Bamanghati, - and especially by those of Toipir, who refused 
to pay rents directly to the raja. The Toipir Kols had played 
a considerable part in the 1821 disturbances, so Gilbert wrote 
to the Cuttack Commissioner, under whom Mayurbhanj came, 
asking him to intervene, "it being expedient to conciliate as 
much as possible the wild and savage Toeepier Coles I earnestly 
recommend that their request be complied w i t h . H i s  case was 
further strengthened by news of the improper proceedings by
1. Capt. Wilkinson to Govt., 12 Jan. 1833, Para.6, B.C.1503/ 
58904.
2. Ibid.
3. Gilbert to T.Pakenham, Cuttack Commissioner, 31 March 1827, 
Home Misc. No.724.
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the revenue agents of the raja, within the Bamanghati estate. 
Convinced that the adherents and relations of Madho Das Maha­
pater were encouraging him to take to arms, Gilbert arranged
in May 1827 to take both Madho Das and the Mayurbhanj raja to
1
Cuttack to discuss the whole matter with the Commissioner.
A settlement was there patched up, which was warmly
approved, as offering a return to peace and order, by the
2
Bengal Government. But the situation continued to be tense, 
and late in 1831 Bamanghati was again in turmoil. The crux of 
the problem was administrative: the four parganas of Toipir, 
Burbariapir, Aolapir* and Lalgarhpir were inhabited by Hos and 
might have been expected therefore to come, like the rest of 
Singhbhum, under the Agent of the Governor-General for the 
south-west frontier. But Bamanghati, of which they formed part, 
being a zamindari of Mayurbhanj, came under the Cuttack Commis­
sioner. In 1821 Major Roughsedge had pointed out the anomaly, 
and had suggested that the four parganas be placed either * 
under the Cuttack or the Midnapur authorities. He had, 
however, been entrusted to assume temporary charge of the 
parganas, and that charge his successors had continued to hold. 
Consequently the Bamanghati zamindar, in respect of the four 
Larka Kol parganas, remained independent of the Raja of
1. Gilbert to Govt., 29 May 1827, Enclosure, Wilkinson to 
Stockwell, 27 Nov. 1832, Beng. Cr. Judl. ConsM3 Apl. 1832,
(UO)
2. Vide Govt, to Gilbert, 17 Aug. 1827, Ibid.
3. Wilkinson to Stockwell, Cuttack Commissioner, 27 Nov. 1831- 
Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons.^ 3  Apl. 1832, /140\
v 3'
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Mayurbhanj and solely responsible to the agent for the South­
west frontier.^ This naturally aroused the jealousy of the 
Mayurbhanj raja.
The situation was further complicated by disturbances 
arising in the same parganas from other causes. One was the 
oppression practised upon the Larka Kols of Jayantgarh by 
Raghunath Bisi, who had received the pargana as a reward for 
his aid to the British in 1821, and had since accumulated vast 
wealth by means more often foul than fair. By 1830 he had so
roused the Larka Kols that his life was in danger, and his
2pargana was exposed to constant incursions*
The Agent was in a dilemma. His predecessors had sup­
ported Raghunath Bisi, but to support him now would mean post­
ing troops at unhealthy Jayantgarh, and risking a fresh clash 
with the Hos. Already there was a feverish stir in Lalgarh and 
Aola and the village headmen were refusing to pay the plough-
tax. -jjo leave the Hos1 crimes unpunished would invite
outrages in other parganas also.
A second reason for the disturbances was that the Raja 
of Porahat was showing himself unable to punish the Kolhan 
Kos for their outrages upon the Muslim and other non-tribal 
traders in salt. Apparently Wilkinson, the acting Agent, wrote 
to the Calcutta authorities, "If that punishment cannot be
1.Wilkinson to Stockwell, Cuttack Commissioner, 27 Nov. 1831, 
Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons .1^3 Apl. 1832,
2. Wilkinson to Govt., 12 May 1830, Home Misc. No.724.
3. Ibid.
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inflicted by the Rajah, of which I see no prospect from his 
powerless state, probably we ought to take the Cole districts 
under [our] own immediate management, dividing them into 
communities of several villages, and placing over them a man 
of energy, through whom they should communicate indirectly
i
with the agent. " He went on to suggest that the revenues and
abwabs levied by the raja on the Larka Kol villages should be
spent upon the maintenance of a military force under this
manager, and then, if possible, they could be enlisted upon a
2
police force recruited from the Larka Kols themselves. These 
wise suggestions were, however, turned down, and the disturb­
ances continued.
In November 1831 the whole question of Bamanghati was 
brought to a head by an attack upon the zamindari by the Raja 
of Mayubhanj. Wilkinson explained the whole history of the 
four kol parganas to the Cuttack Commissioner, and in December 
the latter agreed to take charge of them. Since the Mayurbhanj 
raja, whose minority was now at an end, was clearly determined 
to push his claims to the full, the Commissioner decided to 
act as arbiter in the dispute : of the Bamanghati zamindar it 
was reported: "in the uncertainty which appears to have
existed in the mind of the zemindar whether thro1 tributary
1. The contents of the letter suggest that it was written by 
Wilkinson to Govt,, Home Misc,,No. 724, pp.478-479.
2. Ibid.
to the Rajah he was subject to the orders of the political
agent or to those of the superintendent of Tributary Mahauls,
he seems to have lost sight of his obligations as a feudal
tenant,Through Wilkinson, therefore, he was ordered to
desist from any military or other reckless measures, and
troops were moved to overawe him. The Raja of Mayurbhanj was
2
also ordered to stop his military operations in Bamanghati.
In this way the administrative problem of the area was tempor­
arily settled.^But the events during the unrest of 1831-1833 
showed that the problem of the Larka Kols of Singhbhum was 
still unsolved.
1. G-.Stockwell to Wilkinson, 5 Dec. 1831, Beng. Cr. Judl Cons, 
3 Apl. 1832, (140)
2. Ibid.; Also see Govt, to Wilkinson, 16 Dec. 1831* Ibid.
3. Govt „ to Wilkinson, 16 Dec. 1831? Ibid. The Bengal firovt. 
instructed the Cuttack Commissioner to ensure that the 
Mayurbhanj Raja did not oppress the Bamanghati chief in 
revenge for his past insubordination.
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CHAPTER III.
The Outbreak of Unrest, Its Progress and Suppression 
The First Phase, December 1831 to May 1832*
The year 1831 saw trouble in eastern and central 
Bengal, but to the south-west all seemed calm. The local 
authorities were busy with routine matters: Cuthbert, 
Magistrate-Judge and Collector for Ramgarh, was settling 
revenue details in Palamau,'*’ his assistant, Neave was at
headquarters; A the commissioner of the Patna division, was
2
trying cases at Sherghati. Both Neave and Lambert were
•a
looking forward to the leave for which they had applied. 
There were some disturbances in neighbouring Sambhalpur; 
but Chota Nagpur seemed peaceful.
Then, at the very end of the year the tribal people 
- the Dhangar and the Larka Kols - broke into unprecedented- 
ly widespread rebellion, shaking Government abruptly from 
its complacent slumber. The disturbances started on 11 Dec­
ember 1831 in Sonepur "when a party of Coles from Roochang 
[Kochang] and Jamoor carried off from the village of
1. Cuthbert to Wilkinson, 11 Jan. 1832, B.C. 1362/54-223.
2. W.Lambert to Govt., 2 Apl. 1832, Para.3, B.C.1362/54225. 
3# Ibid. Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 8 and 9 of 17 Jan. 1832 /140\
Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 17 of 31 Jan. 1832 (140)
Koomung [Kumang] which was held in Tieka or farm by Mahomed 
ally Naik) two hundred head of cattle without however in­
flicting bodily injury, plundering or burning other 
property.
Such cattle raiding was not uncommon - though the
scale was unusually large. But the attack on Kumang was
soon followed up on 20 December by a raid on four other
villages in the Sonepur pargana by a body of some 700 men.
These villages were plundered and burnt, and two men - both
2sikhs - were wounded.
The importance of both the attacks was that they 
were attacks upon outsiders, a Muslim ef Kumang, and a Sikh, 
Hari Singh, who had taken the farm at the four villages. 
Because of the widespread tribal discontent at their loss of 
land and influenoe to outsiders, these two attacks found 
popular support - the arrow of war circulated, says Dalton, 
like the fiery Cross  ^ and more and more tribal people 
joined the insurrection. Some, as in the mutiny of 1857,
1. Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 16 Nov, 1832, Para,3, B.C. 
1502/58891* Bindrai Manki stated later on that a few days 
before this he and other tribesmen had assembled at 
Lanka, in Tamar, and decided to begin at once "to cut, 
plunder, murder and eat’1: Bindrai99 statement to Bahadur 
DubhavjJi*, Enclosure, Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 12 Peb, 
1832, B.C. 1363/^5127-
2. Jt, Commissioners to Govt,, 16 Nov, 1832, Para,3, B.C.
1502/58891.
3* Ethnology, 171, "An arrow passed from village to village
is the summons to arms'1: Ibid. footnote.
may have joined from fear of social ostracism, others were 
glad of a chance to plunder, but many followed because their 
natural tribal leaders called them to assert tribal auth­
ority. In the second attack there took part Sui, a munda 
or village headman, Topa Munda and Bindrai of Singhbhum, 
Singrai, a manki or circle headman of Sudgaon, another Sing-
rai of Kochang in Tamar, and several other mankis and mundas
1of Sonepur and Anandipur. Their attack was directed
against the outsider who had taken over the villages of
Singrai Manki when he was dispossessed by Kunwar Harnath
Shahi of Govindpur.
These attacks were quite unexpected, and found the
authorities totally unprepared* Troops there were none (the
2
strength of the Ramgarh battalion had been reduced during 
Bentinckfs economy campaign) and many of the police stations 
had been abandoned. The police who went to investigate the 
second outrage were only a handful of men - the Jamadar of 
Govindpur thana, and two of his barkanJazes, supported by 
thirty armed men of the Kunwar of Govindpur - and though 
they completed their investigation, they were pursued and 
attacked during their return and suffered heavy casualities
1. Jt.Commissioners to Govt., 16 Nov. 1832, Para.3, B.C. 
1502/58891. Also see Jt, Commissioners to Govt., 12 Peb, 
1832, B.C.1363/54227.
2w Metcalfe wrote to Bentinck on 29 January 1832, "We must
I conceive hereafter, as a permanent arrangement for 
that quarter, either increase the strength of the Ramgarh, 
Battalion, or post other corps there:'1 Bentinck MS.,
Box 17.
- one of the barkandazes was killed, fourteen of the Kunwar*s
men were wounded*^*
The discomfiture of the police foroe only
encouraged the insurgents, for on Christmas Day, 300
tribal people attacked, plundered and burnt the villages
of Gassu [?] and Ramji [Ramjeri], the former held in farm
by Kale Khan and the latter by Saif-ullah Khan (both of Deo,
now in the Gaya district)* One man was killed and thrown
into the fire and another wounded, and Saif-ullah Khan only
saved his life "by defending himself in the upper storey of
his house, which the Coles set fire to, but on approach of
2
assistance they fled before it was consumed*"
On 2 January they returned to plunder and burn
Kumang and attacked a neighbouring village Koru Buru. On
the 3rd, they thoroughly plundered Gangira, and murdered the
thlkadar or farmer Jafar Ali, the kol woman whom he kept
as his concubine, their two children, and several others
of his dependants* (Had he not heeded the assurances of
Moti Ram Rautia, of Bamhani, from whom he had taken the
farm of Gangira, he might have escaped to Deo). About one
thousand insurgents took part in the attack*
So far little attempt had been made to check the
outrages* The poor daroga, Karam Ali, had applied for aid




to all the zamindars of the southern parganas, and to the 
Maharaja of Chota-Nagpur without result* The Nazir- of the 
Sherghati court was tut little more successful* He went to 
Khunti, and called in the thana barkandazes of Barkagarh, 
Jhikuchatti, and Govindpur and found but one zamindar, the 
kunwar of Govindpur, who was ready to supply armed assist­
ance* He reached Gangira with this force, inspected the 
damage, ordered Karam Ali to bury the dead and returned to 
Khunti.- No sooner had he gone than the Hols returned,' and 
Karam Ali fled for his life,^
Nor were his attempts at negotiation successful*
On 5 January he had offered immediately to restore their 
lands to the manki s of S one pur, if they would halt the 
depredations. At the suggestions of Ghasi Manjhi, the Ilaqa- 
dar of Khunti, he had also appealed to them to come in to 
him, offering the necessary assurances. The only response 
he received was the audacious statement that they '’would 
not attend to the Hakim, the Kooar of Sonepoor nor to 
Ghassie Manjec, that they would not leave a single Teekadar 
alive and that they would destroy every village of the 
Sonepore pergunnah and even Govindpore itself and would 
wash their weapons in the river (the Karroo) which flows
1. Ibid. Para.4.
2. TFH, Para,5♦ ^




The nazir thus acted to the best of his capacity* In
the words of the Joint Commissioners for Chota-Nagpur, he
"conducted himself with great judgment and firmness and had
are
the zemindars come forward with assistance, we/of opinion
that the progress of insurrection might have been arrested
2at this stage*" But his arrest of Baijnath Manki added 
oil to the fire,^ and his withdrawal to Govindpur on the 
9th morning further heartened the insurgents* By the 11th, 
the Kols were mustering in force, (about 4,000) to attack 
Govindpur itself. The Kunwar of Govindpur made a piteous 
appeal to his mundas and mankis to proteat and assist him* 
None paid any heed, and the Kunwar fled with his family to 
Borea, his guru1s (preceptorfs) place*^ The daroga and the 
thana employees fled towards Jhiku-chatti. On 12 January, 
Govindpur and almost the whole of the pargana of Belkudra 
were plundered and burned, especially the houses of the non- 
tribal people* The kunwar, at Borea, was aompelled, by a 
body of insurgents, to write an amalnama for the villages
1. Ibid* Para.8, B.C. 1502/58891*
2* IhiS.* Para*9* But the causes were so deeprooted that it 
seems hardly possible that it could have been checked 
at this stage*
3* Ibid* Para.7* .
4* Kunwar Harnath SahiJto Singrai Manki and others, 14 Pus 
1888 Sumbat, B.C.1363/54227*
to
of Turpa patti, making them over/the Kamal Singh and Samode 
Baraik.*1-
The insurrection had now become universal, and the 
tribal insurgents indiscriminately attacked "the Hindoos, 
Mahomedans, and other foreigners, who were settled in their 
villages engaged in commercial, or agricultural pursuits, 
drove them almost universally from their homes and property, 
which were burnt or plundered; and sacrificed numbers of 
those who fell into their hands, to their excited passions,
p
of revenge and hatred.1 The disposable force of the police 
in Ramgarh, as Neave said, was “wholly inadequate to repel 
these marauders,"-' Since Cuthbert, the district officer, 
was away in Palamau, Neave called on Captain Wilkinson, the 
Acting Political Agent to the Governor-General on the south­
west frontier and Temporary Commandant of the Ramgarh bat­
talion, to provide "a sufficient force for the protection 
of the district.
The reports of the Govindpur daroga indicated that
the insurgents were already a thousand strong, and their
5
number was growing, But at the headquarters of the Ramgarh
*—— ™—  ■
1, Statement of Kunwar Harnath Sahi, 28 Feb. 1832XAlso 
Harnath Sahi to the mundas of Turpapatti, 13 £us, 1888 
Sum but, Ibid. An amaTnlnria was an authority to take 
possession of a property or an order for possession*
These cultivators had been dispossessed of this village 
a few years back,
2* Bengal & Agra Annual Guide & Gazetteer, 1841, II, 35*
3# R.Neave to Wilkinson, 9 Jan. 1832, B.C.1503/58896.
4. Ibid.
5* leave to Govt., 9 Jan. 1832, B.C.1362/54223.
232
■battalion the whole disposable force only consisted of one 
subadar, two jamadars, six havildars, six naiks, 100 sepoys, 
and a six-pounder. Nevertheless Wilkinson acted quickly. All 
the available force was marched direct to Barkagarh on 12 
January. He also directed a party of the Ramgarh battalion, 
on the march from Sambhalpur, to proceed to Govindpur.'*'
Wilkinson also urged Neave to apply for further mil­
itary forces, pointing out the inadequacy of his own force
now that the Dhangar Kols of Chota-Nagpur were joining the
2
Larka Kols of Singhbhum. Prom the Raja of Ramgarh he asked 
the loan of two elephants with cavalry escort to carry his 
guns across the ghats and to Cuthbert he wrote saying "your 
presence in the pergunnah would be of great advantage to 
the speedy restoration of tranquility.
Wilkinson’s estimate of the situation was approved
A
by Neave, who asked for reinforcements from Dinapur,
while Cuthbert under orders from Lambert, the Commissioner
of the Patna division, hurried to the headquarters of the
r
Ramgarh battalion at Hazaribagh. Thus, "although the Gov­
ernment of Bengal acknowledged no obligation to protect thw 
zemindars of Chota-Nagpore against each other or their
1. Wilkinson to Govt., 11 Jan. 1832, B.C.1503/58896,
2. Wilkinson to Neave, 11 Jan. 1832. Para.3, B.C.1503/58896,
3. Wilkinson to Cuthbert, 12 Jan. 1832, B.C.1362/54223.
4. Neave to Major Penny, Brigade Major, Dinapur, 12 Jan.
1832. Ibid.
5. Cuthbert to Lambert, Patna Commissioner, 13 Jan. 1832,
Ibid.Also see Govt, to Lambert, 19 Jan. 1832.B.C.1362/54224
subjects; yet even its cold and selfish policy was roused 
to the necessity of interference by the impossibility of 
confining the outrages perpetrated to the estates of the 
dependent chiefs, and their menaced extension to the British 
districts on the one hand, and those of the Raja of Nagpore 
on the other
Meanwhile the insurrection continued to spread 
like wild-fire, On 13 January, all the villages of thana 
Govindpur (including the town itself), the Barkagarh pargana 
and thana, and several villages within the Jhikuchatti 
thana (to the north-west of Sonepur) were burned and plund­
ered, Those foreigners or suds, who had not made good their 
escape, were murdered in cold blood. The ravages extended to
the river Koel near Basia in the south, and to the ancient
2
village of Chutia about ten miles south of Pitoria.
By then, the nazir had reached Churia. There he 
tried to get Mukund Singh Baraik to resist the insurgents^ 
but when he found that even the tribesmen of his own estate 
were wavering, he fled with his family into the jungle while 
the nazir pushed on to Sherghati.^ The huge wealth in Churia
1. Wilson, Millfs History of British India, IX, 234.
2. J t. Commissioners to GovtV, 16~Nov. 1832, Para*10,
B. C. 1502/58891. Now the number of insurgents was stated 
to be fourteen thousand: Neave to Govt*, 14 Jan*l832, 
B.C.1362/54223.
3. Jt.Commissions to Govt*, 16 Nov. 1832, Para.10, B.C.1§-Q2 
1502/58891.
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was thus left to he seized.
What had happened in S one pur, Govindpur and 
Barkagarh soon happened in the other thanas. Some hundred 
villages in Jhikuchatti were burned or plundered, and by 
the 14th, the rebels were within a kos of the thana itself. 
On the 16th, the nerves of the thana staff broke, Jhikuchat­
ti was abandoned, and they made their way, with those of 
Govindpur, to Lohardugga and thence to Palamau.’*’
The Armai thana was also overrun, the amlas and 
peaceful inhabitants fleeing to Palamau or Jashpur. Those 
who stayed behind lost their lives and by January 24, almost 
all the villages of the area had been utterly destroyed*
The daroga had fled to Leslieganj in Palamau. The insur­
rection then spread into Barwa and the raja of that pargana, 
his employees and all the Respectable1 inhabitants sought
refuge in the estate of Jashpur. Acts of plunder, arson and
2murder went on unabated.
Thus by 26 January, the tribal insurgents had 
"complete possession of the whole of [Chota] Nagpore, with 
the exception of some of the jungly tracts to the south of 
Palkote - Palkote khas (the residence of the Maharaja) and 
the villages of that Pergunnah, Bussea, the zemindary of 
Lohar Sing Barrack [Baraik] (forming part of the jageer of
1. Ibid.
2. ibid. Para. 11.
G-opeenanth Sahi uncle of the present Rajah [Maharaja], also 
to the south, and Peethowreah and the adjoining villages 
in the north east corner.
The first check to the very rapid spread of the 
disturbances was imposed by Captain Wilkinson and his small
p
force. They reached Rara (Rarah), about half-way between 
Doesa and Ramgarh and a few miles short of Pitoria on 14 
January 1832. A small party was pushed forward to safeguard 
Pitoria, while the gan bullocks, completely knocked up by 
the ascent of the ghats, recovered. Smoke and flames from 
the nearby villages indicated the presence of the insurgents, 
and on arrival at Pitoria (on 16 January) Wilkinson immed­
iately sallied out to attack them at Kharkatta. News of his 
little victory there encouraged Lai Jit Nath Sahi of Gujnu 
(Gujnoo),^ ten miles south-west of Pitoria, to oppose the 
insurgents. On the 18th he faced some six hundred of them, 
charging them with three followers, killing six and routing 
the rest,^ A few days later Wilkinson oame up with a party 
of seventy insurgents near Borea, his ten horsemen charged 
them with such force that they could not esaape, and one
1. Ibid.
2. TbTd.Para,27. See the enclosed map, 1 Sketch of Chuta 
Nagpore and its dependencies1, There is a hill chain 
betv/een Pitoria and Rarah. According to A Subaltern 
Sketch of the Campaign^ East India Journalfinl85» Rorah 
was "a small village,or rather hamlet, situated between, 
two ranges of hills„"
3. Ibid.Also see Jt.Commissioners to Govt., 16 Nov,1832,
Para.28, B.C.1502/58891.
4# Jt.Commissioners to Govt,, 16 Nov.1832, Para.29. B.C.1502/ 
58891, Also see Wilkinson to Neave, 20 Jan.1832, B.C.1362/
54224#
was killed and thirty taken prisoner*1
These three minor successes, and the arrival of the
magistrate Cuthbert with a considerable body of irregular
foot and horse, turned the tide locally* The tribal mundas
2and pahans of 56 villages submitted, and the suds on the 
northern borders of Chota-Nagpur were induced to stand firm 
in their villages. But the country in other quarters, 
(especially in the south) was entirely in the hands of the 
insurgents.
The presence of Wilkinson1 s detachment, and their 
minor successes thus gave heart to the districts round and 
to the north of Pitoria. But any further success was 
obviously dependent upon his timely reinforcement* Neave, 
the acting magistrate, had already asked Ghanshyam Singh, 
the Deo raja, to supply horsemen and matchlock men,  ^and 
twice advanced him Rs,1,000 for expenses. The 50th.Native 
Infantry, marching from Gorakhpur for Dinapur,^ dive rted via 
Gaya to the Ramgarh district.^ But Neave and Wilkinson felt 
this was still quite inadequate* "This force is wholly
5
unequal to the task", wrote Neave and he accordingly
1* Wilkinson to Neave, 22 Jan* l8325l&i>,
2* Ibid.
3* Neave to Govt*, 14 Jan* 1832, B.C.1362/54223; Also see 
Neave to Govt*, 23 Jan, 1832, B.C.1362/54224.
4* Military Deptt. to Judl. Deptt., 18 Jan. 1832, Para,2, 
Ibid.
5. Neave to Govt., 18 Jan, 1832, Para*2, Beng. Cr.Judl,
Cons* 67 of 31 Jan. 1832 (140)
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put in an urgent demand for a cavalry force from Benares*
Wilkinson for his part felt that even these troops would he
inadequate: MAs it may not he practicable to furnish more
than a battalion and a squadron of cavalry, I should deem
it very advisable that at least five or six hundred Burk-
undazes and from 50 to 100 horsemen well armed should be
employed under Gunsham Sing, who has volunteered his
services and the sooner they reach my camp the better*
A new difficulty was also making itself felt - a shortage of
supplies, most of which had been carried off or destroyed
2by the insurgents* Neave had, therefore, to appoint an 
active officer to create a depot at Hazaribagh. He sent 
the nazir to collect supplies at Chatra, while Mitrabhan 
Singh, son of the Raja of Deo, also brought in provisions 
as well as troops.
Thus supplied and reinforced, Wilkinson was able to 
rout a force of some 3>000 insurgents advancing upon 
Pitoria*^ But meanwhile rebellion had spread to the five 
parganas,below the ghats - Tamar, Rahi, Bundu, Silli, and
A
Baranda - the dependencies of the Chota-Nagpur maharaja,
1. Wilkinson to Neave, 20 Jan. 1832, B*C.1362/54224*
2. Neave to Govt,, 23 Jan. 1832, Ibid,
3. Jt, Commissioners to Govt., 16 Nov. 1832, Para.30,
B.C.1502/58891.
4. Ibid.Para.13. Also See the enclosed map; ’Sketch of 
Chufa Nagpore and its dependencies’.
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on the immediate borders of the Jungle Mahals and Singhbhum. 
The Sonepur insurgents had entered this area on 16 January, 
and had since been joined by several village and circle 
tribal leaders: Lakhi Das of Kachi, Dasai Manki and their 
followers* They first threatened the Raja of Bundu, who 
lost heart when he found that his mundas and mankis under 
LaKhi Das had deserted. He fled with his family to Jhalda 
in the Jungle Mahals. On 18 January the insurgents 
captured the rich town of Bundunagar. Bor four days they 
plundered the enormous wealth of the mahajans and then 
burned it down.^ Three Pathans and two other foreigners 
were done to death, and within a few days the houses of all 
the non-tribal people of the whole pargana had been 
destroyed. (Strangely enough, they spared the raja*s 
house, presumably as a token of respect to their recently 
hinduized chief).
When the Raja of Rahi heard about the burning of 
Bundu and found his own mundas and mankis hostile to him, 
he also fled with his family to Bagankodar in the Jungle 
Mahals. On the 17th, the tribal people of the area plund­
ered the houses of all the non-tribal people in the villages 
of Baranda and Rahi. The houses of the raja, and of the




tikait, or guardian of the pass, who had fled with the raja, 
were, however, spared. In the adjoining pargana of Khas 
Silli the story was the same: all the houses of the suds 
were plundered and destroyed, the tribal people of Silli, 
Banta Ha jam, Bundu, Rahi and Baranda all taking part. The 
Raja of Silli had already taken shelter in Kulma in Jhalda. 
Once again the house of the raja was spared, and by the 
23rd, when the insurgents from outside the pargana had 
moved on, he was able to return to it. In the 12 villages 
of Banta Ha jam, belonging to the Pachet raja, the same 
scenes were enacted on January 17# The houses of Paryag 
Sahu and other wealthy inhabitants, who fortunately had 
escaped, were plundered and burned.
Only a week after these events, Tori pargana on the 
north-west borders of Chota-Nagpur proper, and Tamar on the 
south-east were disturbed. On 24 January the Bhogta and 
Ghasi tribes of Tori, 1 imitating the example of the Coles of 
Nagpore who had joined them1 ^ . rose in arms. They took 
possession of the Hutap ghat and plundered and burned many 
villages below that pass. Those who tried to pass the ghat 
were plundered and killed. The daroga of Udaiganj thana 
had already fled and many peaceful inhabitants were now 
flying for shelter and safety.
Soon Tamar khas and the villages of the pargana
1. Ibid. Para.12.
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were attacked, plundered and burned* The tribesmen of this 
hilly area under their mankis and mundast who had deserted 
the rani* took part in the devastation. At the outset the 
rani resisted the insurgents with 300 men of Thakur Che tan 
Singh of Kharsawan and Lachhuman Singh of Tarai, The assail­
ants were repelled and some of them were killed* But ulti­
mately the rani left her residence which was burned, "This 
forms a solitary instance of the house of a Rajah being des- 
tro3red and is thus accounted for namely that the other 
Rajahs left people to protect their houses while the Tamar 
Rannie was alone deserted by all." The main booty was 
secured from the town of Tamar and the bhandar (khas) 
villages. One mahajan in the town of Tamar and some three of 
Janampuri, the estate of Tribhuvan Manki, were murdered. 
Sarjandihi, the estate of Thakur Borhan Singh, who had not 
deserted the rani, was also plundered and burned, Lachhuman 
Singh, who had also openly assisted the rani, was able, 
however, to protect his villages.
Though Singhbhum itself, to the south-east corner 
of Chota-Nagpur proper, was not disturbed in this period, 
the Larka Kols of this area, famous for their martial spirit, 
were the chief supporters of the Dhangar Kols of Chota^
1* Ibid. Para. 17.
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Nagpur. The latter purposely circulated rumours that more 
and more Larkas were arriving so that the people might be 
overawed* The Larkas of Bandgaon under Bindrai Manki, a 
man of daring character, and Sui Munda of Godarpiri and 
several others of Singhbhum first came to the aid of their 
brethren of Sonepur. Moreover, the tribesmen of Kochang 
and Jamur had participated in the outrages, probably at 
the behest of Basal Manki and Katik Sardar, the heads of 
these villages* Other leaders were Mohan Manki, Sagar
Manki, Surga Manki, and Nagu Pahafc, a daring man of Sarad-
2kel. The Rautias in general in S one pur, Basia and other 
southern parts of Chota-Nagpur first gave them moral support, 
but later took an active part in the plundering excursions.
Of these Kamal Singh Baraik of Turpa patti,and a landholder 
of Singhbhum too, who had harassed Kunwar Harnath Sahi ! at 
the very beginning of the disturbances,*^ was the most prom­
inent. All the mankis and mundas of the five parganas, 
except Lachhuman Singh and Borhan Singh, were actively con­
cerned in the perpetration of heinous crimes*
Thus from mid-January almost the whole of Chota- 
Nagpur proper and its five dependencies were at the mercy
1. Wilkinson to Neave, 20 Jan. 1832, B.C.1363/54227.
2. Jt.Commissioners to Govt., 16 Nov. 1832, Para.21,
B.C.1502/58891.
3. Statement, Kunwar Harnath Sahi, 28 Feb. 1832, B.C.1363/ 
54227.
of the insurgents and so remained till the arrival of 
sufficient troops from outside. Wilkinson at Pitoria could
i
not do much, at least he could not act offensively. As 
the Acting Magistrate of Ramgarh reported, "Notwithstanding 
what that officer has effected in his own immediate neigh­
bourhood, the general state of the pergunnah remains much
2
the same." He further reported, "The insurgents are in 
several large bodies and commit their horrid outrages in 
various parts of the country, at the same time. The respect­
able part of the inhabitants have fled into the jungle3* 
and the police have come for protection below the ghs.uts."*' 
By the end of January the first troops from outside 
Chota-Nagpur began to arrive. Captain Maltby with 100 men 
of the 2nd Infantry from Dinapur and a body of horsemen 
and barkandazes, which had been recruited by Neave at 
Sherghati, entered Tori on 28 January and reached Tikoo, 
just above the ghats, on the 30th. Captain Wilkinson had 
already been reinforced by 200 matchlockmen and 50 horses 
under the command of Mitrabhan Singh of Deo on 25 January.
1. Bengal Hurkaru , 23 Jan. 1832.
2. fteave to Pat ha Commissioner, 25 Jan. 1832. Para. 1 Beng.
Cr. Judl. Cons. 4 of 7 Feb. 1832. /14-Ox 7 ?
(—
3. Ibid. He wrote in another letter; ’From absence of troops 
and the great distance of the stdtions whence they are 
procurable, the Pergunnah of Chota Nagpore has been for 
one month in the hands of the Insurgents, and no resist­
ance has been made". Neave to Lambert, 27 Jan, 1832, &
Cr, Judl. Cons. 76 of 31 Jan. 1832 ^140^ ^
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Moreover Maharaja Mitrajit Singh of Tekari in the district 
of Bihar (now in Gaya) supplied 300 barkandazes with 200 
cavalry, his nephew Bishun Singh supplied 70 cavalry and 
150 barkandazesf and his illegitimate son, Raja Khan Bahadur 
Khan, also came forward with his 300 men,^
To meet Wilkinson1s urgent need for supplies Neave 
made further advances to the police officers and to •respect­
able* landholders* An establishment of two hundred and 
fifty oxen with their drivers for the conveyance of these 
supplies was kept ready. At Chatra the collectors nazir
r  \
was posted to superintend the collection of grain etc*" He 
also arranged supplies for the cavalry contingent coming 
from Benares, establishing chaukls , or depots, at Nabinagar, 
Aurangabad, Daudnagar, Gaya and Chatra so that sufficient 
necessaries (e,g. grains like gram, Dal ghee, salt, etc.) 
might be collected from the neighbouring bazars and 
forwarded to camp by bullocks.
By now the Bengal Government had realized the 
gravity of the situation and accordingly it directed the 
following detachments to march towards the disturbed areas: 
"Prom Barrackpore, a Regiment of Native Infantry (the 34th.
1. Reformer, quoted in Bengal Hurkaru, 12 March 1832:
Ttie Reformer commented that while the Muslims had risen 
against the'"""British at Baraset. these Hindu gentlemfin 
(One of them was partly Muslim) willingly and promptly 
came forward in support of the Government, thus maintain­
ing the tradition of Jagat Seth and others who had aided 
the British in the battle of Plassey.
2. Neave to Lambert, 25 Jan. 1832. B.C.1362/54224.
3. Neave to Lambert, 29 Jan. 1832, B.C.1362/54223.
Regiment) proceeded on duty joined by a "brigade of horse
Artillery from Bum Bum. Prom Midnapore, a detachment of 300
men of the 38th Regiment Native Infantry stationed at that
place could furnish one of that strength, if not, the Betach-
ment to be as strong as the Regiment could supply. The
detachment actually sent consisted of 2 companies."^ These
reinforcements had been ordered because news had arrived of
the spread of the insurrection to Tori and Palamau
parganas on the north-western borders of Chota-Nagpur. By
227 January the whole of the Tori pargana was in revolt.
The daroga of Armai had been compelled to flee into Palamau 
for asylum. The pargana of Barwa had been plundered and 
burnt and thereafter the insurgents had moved towards 
Palamufi.^ Then on 28 January the Government was further 
informed about an extension of the outrages to Lohardugga 
and Tikoo on the one hand, and to the five dependent 
parganas (Tamar, Bundu, Rahi, Baranda and Silli) on the 
other.^ The Barackpur detachment was thereupon ordered to
1. Bengal Govt, to Court of Birectors, 25 Sept. 1832,
Para. 12, Ibid. Also see Bengal Hurkaru, 1 Peb. 1832s 
Col. Bowen was commanding the troops from Barrackpui%
2. Lambert to Govt., 29 Jan. 1832, Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons.
75 of 31 Jan. 1832 1^40)
3. Neave to Lambert, 30 Jan. 1832, Para.2. Beng. Cr.Judl. 
Cons. 10 of 7 Peb. 1832 /140x
4. Bengal Govt, to Court of Birectors, 25 Sept. 1832, Para. 
12, B.C. 1362/54223.
communicate immediately with the joint commissioners and to 
act in cooperation with them, and the Midnapur detachment 
to communicate, in the first instance, with the magistrate 
of Bankura. Moreover, to ensure cooperation and combination 
of movement on the part of all the forces proceeding to the 
disturbed areas, the Government ordered on 1 February 
that the commanding officers were to communicate with the
commissioners and to proceed as they might point out. The
seniormost military officer would, of course, assume the 
command of actual military operations, but in other respect 
he and all other officers were to be guided by the commis­
sioners, ^
The hands of the Joint Commissioners had already
been strengthened by the grant of special powers Mto appre­
hend, try and bring to immediate punishment without further
reference to Government all persons whom you may find in
2
open resistance to the civil power, M To guide them in the 
exercise of these emergency powers, they were instructed 
that nwhen the emergency'might appear to them such as to 
render necessary or expedient the employment of prompt and 
vigorous measures, they might avail themselves of the 
special powers, but when they might be of opinion that
1. Ibid, Para.13.
2. Govt, to Cuthbert, 24 Jan. 1832, Para.l. Beng. Cr.Judl. 
Cons. 61 of 24 Jan. 1832. /140) Cuthbert and Wilkinson 
formed the special .• ' $'
commission in this period.
the offenders could, without detriment to the public 
interests, be left to be disposed of under the ordinary 
rules for the administration of criminal justice, they 
should proceed against them according to established form.n 
Neave, however, was not given any extra-ordinary powers, and 
when he urged that the deplorable state of Tori required 
a proclamation of martial law - and seemed inclined to make 
such a proclamation on his own responsibility - he was told
not to exercise such powers without the express sanction of
2the Gove rnme nt *
JUi
Patkum, Bagmundi. Hasla and BaggftmM:-
While Wilkinson, from Pitoria, was attempting to 
check the revolt in Ramgarh., and troops were on the move to 
deal with the outbreak in Tori, Palamau and the five depend­
ent parganas, unrest had flared up in Patkum, the pargana 
which formed the most south-westerly part of the Jungle 
Mahals, It was in this pargana that the refugees from Chota- 
Nagpur, and then from Tamar, Bundu and Rahi, which lay 
immediately to the west of Patkum, had sought asylum.,
Russell, the Jungle Mahals magistrate, had been warned of
the approach of the insurgents by the zamindars of his
1. Bengal Govt, to Court of Directors, 25 Sept, 1832. Para.
9, B.C.1362/59224.
2. Lambert to Govt., 29 Jan, 1832, Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons* 75
of 31 Jan. 1832 /140\ Also see Govt, to Lambert, 31 Jan.
 ^ 3  1832, Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons* 77 of
31 Jan. 1832 (140)
districts western borders,'*' and on 23 January two messen­
gers arrived from the Rani of Patkum to report to her 
husband, who was with Russell at headquarters at Bankura,
that insurgents had invaded Patkum and burnt down three
2
villages. On the 24th. Russell wrote to Midnapur, 55 miles 
south of Bankura, for military assistance. He pointed out 
that "the detachment out against them [the insurgents] from 
Hazareebang is small, and consequently not of sufficient 
strength to be divided into parties until reinforcements 
arrive, and as the extent of country these marauders are 
plundering is considerable, and they have commenced their 
outrages in this district, I deem it proper to apply to you 
direct, and to request that you will with all despatch for­
ward what disposable force you have at your command into 
pergunnah Patcoom, through Burrabhoom* to cooperate with 
Captain Wilkinson and to oppose any extensive descent of 
these insurgents into this district.
The Bengal Government, however, obviously thought 
Russell alarmist and told him that his requisition was
1. Hasla, Jhalda, Bagankodar, Bagmundi and Jaipur.
2. Russell, Magistrate*Jungle Mahals, to Govt., 23 Jan.1832, 
B.C. i 83 B.C.1363/54226.
3* Russell to officer commanding at Midnapur, 24 Jan. 1832, 
Ibid. He also wrote to the Ramgarh Magistrate and to the 
political Agent at Hagaribagh, 120 miles northwest from 
Bankura, asking the latter to send a party of sepoys to 
preserve the lives and property of the inhabitants: 
Russell to Wilkinson, 23 Jan.1832, Ibid.At the same time 
he sent a daroga to Jhalda and another to Patkum with 
instructions to the zamindars of that area to stand 
against the insurgents.
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unnecessary as sufficient military force had already been 
placed at the disposal of the civil authorities. They can­
celled the leave of Martin, Russell1s assistant, and ordered 
him to proceed by dak to the Jungle Mahals headquarters. **
They told Russell, "For the protection of your own district 
you will of course call upon the zemindars of Patcoom,
Jaldeah [Jhalda] and the other estates bordering on the 
scene of the disturbances to summon all the pykes[sic] at
their disposal, and to aid you in opposing the insurgents,
2
and in maintaining the peace of the district.'1 If the dis­
turbances continued, Russell was to hand over the charge of 
his office at the headquarters to Martin and was to proceed 
himself to the spot. He was further directed to consult for 
his guidance the proceedings of the years 1806 to 1808 under 
Blunt when similar disturbances had occurred in this area.
Thus reproved by Bengal Government, Russell wrote 
to the officer commanding at Midnapur to stop the march of
4
any military force. However, it remained his firm convict­
ion that the military force in Ramgarh was insufficient to 
cope with the situation. He had at his command at Bankura, 
besides the ghatwalsy only the barkandazes who had belonged 
to the late provincial battalion. He thought that his pro­
1. Govt, to Martin, 24 Jan. 1832, Ibid.
2. Govt, to Russell, 24 Jan. l832,"TT5Td.
3* Blunt, the third member of the Governor-General1 s Council 
at this time, was the Magistrate of the Jungle Mahals 
in 1806-1810.
4. Russell to Govt., 26 Jan. 1832, ■Jhidy h t • \1> .
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ceeding to the disturbed area with only these indifferent 
men, and unaided by some military force, would be of no 
avail* He proposed, however, to place a sufficient number 
of hired men for the protection of the Bankura jail incase 
he had to go to Patkum with the matchlockmen.^
Russell1s forebodings soon began to seem justified. 
The houses of those who were in the employ of the Patkum 
zamindar were burnt in several villages* Pour more villages 
in western Patkum, on the other side of the Subarnarekha 
river, were destroyed, and on 23 January Elu, the chief 
village of the Hasla pargana, seven kos from Patkum, was 
devastated. Between Wilkinson with his little force at 
Pitoria and Patkum, fifty hilly, difficult miles to the 
south-east, the insurgents were sweeping through the 
parganas of Bundu, Baranda and Silli, Though Russell had sent
parwanas to the zamindars of the area to take courage and to
2
arm their paiks for resistance, most of them were in a state 
of great alarm and preparing to flee. Out of the zamindars 
of Patkum, Torang, Bagmundi, Hasla and Jhalda, the bordering 
parganas of his district, he found only the zamindar of the 
last-mentioned pargana ready to act, aided by the chiefs of 
Jaipur and Bargankodar. The zamindar of Pachet was in a 
deplorable state of mind and nothing could be expected from
1. Ibid.
2. Tiussell to Govt,, 29 Jan. 1832, B.C. 1363/54226.
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him.1
On 29 January Russell wrote again to Midnapur for
military assistance. This time he had the support of the
Burdwan commissioner, who expressed his willingness himself
to proceed to Bankura. Accordingly two companies of the
38th N.I. set out under Captain Horsburgh from Midnapur,
2
via Bishnupur and Bankura. Russell had also learnt from 
Bent that a regiment had been ordered to Ramgarh from 
Barrackpur,^ and the Bengal Government, confirming its des­
patch, asked Russell to provide the requisite supplies for
4
the regiment when it passed through his district. It was 
therefore with some confidence that he joined Horsborough1 s 
detachment and marched with it to Patkum, where they arrived
jr
on 12 February. (Wilkinson, urging that great caution 
should be exercised in any further advance towards him, 
suggested that for the time being the two companies should
c
be held at Patkum for the protection of the Jungle Mahals).
With the arrival of the troops the disturbances 
rapidly subsided, and Russell threw himself heart and soul 
into the task of restoring order, investigating the out­
breaks and preparing a report upon them. This work took
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid. Also see W.Braddon, Burdwan Commissioner, to Govt., 
■57Tan. 1832, B.C.1363/54226.
3* Russell to Govt., 31^  Jan. 1832, Ibid.
4# Govt, to Russell, 30 Jan. 1832, Tbi5.
5, Russell to Govt., 13 Feb. 1832, ibid.
6. Ramgarh Magt. to Russell, 1 Feb. 1832, Ibid,
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more than two months and his assistant Martin remained in 
charge of the Bankura civil station in this period. Russell 
assembled a considerable force of armed men from the 
interior of the district, consisting of barkandazes and 
others, and he was authorized by the Bengal Government to 
give them diet allowance and suitable remuneration* But his 
requisition of elephants and tents from the zamindars was not 
approved*
On 22 March Russell reported that he had completed
his investigation, that he had recovered more than 1,200
head of cattle about 6,000 maunds of grain, and that he had
taken more than 650 prisoners, eighty of them for the attack 
1on Elu alone. The most important of these prisoners was the 
zamindar of Jhalda, whom Russell had arrested as a principal 
fomenter of the disturbance at Elu. Russell’s investigations 
also implicated the Diwan of the Patkum zamindar, and his 
dependent chiefs and ghatwals, and in Bagmundi pargana the 
brother of the late zamindar.
It seems certain that the disturbance ceased so 
quickly in this area because of the decisive action taken 
by Russell. As. Russell reported, "On the 4th day and when 
the system of plunder was still continuing, a rumour was 
spread abroad that the magistrate was proceeding to Patcoom 
with a military force, on hearing which the Ghautwals with
1. Russell to Govt., 22 March 1832, Ibid.
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the view of extricating themselves from the dilemma in which
they had fallen and to make it appear that they had taken
no part in the disturbances and to throw all the odium on
the Coles, concerted a scheme for the apprehension of the
party which had entered the purgunnah at their invitation.
"If it had not been for the rumour of troops marching through
the district," Russell went on, "the disturbances would
have also spread into other pergunnahs^ [of the Jungle Mahals]
where the police is invested in the landholders and where
2there are no regular police Thannahs."
Palamau and Tori;-
t o n  in January 1832 the tribal people of Chota- 
Nagpur and its dependencies were carrying fire and sword 
against the non-tribal people the Company?s officials 
attempted to check their progress by using against them their 
kinsmen in Palamau, the cheros and kharwars who "had evear 
been celebrated as good fighters."^ But no sooner had the 
jagirdars of Palamau assembled their tribal militia at Les- 
lieganj than news came (on 26 January) that the Kols were 
planning an incursion into Palamau as well. So the jagirdars 
were asked to defend their own ghats instead of marching for
1. Russell to Braddon, 18 Apl. 1832, Para.4. Ibid.
2. Ibid. Para.16.
3. Neave to Jt.Commissioners, 28 Apl. 1832, Para.3A,
B.C. 1363/54228; Parwanas were issued to the principal 
jagirdars of Palamau to assemble their men at Leslie- 
ganj' and then to set out to Chota-Nagpur via Chatra.
the protection of the neighbouring parganas.
The ghats at which the insurgent kols were said to be 
aiming were those of Tissa and Rania, and many of the peace­
able settlers, fearing that Chechari would be attacked from 
the south, began to flee northwards. Neave, the Assistant 
Magistrate of Ramgarh, attempted to prevent any such attack 
by calling on the raja and jagirdars of the area as well as 
^arogas of Leslieganj and Tarhasi to defend the ghats.
The jagirdars of Che chari and Sima accordingly proceeded 
to close the approaches to their jagirs effectively. The 
daroga of Leslieganj also collected a hundred cheros with 
matchlocks and took them to protect the defiles leading from 
the Tissa ghat on 28 January. Moreover, at the suggestion of 
many dependable persons in Palamau, Neave advanced a sum of 
five hundred rupees for hiring barkandazes to Raja Ran
Bahadur Rai, whose family, though disposed of its zamindari
in 1813, still possessed some influence.’1'
The attempt to halt the Chota-Nagpur insurgents 
failed. The first breach occurred at the Tisaa ghatt through 
which Thakur Udainath Singh and Lai Maninath Sahi of ( Jugi 
were pursued. The ghatwal at Tissa, chamar Sahi, held his 
ground for a while against the insurgents, but eventually
1. Neave to Lambert, 30 Jan. 1832, Beng.Cr.Judl. Cons. 10 
of 7 Feb. 1832 /140\ This action of Neave was criticised
 ^ ^  ^  Major Sutherland as * dangerous1
probably because relying on the false report from the 
qanungo,Sutherland thought that Raja Ran Bahadur might 
himself rebel after getting the money. See Sutherland to 
Govt., N.D., B.C. 1363/54227.
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under heavy pressure had to yield. Once he had done so, 
perhaps feeling compromised, he proceeded to join the rebels, 
and became one of their most active leaders,His example 
proved infectious. After a week on the borders of Palamau 
awaiting a suitable moment for attack the insurgents had won 
over a number of the Kharwar leaders and other tribal chiefs 
who had entertained them. Soon all the tribal people came to 
terms with them, and on 7 February the attack on Palamau 
began, led by the Kol Bhutnath of Sazardi and the cheros,
kharwars and Poliars of Palamau under Dakhin Sahi, a relation
2of Chamar Sahi, the Tissa ghatwal. On that day the villages 
of Ichak, Bari and Mankiari were all burnt and the force of 
Raja Ran Bahadur driven back with much loss. The attempt to 
use tribal people to oppose tribal insurgents had thus broken 
down, and Neave had to report to Patna that the Chota-Nagpur 
kols were busy trying to excite the lower to rise against 
the higher orders.^
Fortunately, at this time the detachment from Benares, 
for which Neave had put in a requisition in the middle of 
January, was in the neighbourhood of Palamau in the north 
in the Shahabad district. Therefore, as a preventive measure, 
Neave directed the march of two companies of the 54th regi­
1. Neave to Jt.Commissioners, 28 .Apl, 1832, Para,3C,
B.C.1363/54228.
2. Ibid,
3. Neave to Lambert, 4 Feb, 1832, Para.l, B.C.1362/54224; 
Lambert to Govt., 6 Feb. 1832, Ibid.
Also see Bengal Govt, to Court of Directors, 25 Sept.
1832, Para.26, B.C.1362/54223♦
ment direct to Palamau, though, the remainder of the 3rd 
regiment of Light Infantry had to be directed to halt at 
Sasaram, 75 miles north of Palamau, due to the shortage of 
supplies.^
The disturbances in Palamau thereafter spread like
wild-fire, The kols had entered the area in two places. Most
of the jagirdars, who were holding land on condition of per-
2
forming military service, shirked from hazarding a fight. 
Neave* therefore, recommended that their lands should be 
confiscated.-' Unable to expect any assistance locally, Neave 
asked Captain Angelo, commanding the 3rd Light Cavalry, to 
detach a small force into Palamau pargana to prevent the 
further spread of the unrest, ^ Angelo replied that as he 
had guns with him he could not divide his force. He added 
that he had the Chota-Nagpur special commissioner’s request 
to proceed to Pitoria with all speed. Neave’s request was, 
therefore, not attended to.^
Neave was not satisfied with this refusal, and wrote 
to Lambert to express his fear that without a military force
1. Neave to Lambert, 4 Peb. 1832, Beng.Cr.Judl.Cons. 22 of
14 Peb. 1832. ,14CK
V p
2* Neave to Lambert, 5 Peb. 1832, Beng.Cr.Judl.Cons. 27 of 
14 Peb, 1832 /14Q\ Only two of them had come forward to
 ^ 4 check the progress of the insurgents,
3. He was asked by Commissioner Lambert to submit a further 
report on this to the Government: Lambert to Govt,,
7 Peb. 1832, Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 26 of 14 Peb, 1832
(M2)V p
4, See Neave to Govt., 27 Peb. 1832, Para.9, B.C.1362/54224.
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Palamau would go the way of Chota-Nagpur. Because of the hill 
harrier between Chota-Nagpur and Palamau any British activity 
in the former area had little effect in the latter: success 
in Chota-Nagpur would do little to encourage the jagirdars 
of Palamau - certainly not as much as the presence of a 
detachment of troops. If the jagirdars persisted in their 
cowardice and the pargana was overrun then the supplies for 
the troops in Chota-Nagpur would he endangered and there 
would also he a great loss of revenue. “* Why then when a regi­
ment and guns from Calcutta and a detachment from Midnapur 
were on their way should a detachment not he spared for 
Palamau?
However, the approach of the troops had a good moral 
effect. The large-scale work of destruction stopped, though 
one more village was burnt. Raja Ran Bahadur, provided with 
ammunition hy Neave, and the jagirdars now hegan to exert 
themselves. The raja marched to the hurnt village immediately.
But the more favourable turn of events was short­
lived, for the withdrawal of troops from Tori was followed 
hy further disturbances. "The lower classes,1 Neave reported, 
"have evidently entered into a combination with the Coles 
and Immediately on the departure of troops, they recommence
p
the old system of burning, plundering and killing.1 The 
police, temporarily re-established by military force at
1. Neave to Lambert, 7 Peb. 1832, Ibid.
2. Neave to Lambert, 10 Peb. 1832, !Para.3# B.C.1362/54225#
257
Udaiganj, was again dislocated and could afford no protection 
to the people against the crimes being perpetrated# Neave, 
therefore, wrote to the commissioner about his helplessness 
in the absence of any troops at his command. Lambert did on 
this occasion sanction a request to Captain Wilkinson to
1
detach a party of troops for the protection of that pargana. 
The worsening of the situation in Palamau, just when the 
jagirdars had begun to make headway against the insurgents, 
was more directly due,, however, to the intrigues of subord­
inate officials of the collectors office posted at Leslie-
ganj, "to which may be said to have been sacrificed the peace
2
of the country." The qanungo, Gauri char an, and the Bhe ir­
is tadar, Alam Chand, contrary to Neave*s orders, did not 
allow the jagirdars, who had assembled at Leslieganj, to 
blockade the advancing rebel armies at the ghats* Moreover, 
they continued to send false reports to Neave from 31 Janu­
ary till the middle of February. The forces of the jagirdars 
were divided because of this duplicity of the subordinate 
staff.
Nevertheless, Raja Ran Bahadur did march to the 
Jhabe Ghat and thence to Che chari with about 300 Chero and 
Kharwar barkandazes, some fifty Pathans and a few Brahmans.
He was joined by the Leslieganj daroga and some barkandazes
1, Lambert to Govt., 11 Feb. 1832, Ibid.
2* Neave to Jt.Commissioners, 28 ApTI 1832, Para.3E,
B.C.1363/54228.
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as well* Bat the sheristadar and the qanungo did not allow 
most of the Barkandazes at Leslieganj to join the raja in­
spite of his repeated requests. Still the raja followed up 
the insurgents. Even when on 8 February the tribal followers 
of the raja deserted him to join the rebel army, the raja 
did not lose heart and with Babu Chhatradhari Singh, Jagmohan 
Singh and Bhawani Baksha Rai, and with his Pathnas and Brah­
mans, "rushed on the enemy and fought most bravely until they 
actually put to flight the Coles*However when the victors 
were taking their meal at ease, the united body of Cheros, 
Kharwars and others fell on them and slew fourteen men.
Again the raja requested the nazir and sheristadar at Lesli­
eganj to send the barkandaze s but once again they would not 
pay any heed. Thereupon the raja, in utter disgust, left for 
his home at Shahpur.
The treachery, or selfish timidity of the sherista­
dar and his accomplice was not at once discovered, for they 
concealed their misconduct by producing on 13 February a 
slanderous and alarming report, accusing the raja of compli­
city in the insurgents crimes. They even denied that he had 
ever fought a battle at all, stating rather that he had run 
away with all his men. It was not till some time later that 
the report was exposed as false and the two officials were 
punished, and meanwhile their treachery had led to disaster, 
for with the rajafs withdrawal, and that of the other
1. Ibid.
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aggrieved jagirdars,the Kols were left at liberty to plunder 
and burn without check,"1* while the sheristadar and other 
officials abandoned their posts - to save the official 
papers,
Lambert, on receipt of the alarming reports, asked
Neave to send an express requisition to the Brigadier General
commanding at Benares, for such additional military force as
could be spared. He also informed Neave that he had ordered
a direct dak to be established for immediate communication
2
with Sherghati. Lambert also wrote directly to the Briga­
dier General commanding at Dinapur to ask whether there was
any military force there for the protection of the disturbed 
3areas,-1
Meanwhile the insurgents were reported to be in force 
near Satbarwa, 10$ miles frofii Leslieganj, and the inhabitants 
of Palamau, failing completely to live up to their fighting 
reputation, began to flee. Their flight had naturally a 
demoralising effect on the people of the neighbouring 
pargana of Tori which had already been devastated twice * The 
insurgents had approached Chiteri, Barahatu and Jabera, and 
the shopkeepers were ready to flee away, Since the chiteri 
was a depot for supplies for the troops, its desertion would 
be a severe calamity.^
1. Neave to Lambert, 14 Feb, 1832, Para,3, B.C.1362/54225.
2. Lambert to Neave, 14 Feb. 1832, Ibid.
3. Lambert to Govt., 14 Feb. 1832, Ibid.
4. Neave to Lambert, 11 Feb. 1832, Seng,Cr.Judl.Cons. 9 of
21 Feb. 1832 ,14Ck
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Neave* s idea of employing the 3rd Light Cavalry in 
Palamau was now supported Toy Wilkinson.^" One of the 
squadrons, Neave wrote on 14 February, had already moved 
into Palamau on 10 February and the second under Colonel 
Hawtrey, he thought, might be kept at Sherghati to protect 
the areas of Bihar north of Palamau. True., thousands of 
barkandazes could be recruited, but Neave had little confid­
ence in such a corps, especially after Captain Matby's ex­
perience of their conduct, and after their desertion while 
fighting on the raja's side. (The tribal levy of the raja 
had first refused to fire and then fled and the non-tribal 
followers were surprised by a body of 5,000 insurgents, in­
cluding 1,000 Ashrafs (respectable men or small jagirdars),
p
armed with matchlocks, and 25 horsemen with spears).
At such a critical juncture, Lambert learnt with 
dismay that there was no disposable force at Dinapur and 
that the 64th N.I. was only due to arrive there after a 
fortnight,^ so from Gaya he went to Sherghati and conferred 
with Neave and Lt.Col, Hawtrey of the 3rd Light Cavalry on 
16 February. It was then decided that Hawtrey should march 
with the remaining squadron of his regiment to pargana 
Tori. This squadron would then remain there and that under
1. Neave took a certain pleasure in pointing out that had 
his request for the aid of Captain Angelo's forces been 
met, the danger could already have been averted: Neave to 
Lambert, 12 Feb. 1832, B. C. 1362/54225.
2. Neave to Lambert, 14 Feb. 1832, Postscript, Ibid.
3. Brigadier General O'Halloran to Lambert, 16 Feb. 1932, 
Ibid.
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It. Drummond would stay in Palamau until instructions came 
from the special commissioners. It was hoped that the road 
to Tikoo from Sherghati, a distance of 56 miles to the south, 
could thus he kept open for carrying supplies for Impey's 
detachment at Tikoo and Wilkinson1s headquarters at PitoriaJ 
Lambert, more over, requested the G-overnment to sanction the 
further requisition of troops from Benares and Dinapur.
On 16 February the special (joint) commissioners 
at Pitoria instructed the officer commanding the 3rd light 
cavalry that the squadron under Drummond, which had proceeded 
to Palamau, should remain as near to the Tissa Ghat as pos­
sible so that he could easily join the right column of the
2force at Lohardugga. But when that very day they heard from 
Neave that the insurgents had further penetrated into Palamau, 
they asked Hawtrey to proceed to Palamau to "attack and slay 
the insurgents."*'
On the basis of these instructions from the Patna 
commissioner and the joint commissioners, Neave requested 
Hawtrey to proceed first to Tori where the conditions were 
worst. He wrote, "your being in that Pergunnah will keep 
open our communication with Tikoo. You will be able to com­
municate with Lieutt. Drummond in Palamow, and you will
likewise be near at hand, should your assistance be required
4to the southward."
1. Lambert to Govt., 16 Feb. 1832, Ibid.
2. Jt.Commissioners to Hawtrey, 16 Peb. 1832, Ibid.
3# Ibid. Postscript.
4. Neave to Hawtrey, 17 Feb. 1832, B.C.1362/54225.
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When Hawtrey with his squadron left Sherghati for 
Tori, Neave realized that the protection of the former place 
and of the areas adjoining it was also necessary, and he 
wrote to the commissioner asking that "a requisition for some 
further aid he made, from whatever quarter you may suggest;
1 should think two companies of Infantry would be sufficient 
for the purpose. He stated further that Tori was in tur­
moil, while Palamau was tranquil, but he was not sure 
whether the tranquillity in Palamau would last: "There has 
been nothing so prominent in the whole of this business as 
the singular variation of affairs daily, nay hourly, so that 
it has happened, that I was signing a letter of congratula­
tion on the apparent approach of tranquillity I have received 
intelligence of reverses and fresh disturbances* We must
not therefore too highly estimate this peaceful state of 
Palamow." This was to prove a truly prophetic utterance 1 
On 18 February, Hawtrey and his squadron entered 
Tori pargana, leaving Drummond to ensure the continued tran­
quillity of Palamau* Three days later Neave was told by the 
Baja of Kunda, twelve miles west of Chatra, that a body of 
insurgents was at the foot of the ghats leading from his 
estate*., to Palamau on the west. But neither he nor Drummond 
was able to secure further information as the scoundrelly 
sheristadar at Leslieganj had set Drummond and the jagirdars
1. Neave to Lambert, 17 Feb. 1832, Para.2, Ibid.
2 Ibid Para 5
3! Heave to Lambert, 21 Peb. 1832, B.C. 1362/54225.
Also see Lambert to Neave, 22 Peb. 1832, Ibid.
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1
at odds and had prevented any news getting through to him.
Neave was thus still reporting Palamau calm when insurgents
had entered the pargana and driven Drummondfs forces hack.
The check to Drummond^ squadron had occurred on
the 22nd. He had received information the previous evening
of insurgents plundering Satbarwa, eleven miles south of
Leslieganj, and six miles east of Palamau, and had despatched
a hody of troops under Lieutenant Marsh against them. On
the morning of the 22nd Marsh found them in the open, and
2
charging, easily dispersed them. But during the pursuit a 
further hody of insurgents, this time six or seven thousand 
strong, was discovered, and it was soon seen that they were 
heading for the Chitma pass with the ohvious intention of 
cutting off the retreat of the troops to camp. As the troops 
were entrapped in a hollow surrounded hy immense hills and 
impenetrable jungle, they were obliged to force the ghat.
The cavalry found itself helpless, faced with a shower of 
arrows, matchlocks and other missiles from all sides against 
which the troops could do nothing in reply because all their 
ammunitions had been spent. Consequently one jamadar, one 
sepoy and two horses were killed and one Naik, three sepoys 
and six horses wounded.^
1. Neave to Jt.Commissioners, 28 Apl. 1832, Para.3i,
B.C. 1363/45228.
2. H.Drummond to Neave, 22 Peb. 1832, B.C.1362/54225. 
According to 'A loyal jageerdarf close to the camp, 28 
Peb. 1832, Bengal Hurkaru, 13 March 1832, this encounter 
took place on 21 February and the number of the insur­
gents was 8 to 10,000 in Goles of 1,5000 to 2,000 each.
3. Drummond to Neave, 22 Peb. 1*832, B.C. 1362/54225.
Drummond hurried from Leslieganj with the remaining 
forces as soon as he heard about the reverse and covered 
the advanced party in its retreat* Back in camp the officers 
unanimously decided in a council that the ghat on the road 
to Sherghati should be instantly passed to prevent a 
similar ambush and to secure communications with Sherghati* 
Drummond wrote to Neave that as it was impossible to con­
tend against such a superior insurgent force, he thought it 
useless to remain at Leslieganj* He, therefore, requested 
immediate re-inforcements so that he could proceed to Sher­
ghati with his cavalry. If the relief did not come, he 
warned, he would proceed in forced marches without it.'*’
Neave*s response was to set out next day, 24 Feb­
ruary, from Sherghati with 50 men of the late Patna Pro­
vincial battalion and about 200 men armed with matchlocks.
He joined Drummond*s detaohment at Manatu, 16 kos south of
p
Sherghati and 8 north of Leslieganj. That same day Lathurna 
and other villages south of Leslieganj were destroyed, and 
then Leslieganj itself. On the 25th the squadron pushed on 
as far as the burning villages near Turhasi, but found no­
body.^ On the 27th a further 50 provincial sepoys and 
irregular barkandazes arrived from Sherghati.
The reverse suffered by Marsh had shown that cavalry 
could not with safety operate alone - Hawtrey, when moving
1. Ibid.
2. tambert to Govt., 25 Feb. 1832, B.C.1362/54225.
3. Lambert to Govt., 27 Feb. 1832, Ibid.
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into Tori, had asked for a small detachment of infantry to
1
be placed at his disposal -and also suggested that the 
Bengal Government's expressed dislike of the splitting up
of the cavalry forces into small detachments was well
2
founded. But more important still, the reverse emphasized 
the necessity for carrying the jagirdars with the Company 
and so securing timely intelligence and the cooperation of 
those who knew the country-side. The most important service 
rendered by Neave was to expose the criminal folly of the 
sheristadar and qanungo of Leslieganj, to get rid of them, 
and so to secure the cooperation of the jagirdar once more. 
That done the Palamau insurrection came speedily to an end* 
The second phase of unrest in Palamau had been 
largely confined to the Mankiari and Manka parganas, where 
the local tribesmen had been led by Chamar Singh of Bariatu, 
Hukum Singh and Haril Singh of Jer and a few others.-^  After
1. Lt.Col. Hawtrey to Jt.Commissioners, 18 Peb, 1832, Ibid*
2. The Bengal Government had disliked the splitting of 
Captain Angelo’s 3rd Light cavalry into two, and they 
had demanded an explanantion from Neave* (Govt* to Neave, 
14 Peb. 1832, Bengal Cro. Judl* Cons. 37 of 14 Peb. 1832
/140n. When they got the detailed explanation from Neave 
' p  (Neave to Govt., 27 Peb. 1832, B.C. 1362/54224) they 
thanked him for his exertions, and cleared him from the 
charge of having misguidedly directed Captain Maltby's 
change of route, but he was found to have frustrated, 
though not wilfully, the intention of the Government to 
effect an early junction of troops. (Govt, to Neave,
6 March 1832, Ibid.) (Already on 27 February they had 
drawn the attention of the Joint Commissioners to Mthe 
cavalry in Palamau and Toree being without Infantry, and 
the Infantry in Tamar without cavalry.” B.C.1362/54225.)
3. Neave to Jt .Commissioners, 28 Apl. 1832, Para.3E,
B.C.1363/54228.
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Neave rs junction with. Drummond the Kols from outside the 
area returned to Chota-Nagpur, declaring that they had 
borne the brunt of the two battles at Chitma and Lat-ehar and 
that at Leslieganj the Cheros and Kharwars, the local 
tribesmen, alone had perpetrated the depredations* So long 
as the kols were in the area, the local tribesmen were 
encouraged to action and felt free to enact any ghastly 
scene in their name* After the withdrawal of the Kols, how­
ever, that support and that alibi were alike lost, while 
most of the leaders, who were the brains behind these out­
rages, were captured by the troops*
The return of Colonel Hawtrey to the support of 
Drummond on 27 February and the arrival of the advance guard 
of the 64th, and then of Lt.Col.Hamilton with the other 
five companies of the 64th on 5 March,^ completed the 
covering and pacification of Palamau.
The strengthening of Neave*s hand in Palamau in part 
had been achieved by a weakening of control over Tori*
Before the arrival of Hawtrey*s squadron Tori had been ftin
p
a state of complete disorganisation" with villages burned, 
roads blocked, and all travellers without exception 
plundered. "All the well-affected inhabitants south of this 
[camp Bariatu] had fled, and their villages were destroyed"*
1. Lambert to Govt., 6 March 1832, B.C.1362/54225.
2. Neave to Lambert, 23 Feb. 1832, Ibid*
3. Hawtrey to Jt.Commissioners, 23 Feb. 1832, Ibid.
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Col.Hawtrey, on his arrival in the pargana on 25 Pebruary, 
had achieved one notable success by surprising the insurg­
ents at Balunagar where f having plundered the villages of 
Charu and Bora the night before, they were celebrating with 
a feast of two fine bullocks. As a correspondent of the 
Bengal Hurkaru put it "The cavalry dropped in 'quite pro­
miscuously1 which so astonished 'my host1 and his friends 
that they completely lost all etiquette of polite­
ness."^ About 40 or 50 of the insurgents were cut up in the 
2
attack. "The only casualties on our side in this affair," 
wrote Hawtrey, "were two horses wounded and it is with great 
regret I add, that one of our spies was killed, and another 
severely wounded, having been mistaken for enemies by our 
own m e n . B u t  the good effect of this vigorous action was 
largely undone by Hawtrey fs return to Palamau, after the 
defeat of Marsh's detachment. Two companies of the 50th N.I. 
with one six-pounder, which had joined Hawtrey stayed on at 
Jalera after his withdrawal,^ but their presence was not 
enough to overawe the insurgents after the cavalry had with­
drawn. Consequently before Lt.Col. Hamilton, who arrived at 
Sherghati on 5 March with the remaining five companies of
5
the 64th N.I. and two six-pounders from outside, reached 
Tori early in March, the mischief in that pargana was over.
1. fA loyal Jageedar*, 28 Peb. 1832, Bengal Hurkaru,
13 March 1832.
2. Hawtrey to Wilkinson, 25 Peb, 1832, B.C.1362/54225.
3. Hawtrey to Jt.Commissioners, 26 Peb. 1832, Ibid.
4. Jt.Commissioners to Hawtrey, 3 March 1832, Ihid.
5. Lambert to Govt,, 6 March 1832, Ibid.
Several humdred villages were laid waste and the major 
portion of the pargana fell a prey to the insurgents1 
wrath.^
With the main bodies of insurgents dispersed, troops 
arriving in considerable numbers, and the inhabitants of 
Palamau and Tori thereby reassured, the next task was to re­
establish the civil administration and to enquire into the 
causes of the disturbance. It was not easy for the Calcutta 
authorities to decide how best this might be done. Neave 
had already impressed upon them, in a report of 14 Pebruary, 
that the Special Commissioners in Chota-Nagpur had not the 
means to deal with the situation in Palamau, They had, 
therefore, authorised Lambert, the Patna commissioner, ,fto 
exercise with regard to that tract and to confide to Mr.
Neave at your discretion, the same powers that have been
entrusted to these officers [Cuthbert and Wilkinson] in
2
suspension of the ordinary Regulations.1 To that course 
the joint commissioners had agreed, asking Lambert either 
himself to exercise or to depute some other person to exer- 
cise special civil powers in Palamau. Accordingly Lambert 
asked the Government to appoint Robert Trotter as Register 
of the Ramgarh court with special powers, and to sanction 
his acting as Magistrate of Ramgarh if Neave had to go to
1.R.Trotter to Lambert, 7 May 1832, B.C,1363/54228.
2. Govt, to Lambert, 20 (incorrectly written as 29) Peb.
1832, Beng.Cr.Judl, Cons. 12 of 21 Peb. 1832 /140\
' V
3. Jt.Commissioners to Lambert, 29 Peb. 1832, B.C.1363/54228.
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Palamau.
It seemed likely at the end of February that Neave*s
presence would be required in Palamau, for despite the
steady assembly of troops there, to restore the situation
after Marsh*s retreat, great alarm had been raised in Kunda,
2
Nabinagar and Che chari of more insurgent attacks impending.
On 6 March the Bengal Government appointed Trotter as 
register with special powers,^ while Lambert directed Neave 
that "in the event of the disturbances again breaking out in 
the pergunnah, you will proceed thither, and exercise there 
the same powers that have been entrusted to the special 
commissioners in suspension of the ordinary Regulations." ^ 
(He made it clear, of course, that according to the orders 
of the Government of 13 February the direction of the mili­
tary force in the whole of the disturbed parts of Ramgarh 
would be re taine d by the j o int c ommi s s i one rs#)
Neavef however, objected to the instruction that 
he should take charge of Palamau only if a fresh outbreak 
should occur, for he held that it was essential to hold a 
prompt enquiry and enforce immediate punishment upon those
5
found guilty. Lambert put his case to the joint commission­
1. Lambert to Govt., 28 Feb. 1832, B.C.1362/54225,
Lambert tc Govt., 29 Feb. 1832. Ibid. and
Lambert to Govt., 5 March 1832, E.C.1363/54228.
2o Lambert to Govt., I March 1832, B.C.1362/54225.
Khirodar Sahi, jagirdar of Che chari, to Ramgarh Magt., 
N.D., Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 84 of 13 March 1832 ^140^
3. Govt, to Lambert, 6 March 1832, B.C.1362/54225#
4. Lambert to Neave, 5 MarcliS^B.C. 1363/54228.
5. Neave to Lambert, 7 March 1832, B.C.1363/54228.
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ers, asking that in the event of their heing unable to con­
duct the necessary enquiries in Palamau, Neave might be 
authorized to make them.'1' The Patna commissioner was the 
readier to press this because the alternative seemed likely 
to be that he himself would have to conduct the enquiry, 
whereas his own plan was to return to Patna and go on a 
month*s leave. (On 12 March the joint commissioners had 
written impressing upon him the particular desirability of
the presence of a senior officer in Palamau to institute
2
enquiries into the horrible drama lately there enacted. On 
the very same day Lambert had written to Calcutta to explain 
that, with the return of peace to Palamau and the appoint­
ment of an officer in the Commissariat Department to take 
over the duty of furnishing supplies to the troops, Mmy 
residence at this station for the purpose of affording 
instructions and superintendence to the Acting Magistrate 
will probably be shortly no longer requisite."^) When, 
therefore, he received the Government’s sanction for 
Trotter*s acting magistracy, Lambert lost no time in asking 
Neave to proceed without delay to Palamau and there to con­
duct the necessary enquiries into the outbreak, reminding 
him that his special powers should only be exercised "in 
cases in which persons may be found in open resistance to
1. Lambert to Jt .Commissioners, 8 March 1832, Beng.Cr. Judl. 
Cons. 93 of 13 March 1832 /140>
5 }
2, Jt.Commissioners to Lambert, 12 March 1832,
B.C.1363/54228.
3* Lambert to Govt., 12 March 1832, B.C.1362/54225•
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the civil power, and in which the emergency may he such as 
to render necessary the employment of prompt and vigorous 
measures, hut not in cases in which the offenders may with­
out detriment to the public interests be left to be disposed 
of under the ordinary rules for the administration of 
justice. Towards the end of March then Neave set off for 
Palamau and Lambert for Patna, the latter sending to Calcutta 
a long explanation of the good reasons for his returning
p
there and the zeal which prompted him to do so. (It did not 
save him from Government fs reproof for not having delayed 
his departure from Sherghati till the troops* return indi­
cated the restoration of complete tranquillity, and till he 
had obtained their permission).^
While these complicated manoevers were taking place 
among the civil officials, in preparation for an enquiry 
into the disturbances and restoration of the administration, 
there were further military alarms* Pour companies of infant­
ry with one field piece had been despatched from the right 
aolumn operating from Tikoo, and two other companies came 
up from Patna to Sherghati to join Hawtrey*s cavalry. The
joint commissioners rightly held that this should be suf-
4
ficient to deal with the insurrection in Palamau* But
alarming reports now came in from Raja Khirodar Sahi of
1. Lambert to Neave, 15 March 1832* B.C.1363/54228.
2* Lambert to Govt., 2 Apl. 1832, Paras.2 to 9, B.C.1362/ 
54225*
3* Govt, to Lambert, 17 Apl. 1832, Para.2, Ibid.
4* Jt .Commissioners to Hawtrey, commanding in Palamau,
27 Peb. 1832, Ibid.
Che chari, near Barwa pargana, stating that he was surrounded 
hy insurgents and in imminent danger of attack."*" The 
thanadar of Guran, in Palamau, also reported that three 
hundred Kharwars and Cheros, calling themselves Kols, had 
plundered the malik (proprietor) of Sipua [Supa?] near 
Udaipur.2 Col. Hawtrey also reported several thousand in­
surgents assembled near Barwap These reports seem, if not 
false, to have been much exaggerated - Major Blackall 
wrote that he thought the raja had "not yet recovered from 
the panic with which he was seized on the insurrection 
first breaking out."^ Certainly when Hawtrey set out on 17 
March with infantry of the 64th to try and surprise the
insurgents they failed to make contact and reported that no
5
further operations at Barwa and Chechari were necessaiy.
By that date, too, Tori was quiet, and the communications 
between Tikoo and Sherghati via Tori had been completely 
re stored.
When, therefore, Neave reached Latehar in Palamau 
at the end of March he was able to proceed with his invest­
igation of the causes of the outbreak. He showed, however, 
very firm pre-conceived notions of what ought to be done 
with the insurgents. Thus on 29 March, almost as soon as he
1. Hawtrey to Jt.Commissioners, 18 March 1832, and its 
enclosure, Ibid.
2. Lambert to GSFTf., 12 March 1832, Ibid.
3* Hawtrey to Jt.Commissioners, 9 LozHTJ March 1832, Ibid.
4.Major Blackall to Jt. Commissioners, 22 March 1832/ Ibid.
5. Lt.Col. Hawtrey to Jt.Commissioners, 18 March 1832,"T|Td.
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had arrived, he wrote to the Government to express his 
opinion that the tribal people of this area had become 
reckless because they had been treated with levity after 
their previous risings in 1801 and 1817. He thought that 
"until some of the insurgents especially those who have been 
actively engaged in bloodshed, suffer on the spot, no suf­
ficiently effectual example for the purpose of prevention 
1
can be made," He suggested, therefore, that Col.Hawtrey 
might be joined with him "in a commission to punish at dis­
cretion, save extending to life and death, all persons who 
may have been proved to have been concerned in the rising, 
and extending to life and death where the person may be
p
proved to have been a leader or to have committed murder."
Such attitudes did not meet with any support from 
the Bengal Government - their main concern was with the re­
establishment of tranquillity. They, therefore, recommended 
lenience and the pardoning as far as possible of all off­
ences committed in the heat of the insurrection. All plun­
dered property had, of course, to be restored to its right­
ful owners, but the trial of the ringleaders and those 
accused of murder should take place according to the normal 
regulation procedure. "It is not deemed necessary", they 
told Neave, "to form any special Commission, or to confer




any extraordinary powers for this purpose*
This check to any vengeful spirit in the civilian
officials was paralleled, it may he noted, hy one given to
the military hy the joint commissioners, a little earlier in
the month* The occasion for their rehuke had heen an attack
upon a village near Bariatu in Tori hy It*Burt, in which he
had taken ten persons, seventy three hows, seven goats and
2
a quantity of grain. The commissioners, pointing out that 
now that the area was peaceful such actions were the respon­
sibility of the police, ordered Burt to release the persons
•a
forthwith and to restore their cattle and grain. Trotter 
later repeated their censure of Burt, pointing out that the
4
action was quite contrary to established regulations.
Early in April it became clear that Palamau and the 
surrounding areas had heen pacified. Naturally therefore 
consultations began between the civil and the military auth­
orities for the withdrawal of the majority of troops which 
had heen employed there. Lt.Col. Hawtrey wrote to the joint 
oommis si oners on 6 April suggesting that two companies of 
Infantry would he sufficient to prevent the recurrence of 
any disturbances in Palamau. As Neave also thought they 
would he sufficient the joint commissioners agreed to retain 
two companies of the 64th and directed Hawtrey to return his
1. Govt, to Neave, 7 Apl. 1832, Para.6, B.C.1363/54228.
2. It.Burt to Jt.Commissioners, 22 March 1832,
B.C.1362/54225.
3* Jt.Commissioners to Burt, 27 March 1832, Ibid.
4. Trotter to Burt, 9 Apl. 1832, B.C.1363/54‘??H7
5. Hawtrey to Jt.Commissioners, 6 Apl. 1832, Ibid.
forces to cantonment*
Neave* s proposal that some troops should he stat­
ioned at Satbarwa and Latchar, though reluctantly agreed to 
1
by Wilkinson, was turned down by the Government, and for 
the very reason which had made Wilkinson hesitate - a con­
viction that "regular troops ought not to be frittered away
2
in the manner proposed by Mr* Neave." A civil force, they 
thought, might be stationed at Leslieganj and other places 
in Palamau. (They had already informed Neave that he had 
to look to the joint commissioners for guidance.)^
Prom the middle of April Lt*Col* Hamilton, command­
ing the 64th Regt. N.I., began to press hard for the early 
withdrawal of the troops under him.^ As Neave also thought 
that Palamau did not require troops any longer, Wilkinson 
raised no objection to the move, particularly as sickness 
had broken out in the detachment. But about Tori there was 
a difference of opinion. Though it was apparently tranquil, 
both Trotter and ^t.Col.Burt saw signs of intrigues by the
7
landholders and some of the police officers. On the other 
hand, both Wilkinson and Neave saw no reason why Lt*Burt*s
1. Jt.Commissioners to Hawtrey, 10 Apl. 1832, Ibid.
Also see Wilkinson to Neave, 20 Apl.1832, Ibid.
2. Govt, to Jt.Commissioners (Dent and Wilkinson),'
1 May 1832, Ibid.
3. Govt, to Neave, 12 Apl. 1832, Ibid.
4. Lt.Col.Hamilton to Jt.Commissioners, 15 Apl.1832, Ibid.
5. Neave to Hamilton, 15 Apl. 1832, Ibid.
6. Wilkinson to Hamilton, 28 Apl. I8‘j2, ‘I M d ,
. Also see Lt.Col. Hamilton to Neave, 28 Apl. 1832, Ibid.
7* Trotter to Burt, 12 Apl. 1832, Ibid.
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detachment should he continued there. However, when early
in May Captain Malthy moved with his detachment from Tori
2to Chatra on his way to Sherghati, reports came through 
the joint commissioners about the assembling of armed bodies 
of men in Tori. Trotter also learnt about this development 
from a respectable person of the area named Radna Krishna 
Chaudhuri . This was really an alarming report, and it was 
conveyed forth-with to the Patna Commissioner and through 
him to the Government. Maltby^ further progress was halted 
at Chatra. Maltbyrs thorough enquiries showed, however, that 
the reports of unrest were a hoax, and had been occasioned
A
by a private feud.
The Government, therefore, on Lambertfs recommenda­
tion, sanctioned the maintenance of an extra police force 
in Tori and asked the special commissioners to take charge 
of the pargana.^  When that had been done Malthy set off 
again with his detaohment from Chatra, thus completing the 
withdrawal of the military force from the area, to the great 
satisfaction of the Government.^
1. Wilkinson to Trotter, 15 Apl. and 20 Apl. 1832, Ibid. 
Also see Neave to Hamilton, 15 Apl. 1832, Ibid.
and Hamilton to Neave, 28 Apl. 1832, Ibid.
2. Trotter to Lambert, 7 May 1832, Ibid,
3. Trotter to Capt. Maltby, 6 May 1832, Ibid.
4. Maltby to Trotter, 10 May 1832, Ibid.
Trotter to Maltby, 11 May 1832, Ibid,
Lambert to Govt., 13 May 1832, Ibid.
5. Govt, to Jt. Commissioners, 15 May 1832, Ibid.
6. Lambert to Govt,, 17 May^Ibid.
Also see Govt.^to Lambeft, 22 May 1832, Ibid,
Cho ta-Nagpur i -
It is time now to turn again to the situation in
Chota-Nagpur proper, where in January Wilkinson1s force had
checked but certainly not ended the disorders. As an account
in the East India Magazine put it, Wilkinson1 s force was
"too weak to enable him to act offensively, and he could
only maintain his position at a place named Pathoraeh
[Pitoria]".^
At the end of January the first reinforcements
reached Chota-Nagpur - a company of the 2nd N.I., a hundred
strong, under Capt. Maltby from Dinapur, together with a
body of horsemen and barkandazes recruited by Neave, who
went from Tori up the ghats to Tikoo, where they arrived on
the 30th. Prom their arrival in the hills skirmishes began.
On 1 February Maltbyfs camp was surrounded by some four
thousand insurgents. They fled out of range when he moved
out of camp, but the cavalry - an army with which they were
unfamiliar- overtook and cut down 50 or 60 of them. After
this the troops advanced unopposed to Churia. Their baggage
hackeries (carts) were set upon, however, and it required
another attack to get them through. Only on 4 February did
2the whole force join Wilkinson at Pitoria.
Cuthbert had meanwhile joined Wilkinson and had 
been dismayed to find how circumscribed was the area -under
1. East India Magazine. July 1832.
2. dTTOommissloners to* Govt., 16 Nov. 1832, Para.31,
B.C.1502/58891.
the Company's control. Wilkinson's force held the town of 
Pitoria, and a few neighbouring villages. Lai Jit Nath 
Sahi of Gujnu, with some barkandazes from Pitoria, held his 
own villages in the pargana of Anaaidanda to the north-east 
and had beaten off several attacks - and further reinforced 
was to repel yet another on 8 February, - while his relation 
Kapil Nath of Salgi had also done well.1 But all the rest 
of the countryside was in the hands of the insurgents.
The arrival of cavalry quickly produced a change in
that situation* Regular infantry had proved ineffective -
as Maltby wrote to Neave, "without some good cavalry, we can
2
make but little of the Coles. They run faster than we can." 
When the ground was suitable, however, cavalry were able to 
inflict heavy losses. On 2 February the cavalry caught a 
large body of Kols in the open at Tikoo and cut them up 
most effectively. Maltby reported, "a few of the suwars 
behaved also in the noblest manner, and it is them chiefly 
that the loss which the insurgents received is due."*^  Next 
day irregular cavalry with Wilkinson at Pitoria did similar 
execution. Wilkinson had heard of the insurgents• advance
1. Ibid, Para.32: The Joint Commissioners spoke highly of 
the two zamindars: "They are the only Jageedars of all 
Nagpoor proper who made a manful stand against the In­
surgents. The latter of the two after maintaining his 
ground for two or three days was at last overpowered by 
numbers and had three of his brothers and several of his 
followers killed only two days previous to Captain 
Matlby's arrival at Teekoo."
2. Maltby to Neave, 2 Feb, 1832, B.C. 1362/54224-.
3. Maltby to Captain Penny, Adj. General, 2 Feb. 1832, Ibid.
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from Chutia, and had moved out against them. The Kols fled 
from his infantry hut were pursued hy the irregular horse
i  commanded hy Mitra Bhan Singh, and suffered at least a
I 11 score killed.
ii
j Wilkinson thereupon wrote to the Adjutant-General
i
| to point the moral - that without more cavalry or irregular
I
| horse it would he impossible "to make any very severe
! example" of the insurgents. It must he confessed that the
cavalry he had with him did not always come up to scratch.
i
On 5 February Malthy wrote impatiently of the failure of the
sawars to use their opportunities: "We could at different
times have killed hundreds of them if our cavalry had dared
to advance, hut they are afraid to go near to Kholes, who
[when] they are in bodies they drive readily enough at the
stragglers, hut never when there ia any chance of 
■a
opposition.But Captain Impey at Tikoo was anxious for 
more cavalry, and the Bengal Government also struck the same 
note in their instructions to the joint commissioners: "It 
is the opinion of the Vice President in Council that Cavalry,
j 1 1 1  ■ ^  . ii
1. Cuthhert to Captain Ponnyy-Aflj.— Gonoralr 2 Feb. 1832, Ibid.
2. Wilkinson to Adj.General, 4 Feb. 1832, Ibid.
A letter from 'A Khol Killer1 in the Bengal Hurkaru,
29 Feb, 1832, emphasised the value of cavalry: "Ihe 
cavalry (we had with us a troop of the 3d light cavalry) 
proved far more serviceable than Infantry, as the poor 
wretches trust more to their heels than to their bows and 
battle-axes; they indeed run with surprising swiftness;
I have known a body of 1500 or 2000 men come down with a 
few hundred yards of the camp, flourishing their swords 
and battle-axes and cutting the most extraordinary 
capers; but on a small party of cavalry and a company of 
Infantry being sent to meet them, they made off at a 
rate which set all pursuit at defiance."
3* Maltby to Acting Magt,, Ramgarh, 5 Feb. 1832,
B.C.1362/54224.
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if they can he fed, will he of the greatest use in subduing 
the insurrection.
The possibility of securing more cavalry depended, 
however, not so much upon the willingness of the Adjutant- 
General to furnish them as upon the power of the Chota- 
Nagpur authorities to keep them supplied. The arrival of
the 50th N.I. at Sherghati - less two OLompanies directed hy
2
Neave to Chass - had cleared the great Benares road and had 
so re-opened the communications with Calcutta - hut this 
did little to improve the supply position. That had so far 
deteriorated, indeed, that on 4 February Neave had to re­
quest the commander of the 3rd Light Cavalry to halt at 
Sasaram, in Shahabad district. "Although I do not doubt 
that your presence here would materially tend to suppress 
the insurrection, " Neave explained, "yet the extreme diffi­
culty there is and will be of furnishing so large a body of 
cavalry with necessaries (for every article must be sent 
from here [Sherghati] in consequence of the rebels having 
completely ravaged the country) induce me to refrain from 
calling into this country more troops than are absolutely
1. Govt, to Jt.Commissioners, 10 Feb. 1832, Para.2,
B.C.1362/54224.
2. The Bengal Government objected to this dispersion of 
forces: "A military force when ordered on a duty of this 
nature should not be weakened and rendered inefficient
by being broken up into small and detached bodies." (Govt* 
to Lambert, 7 Feb. 1832, Para.3, Ibid. But they recognized 
Neavefs zeal, and blamed Lambert, the Patna Commissioner, 
for not supervising that young and inexperienced officer. 
Lambert, they said, had not "taken the lead which was to 
have been expected from the high office" which he held.
(Ibid. Para„5*)
necessary. (To Lambert, the Patna Commissioner, he
explained, "If is with the greatest difficulty I am enabled
to supply the troops at present marching to Nagpore, the
arrival of this corps would perhaps reduce me to greater 
2
straits.1 Wilkinson, too, was experiencing great difficulty 
in obtaining supplies of any kind at Pitoria because all the 
supplies had fallen into the possession of or had been des- 
troyed by the insurgents* Neave had been spending heavily 
to secure supplies for Wilkinson - he reported to Lambert 
on 29 January the advancing of Hs.3,500 to the Chattdhftries 
and other officials for this purpose. Subsequently, when 
defending the halting of the 3rd Cavalry at Sasaram, Neave 
wrote, ,!The providing of grain and other food for so large 
a body of men and horses formed another objection to the 
employing of this force, unless in a case of necessity, when 
it is considered that at present I have been obliged to 
entertain an establishment solely for the conveyance of 
grain and other supplies into Nagpore, costing several 
thousand rupees monthly, the increase necessary for the 
virtually three more squadrons of cavalry with their follow­
ers may be imagined.11^
Meanwhile the road b&wcen Chass and Hazaribagh was 
still infested by insurgents and there was great alarm,
1. Neave to Col.Hawtrey, 4 Peb, 1832, Ibid.
2. Neave to Lambert, 4 Peb. Para.2. Ibid.
3. Neave to Govt., 28 Jan. 1832, Beng.Ur.Judl. Cons. 68 of
31 Jan. 1832 ^140)
4. Neave to Lambert, 9 Peb. 1832, Para.5. B.C.1362/54224*
especially after the daroga c-f Chass had reported large
numbers assembling on the Patkum frontiers.^* In the Churia
area, again, the Kols were very active. Their population
in that area was very dense, so that large numbers could be
assembled at a moment!s notice, and they had in Buddhu
Bhagat of Silligaon a leader with very great influence over 
2
them, * Moreover they knew intimately a countryside which 
was very well adapted to guerilla warfare, while the 
officers of the Companyfs forces, without adequate maps, and 
no previous knowledge of the passes and jungle, were often 
completely at a loss: "so little was known of its topography 
that when the troops marched out of the beaten path scarcely
a soul knew where he w a s   In consequence of the want of
this necessary knowledge, the troops ... were frequently 
marched and counter-marched very unnecessarily."^ The result 
was that even when the Kols were engaged it was often im­
possible to close with them effectively.
Troops continued to arrive, however. Prom Benares 
the six companies of the 50th N.I. marched in under Captain
A
Impey and a troop of the 3rd Light Cavalry reached Tikoo.
On 11 February two companies of the 54th N.I. and a brigade
1. Capt.Angelo to Neave, 6 Peb. 1832, Ibid. Also see Martin,
Asstt, Magt., Jungle Mahals, to Neave, 8 Peb. 1832. Ibid.
2. Jt.Commissioners to officer commanding 50th N.I., o Teb. 
1832, Para.3, Ibid.: It was confidently expected that 
his death or seizure would soon lead to the pacification 
of the area,
3. Spry, Modern India, 1837» I, 117.
4. Jt,Commissioners to Govt., 16 Nov, 1832, Para.34,
B.C.1502/58891.
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of guns arrived and Col. Bowen of the 34th N.I. was directed 
on 9 February to turn aside from his march from Barrackpur 
to Bankura into Tamar, Bundu and the other dependent 
parganas of Chota-Nagpur bordering on the Jungle Mahals.
With these re-inforcements it was .possible to restore order 
in the northern and central parganas.^  After Captain Impey 
had inflicted heavy losses on the insurgents near Tikoo, a 
body of some 4,000 of them threw down their arms and 
surrendered to him on 10 February. (They had been promised
p
mercy if they did so. ) The prisoners taken on the 10th 
were nearly all lost on the march to Churia during a hail­
storm so violent as to throw the 3rd Cavalry into complete 
confusion,*^ but on the 13th that loss was more than made 
good by a successful attack on Buddhu Bhagat at Silligaon. 
impey surrounded the village with four companies of infantry 
and his troop of cavalry, and then attacked the village. The 
insurgents made a stubborn resistance. "We here found”,
rv
wrote a Newspaper correspondent, "a set of men very different 
from our Tikoo friends."^ In the face of bullets they stood 
firm like a rock. As Major Sutherland noted, "The Buggutfs 
[Bhagat's] family and followers stood up like men round
their aged chiefs but what chance has the bow and arrow
1. Bui, as Metcalfe admitted in his private letter to Ben- 
tinck, 19 Feb. 1832, ”no impression has yet been made on 
the insurrection in Chota-Nagpoor:" Bentinck MS., Box 17. 
He further referred to "the helplessness and dismay in all 
places without troops:" Ibid.
2. An officer, Bengal Hurkaru, 25 Feb, 1832, Also see 
Capt.Impey to Neave, 11 Feb. 1832, B.C.1362/54224.
3. Capt. Impey to Jt.Commissioners, 12 Feb. 1832, Ibid.
4. "A !Khol-Killer1, Bengal Hurkaru, 29 Feb, 1832.
against a round of musketry or the Cole battle-axe against 
the pistol and sabres of our t r o o p e r s ! T h e old leader
2
thus perished with his brother, sons and a hundred followers*
i
As two other attacks were made the same day by Captain 
Maltbyrs forces on the villages of Deori Nagri^ and Gari,
17 miles south-west and 12 miles south-east of Pitoria, in 
which despite a stubborn resistance^ by the Kols, consider^ 
able losses were inflicted upon them, the insurgents1 spirit 
was for the moment broken, "The good effects arising from 
Buddoo Buggutrs death are already visible, as the chiefs 
of many Khole [Kol] villages have come in and tendered their
1. Major Sutherland to Govt,, N.D., B.C.1363/54227.
2. Some accounts put it at 200 and 350: Impey to Jt,Commis­
sioners, 18 Peb, 1832, B.C.1362/54224; A 'Khol-Killer1, 
Bengal Hurkaru, 29 Peb. 1832, The death of Buddhu Bhagat 
was described' by a correspondent in Pitoria camp in his 
letters to the Bengal Hurkaru, 21 Peb. 1832. He wrote with 
rather unpleasant satisfaction of the "jolly good drubbing" 
given to the Kols, though a close inspection of the results 
seems to have been less agreeable: "I have to [at] this 
instant seen the heads of Boodd Bhugghut and his brother 
and his nephew which have been brought^to the Commissions 
ers; how horrid it is to see such sights," Ibid.
3. Dalton in 1872 described Nagri as "a very primitive 
Oraon village" where "songs are sung that remind the 
young men how their fathers fwent out* in 1832":
Ethnology, 172. According to A Subaltern (East Indian
3ournal, j? No. 3, old series, 189) Deori and Nagri were 
two villages about twenty miles from P/itoria.)
4. Maltby reported of the engagement at Gar/i that there 
was hand to hand fighting and the Kols with their 
battle-axes fought desperately:
Captain Maltby to Capt Pasmore, Adj.General, 16 Peb.1832, 
B.C.1362/54224.
submission to the Commissioners,According to an eye­
witness account, the people for 20 miles round Churia sub- 
2mitted. They tendered their submissions through their 
pahans and mahtos in great numbers. The only British failure 
at this period was at Basia. Sahib Singh, a subadar of the 
Ramgarh battalion with a party of 42 sepoys, who had reached 
Basia on 9 February, remained an inactive spectator of the 
Kol atrocities in that area, and the only action in which he 
engaged was a skirmish at Palkote, the residence of the 
maharaja on the 12th in which some 4 or 5 Kols were killed.J
The British success in the north of Chota-Nagpur,
however, did not lead to a surrender by the tribal people of
the western and southern parganas - indeed they showed, said
Major Sutherland, a "power of endurance beyond that which
4exists in most other countries," Resistance continued, 
particularly in Tamar, Sonepur and Barwa, where the inhabi­
tants had carried their corn and cattle into the hills, and 
where the proximity of Singhbhum gave promise of Larka help, 
or of safe refuge in case of a crisis. Against such people 
isolated successes were not enough. The Dhangar Kols, with 
their extraordinary power of concerted action when summoned
1. fA Khol-killer1, Bengal Hurkaru, 29 Feb, 1832,
2. Spry, op.cit. 122. The troops got Rs.1,000 as reward for 
the Bhagat1 s head which was divided among the non-com­
missioned officers and privates. Ibid. 121 .
3. Translated letter, Sahib Singh, 12 Feb. 1832, B.C.1363/ 
54227.
4# Sutherland to G-ovt., N.D., Ibid.
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by their manki, munda or bhsgatf were formidable fighters* 
Moreover, as they became familiar with the destructive 
capacity of firearms and more wary of cavalry attack, it 
became more difficult to inflict any considerable defeat* 
Their scouts and spies quickly passed news of the plans of 
the authorities from circle to circle so that surprise was 
difficult*
To deal with such enemies required patience and 
endurance, and closely coordinated action. That coordination 
was for a while made impossible by the outbreak in Palamau, 
already described, and the consequent division of Hawtrey's 
forces into Palamau and Tori. By 17 February, however, the 
joint commissioners had laid their plans for a concerted 
sweep into the dangerous southern parganas * They divided 
the troops into three columns, the right column being posted 
at Tikoo, the centre at Churia, a village to the eastward 
of Tikoo and between that place and Pitoria, and the left at 
Pitoria.'*’ The right was to move to Palkote, the centre to 
Basia, to the east of Palkote, and the left into the Sonepur 
tract of villages. The officer commanding the right column 
was asked to open communications with the troops in Palamau 
and the left, with which the commissioners themselves pro­
ceeded, was to operate to the eastward as far as the bound­
aries of Tamar and Bundu into which Col.Bowen's force had
1* Jt.Commissioners to Maltbys 17 Feb. 1832, Para.2,
B.C.1362/54224- Also see the enclosed map 'Sketch of 
Chuta Nagpore and its dependencies.*
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"been directed.*** The object underlying this plan was either 
to punish or to conciliate the insurgents as might be nec­
essary, In case of resistance the example of Silligaon 
might be repeated.
On 17 February, Captain Johnson of the 50th N.I., 
who had been detached to Chass to keep open the great 
Benares military road, reached Pitoria with two companies 
of his corps and on the day following marched to Churia 
with his detachment and the brigade of guns which had 
arrived on the 11th, Then in conformity to the general plan 
of operations mentioned above, Captain Johnson with a wing 
of the 50th, one six-pounder, some barkandazes and the 
horses of Mitrajit Singh's contingent, proceeded to Tikoo 
on 19 February, The Midnapur detachment under Captain
K.
Horsb^rough was placed under the general command of Col.
2
Bowen, so as to concert their action in Tamar.
While these movements of troops were taking place 
ready for intensive operations in the last week of February, 
important consultations were being held between the Bengal 
Government and the joint commissioners about the treatment 
of offenders. In case of continued resistance, the Govern­
ment thought, bloodshed was unavoidable. But those who 
submitted without resistance, although guilty in the past,
1. Jt,Commissioners to Capt. Maltby, 17 Feb, 1832, Para,5, 
B.C.1362/54224.
2. Govt, to Asstt. Quarter\Master General of the army,
17 Feb. 1832, Beng.Cr.Jl.Oone. 1 of 21 Feb.1832 /14CK
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were either to be reserved for trial or dismissed with or 
without security for their future good behaviour. The Gov-* 
ernment totally prohibited the practice of offering rewards 
for delivering the insurgent leaders dead or alive, as had 
been done in the case of Buddhu Bhagat.^ (They thought that 
the tone of some of the passages in the letters of instruc­
tions of the commissioners to Captain Impey and Col.Bowen 
was of an objectionable harshness and severity.)^ They also 
issued instructions to the Commissioners to guide them in 
exercising the powers of summary trial and punishment with 
which they had been invested* On 23 February they wrote to 
them to ask whether they had issued proclamations which 
would encourage the people to return to their allegiance, 
and thereby save any further and unnecessary effusion of 
blood.^ Later on they authorized them to offer a full pardon 
to all concerned in the unrest excepting those who had been 
the princiapl instigators or the main perpetrators of crimes. 
Last, but not least, they, ordered the commissioners to assure 
the peaceful inhabitants that they were prepared to investi­
gate any well-founded complaints.
Already on 20 February, however, the joint commissio­
ners had issued the following proclamation from Tikoo: "To 
all the Moondas, Pahris [sic] &ca in the neighbourhood of
1* Govt, to Jt.Commissioners, 23 Feb. 1832, B.C,1362/54224.
2. Beng. Govt, to Court of Lirectors, 25 Sept. 1832, Para.22, 
B.C.1362/54223.
3. Govt, to Jt.Commissioners, 23 Feb. 1832, Para.8,
B.C.1362/54224.
Teekoo and Lohardugga. Know you,all those who wish to submit 
to the Sirkar come to the officer in command of Teekoo, and 
write down your names, , or if you come within one or two 
days, come to the Huzoor and write your names. Those who do 
not come in will take the consequences on themselves; those 
who consult their good-will come in & restore the property
1
to those from whom they have taken it; come in without fear.1
Another such proclamation was issued from Churia on the same
day; "To all Coles who are assembled and [were] assembled
near the Hurryhurpore GhaUt, know you. If your intention be
to submit, and be obedient, come to the presence immediately
on the receipt of this perwanah. If you do not intend to
submit, but continue in rebellion, you will certainly be
punished and killed, If you consult your good by all means,
come to the Huzoor quickly. Lall Gokul Sahy has spoken in
2your behalf, Therefore come quickly to the Huzoor,1
These proclamations did not result in any immediate 
flow of surrenders, so several small attacks were made by 
the assembled troops. Impey forced his way into the small 
but difficult range of hills near Gajnu (14 miles south­
west of Churia) where the Kols under the influence of their 
leader Suru Bhagat had refused to submit. In a night attack 
some fifteen of them were killed and others captured.^ The
1. Enclosure, Jt.Commissioners to Govt., 26 May 1832,
B.C.1363/54229.
2. Ibid.
3. Oapt. Impey to Capt. Penny, Deputy Adjutant General,
24 Peb. 1832, B.C.1362/54224.
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unexpected blow was followed by the surrender of Suru Bhagat
and of the pahans and mahtos of all the insurgent villages
of this area on 26 February at Tikoo* Some 151 village
heads came after this, and made their submission.
Col* Bowen, at Pitoria, set out in similar fashion
for Sonahatu on 22 February. He caught up with a number of
the insurgents there, inflicted considerable losses, and
thereafter was able to reinstate the Raja of Rahi pargana^,
who established a police thana, and to restore to the
mahajans and other dispossessed persons their property and 
1
possessions.
This success was followed up by an advance into
Bundu pargana, Two parties, directed by the Raja of Bundu
surprised the insurgents at Kumta Induhotri and Kachri,
inflicting a few casualties, and a major success was scored
at Buruhatu, 4 miles or so from Buidu. There the guns were
used for the first time, and some 60 insurgents were killed,
2
and much surprise and terror caused.
In central Chota-Nagpur there were other successful 
attacks, which led to the submission of over a hundred Kol 
villages through their mundas, pahans, etc. At the same 
time the joint commissioners received the sworn allegiance
1. Col.Bowen to Jt.Commissioners, 26 Feb. 1832, Paras. 1 
and 2, Beng. Cr.Judl,, Cons. 47 of 6 March 1832 (2£0\
Also see Report from Camp Bundu, 26 Feb. 1832',  ^ v
Bengal Hurkaru, 3 March 1832.
2C Bowen to Jt.Commissioners, 26 Feb. 1832, Para.5 Beng. Cr* 
Judl. Cons. 47 of 6 March 1832. (140\
Also see Col.Bowen to Jt. Com- 
missioners, 27 Feb, 1832, B.C.1362/54225.
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of 300 influential Kols at their camp at Pitoria.
The join4; commissi oners also adopted various con­
structive measures at this time* They did not merely 
threaten, they proclaimed to the mankis, rnundas, etc, whom 
they urged to come in, that "it is the object of the Sirkar 
to benefit its subjects," This they demonstrated by 
hearing the legitimate complaints of the Kols against their 
zamindars, and ordering the officers commanding the detach­
ments at Tikoo and Churia to collect information about any 
oppression by the zamindars and renters, so that offenders
p
might be brought to book. As a result of such action, and 
of the direct appeals to the insurgents which, since the 
audience was illiterate, were intimated "through their 
brethren who have already aome in, and through their zamin­
dars, large numbers did come in. By early March a corresp­
ondent could report, "one of the chief proofs that the in­
surgents are coming to their senses is that both they and 
the zemindars are daily bringing complaints against each 
other before the commissioners,"^
It was from pacified north, east and central Chota- 
Nagpur that on 5 March the three columns set out for the 
still rebellious south-west. Prom their bases at Bundu,
1. Jt.Commissioners to Govt., 27 Peb. 1832, Beng.Cr.Judl. 
Cons. 45 of 6 March 1832 /140\
2. Jt.Commissioners to officers commanding at Tikoo and 
Churia, 2 March 1832, B.C.1362/54224.
3. Jt.Commissioners to Govt., 3 March 1832, Ibid.
4. 'P1, Camp Pitoria, 5 March 1832, John Bull, quoted in 
Bengal Hurkaru, 13 March 1832.
Churia and Tikoo the troops undertook frequent dours or 
drives against the insurgent strongholds. Herds of cattle, 
hags of grain, salt etc. were seized and carried off. All 
too often little discrimination was exercised and the vil­
lages of peaceable Muslims and mahajans were burnt (perhaps 
to vent the personal spite of those who acted as guides) 
and their property seized.^ The troops might perhaps be 
excused - the work was quite unfamiliar, very arduous, often 
fruitless - as on the occasion reported in the John Bull 
when the troops abandoned their pantaloons the better to 
pursue the Kols, marched ten kos at night through paddy 
fields and along miserable paths, climbed a thousand foot 
hill of enormous dark granite rocks, piled one^another -
and then found the whole expedition "a most abominable hoax
2
practised upon the Commissioner, by one of his own spies.” 
But when their irritation was vented upon an innocent vil­
lage the joint commisioners were hard put to it to make 
amends, and there was some adverse criticism in the press,
A letter from Churia camp to the John Bull declared, "Men 
stare at each other, and ask how long this state of affairs 
is to continue; and what is the cause of this assemblage of 
troops to fight an enemy who is not in existence ..... What 
has been going on against the Coles will bear a strict 
parallel with some of the persecutions against the Waldenses,
1. Letter from Churia camp, 24 Peb, 1832, John Bull, 
quoted in Bengal Hurkaru, 2 March 1832.
2. Ibid.
or the sufferings of the Hugenots in France, after the revo­
cation of the Edict of Naifc;, hy Louis X I V . T h e  writer 
went on to agree, however, that since many of the Kols had 
been misled by their leaders the whole retribution 
exacted was unjust and oppressive, and he painted an 
"unhappy picture" of the joint commissioners, exasperated by 
the insolence of rebel chiefs bent upon "making an example" 
and of "women and children in the midst of dead bodies
holding out their infants and screaming" after the attack
2
on Silligaon.
By the end of February the operations in central and 
northern Chota-Nagpur were at an end. Those in the eastern 
parganas such as Tamar and Bundu were still, however, in 
full swing. There were stockades being built at Gurjfihatu 
and Kotonagar in Tamar and several thousand Kols in arms 
under eight leaders.^ In March there were reports from Kera, 
in Singhbhum, of five more villages in revolt, and ready to 
join the Tamar insurgents.^ Against these Col. Bowen1 s 
force advanced, in a series of raids and skirmishes, such 
as that against the hill stronghold of Kota on the ridge 
above Surgia, where a large granary was found and destroyed: 
"everyman of the detachment took what he wanted of the grain
1. Ibid.
2. TEI3.
3. 'Jt,’Uommissioners to Bowen, 28 Feb. 1832, Beng.Cr. Judl.
Cons. 49 of 6 March 1832 ,14CK
V— p
4. Wilkinson to Lowen, 2 March 1832, B.C.1503/58896.
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etc. and the remainder and the village were afterwards 
destroyed.The 34th next entered Tamar, a considerable 
town hut almost completely destroyed hy the insurgents, and 
thence pushed on to Bugai, driving the Kols before them. (A 
report in the Bengal Hurkaru noted, "Had the Khols stood, we
must have sustained a heavy loss, as we were absolutely
pinned in a defile full two miles in length and between two
ranges of high hills covered with a heavy jungle.)
Where they did stand, as at Arki on 8 March, where 
they had a strong position approached by defiles which had 
been blocked by felled trees, ditches and bamboo stockades, 
the British forces were in fact beaten off,^ though not 
before they had inflicted considerable losses. Col.Bowen 
was so impressed, indeed, by the strength of the position 
that he declined to attack a second time without re-inforce- 
ments.^ However, the enemy had been even more impressed by 
the 34th N.I. and on 10 March Arki was found abandoned. f,A 
quantity of grain was brought into camp from their granary, 
and what could not be carried off, was destroyed in addition 
to all the huts, etc. on the brink of the hills in the
5
neighbourhood, that had not previously been burnt down. "
1. Report from Tamar, 4 March 1832, Bengal Hurkaru, 19 March 
1832. Also see Bowen to Jt.Commissioners, 3 March 1832, 
B.C.1362/54225*
2. Report from Tamar, 6 March 1832, Bengal Hurkaru, 19 March 
1832. Also see Bowen to Jt .Commissioners/ 9 March 1832, 
B.C.1362/54225.
3. Ibid. One sepoy was killed and Ensign McLeod fatally 
wounded.
4. Bowen to Jt.Commissioners, 9 March 1832, B.C.1362/54225.
5. Report from Tamar, 11 March 1832, Bengal Hurkaru.
23 March 1832. -------------
Meanwhile, some of the insurgent leaders were sub­
mitting in this area. On 6 March eight mundas came to the 
camp and gave written nruchalkas (securities) for their 
future good behaviour, and for the restoration to the
i
rightful owners of all the plundered property. According
to a newspaper report, many more were hourly expected and
there was Msome prospect of a termination of this warm cam-
2
paign" in this area. Bowen's report of 11 March confirmed 
the report of a strengthening disposition to submit - a dis­
position which he had encouraged through letters sent to the 
chiefs, and by the circulation of the joint commissioners* 
proclamation. He wrote to the joint commissioners "I trust 
that these measures of conciliation (now that punishment has 
been so repeatedly inflicted) will be crowned with success, 
and that the insurrection in these pergunnahs will be 
£die]"^ In the same letter he forwarded a list of thirteen
1. Bowen to Jt.Commissioners, 9 March 1832, B.C.1362/54225: 
Prom Tamars Bahadur Singh Munda of Sundari, Bhun Singh 
Munda of Kaparia (Kasaria?), Lai Singh Munda of Mankidi, 
Boran Singh Munda of Prassi, Kandi Singh of Kandihi and 
Mochi Rai of Kundula$
Prom Banta Hajams Mohan Singh Munda of Putrahatu.
2. Report from Tamar, 6 March 1832, Bengal Hurkaru, 19 March 
1832.  ------
3. Bowen to Jt.Commissioners, N.D., Beng* Cr.Judl. Cons.
55 of 20 March 1832 ^140^
insurgent chiefs who had submitted with the usual 
securities*x
It was high time for peace to be restored, for 
thanks to the operations of both the Kols and the Company’s 
forces, the country had become one scene of desolation*
There was no prospect of any harvest and famine was impend­
ing. The situation was such that Col.Bowen felt compelled 
to take action to restore stolen working cattle to the 
owners so that the work of cultivation could continue. About 
4,000 head of cattle had been seized by the Kols in Tamar 
alone, and these the diwans of Tamar, Bundu and other 
parganas were now reclaiming (the captains of the various 
military detachments naturally claimed them as booty), but, 
as Col.Bowen wrote, it was impossible to see ,fhow this 
country is again to be cultivated if the bullocks plundered
by the Coles are not restored to the owners, when they fall
2  ^into our hands.” He, therefore, issued the following order:
"The Commanding officer desires that all cattle (including
bullocks, cows, horses or tattoos) which have been taken in
the insurgent villages of Solakotee, Sergee and Kotah shall
be delivered over to the custody of the local constituted
1. Ibid. They were from Bundu parganas Baya Ram Munda of 
Buchuhatu, Hindu Munda of Humpta, Gundul Munda of Amadi, 
Borhan Singh Munda of Sungu [Tungu], Munda- Gokul Munda 
of Baradi, Jit Rai Munda of Hadimat Kema, Mochi Rai 
Munda of Kadi, Narain Munda of Karama, Sahari Munda of 
Kulma, Kadi Rai Munda of Chitudes, G-unsa Munda of Kailadi 
and Kaisa Munda of Teli Murcha.
2. Bowen to Jt .Commissioners, 11 March 1832, Beng.Cr. Judl. 
Cons. 57 of 20 March 1832 /140n
(— .
3. Extract, Detachment order, Ibid.
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authorities of the pergunnah (the Dewans) in which such 
villages are situated,,in order to their being identified 
and claimed by the Mahajans, and other respectable inhabi­
tants from whom they are generally known to have been 
plundered. Receipt will be taken by the commanding officer 
for the number given over .....This order [is] to be con­
sidered applicable to such of the insurgent villages as may 
hereafter be visited or attacked by any portion of this 
force.1
With Tikoo, Churia, Palamau and Tamar pacified, the 
joint commissioners ordered a further general move to the 
South.^ The troops of the rajas and zamindars were appointed 
to hold the area already subdued and to keep open communica­
tions with the troops operating below the ghats. Supplies 
were arranged for a campaign of a month and a half, with a 
few days* supply of rice always in camp. An assistant com­
missary-general was appointed to regulate the distribution
of the supplies forwarded by Neave, and to report to him
2
the details of sales proceeds etc. Still other supplies 
were arranged from Calcutta via Jhalda. The columns then set 
out for Lohardugga, Tikudiga^ and Barkagarh.
The joint commissioners were anxious for an oppor­
tunity to strike some telling blow - there was to be no
L, Jt.Commissioners to Major Blackall, 4 March 1832,
B.C.1362/54225.
2. Jt.Commissioners to Asstt. Commissary General, 4 and 5 
March 1832, Ibid.
3. Capt. Johnson to Lt. Saunders, Detachment staff,
14 March 1832, Ibid.
manoevering,no diplomacy. But there was, in fact, little 
chance of any major engagement - the Kols occasionally dis­
played individual bravery, more often they took to their 
heels, vanished into the jungles and fitfully harassed the 
sepoys.
In any oase the right and centre columns^ met with 
no opposition, Mahtos and pahans regularly came in and 
tendered their submission. At Maharajganj and Armai submis­
sions began almost as soon as the troops arrived, and every 
encouragement was given by proclamation to the tribal people 
calling for no more violence and a return to their peace­
ful occupations. Near Barkagarh the Maharaja of Chota-Nagpur
and his uncle, the Kunwar of Basia, joined the joint commis-
2sioners with a small number of their retainers. They 
reported some Kols still defiant at Nawagarh and Barwa, but 
on Major Blackall!s approach with the right column the 
mahtos and pahans came in as readily as they already had 
done round Armai and in Mokha (Mokhatu) pargana. His march 
to Palkote, which he reached on 20 March, was thus unevent­
ful.
Por some days the advance of the left column, which
the joint commissioners accompanied, was just as quiet, with
the villages along the route all tendering their submission.
But on reaching Sonepur, where the insurrection had origin-
1. Major Blackall to Jt. Commissioners, 13 March 1832, Ibid. 
2* !P J, 10 March 1832, John Bull, quoted in Bengal Hurkaru 
17 March 1832.
Also see Jt.Commissioners to Blackall, 12 March 1832,
B.C. 1362/54225.
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"broken out, signs of resistance were discovered, The Kols 
had deserted all the villages south and east of Khunti and 
had carried off their grain and cattle into the hills and 
jungles where they were reported in force. (The only sub­
missive villages were those of the Rautias.) Only two of 
"the mankis came in.
There now began a war of attrition in a country of 
great difficulty and strength. On 20 March Captain Maltby 
attacked the village of Ranidih, destroying grain stores, 
carrying off a hundred head of cattle.^" Then Johnson of the 
centre column closed in driving off yet another large body
of insurgents, while Ewart, with the 54th, killed others,
2and destroyed many grain stores. Col.Bowen was ordered to 
advance from Tamar to Saradkel (or Saradk&li),  ^and the 
zamindars of Saraikela, Kera and Karaikela (all in Singhbhum)
A
were ordered to cooperate from the south. On 22 March 
Maltby with three companies of the 50th, two of the 54th, 
a hundred men of the Ramgarh battalion, a company of the 
2nd N.I., a troop and a half of the 3rd cavalry, one six- 
pounder and the barkandazes and retainers of the maharaja 
burned more villages, destroyed further grain-stores and
1. Jt.Commissioners to Maltby, 20 March 1832, Ibid.; Capt. 
Maltby to Capt. Pasmore, 21 March 1832, IbiTI
Also see an eye-witness account in Spry, Modern India, I, 
122. "
2. Maltby to Pasmore, 21 March 1832, B.C.1362/54225.
Report from Camp Bemujurda, 25 March 1832, Bengal Hurkaru 
7 April 1832.
3. Jt.Commissioners to Bowen, 23 March 1832, B.C.1362/54225#
4. Jt.Commissioners to the chiefs of Singhbhum, Enclosure,
Jt, Commissioners to Govt., 23 March 1832, Ibid.
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captured some hundreds of cattle. The objective had indeed 
"become not the elusive Kol forces, "but their supplies and 
their families, Captain Malthy put this quite plainly: ”1 
hope to succeed in attacking them, and destroying the re­
mainder of the grain, and I shall, if possible, capture
their wives and families as being one of the surest means
2
of bringing them a sense of their duty to Government, "
The process of starving the rebels into submission, 
and of harassing them continually was made more tedious and 
difficult by the onset of bad weather, and by the intrigues 
of the supposedly loyal zamindars, or their periodic bursts 
of panic. Col, Bowen*s march from Tamar was delayed by 
pressing appeals from the Rajas of Silli and Banta Hajam 
and by the panic which his departure induced in the Rani of 
Tamar, The Raja of Silli even went so far as to seek to con­
vince Col .Bowen that "without the total extermination of 
the Coles in this quarter there will be no security for the 
lives and property of the well affected."^ Yet the news­
paper correspondents in Tamar were very doubtful about the 
loyalty of "the well-affected" and denied that there ever 
had been serious danger in Silli and Banta Hajam: "private 
Squabbles, in which we have no right to interfere, there
4
have undoubtedly been, but there has been no insurrection,"
1, Maltby to Pasmore, 22 March 1832, Ibid,, 13 sepoys and 
several horses were killed at Rajii&ih. Also see Report 
from Sujna Jtfadi camp, 23 March 1832, Bengal Hurkaru,
31 March 1832.
2, Maltby to Pasmore, 21 March 1832, B.C.1362/54225*
3, Bowen to Jt, Commissioners, 15 March 1832, Ibid,
4- Report from Camp Banta Hajam, 16 March 1832.""jBengal 
Hurkaru, 23 March 1832,
Also see Report from Silli, 17 March 1832, Ibid.
3 01
or even more forthright, "our good friend the Sillie Raja 
still keeps up the joke of pretending that a "body of insur­
gents is in out neighbourhood, but whether he will give it 
up as a bad job on finding that he cannot employ the force 
to be sent ... on some wild goose chase merely to save 
appearances has not as yet been determined."’*' When the rebel 
Mohan Munda(of Putahatu in Banta Hajam) was taken he boldly
asserted that the Silli raja was accusing him because of a
o
quarrel for the possession of some property - and a corres­
pondent of the Bengal Hurkaru evidently believed that the 
Silli raja’s story of the munda’s rebellious activity was 
all humbug, designed to secure the destruction of Mohan’s 
village by the British troops.-’ In another instance the 
zamindar of Kharsawan Thakur Chetan Singh was suspected 
rather of sheltering the rebel manki of Gamharia, of con­
cealing the granaries of the insurgents for a bribe, and of
A
"filling his pocket at the expense of both parties."
Such suspicion of their allies and of those whose 
interests they were supposed to be protecting did not 
sweeten the temper of the officers and their troops, Nor did 
the appalling weather, the drenching rain which made the 
jungle warfare doubly depressing at times even halting all 
operations, and the swollen rivers which made still more
1. Report from Silli, 17 March 1832, Ibid»
2. HSW^.Bowen to Jt.Commissioners, 16 March 1832, B.C.1362/
3. Report from Banta Hajam, 16 March 1832, Bengal Hurkaru,
23 March 1832.
4. Report from Arki, 28 March 1832, Bengal Hurkaru, 7 Apl, 
1832.
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difficult to get up supplies* "The weather here is dreadful,
wrote one correspondent, "incessant storms of wind, hail
and rain. The cold is at times intense, and the thunder and
lighting far exceeded anything I have hitherto experienced
in India* In fact this is positively fthe land of storms1.
Moreover, though the Kols rarely stood their ground
2
before an attack of the British forces, and though they 
were being steadily driven back, they were capable at all 
times of inflicting losses* The country was unfavourable 
for cavalry action, and when it pressed too close into the 
hills - as on 22 March when Maltby launched his biggest 
attack - it suffered unpleasant losses: "Information having 
been brought that the grass-cutters had been attacked, they 
[the cavalry] charged forward to protect them and some found 
themselves in the midst of an almost invisible enemy, who 
were hidden in the surrounding jungle, but who made them­
selves felt by pouring in showers of arrows upon our unfort­
unate men who were perfectly helpless. Their horses could 
not charge into the wood and up the hills and they could 
see no one to fire their pistols at .... They [the Kols] 
are extremely watchful, and woe to the man who strays from 
his companions; they instantly make a dart on him and
1. Report from !P 8 Camp Tujna (Sajna) Nadi, 26 March 1832, 
John Bull, quoted in Bengal Hurkaru, 3 Apl* 1832.
2. "The insurgents neverHSpposed the infantry en masse, but
contented themselves with cutting off every one who
straggled from the column of attack": Ibid*
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annihilate him, and we are often extremely delayed and 
inconvenienced by waiting to protect that infernal crowd of
i
camp followers, " Those who were cut off were invariably
done to death, the bodies being completely stripped, horri-
2
bly mutilated and "dreadfully hacked". The British forces 
were obviously handicapped by their ignorance of the jungle, 
which the Kols used so well, and their military training 
was often of little use in the unfamiliar conditions: "Prom 
their knowledge of the localities of the hills and superior 
personal activity, together with the circumstances of the 
black and crouching Coles being with difficulty seen in the 
dark jungle, whilst our red coats and erect attitude render 
us always a conspicuous mark, I conceive they are more than 
a match for our muskets in jungle fighting. Many an arrow 
glanced by our men, without our being able to espy the 
hands that directed it.
Both sides had by this time good cause to wish the 
struggle ended. When therefore the joint commissioners were 
told by the vakil of the Chota-Nagpur raja that if they 
wrote to the mankis, mundas and other Kols of Sonepur still 
in arms, they would submit forthwith,^ they readily agreed
1. Letter from Camp Sajna Nadi, 23 ^arch 1832, Bengal 
Hurkaru,31 March 1832,
2. Report from Kundipatti, 30 March 1832, Bengal Hurkaru,
9 Apl. 1832.
3. Report from the banks of the Sajna Nullah (Nadee),
21 March 1832, Bengal Hurkaru, 29 March 1832.
4. Jt.Commissioners to Grovt., 7 Apl. 1832, Para.2,
B.C.1362/54225.
to suspend Maltbyfs operations, and offer an amnesty# On 
29 March they accordingly issued a proclamation^. This 
implied - though it did not say so in so many words - that 
the headmen as well as their followers would be pardoned. It 
had been realised that tribal loyalties were such that peace 
could only be secured by the promise of pardon for manki, 
monda, and villager alike,
Por a day or two there was no response and Col,
BowenTs column advancing from Tamar ran into heavily stock­
aded jungle near the Arkighat in which he lost three
Europeans of the Horse Artillery, who, straying from the
2
column, were cut off and terribly hacked. Moreover, when
he still sent out a proclamation of free pardon, he received
hack the uncompromising reply that "they preferred being
killed in fighting against their oppressors to being hanged
by the judge. (This defiance was replied to by the burning
down of the villages from which those who killed the
Europeans had sallied forth, as an act of deliberate ven- 
4g5 ance,
But though the country was formidable and easy to 
defend, the Kols could not hope to resist for long, "They
—   -
1. Parwana, 29 March 1832, Ibid,
2. Sowen to Jt.Commissioners, 30 March 1832, Para.2, Ibid. 
Also see Report from Camp Kundi, 29 March 1832, Bengal 
Hurkaru. 14 Apl. 1832, and Letter from Kundipatil, 3C 
March lo32, Bengal Hurkaru, 9 Apl. 1832.
3. Report from Camp Kundi, 25 Mapc^ Bengal Hurkaru,
14 Apl. 1832. ---------
4. Report from Kandu Patti, 30 March 1832, Bengal Hurkaru,
14 Apl. 1832.
must", wrote a correspondent, "ere long, give way before us, 
for we are about to be joined by Colonel Bowen, from Tamar, 
on the East, and the Singboom chiefs are coming from the 
south, so that they will be completely hemmed in, and if 
they do not give up speedily, will inevitably be starved, if 
a more speedy death does not overtake them, from the hands 
of our soldiers; for in the first place, we have destroyed 
large quantities of the grain they had laid up in store, 
and continue to do so, whereever we can find it - and in the 
second place, they will be unable to sow their seed for the 
next yearfs crop, the time for which process is fast 
approaching: as we are in full possession of the plains, 
which were already ploughed for the purpose, before we
i
entered them." On 3 April, few days after Col.Bowenfs 
arrival at Saradkel , the surrenders began in response to 
yet another proclamation - Singrai Manki, Mohan Manki, Sagar 
Manki and a few others submitting to the joint commissioners. 
Next day they brought the whole population of Kandupatti to 
yield, Contrary to expectations, some of the ringleaders of
Tamar also submitted. Only one ringleader of this area now
2remained at large.
There was still evidently some apprehension among 
the Kols - that they would be put in irons, be held
1. Report from Sajna Nadee, 30 March 1832, Bengal Hurkaru,
9 Apl. 1832,
2. Report from Camp Sarad Kel, 4 Apl. 1832, John Bull,
Quoted in Bengal Hurkaru, 14 Apl. 1832.
responsible for all property destroyed or looted and so
on - but it was becoming more and more apparent that they
could not resist much longer. Wilkinson, therefore, redoubled
his "soothing system11**". He sent messengers to Bindrai
Manki and Sui Munda of Bandgaon in Singhbhum, the most noted
leaders of the area. A few leaders of Tamar and Sonapet were
2in the same way tackled by Cuthbert and Col.Bowen. On 8 
April Bahadur Singh and others, who had been sent by Wilkin­
son to contact the Kols of Singhbhum brought the news that 
their submission was rather doubtful, though they had asked 
for ten days* time,^ So Col. Bowen’s march to Tamar was 
deferred and the whole force marched to Bamhani in the 
neighbourhood of Bangaon.^ Major Blackall was also approach­
ing the area with the right hand column, having already 
received the submission of all the insurgent leaders of 
Barwa and restored the Barwa raja to his estate. On his 
approaching Bamhani, on 13 April the Bandgaon insurgents 
were deserted by Dasai Munda, and Rati [Katik?] Sardar of
g
Kochang. On 19 April Bindrai and Sui surrendered, and on 
the 25th Dasai Manki of Kochang, accompanied by Khandu Pater
1. Report from a fine open plain, Injra Nadee, 1 April 1832, 
Bengal Hurkaru, 14 Apl.. 1832.
2. Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 7 Apl. 1832, Para.3,
B.C.1362/54225.
3. Jt.Commissioners to Govt., 8 Apl. 1832, Ibid.
4. Ibid. ----
5. letter from Barwanagar, 2 Apl. 1832, India Gazette,
19 Apl. 1832. Also see Letter from Camp Armai, 9 Apl.1832, 
India Gazette. 19 Apl. 1832.
6. Jt. Commissioners to Bowen. 13 Apl. 1832, B.C,„ 1362/
54225.
of Karaikela and the Mukhtar of the zamindar of Kera, also 
submitted. When they had come in all the rebel chiefs had 
been accounted for.
It was now possible to disband the punitive columns 
and they began the return to cantonments. There was great 
rejoicing by officers and men, all of whom were fed up with 
the campaigns, even to the point of believing that Wilkinson 
was prolonging the affair for the sake of his special 
salary of Rs.3,000.2
The first to leave were the Barrackpur detachment 
■under Col. Bowen who set out on 15 Apl. for Tamar accompan­
ied by the senior commissioner, Cuthbert. "Thank God", 
wrote one • of the men, "we have at last turned our backs 
upon the Bamghurees and Bhuddoo Buggutfs pickled head ...
I am precisely sick of the business .....As he [Cuthbert]
1. Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 26 Apl. 1832. Ibid.
S.C.Roy, (Mundas, 207) says, "The Mundas still commem­
orate in their songs the delusive victories of the 
Larkas in their struggles with the British troops." 
One such song, in translation, is the following:
"Within Pithouria [Pitoria*s] bounds,
The soldiers mustered strong.
Balanga Goa saw
The fighting Larkas throng.
At Jiki lata then
The Larkas1 arrows flew.
At Dombaghat Ich'rung,
Their foes the Hos shot through.
Ah! then, on Jik'lata field 
The soldiers vanquished lay.
At Dombaghat Ich'rung 
The Larkas won the day".
2. Letter from Sajna Nudee, 8 Apl. 1832, Bengal Hurkaru, 
18 Apl. 1832.
Also see a letter from 'Delay1, N.D. Bengal Hurkaru,
9 May 1832. --- ---------
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is particularly anxious to settle affairs as amicably as
possible, and with all practicable despatch I trust his
endeavours [to settle the dispute regarding Tamar succession]
1
will be crowned with the success they deserve.” As sickness 
was breaking out in the contingent Cuthbert, on arriving 
at Tamar, authorised their further march for Barrackpur. 
Wilkinson, after receiving the later surrenders, and arrang­
ing for a wing of the 50th N.I. and the Ramgarh battalion
2
to go into cantonment for the rains in Hazaribagh, released 
the other troops. On 27 April the troops for Linapur and 
Benares marched under Capt. Maltby. Major Blackall with the 
rest of the force marched from Bamhani on 29 April, reached 
Barkagarh on the 1 May ^  and on the 2nd the right wing of 
the 50th proceeded via Tamar and the Jungle Mahals towards 
Barrackpur.
The two thousand men of the 2nd, 38th, 50th, 54th 
Regiments, N.I., the squadron of light cavalry, the horse 
artillery, foot-artillery, the Ramgarh battalion, the match- 
lockmen and irregulars, who had closed on Bamhni to reduce 
perhaps three hundred active insurgents in Singhbhum, thus 
dispersed. The campaign was declared successfully closed.
Yet as will be seen fresh operations were very soon to be 
necessary in the neighbouring tribal areas. Perhaps the
1. Letter from Kandu Patti, 15 Apl, 1832, Bengal Hurkaru,
24 Apl. 1832,  5---------
2. Capt. Wilkinson to Blackall, 25 Apl. 1832, B.C.1362/54225.
3. Letter from Barkagah 1 May 1832, Bengal Hurkaru. 9 May 
1832.
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writer in the India Gazette, who used the pen-name Miles,
       — — — —
was not far off the mark when he wrote of the campaign, " 
"What a ridiculous episode it will make in the history of 
British India! How the future historian will laugh as he 
tells the tale of the worse than useless Cole hunt! Oh for 
the genius of a Gibbon to describe "with solemn sneer" the 
magnaminous exploit! Oh shade of Napoleon! if I knew of any 
dak that could convey a parcel in safety to thy present 
habitation in Elysium, most assuredly would I send thee an 
account of the late events in the perturbed territory, 
which might perchance amuse an idle hour and make thee 
fwreath a smile1 at the operations of that mighty Indo- 
British power, which it was thy fondest ambition to over­
throw. ,fl
1. 'Miles1, India Gazette, 23 Nov. 1832.
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CHAl'Tl K IV
■e origins of the unrast In Chota-MftKpur, Palaawu and
UflfiMJate
Our study of the early impact of British rule in
Chota-Hftgpur and Palamau has made it clear that this
undeveloped tribal area suffered much from the introduction
of the Cornwallis system, more so because of the ignorance
of tribal language and lack of respect for tribal customs
on tho part of the British officers who administered it*
an anonymous writer in the Calcutta Ueviow in 1869 made the
point that Englishmen who had fought in New Zealand against
the aborigines trying to preserve their ancient tribal
rights, and who had encroached unthinkingly upon the tribal
right* in land in Ireland, recognised by tha Brehon laws,
were scarcely likely to understand or sympathise with the
tribal peasantry in Chota-Nagpur• As Hutton has said,
"In Chota~Nagpux the establishment of British authority
led to a more general and more thorough victimisation”
(2)
of the tribal people of this area,' ' Tho *econoBiic
1) •Kolg of Chota-Nagpore9, Calcutta Review, XL1X, 12*1 •
2) J.H. Hutton, •Primitive Tribes9, Modern India ami the
West, **13»
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freedom9 brought by British rule, and the indiscriminate
enforcement of contracts by the courts of law attracted a
large number of ilndu* Muslim and Sikh land grabbers9
(l)jobbers9 traders and usurers into this area*' 7 They
seized the land9 the very basis of the tribal society9
and so Inevitably set in motion the "break-up of tribal solids
( 2 )arity and the disintegration of the village coruuunlty •99' 7
It has already been seen that by the time this
calamity befell the tribal people9 their maharaja (and many
lesser rajas) had been hinduized* and that he had been
bringing in "crowds of hangers-on of all kinds9 whose
services he rewarded* or whose goods he paid for* by the
(3)transfer of his rights over various villages."' 7 This 
inevitably led to the ruin of the tribesmen* the original 
clearers of tho land* who could not compete with the plains­
men in cunning or prestige.
The maharaja's primary concern was to imitate the 
pomp and grandeur of Hindu and Muslim zamindars * and he 
looked down upon his tribal ryots as marauders and savages. 
Thus* Gorlnd Nath Sahl* who succeeded to the estate in 1808*
(1)j, Air*— .Hutton*— Hftriiiiifrivo Tribes^  Modern India and the 
West. 730.
(2)ibid. >430,
(3)S.C. Iioy* Mundas. Introduction by .A. Gait.
described the inhabitants of Chota-Nagpur as "wild
mountaineers and robbers, who are incapable of understanding
any order and will not listen to reason1*, and as "nothing
but a set of lawless tiountaineors*• ^ ^  The next maharaja,
Jag&xmath Sahi, who succeeded to the estate in 1822, had
a positive hatred for his fellow-trlbesmen. In his petition
to Government during the unrest of 1832 he described them
as low caste, turbulent wretches who "in person resemble
(i)
nan# but in mind wild beasts'**' 9
This attitude of derision was encouraged by the large 
number of his non-tribal advisers and servants from the 
plains of Bihar and Orissa - the priests, the dlwans* 
the tahslldars* adventurers and fortune-seokers• Thus, 
in 1818 a certain Narainbhatta Brahmachari (a religious 
mendicant) persuaded Maharaja Oovind Hath Sahi to believe 
that an old woman, Adhar-Dai, had destroyed his children 
by witchcraft,usaying that this had been revealed to him
by the image of God Kapil Hath at Does* before which he
(3)had fasted for nine days*' ' The barkumlases■ who were
(1) Petition, Haja Govlnd hath. Heed* 2 May 1808, Para 3# 
Bong, lev* Cons. 11 of 22 July 1808. (55/13).
(2) Petition, Haja Jagannafch, 25 March I832, B.C. 13*0/
5*»227.
(3) ’ amgarh Magistrate to Govt., 6 Apl* 18X9# Para 12
B.C.7^6/20327.
suspected of having committed the murder of this woman 
and her family were, with a few exceptions, all non-tribal 
adventurers who had found service at the maharaja*e court*^
The maharaja, being of an "indecisive and procrastin-
(2)
ating character”' , could not assert his authority, and 
the non-tribal adventurers in his service made him a non­
entity, He was Hwholly immersed in religious ceremonies 
and observances'* and left "the entire management of his 
estate to a set of worthless and corrupt Amlah” , who took 
"every advantage of his supineness with regard to worldly 
affair*.
Maharaja Jagannath Sahi, who succeeded his father at 
the young age of 19» was not expected to acquit himself 
better than his father, and in his time the grip of the 
non-tribal adventurers upon the administration became still 
firmer. Cuthbert, the officiating collector, rightly 
predicted, on hie accession, that "the young Rajah probably 
like his father will be a mere cypher in his Raj and
Ik)everything as formerly will be conducted by the Aumlah."' 7
(1) Ramgarh Magistrate to Govt., 6 Apl. 1819, Para 12 
B.C.7**6/2Q327• chapter • l.X . £
(2) V. Smith, Joint Magistrate, |A&fc:t'"officiating collector, 
Chotn-tTagpur-, Ramgarh, to Board, b March 1820, Bong. 
Rev. Cona. 17 of 22 June 1821 (58/60).
(3) W. Smith to Board, 28 Sept. 1819, Ibid.
(b) Cuthbert to Govt., 1 Aug, 1822, Iieng. Rev. Cons. 28 
of 8 Aug. 1822 (59/21).
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A report of 1823 shows that hie main interest, like his
father's, was the upkeep of temples (especially the snake
temple)9 the worship of Hindu goddesses and the celebration
(1)'uohahara fesival on a lavish scale• 9 In the
maintenance of the pomp and grandeur of his court too9 he
did not lag behind his forefathersi more than a year after
his suceession9 he was still pressing the political agent
on this frontier to attend the installation ceremony and
to present him with a Khi H a t . as had been done in the case
(2)of his father and grandfather.' He had an unhappy knack
of buying costly horses and clothes on credit from foreign
merchants! several Pathans (popularly called Moghuls)9
Sikhs9 and others who came to him as horse-dealers and
shawl and brocade merchants9 secured enormous sums for
their goods and even obtained land from the maharaja in
(3)exchange for their luxury goods. '
Such a chief could not have any Interest in the
v
plight of his tribal subjects* So while the tribal peasants 
were ousted by the non-tribal settiers, the whole business
of revenue collection and internal Management was left in 
the hands of the unscrupulous Hindu tliwan and his foreign 
subordinates. One such divan was a Brahsmn named Joaram
(1) Smith, Joint agistrata, Chota-Nagpur9 to Govt.,
Para 8 9 19 June 1823, Uong. Cr. Judl. Cons* 21 of 
26 Jan. 1826 (l37/3«).
(2) Bang* Rev. Cone. 46 of 2 Jan. 1824 (59/61).
(3) - uppler.«ent. Calcutta (Govt.) Gazette 1 3 ©c. 1880.
whose zeal by 1827 Had degenerated "Into rapacity and
extortion* thereby producing ruin to the people and
consequently depopulation to tho province".^- The
maharaja* who evinced "neither talent nor inclincation
(2)lor business"* 9 had given this new diwan a free hand*
and the diwan* to please his master* sought to increase
the Income of the estate by all possible means* Thus*
in 1827 he set up a claim to recover a great part of the
jtugjrs on the plea that the jagirdars were mere mortgagees*
and that their money had been more than paid through the
( 3 )
yields of the jagira, x ' These unprecedented claims were*
however* rejected by the Hamgarh magistrate who "in 
consequence of the f^ars and representations of many of the 
respectable inhabitants of the Pergunnah as well as certain 
indications in the conduct of this man"* compelled him 
"to enter into recognizances not to dispossess any of the
present occupants from their lands* nor to do any act
contrary to the Regulations of Governeient or the customs
Ik)of the Pergunnah"' '* Such an undertaking* however* in 
the absence of close supervision* was meaningless*
(1) Cuthbert to Gtovt** 21 Apl* 1827# Para 9# Beng* G* Judl*
Con*. 53 of Ik June 1827 (138/22).
(2) Ibid. lara 8.




Jnd*<*»d, every species of oppression vai perpetrated
on tho tribal peasantry• According* to Cuthbert, tho
r
desertion of aany villages could “o h u n y  be imputed to 
tho conduct of the principal lend holders towards their 
ryots, and their not granting receipts for the payment of 
rente, which alone opens a vide door to abuses add to 
this the effects of the feudal system, which, under the 
most favourable circucistancce, must ever act as a cheek 
to the increase of population, by damping the industry 
and independence of the p e o p l e T h e  maharaja and the 
lesser rajas received be,-arl (forced labour) frost the
(2) xtenant**' Moreover, several duties known as rasum,
(3) " •ftmtfurka* etc*, were levied* The rapacious
non*tribal servants of the chiefs fleeced the tribal
peasant* whenever they visited the villages*
Under a fully tribal system, when custom remained a
*
powerful barrier to excess, the feudal system which 
Cuthbert assumed to be so harmful, had been quite tolerable* 
But when the non*tribal servants of the hlnduised chiefs
worked the same system, they made it an instrument of 
oppression and extortion* If rent fell in arrears, a
i
1) Cuthbert to Govt*, 21 Apl* 1827, Para* 27*
21 Ibid* Para. 29.
3) 3-bld* Para* 48*
Jaiaadar at eight annas a day tali)ana (subsistence
allowance) or sometimes two at the same rate, accompanied
by three or four barkandazes at one and a half annas a day,
were sent from Palkote, the maharaja*s cutchery to collect
the dues* They stayed in the village, were fed at the
expense of the ryots, soiueti.iea for several mouths, and in
the end the talbana for the whole period of stay was
realized from the poor v i l l a g e r s * E v e n  when most of
the ryots had paid their duos, these servants were retained
in the villages on the excuse that a trifling amount was
still due* The main motive of the maharaja, and the
leaser zanindars, was to keep up their revenue and police
establishments on a small pay, the balance being made up 
(2)talbana*N Sometimes tho manager of the farmer of a
village also assessed the ryots separately on the pretext
that he had to pay a part of tho talbana of the maharaja*s
(3)servants and had to feed them*' '
No doubt some of the abwajbrs* e.g* the Daahahara 
salami (contribution towards tho celebration of the 
Dashahara festival), were paid willingly, because they 
would add to the grandeur of the maharaja*a court, but
(l) Davidson to Ouseley, 29 Aug, 1839 » Para. 37* Misc* Despatri 
Book, No, 2^7, G*G**s Agents Office, Patna Archives*
( 2 ) ibid. Para* 38.
(3) 1bid* Para* 39.
31b
th<t high-diandedncss of tlx e peons* the ^ahfc&ldar and other 
ucin-tribal servants of the maharaja was felt very sorely
by the tribesmen* These servants not only seised goats 
and buffaloes for sacrifice at the altar of the goddesst 
but they also took bribes to leave some of the villagers
untouched•v ^ ^
All these oppressions and extortions might have been 
checked had there been a closer control by the Kamgarh 
authorities* But unfortunately tho civil station was far 
removed from tin. par ;:ana• even though several officers in 
the past had emphasised the necessity of moving it to
i z )
a  nearer place*' 9 Ivon when heavy mortality at the
Shergbati Jail in 1827 suggested that a move to more
healthy Hasarlbagh was necessary« the Government still
(3)made no move,w /
While the civil station thus remained remote from 
Chota-Kagpur» nothing was done to post any Luxopoan officer
(1) Davidson to Ouseley9 29 Aug* 1839* Para* 42*
12) of* r, ©ugh sedge to Kamg&rh Magistrate* 5 Hay 1809*
Para 12* Bong* Or* Judl* Cons* 23 of 26 Jan* 1826
S137/38)* Also see Bong* Kev. Cons* 19 of 28 May 1824 60/7).(3) Ben . Cr. Judl* Cons. 14 of 18 Oct. 1827 (138/31). Till
1825 courts were held alternately at Chatra and Sherghati. 
But in January 1826 the civil station was fixed at 
Sherghatl* a place more distant froa Chota-Hagpur than 
Cxatrai Resolution* Govt** 26 Jan* 1826* Para* 15* B*r*g. 
Cr* Judl* Cons* 32 of 26 Jan* 1826 (137/39)•
in the tribal aroe* The argument, h#r«, was that Chofci*
Nagpur was most unhealthy* French, the namgarh magistrate,
tor «xsr.pl«i thought In 1817 that the constant residence
of a Joint magistrate in this area "would almost certainly
be attended with tho destruction of tho person appointed. 
The mvmt that was considered feasible was an annual visit
by tho magistrate.!2 ) But though in 1821 tho Joint
Magistrate and Assistaut Collector for €hota~Nagpur was
specially directed to visit the par? .-■. na during a favourable
season and to ettabliah a more vigilant superintendence
(over its affairs' , Cuthbert in 1827 and again in 1830 
admitted that no superior officer had visited the area
Ik)for several years' ' due t© the pressure of work at the 
civil station. He emitted, however, that the "watchful 
attention of the Magistrate over the interests and welfare
of the people" was the surest method of ameliorating their
/ k)
lot* • Moreover, he reported in 1830, "the great
(1) Seng. Cr. J dl. Co«*. 9 of 23 Kay 1817 (l32/5»).
(2) As iar back as 1809 Fou&hsedge had laid emphasis on
such a tours Ieughsedge to Kaagarh Magistrate, 5 May
1809* Hens. S *  Judl. Con*. 23 o f 26 Jan. 1826 (137/38)•
(3) Momoi nndua, Shakeepaar, 20 Jan. 1326, Seng. Cr. Judl. 
C w k .  31 of 26 Jan. 1826 (137/39).
(1») Cuthbert to Govt., 21 Apl. 1827, Para. 7<»» Bong. Cr.
Jdl. Con*. 53 of 14 Juno 1827 (136/22).
Alao sea Cuthbert to Govt., 15 Apl. 1830, Para. 14,
Bang. Cr. Judl. Con*. 27 of 11 May I830 (139/51).
(5) Cuthbert to Govt., 21 Apl. 1627. Para. 108, Bon,. Cr. 
Judl. Con*. 53 of 14 Jone 1827 (138/22).
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distanc® of the Magistrate9s residence from the pergurina 
renders the J o u r n e y s t a t i o n  expensive and 
inconvenient to prosecutors and witnesses and this of 
itself naturally tends to the concealment of crime• The 
people are reluctant in coming forward to give information 
of a robbery committed on their property to a small amount f 
knowing that theroselvos and witnesses will have to proceed 
to Sheherghotty, a distance of 50 Coss generally9 and 
sometimes more to prove the facts
The district was not altogether fortunate in the
(2)
officer^ appointed to it. Nathaniel Smith' 7 who, as has 
been seen, was responsible for the Introduction of the 
abkari and abolition of rahriari dues, was formally charged
)a ( 3 )
by the Niaamat Adaht with "eccentricity of character*1*w /  
His order of 10 February 1822 that the maharaja should 
appoint a police daroga who should be "respectable and 
very humble and very foolish (Nihayut bewuquf) and who 
may not possess any knowledge of his duty towards the
(1) ^uthbert to Govt., 15 Apl. 1830, Para. 8, Ueng. Cr.
Judl. Cons 27 of 11 May 1830 (139/51)• H® admitted that 
whenever cases came before him "of people having neglected 
to report trivial thefts in Chota-Nagpoor, I fully enter
their feelings, make allowance for the great distance they 
have to come and act as mildly towards them as circum­
stances will permit•"
(2) He was in charge of Chota-Nagpur from February 1821 to 
November 1825 with a few short breaks. lie also officiated 
as the Magistrate and Collector of Ramgarh for some time 
in this periods Register of h.l.Co.>s Bengal Civil 
Servants, 350.
(3) Register, Nizamat Adalat, to Govt., 5 Sept.1823# Para.2, 
Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 23 of 26 Jan. 1826 (137/38).
Company,*' ' certainly supports the charge, So does his
order to the thanadars to report only cases of highway
robbery, theft, burglary, affrays end no other /Thus murder
and dacolty were excluded^./*w ^  Again, he ordered in one
of his public proceedings that "a proclamation be issued
declaring that no zemindar or Talookdar shall exact the
sayer duties from merchants, in the event of the demand
being made, the merchants may beat the person making such
demand with their sticks..*, and moreover that it be
inserted in the proclamation, that a merchant may strike
with a sword any person who demands the sayer duties, but
as under all circumstances it is unadvisable to use a
sword, it is sufficient that they beat him with their 
{3)sticks.*' 7 The Nizamat Adalat called this proceeding
”strange and irregular, and likoly to operate perniciously.” 
Similarly with regard to his peculiar letter to the
(1) J.B. Llliot, 4th Judge, Patna Court of Cirouit, to 
Register, Nizamat Adalat, 2 July 1823, Ibid.
(2) ibid.
(3; Proccodings of Smith, 9 Feb. 1822, Beng. Cr. Judl.
Cons. 23 of 26 Jan. 1826 (137/38). 
w  Register, Nizamat Adalat, to Patna Court of 
Circuit, 15 Sept. 1823. Ibid.
superintendent of p o l i c e , t h e  Adalat hoped "that Mr,
Nathaniel Smith will in future exercise a more rigid control
(2)
over hie feelings, his imagination, and his pen,"
« (3)fortunately °mith did not stay for long , but
Cuthbert, who remained in this district for more than a
Ik)decade from 1321 onwards was no better choice* In his
case It was not eccentricity but an unimaginative seal 
that made him an unwise choice* It was he, as has been 
seen, who introduced the tax on rice beer, and pressed 
for the cultivation of the opium poppy* It was at his 
suggestion that a non-tribal Indian officer was appointed
I*) ^bid* This was tho letter of 21 Apl* 1822 in which
Smith had discussed a criminal case of Chota-Nagpur in a 
peculiar style*
(2) Ibid.
(3) This area was saved from the innovations resulting from 
his "favourite idea" that the iagjrdars of Chota-Nagpur 
were similar to the talukdare of Bengal* That was why he
had pressed the Board of Revenue that they should be
freed from subordination to tho maharaja* Moreover, he 
had wanted the introduction of partition laws (which 
had been prohibited in 1800) v*to this area - a suggestion 
which, according to Cuthbert, would have tended "to 
disseminate pov rty and misery than to promote prosperity 
and happiness*” Cuthbert to Govt*, 17 July 182k, B^ng*
Cr. Judl. Cons. 36 of 26 Aug* 182k (136/31).
(k) he had served as an officiating district magistrate in 
Saharanpur and Meerut before being appointed Judge- 
Magistrate of Ramgarh on 13 April 1821* In October he 
took charge of the collectorship for some time* After 
that he continued to serve in the district till April 
I832f with a break of a few months In 1825# Register 
of I.i.CoVs 3cmj-:ai Civil Servants, 82-83• From January 
1826 he was the Magistrale-Judge and Collector of 
Ramgarh with a special salary of lie 3,000 and a 
travelling allowance of Rs*300* resolution. Govt*, 26 
Jan* 1 , Bang, Cr • Judl* Cout> • Ji of 26 Jan* 1826
(137/39).
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as Msunsif in Chota Nagpurv in 1825» though thia Nvas 
vehemently objected to” and the maharaja and the landholders
, *. t/r
'’used overy means to dissuade the ryots from resorting to
(2)such a tribunal*”' ' Instead of realising that such a
tribunal encroached upon the powers of the tribal pancha\ at
under the tribal chiefs, he dismissed the protests as
originating "in the most sordid and Interested motives” and
he thought that "the arrangement might promote a more intimate
knowledge of the Regulations amongst this rude people and
(3)thereby tend to their civilisation and improvement. J*
Indeed, he was obsessed with the idea of civilising these 
people - questioning them in their villages as to their 
peculiar customs, their rights, profits from different trades, 
anti "more particularly on their superstitions", e*g* witch­
craft.^**’ He went to the length of threatening them with 
severe punishment if witches were punished by the panchayat, —
He also offended the hindulsed maharaja and other
( 5)samlnuar by interfering with sati ' and by introducing the 
ftamlndari dak ^  • In fact, Cuthbert was over-ambitious in
(1) By 1850 there were two munsifs in this area, one at 
Lohardugga and the other at Bundus Beng.Ctr. Judl .Con*.
27 of 11 May 1830 (139 ).
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(2) Cuthbert to Govt, 21 Apl. 1827• Para.55* Beng.Cr.Judl•
Cons. 53 of 1* June 1827 (138)
(3) Ibid, Para. 56.
(h) Ibid♦ Para. 98.
(5) Ibid. Para. 95*
(6) Ibid. Para.101.
seeking vast powers for himself to eradicate by administrative 
edict all the evils of a backward societyi "In Ranghur 
where the people are for the most part rude and uncivilized, 
the greatest political advantages may be expected from the 
general inspection, care, consideration and exertions of 
officers vested with consolidated powers. * ^  At the same 
time he was over-optimistic. In 1827 he thought that the 
constant fends and predatory habits which had affected the 
crops and property of the people here in the past, had been 
stopped, that the "human sacrifices” which "were annually 
offered up by the Rajah” had been prohibited, that the 
"practices of putting persons to death for sorcery” was ”now
hardly to be heard of”, and that "the demoralizing custom
(2)of compounding punishment” no longer existed. Ko dreamt
of changing the habits of the tribal people by a miracle, 
as it were. "The people,” he wrote, "are simple, obedient 
and willing and can be moulded at /lo/ anything by a zealous 
and accessible officer, who impresses on their minds that 
he is working for their benefit. It is to these annual tours 
then, that I chiefly look to refora the manners of the 
people, emancipate them from the thraldom of their superiors,
(1) Ibid. Para. 105. ne wanted the powers of supervising the
salt-a&ent, opium production, etc.
(2) Ibid. Paras. 107-108.
to develop the capacities of the country and encourage 
Industry and the extension of agriculture and to remedy 
the Inveterate abuses of the feudal system."^ '
Tt was with such adventurous and grandiose ideas that 
Cuthbert, like Smith, used to toy. hike Smith, too, he 
never mentioned the real malady - the Infiltration of non- 
tribal elements In the tribal society - In his long reports 
Only a few months before the unrest broke out he stated 
after his tour, that Chota-Kagpur was as fruitful as a 
garden. No wonder, therefore, that he was charged with 
having "misled the government by prophesying smooth things. 
He was particularly censured by Blunt, the third member of 
the Calcutta Council, because "on the very eve of a general
insurrection* he represented r'the country and the people to
(3)be In a state of prosperity, content and happiness."' ' 
"...The ends for which Hr. Cuthbert was entrusted with 
enlarged powers /In 18267#" remarked Blunt, "have been
(1) Ibid. Para. 108.
(2) fKo!s of Chota Nagparf, Calcutta Review. XL1X. Also 
Blunt, Minute, h Apl.1832, Paras.11-12. B.C.1363/5^227.
(3) Ibid. Para. U2.
utterly defeated.^' Had those powers been exercised 
efficiently, had Mr* Cuthbert duly Informed himself of the 
state of the district committed to his charge, and had he 
exercised a due control over the subordinate native officers 
of Government and others subject to his authority, X am
compelled to declare my firm belief that this insurrection
(2)would never have occurred• *' 9
(1) On 26 January 1826 he was vested with the united powers 
of Judge, Magistrate and Collector under Regulation V, 
1825, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the 
district. Resolution, Govt., 26 Jan. 1826, Para 9* 
Beng.Cr*Judl.Cons. 32 of 26 Jan. 1826.(137). The 
secretary of the Judicial department, 39 
while recommending this measure, had remarked that on 
the transfer of Cuthbert, "who has been in charge of 
the district for the last five years,M the district
**would be in new hands, Government deprived of services 
of an officer who has shewn himself eminently qualified 
by his disposition and talents to conduct the duties of 
a situation which he has so long held** He had further 
observed, *There are few situations under Government in 
which a mild and conciliatory line of conduct is so much 
required as in the management of the rude and half 
civilised people who inhabit the remote parts of the 
district. By an indulgent consideration of their 
character and circumstances they may be easily brought 
to co-operate with their rulers in any plans for 
ameliorating their condition whereas, harsh and coercive 
measures, or any exaction of the observance of 
unnecessary forms, must always have a directly opposite 
tendency and prove in the end wholly unsuccessful and 
injurious. Memorandums Shakespear, 20 Jan. 1826, 
Beng.Cr.Judl.Cons.31 of 26 Jan.1826. (137/39)*
(2) Blunt, Minute, 4 Apl. I832, Para. 39* B.C.1363/5^S27*
Cuthbert ♦© total want of Information about Chota-Nagpur, 
:7lunt thought, could only be accounted for in one of two 
ways - * either his native officer* had the means of keeping 
back complaints from himj or the parties aggrieved had no 
hope of obtaining redress by complaining.* (1) Of these the 
former seems the more likely, for though Cuthbert was many 
years in the tribal area he never learnt the loeal language, 
and so had to rely entirely upon his subordinates. (Dent, 
Uis successor, was a good linguist.) hut even more 
Important Cuthbert was not a sympathetic administrator or 
in his idealism underestimated the magnitude of the task 
of transforming a whole society and the need for safeguards 
at every step* What was needed was the imaginative 
sympathy of a Cleveland, an Outran, a Wilkinson, a Pixon, 
an Ovans or a Macpherson, who had laboured in the cause of 
humanity r,vlthout the stimulating and sustaining aid of a 
single note of popular apx»lause." (2) A newspaper 
correspondent rightly remarked "Call to mind, Mr* Editor, 
a case in times gone by - of one Cleveland at Boglepoor 
/Bhagalpur/ - send a Mr* Cleveland to the Coles and you
(1) Ibid*
(2) Kaye, Administration of the East Indie Company, 465*
Sir J. Outram worked among the Gonds and Cleveland 
amonn the Santhals in the v; a J Mahal Hills in Hlhar~.
•Kold of ChotR Kagpar,* Calcutta Review, XL1X.
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will have no occasion to augment the Ramghur Battalion*  ^
The official apathy and ignorance aay9 therefore, be 
considered an important cause of the unrest* Professor 
Haimendorf has said that all tribal rebellions "were 
defensive movementss they are the last resort of tribes men 
driven to despair by the encroachments of outsiders on their 
land or economic resources* As such they could have all 
been avoided had the authorities recognized the aboriginals9 
grievances and taken steps to remedy them not, as it 
happened In most cases, after the rising, but before the
(2 )pressure on the tribesmen had made an attack unavoidable•*' ' 
Ibis is certainly true of the unrest of December 1831# when 
it began, “so utterly ignorant were the civil functionaries 
in that part of the country of the causes which occasioned 
it, of the grounds which the people had for discontent, or 
of what was really going on, that it was for some time looked
upon as some petty disturbance or robbery, which a few extra
(3) —police officers would soon effectually suppress*" The
Court of Directors laid due emphasis on this facti "With 
regard to the causes to which the insurrection, first in 
Chota Nagpore and subsequently in the Jungle Estates, is 
to be attributed, we have to remark generally that the
(1) 9V*Jf*S*9 Bengal Hurkaru* 14 Apl* 1832*
(2) 9 ihe Aboriginal Rebellions of the Deccan9, Man in India,
belllon Number, XXV, N o • ^ , !>ec.19^5*
(3) F.J. Shore, Notes on Indian Affairs* II, 112, Footnote*
local of fleers seem to have been very imperfectly and 
Incorrectly informed as to the real condition of that part 
of the country«"^1 ‘
A natural corollary to this official ignorance, apathy 
or incompetence, at whatever level displayed, was the 
reduction in the number of the Ramgah battalion which for 
about half a century had been stationed at Hazanbagh to deal 
with such emergencies. True, some people in 1832 thought 
that the putting of this battalion on its former footing
’’would be aiding and abetting and assisting the very cause
(2)of the present disturbances* *tV hut the general congensus
of opinion was that an adequate farce must have acted as a
deterrent* "The great mistake committed,” said a
correspondent of a Calcutta paper, ’"was the reduction of
(3)the Ramghur battalion, without sending other troops*
Another correspondent expressed the opinion that “...the
reduction of the strength of the Ramghur Battalion alone
(/*)
would have been the signal fox' warfare and confusion*"
(l) Court of Directors to Bengal Govt*, X6 Sept. 1835,
Para* 6, India and Bengal/ Despatches* Vol. 6, pp*370-371* 
The views of the Directors may have been true - but one 
may add that they were scarcely blameless themselves*
They expected from officers left in sole charge of vast 
districts an understanding of local languages and 
customs which a m o d e m  anthropologist only feels able 
to acquire (working within the confines of a single 
village) by a year or two years* undivided study*
(§) &a2*tt*, 16 March 1832.
(k) Report from Bants Haja., 16 March 1632, Bengal Hurkaru.
23 March 1832.
Sotf
This view was supported In the editorial column of that 
dayt "The reduced strength of the amghur Battalion 
permitted the Insurgents to gain head and Is a strong witness 
against the penny wise and pound foolish system of military 
clipping," Teveridge struck the same note in 1862 when he 
wrote that ’'these Insurrections were doubtless encouraged 
by the extent to which government, in Its anxiety to meet 
the wishes of the directors on the subject of retrenchment, 
had carried the reduction of Its military establishments.”^ ^  
Wilson also criticised this "mistaken economy of reducing 
its military strength below the amount required to awe and 
control the barbarous border tribes*”' '’As long as a 
strong curie was maintained upon the Koles and Pangas of 
Sambhalpur and Singbhum by the superintendence of a political 
Agent, who was empowered to interfere authoritatively for 
the preservation of internal peace, and had at his disposal 
a military force sufficient to overawe the refractory, some 
degree of order was maintained.. Vhen the powers of the 
Agent were curtailed, and the troops on the frontier reduced, 
the barbarous tribes relapsed into the indulgence of their 
former propensities•*^  Shore in 1837 went to the length
(1) Comprehensive History of India, XI, 207*
(2) Mil1 * s History of Hritish India. 1858, IX, 231*
(3) Ibid. 231-232*
of saying that Hlt is universally acknowledged, that the
constant presence of our troops alone prevents disturbances,
or, in plain English, insurrection.* )
One may not agree that the presence of an adequate
force at hand would have prevented the outbreak, nor agree
that with the writers# assumptions that force was a cure-all,
but that the absence of such a force negatively helped the
unrest cannot be denied. The risings certainly would not
have assumed such proportions if the authorities had been
alert with sufficient force* As the Patna divisional
ceessissleaer pointed out, "Whatever may be ascertained to
be the origin of the disturbances, there can be no doubt
that they would readily have been checked, or prevented
from spreading to any extent if Captain Wilkinson had had
at his disposal a force of the description formerly
maintained at l?asiareoh»aug, consisting of Irregular Horse
as well as a much larger body of Infantry than at present ."
As it was the insurrection went on gaining momentum because
12)the authorities were helpless till the arrival of troops. 
According to a newspaper correspondent, "it was not until 
after the insurgents had discovered how totally unable the
(j\) %. ' 7"! :
(1) Lamtoart to Govt., Feb. 1832, Para.3. P.C.1362/5^22**.
(2) Towards the end of January. See Chapter III.
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authorities on the spot wore to meet force by force, that 
they extended the scene of their operations, increased 
their adherents, and finally concocted the wildest schemee*"^^ 
He further posed a very sane query, "Will rich coffers and 
an overflowing treasury in consequences of reduced 
establishments, civil and military, compensate for all this 
misery?"
In spite of the absence of an adequate military force, 
an efficient police could have faced the situation* "Had 
the police of the country been properly organized," said a 
correspondent, "these disturbances could not possibly have 
taken place, and our officers and men would not have been 
obliged to enter upon a service, which promises neither
(1)honour to their arms, nor brilliancy to their reputation* 7 
We have already seen how several attempts had been made since 
1809 to supplement the zamlndarl (or efcatwali) police of 
the maharaja with a regular police, and how those attempts 
liad failed mainly because of the employment of outsiders 
as police daro^as* Coivln in 1821 reported that only a
fk)purely zamlndarl police could succeed in this area.' 7
(1) ’Jasoos’, 4 March 1832, oengal Hurkaru* Ik Kerch 1832*
(2) Ibid*
(3) ,An Officer', 29 Feb. 1832, j »c ngai Hur k r- r u , 12 M r  eh 1632*
(4) Colvin to Govt., 10 Apl. 1821, Paras*29-59s lleng.Cr*Judl* 
Cons. 16 of June 1821 (134) ♦ He* deplored the neglect of
the ghatwals. 53
Only two years after this the Magistrate of K&mgarh 
reported that the police of this area had been "long 
considered 1zewindarce1 whereas substantially it differs 
in nothing from that of regular districts except that, 
independent of the avowed and notorious defects of the 
Regular Thannadarse system, another most grievous evil has 
been added in the uncertainty of payment of which the police 
officers in h&gpore have but too much reason to c o m p l a i n . * 
K. Smith wrote in very similar terms to the Niy-amafc Ajalat 
a few months after this." In 1809 it was thought expedient 
to introduce an anomalous system in this pergunna H., which 
was neither semlmlary nor Government police.• The 
consequences of this arran^fRi»nt were that the zemindars 
lost all influence, and had no more to say to the police 
than those in any common district with this disadvantage in 
Kagpore, that to all the defects of our regular police
(2)system we superadded another in the uncertainty of p a y m e n t " 
Cuthbert, however, was not at first in favour of the zamlndari 
police, though by 1830 he admitted the unpopularity and 
Inefficiency of the regular police, and he invested the 
subordinate rajas with police powers. However, the continued 
presence of the non-tribal darogss and barkandas thwarted 
the whole plan.
(1) Magistrate to Superintendent of Police, Lower 'rovinces,
8 Aug, 1823, Para 3, eng.tr.Judl.Cons. 25 $r 26 of Jan.1826
(137/38)•
(2) N. Smith to Register, Nizamat Adelat, 17 Nov.1823, Meng.
Cr.Judl.Con*. 2k ^  26 Jan, 1826 (137/38).
How very obnoxious those daro*>a3 had become was proved 
in the course of the Investigation in 1632* The burning of 
several thanas with their records early in 1832' * showed 
the wrath of the people towards the official police system* 
!U.unt lamented that the maharaja had not been left In 
charge of a purely samindari police as had happened in most 
of the Jungle Mahals where "most of the stipendary police
establishments before existing on the part of Government
(2) ! were withdrawn*” "' The six police tharms of SaharaJganj ,
Jhikociuitti* -arva, Harkagarh, jamar ami fori with a daro^a* 
laamuiar, a roohurir, and a small number of Larkandases - 
all from outside • were an eyesore to the vast number of 
ghatwais* chal4kldaYs and others* ruiamond commented in 
1&41 that the sanindari police which owed “its existence 
solely to a mutual understending and acquiescence subsisting 
between parties** • was *'surely the most desirable that could 
be established and tenfold more effectual than any other 
which could be substituted by the Government, whose native 
police would in all probability not only increase the toll 
in the pa*aes/ feut telui insolent arrogance to
produce discontent and insuxTection throughout the country.*
(i) One such thana was at Jhikpchatti; J* Master to Nizamat
Adalat» 22 Oct. 1832* ‘rial No.18, B.C.150 2/58893.
Blunt, Minute, 28 Jan. I832, Para. 3, B.C.1363/5^227*
(3/ frumsaond, M*S. statistical Account, 19.
Like the police thaj.as, the civil, judicial, revenue, 
excise and salt establishment* of the Government in this 
area were manned by plains people whose sole motive was to 
fleece the poor tribal cultivators. Worse still, the naziif.
departments were not only coirupt, they also invariably 
sided with the tribal larmors of land who were dispossessing 
the tribal landholders of their lands.
At the same time, the permanent settlement of revenue 
and the civil and criminal laws had also helped the zemindars 
and ths outsiders in dispossessing the tribal tenants* The 
ryot had gained nothing from the zemindars "whose Invariable
policy has been to grind him down, to enhance his rents,
(1)leaving no margin for a s a v i n g . 7 Major Lees most aptly 
remarked that "Hie Excellency £Lord Cornwallis^ no doubt 
thought to make English landlords of the zanilndars of Bengali 
but it is patent to the world that he succeeded only in 
making Irish ones.wV This change of status was more 
keenly felt in this tribal area where the original elearers 
of land had an hereditary interest and where they had been 
paying only a qui«&-rent or no rent at all in some oases. The
(1) * The Kola of Chota Nagpore*, Calcutta Keview* XLXX.
(2) Quoted from Land and Labour, Ibid*
tho salt- aro, a and the ptdn* of the different
mulnlxak (or 1 hutkhattioUc) or the original cl oar ore of 
the lantl held their land rent free.^*^ Rut now their age- 
old rights were assailed* and even the eld tribal ryots had 
to work on the land for the benefit of others. As a 
newspaper correspondent said* some modification was essential 
In the "perpetual settlement"* so that these original 
clearer* of land had an interest in the land again.
Early in 1832 Major Sutherland argued of the Kols that 
"Like the Gonds of the Nagpore territory, the Pheels of the 
North-Western part of India and other tribes of that nature* 
they require a peculiar form of Government and that which we
have latterly Introduced into this country does not seem
(3)suitable.w W /  blunt* arguing from his experience* held that 
like the pollgars of the Northern Clroars and the tribal 
people of the hilly tributary estates of Orissa* these
people ought to have been put outside the ordinary
(4)regulations' • He further commented that "the system of 
civil administration which may be well-calculated to protect 
the rights and to promote the happiness of the people in 
our Regulation provinces cannot with advantage or safety 
be extended to the Jungle Estates; and that for many years 
to come * the extension of our laws and of the jurisdiction
of the ordinary courts of Justice in such tracts will be
0L) Davidson to Ouseley* 29 Aug. 1839* Para.14, Misc.Dispatch Rk, 
No.247* G.G.'s Agents Office* Patna Archives.
(2) Old Grundy* India Gazette. 4 Apl. 1832.
(3) Sutherland to Govt. N.D., B.C.1363/54227
(4) Blunt* Minute* 27 Apl. 1832* Ibid.
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both premature and Injurious both to tha peace of the 
country and to the welfare of the people* a**d I think a 
serious error was committed in introducing our Regulations 
into Chota Nagpore or in attempting to oreate a revenue 
from tax to be levied from subjects so uncivilised and so 
poor*
Such remarks had also been made in the years 
lnamtiately preceding the unrest* For example* Colvlh, in 
his long report on the Tamar disturbances * had suggested in 
1821 that **a strict adherence to the Regulations also might 
in many instances be dispensed witta.*^*^ "The Regulationsf* 
he noted further* ’’are not well adapted to the character of 
the greater portion of the Inhabitants and It would perhaps 
have been more advisable / » had they not been extended 
to them originally* but the only alternatives now remaining 
are to enforce obedience to them or releasing the Pergunnail 
at once from their control* place it on the same footing as 
the tributary Mehals of Cuttack and in making a selection 
of the two* the success with which the introduction^ of the 
Regulations under the system above alluded to* has been 
crowned in this zlllah would Induce me to adopt the former
(1) Ibid*
(2) Colvin to Govt** 10 Apl* 1821* Para*63* 8eng.Gr•Judl• 
Cons*l6 of 8 June^r 1821 (13^/53) •
(3) Ibid* Para. 66.
N. Smith in 1823 had written in the same vein when he 
had urged the Government to place Chota Nagpur "under a 
more summary system of management than is sanctioned by the 
existing Regulations.^1  ^ "The arguments for a change in the 
mode of administering criminal justice in these parts," he 
had written, "resolves /sic/ into three heads, first the 
expediency of a more rapid administration of criminal justice 
in consequence of the tendency to violence, which has 
displayed itself on a vast variety of ocoaslons, amongst the 
people of Palamaos secondly the simple character of criminal 
trials, arising from the rude nature of the people, the 
practice of voluntary confessions, or the otherwise 
satisfactory nature of the proof adduced, rendering 
unnecessary here, the complicated system of jurisprudence, 
the grand object of which is to guard against the possibility 
of error in the criminal judge and thirdly the great 
geographical extent of the district and the nature of the 
country, its difficult gatlls /ghats7t ^  vast forests 
rendering It an almost Intolerable inconvenience for witnesses 
twice if not oftener to attend a trial.
Vith regard to civil administration also he had thought 
many of these Inconveniences led to a failure of justice.
(1) N • Smith to Govt., 19 June 1823, Para.8, ?eng.Cr•Judl.
Cons.21 of 26 Jan., 1826 (137/38).
(2) Ibid. Para. 9.
‘he ’*total Inability of the people te cope with our ffrrraa
of proceeding, and the process of our courts", he had written,
"led to the explosion of the combustible materials. ( *»in
Pelasiow this inability patiently to endure the tyranny of
forms, and injustice under colour of lav has displayed
itself in acts of violence; while in Sagpoor /chota Nagpur7
it has given rise to conspiracies of the most atrocious
descrlptioh."^ H e  had frankly confessed^ "I find it
easier to decide the rich man•s than the poor nan's cause*
In the rich man's case the system works as we contemplate it
in our regulations; but the poor man has to learn that the
machinery of an Arnold*s time-keeper, when once out of order
In any, even the minutest parts, renders the instrument
uselesst and perhaps in his ease, Colonel Vllkes may be right
where he considers the mechanism of a smoke-jack, as better
adapted to the exigencies of these people than that of the
(*5)finest chronometer.' In support of his argument that 
"what is good in theory is bad in practice and vice versa," 
he had given several illustrations from the cases of tribal 
peoples he had tried at Chatra, and had suggested to the 
ftavernment "the expediency of extending to this part of the
(1) I bid, Para* 10*
(2) Ibid*
(3) Ibid.
countryi the principles of Legislation adopted for the 
arrow Hills* On the other hand, adverting to *the
great extent of the country, the extraordinary dissimilarity 
in the different tribes which displays itself, now in a 
variety of districts, but ln/io7 a total diversity of 
language, to the great variety of tenures and rights and finally 
to the superior grade which these people have attained in 
civilization compared with the savage tribes on the North 
East frontier,* he had thought that the miles with regard
to Garrow Hill area might be modified in some way p to suit
(2)
the requirements of this area.' ' In short. Smith had voted 
for quickness of decision and for the removal of unnecessary 
complicated forms of Judicial procedure, because those 
formalities and delay *the necessity of which they are unable
to comprehend, lead them to have recourse to the main
>}(3)speedy decision of arms*
In the same way the unsuitability of the regular police 
system for this area had been emphasised by Blunt, Fleming, 
Colvin, N* Smith and Cuthbert (in the later years of his 
office)* Fleming,had been the Magistrate of Eamgarh before 
Cuthbert ?had gene to the length of suggesting that the
(1) Ibid. Para. 14.
(2) Ibid. Para. 15*
(3) Memorandum, Shakespear, 20 Jan. 1826, Beng.Cr• Judl.C0ns.3i 
of 26 Jan.1826 (137/39)
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zaroindars might think that the charge of police gave them 
consequence and that they would feel themselves disgraced 
by being deprived of lt# while the nature of the country 
was such that without their Influence and assistance it 
would be impossible to apprehend offenders* ^  ^
y et nothing was done to develop a purely Indigenous 
police system nor to change the complicated machinery of 
British administration. The only changes effected were the 
uniting of the offices of the Judge, the Collector and the 
Magistrate of Ramgar11 in 1826, and the abolition of the 
unpopular post of native superintendent of police, these, 
too, mainly for the sake of economy*
Cuthbert in the later years of his office here had 
repeatedly pointed out the unsuitability of the ordinary 
laws for this area* Only a few months before the unrest, he 
had reported on the abuse of the law of distraint regarding 
the sale of property for the recovery of the arrears of rent* 
"The Inhabitants,* he wrote, "are often exposed to loss, 
hardship, and all those impositions which corrupt officers 
and crafty vakeels know so well how to practise on the 
ignorant* Regulation 5 of 1812 affords the people no 
protection, they being for the most part unacquainted with
(i) iMi-
-t-trj- UMti;t>*iHr~fco I ntna ^ uiimls>;rluMer t -1*1 18*11 f n.G. 1 S«2/
5889*
its pro v i s i o n s ^^  But before Cuthbert could take any 
action to forbid the services of the professional lawyers 
in the amnsifys court, much harm had already been done to 
the tribesmen. The poor, unsophisticated kol, if ever he 
vent to the court, could hardly stand the searchlight of 
cross~exaf?ilnation. Dent admitted in 1833 that the two 
recently established siunsif *» courts were looked upon by 
the kol with awe as instruments of oppression, which only
helped the creditors and the landholders to recover their
( 2)
money and rents respectively.' 7
Spry noted in 1837» *In our revenue assessments and 
collections, such is the nature of this part of the country, 
we are compelled to depend, in a great measure, upon the 
native officers of the courts, a class of men so badly paid 
for their services that whenever the fear of detection is
(3)removed they tyrannise over and oppress the c u l t i v a t o r s . ' 
Indeed the administration of the arealn 1831 nhad all the 
faults of a rigidly legal systen, applied unscrupulously 
over an unwieldy extent of country, by officials who had 
the scantiest knowledge of the people with idiom they were 
dealing. On the one hand, the higher district authorities
(l) Cuthbert to Patna Commi so loner, 1^ March I83I, B.C. 1502/
5889k.
(?) ent, separate remarks, 5 Jan. I8 3 3 , B.C.1502/58831
(3) Modern India, I, 116-117.
(h ) Hunter, Statistical Account. XVI, 20.
were inaccessible, on the other the subordinate non*tribal
officers were enemies of tribal interests. The hindulsed
maharaja and the lesser rajae, irritated at their loss of
power and prestige, and co mittod to the non-tribal settle's,
would not help the tribesmen* No wonder, therefore, that
the tribesmen felt that "they were neglected by their new
masters, oppressed by aliens and deprived of the means they
had formerly possessed of obtaining redress through their
own chief*"'*^
If the Kola went to the non-tribal daro#;a to complain
of the loss of land, or of some manhandling by the foreign
settlers, they found every influence arranged against them,
and "a host of witnesses in the pay of the opposite party"
to prove that the poor Kol ’’had not only no rights in the
(2)land, but was a turbulent rebel b e s i d e s * C o u l d  they 
then approach the Bengal Government directly? Metcalf, the 
Vice-President of the Calcutta Council, thought that they 
could have done so by petition. He believed that they did 
not do that simply because they wanted to overthrow the 
1 ritisit Government and to establish their Independence•
(They vaguely talked of marching to Calcutta!) "I have no 
doubt however much they may have miscalculated," said 
Metcalfe, "that they did intend to expel the British
(1) l alton, bthnolomr» 170*
(2) Ibid* 170*
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Government from their own country and establish their own 
independence in Imitation of their brethren, the Singhbhoom 
Coles» who are as free and independent as any people on 
earth, acknowledging no Government but that of their own 
village chiefs, for the snoet part paying revenue to no one, 
and scarcely acknowledging any allegiance to their nominal 
Raja," though Roughsedge had oncefisaid and fondly imagined”
*that the territory of Singhbhoom" was annexed to the 
British Empire . * ^  f Metcalfe further lamented that ♦’the 
seeds of Insurrection exist everywhere under our Government, 
and more or less in all parts of India under our supremacy*
i f f
This partly owing to the readiness of the people to embrace
the prospect of any change and partly to the antipathy
against us as foreigners and conquerors, which I consider
to be universal among all classes, although, according to
circumstances, it is felt more bitterly and more actively
(2)
by some than by others,'4
It is true that these tribesmen wanted to end all 
encroachments upon their own system, but whether they thought 
in such largo terms as the freedom of the whole area, it is 
difficult to say. Blunt rightly pointed out that people, who 
hardly knew any authorities beyond the native and European
(1) ?etcalfe. Minute Ik Apl. 1832, K.C.1363/5^227.
(2) Ibid.
functionaries of t ie £t±str<et, coulr’ scarcely have planned 
the subversion of th© British power jsf I n d i a , t h e  fact 
was that they could rot find a simpler - or more effective 
- method of airing their grievances than a rebellion. 
Certainly they never dreamed of sending a petition to the 
ice-hresident of the Calcutta Government. Blunt sensibly 
asked, "Even supposing that any of their Sirdars through 
whom they would naturally seek redress, were capable of 
representing; their grievances in that form or were aware of 
the facility afforded by the Honourable the Vice President 
to all persons aggrieved, to prefer to him in person their 
complaints,*’ Vhat villager would have thought to send a 
petition through the dak or would have ventured in person 
to rat.* or Calcutta,'2 )
(1) Blunt, Minute ?7 Apl. 1832, B.C.1363/5*227, J. faster, 
the officiating comraissloner of cirouit, who tried the
hota-Nogpur cases in the sessions, remarked similarly, 
•They /lh© kola in search of employment/ visit the 
Presidency, end all the principal towns in Bengal where 
opportunities occur of witnessing the prodigious extent 
(to their simple minds) of British enterprise, resources 
and power. The possibility of such a Government being 
subverted by their feeble and insignificant efforts 
could never therefore enter their contemplation and 
their views must have been confined to the exnulaion^ 
by whom they considered themselves supplanted and 
aggrieved.*; Master to Govt., 17 Jan.1833* Bara. 2*,
B.h.1502/58833* Also in Bentlnok M.S.
(2) niwnt, Minute 27 Apl. 1832, B.C.1363/5^227.
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Metcalfe's emphasis on the 'spirit of revolt* and 
the spirit of independence* among these tribal people may 
be partially correct in vise of their long tradition of 
unrest in Tawar, iHindu and other dependencies of Chets«~
Nagpurf but it is noteworthy that the ihangar kola of Horth 
and centra! Choia - KTaypur proper** bad never revolted before* 
is belief that the KelS thought, on the basis of reports 
about the reduction of troops at 2iaaarib&gh <nd of the 
exaggerated accounts of ; u©lisa revolt at haraset near
Calcutta that it was the best opportunity of throwing off
(1)the British yoke, 1 is not oonflroied by any statement of the 
prisoners* Metcalfe's idea of a general Kol feeling of 
disaffection against the British - a feeling*composed partly 
of natural antipathy for a race so different in every respect 
irom the native population and partly of disgust for foreign 
conquerors"^2 ) does not seem to be based on facts either, 
lor the ho is revolved against all outsiders /t*didaj - the 
Hindu, Muslim and Sikh landlords, moneylenders and subordinate 
servants of the maharaja as well as the agents of the 
Government. Blunt firmly stated that it had not coe^ to his 
knowleuge * that the Coles of Chola Nagpur or its dependencies 
have at any period antecedent to this insurrection meditated
their independence*"^^ Metcalfe's use of the absence of any
(l) Metcalfe, Minute, 1^ Apl. 1832? The Muslims of Baraset had 
revolted in 1&31 under one fitu Mir*
( 2)lbid*
( 3)Blunt, Minute, 27 Apl* 1832, B.C.1363/5*227
previous wrong as a proof of conspiracy to rebel was also 
rather ludicrous - and Blunt effectively countered it by a 
reference to the Cuttack revolt of 1817 which, though 
occasioned by a long systematic oppression and alsrule, 
had not been preceded by any oomplalnts•^ ^
It Is possible that the Maharaja of Chota-Nagpur had 
been thinking of throwing off a control which had been 
growing lighter ever since 1819 when his police powers were 
taken away. Before that he had b<*en virtually Independent, 
and so late as 1810 the Acting Magistrate of RangarU had 
admitted that the pretensions of this samindar to be a
W-
+4rl*t»tary chief had never been contradicted by the British
( 2)Government.' 7 Similarly In 1811 the Introduction of the 
revenue regulations had not been deemed advisable and the 
collector was peremptorily prohibited from Interfering in 
the affairs of Chota NagpOr.*^*
In 1819, however, though tho maharaja was still 
nominally required to select and dismiss the police officers 
of Chota Nagpur, and was responsible for their payment, he 
ceased to be the head of the police of tho estate, and real
(1) Ibid. Blunt's remarks were more practical because he 
Had'the personal experience of this area.
(2) Ftamgarh.Acting Magistrate to Government, 15 Jan. 1810. 
Beng.Cfc Judl.Cons.5 of 2 Feb. 1810. (130/12)
(3) Cuthbert to Government, 17 July 1824, Beng.Cr.Judl.Cons.
36 of 26 Aug. 1824 (139/31).
^ower passed into the hands of* the mXr/darofca or native 
police superintendent. His heavy blows, however, only fell 
after M. Smith was appointed* Smith’s first measure, of 
February 1822, was *to forbid his collecting; sayer and to 
publish a proclamation forbidding any person to pay it to 
the Rajah, although proof was offered that it had always 
been collected, and that even decrees of our adawlut had 
been passed in favour of the Rajah*s right to collect it*”^ ^  
Ilia maharaja protested against this injustice on the ground 
that the sayor duties had been Included in the assets of 
the Decennial Settlement of 1789* and therefore to prohibit
this was to annul that settlement which had been declared
(2)
permanent•v ' At the same time he claimed an exemption 
from the general regulations as they had not been formally 
extended to his estate. The Government, however, rejected
(1) Sutherland to Government, H.D., 1363/54227* Cuthbert, 
the magistrate, submitted a dozen documents to show that 
the maharaja*s right to collect the saver had been 
recognised by all the district authorities in the past 
and that *on every principle of law, justice, and good 
faith,0 he was at least entitled to a reasonable , 
compensations Cuthbert to Government, 17 July 1 8 2 4 , -Ct* 
Cuthbert at times showed a good understanding of the
local matters - perhaps it was his opposition to some 
Government measures that made Blunt and even the 
Directors ready to abuse him in 1832.
(2) Petition, Agents of Maharaja Jagannath Sahi, Enclosure, 
Sutherland to God*t:, n.d., 1 £. 13^3/54227• Also enclosure^ 
Board to Government, 2 Sept. 1823, Heng.Rev.Cons.42 of
2 Jan. 1824 (59/61).
these c l a i m s . ^  His objection to the introduction of the 
abkari duties (especially ranrla dax) on the /ground that 
it meant "tvice taxing the rice or produce of the l a n d . * ^  
was similarly overruled* According to his own statement, 
besides his loss of Rs*11,000 on aceount of sayer (vith 
corresponding gain of Us*12,000 to the Government and of 
U s •25t000 to the thikadar on account of excise) he vas still 
foroed to pay Rs*7,o06 towards the expenses of police 
establishments, the revenue of Re*4,000 of Tamar and Rahl 
had been assigned to Thakuraln Penchant Kunw&rl of Paehet 
(whose claim vas to not more than Its*2,400 annually) and he 
was also forced to pay an allowance of Rs.l,4<>0 to the Rani 
of TWS»
While he vas forced to meet these demands, his 
financial difficulties vent unnoticed by the authorities and 
in 1825, when he fell into arrears, his amia was called to 
the sadr station, his elephants, horses, etc* were seised 
and he was reduced to great distress* No wonder that while
tendering his resignation as police samlndar, he emphasised
(U)his "utter ruin** and "unhappy situation". 9
(l) Government to Board, 2 Jen.1824, Ibid,
2 Petition, Mahctraja Jagannath Sahl, n*d*, Bang*Rev*Cons*38 
of 19 Jan* 1826 (60/51)*
(3) Ibid.
(k ) Ibid* Xn 1824 the maharaja had shown "his utter inability 
to discharge arrears" of police expenses and had requested 
to be allowed to liquidate them in ten years by annual 
Instalmentst Shakespear. Memorandum, Beng.Cr*Judl*Cons* 
31# of 26 Jan.1826 (13^/35).
In Jannaiy 1826 th« Government accepted the resignation
of the maharaja» and a purely regular police under the
magistrate was established.‘l’ Out a still more severe
blow was given to the maharaja9s prestige when in 1830
Cuthbert vested his subordinate rajas with police powers,
(9 )but kept the maharaja90 oase under consideration.' 1 The 
maharaja 1 objected to the arrangement by which the several 
subordinate Jaghirdar. • • ^ vested with police powers 
independent of his authority and control and he deputed 
lils Moktear to Caleutta to petition Government against that 
arrangement, claiming to be vested exclusively with the 
charge of the police throughout Chuta Naypoor and its 
dependencies as in the time of his f a t h e r . S t i l l  Cuthbert 
in July 1831, shortly before the outbreak of the j&enrest, 
advised the P a t n a  commissioner that the question of the 
trialiar&Ja being vested with these powers, even in his own 
area, should be ."postponed until time shall have been 
allowed to ascertain the fitness or otherwise of the 
i;emlndary system of police in those parts /dependent 
p&rgan&ft? in which it has b*en already introduced," and
(1) Hesolution, Govt. 26 Jan. 1826, Beng.Cr.Judl.Cons.32 of 
26 Jan.1826 (137/33).
(2) Cuthbert to Lambert, 5 July 1931# B.C.1503/5^895
(3) Blunt, Hlnute, 28 Jan.1832, Para.3* B.C.1363/5^227.
until he had proved hie ability to defray the expenses of 
the thanas punctually.^' Blunt criticised this action of 
Cuthbert, on the ground that even in the Jungle Mahale the 
expenses of the thann establishments had not been charged 
to the zMindar.' 7 Major Sutherland, on the basis of his 
long discussion with the maharaja during the unrest* 
continented that the recent measures of the authorities “are 
doubtless all most offensive to the Rajah* and would* but 
for the utter hopelessness of suooesst have naturally led 
to an open hostility on his part towards us«"w /
The interference of the British authorities had 
affected the power and prestige of the maharaja in several 
other ways. In 18279 for lnstance9 he had been prohibited 
from assuming the power of conferring titles.upon his 
subordinate Jagtdars.* 7 tils subordinate rajas had now 
realised that so long as they paid the revenues9 the 
maharaja could do them no harm. Moreover9 In his several
4C
petitions in 16329 the maharaja assessed that he was 
entitled to money payments and services ( d am and karri)
TYVVL
from the igm.nda.St the mankia and all other landholders* but
(1) Cuthbert to Lambert* 5 July 18319 >UC•1503/58895*
(2) Blunt* Minute* 28 Jsn.1832. B.C. 1363/5*1227.
(3; Sutherland to Govt.* n.d. Ibid.
(4) Govt, to Cuthbert* 14 June 1827* Beng.Cr.Judl.Cons.57 of
14 June 1827 (138/22).
that they had now stopped these payments and thought 
themselves master*. Indeed* since the Introduction of
the regulations* the maharaja had lost the power of 
escheating an estate on the failure to fulfil the services. 
Moreover* he had lately been prohibited frost realizing a 
contribution (madad) from them every third year, hot only 
that* the panohpownia. or tax on certain eastes and trades 
(e.g. oilmen* washermen* barbers* weavers, shoemakers* etc.) 
varying from four to twelve annas per house and a levy of 
special contributions on occasions of rejoicing or mourning 
- all these had been prohibited by Cuthbert in 1827.
It may well be surmised that the maharaja would have 
welcomed an end to British control and to their undue 
interference in his affairs. But whether he directly 
instigated the tribal people to revolt has not been 
conclusively proved. Xn his statements he totally denied 
his association with the rebels. Vhen told by Major 
Sutherland that he was suspected of having to some degree 
instigated the insurrection* he pointed out the loss of his 
property and of his kinsmen* and asked the Major* "Vould 
any one believe that you would set fire to this and this 
and this.” (pointing to his bed* table and c h a i r ) B u t
(1) C.r. Petition* Maharaja ^agannth Sahi* 22 March 1832*
B.C.1363/54227.
(2) Sutherland to Govt., n.d.* B.C.1363/54227*
Hut ?>ent, one of the joint commissioners, In his separate
y
remarks, Kussell, the Jungle Mahals magistrate, who 
apprehended some of the rebel leaders of Chota-Nagpur in 
Patkum, and Blunt, who had a past experience of this area, 
honestly felt that themaharaja was at the bottom of the 
insurrection. Dent thought that there were the strongest 
grounds for believing that the Nagvansle "were at the bottom 
of It and that the Raja's name was made use of."^^ The 
maharaja and hi3 Kagvansi kinsmen were very hard pressed at 
that time and to get out of their financial difficulties, 
they wanted to increase the rents of the farmers (non*tribal 
settlers to whom they had recently granted lands) or to eject 
them forcibly, tut since they could not easily do either, in 
the face of the authority of the civil and criminal courts, 
and of the police, they wanted to set this authority at naught.
The instrument for doing this was found in the discontented
(2)and ousted tribesmen.' ' loth Kussell and Dent gave weight to 
this fact because they were convinced of Singrai'a straight* 
forwardness. Moreover, this was corroborated by other 
evidence.For example, Sahils Singh, a subadar of the Ramgarh
(1) Tent, separate remarks, 5 Jan.1833» B.C.l502/58891;
(2) Statement^Slngrai, in Patkum^ Enclosure, Kussell to 
Braddon, 18 Apl. I832, B.C.1363/5^226. He even alleged 
that the maharaja had *ordered them to expel all the 
natives, the Hindusthaneos and the Mahajun Theecadars out 
of their territories, and to bring their riches, money, 
jewels and plates to him, that he may pay his Malgoosar£e 
(Government rent) out of them saying "Let their paddy, 
rioe and other eatable things bo pillaged by the hungry 
and the poor."
354
tat tailor* • who, 1th a part> , was at Ptlkoft, the maharaja's 
residence)during the later part of the unrest, stated It to 
be his belief that the N&gvancii chiefs had Investigated the 
tribesmen* Captain Wilkinson, one of the joint commissioners, 
dismissed this evidence on the goound that the ffctkadar could 
not fully corroborate his statement* But Dent, the other 
joint commissioner, in his separate remarks, described the 
subadar as a dependable character and lent support to his 
contention*
Against such a belief could be set, however, the 
known ill-feeling between the maharaja and his relations,' 9 
and his under tenure holders 11 was the subordinate laicidara 
who could assemble the ,>alki * but they were dissatisfied 
by the maharaja's rack-renting. When even the rautlas were 
at odds with Him, oould the maharaja have issued orders to 
them to create disturbances?
Several statements tending to implicate the kunvars of 
Basis and Gavindfour as the planners of the insurrection 
were received by the joint commissioners• One was that of 
Sibnath liwarl, a Brahman holding several villages in 
:?m&arrari tenure He alleged that the knnwars of Basle and
(1) Dent, separate remarks, 5 Jen* 1833, B.C. 1502/58891*
(2) Sutherland to Government, n.d•, B.C.1363/5^227*
(3) Petition, Sibnath, 7 May 1832, fncloma, Jt. Commissioners
to Govt, 16 Nov, 1832, B.C.1^2/58891.
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Oovindpur, the uncle and cousin respectively of the maharaj, 
had complained to the ssaralndar of Chhatna, a relation of the 
Packet raja, that they had lost their in ependence since the 
commencement of the Company'* rule and that many estates 
were now auctioned through the decree of the courts* The 
Chhatna chief, who had married Into the family of the Nagvansi 
saeiindars» advised them to emulate the example of the Packet 
raja (who had successfully defied the British authority In 
1737-3'0 * to defy the Government with the help of the 
tribesman and to take possession of the iag^r of those who 
would be killed. The kunwars, it was further alleged,
-yyvH
persuaded Lohar Singh, a rautla, and all the w e n d a s  or
mail toe and ftahans to rise in arras, and one Copi Pandey,
who knew theae facts and who wanted to Inform the coramiss3 onexy,
/l)
was murdered•' '
Wilkinson, after his investigation, thought that the
accusation was false, though the marriage alliance with
Packet and foihatna and the death of Oopi in suspicious
circumstances, were true enough. Dent, however, gave more
(2)weight to Tiwari’s statement than Wilkinson had done.' 9 
He pointed out that not one of the Nagvansis had come forward
to assist the authorities in checking the insurrection till
(1) I b i d ,
(2) Dent, Separate remarks,5 Jan. 1833, B.C.1502/58891.
sufficient troops had arrived, and the failure of the
-i-
insurrection had become apparent* oroover the villages
in which these chiefs resided, and their houses and
property were invariably respected* Even the flight of the
kirn war to Boesa might have been » blind* Dent also cited
the case of Raharoalli Khan who had been trading in Chota-
Nagpur for the last 35 years and who had purchased two
villages in the Sonopur parcana, His property had been
plundered at the clear instigation of the kunwar of Basia
and of Lohar Singh Rautia.'**^
Wilkinson admitted that there were **eome Circumstances
in the conduct of the Raja of Nagpoor and the Kuar of Basia
which give the story _/of TiwariJ? an appearance of truth. Tn
several instances, in which llaqadars and thicocuias were
killed in the insiirreetion, their village® hove been taken
possession of by the Kuar and Raja on the plea of there being
(2)
no direct male heir. , kut since the man who made these 
allegations was known to be on inimical terms with the Basia 
family and since he admitted subsequently that certain parts 
of this stateiaent were pure conjecture, Wilkinson refused to 
give any credence to it. Moreover, he thought that the
(1) Ibid.
(2) Jt. Commissioner to Govt. 16 Nov. 183?, P«ra.82, B.C.
1502/58891.
mankle and rautias. whom th© kunwar had reduced to poverty 
and beggary« would not have acted ae hie instrument ^ 1 ^ .
It may« however* be pointed out that thou, h the 
Ragvansis were instrumental in ruining th© tribesmen* th© 
tribal wrath was directed against the non-tribal people 
who had directly harassed them. So when they wore instigated 
by the kunwar and other chiefs* they were only too glad.
Sftliib Singh subadar stated that in his presence one 
day at ^alkote the maharaja had accused the Kunwar of Basia 
and Lohar Singh of being the originators of the insurrection. 
The maharaja insisted in the Joint commissioner*s presence 
that Lohar Singh Rautia alone was the chief instigator of 
rebellion. Was this merely a second thought* designed to 
shield his kinsman?
Another statement dismissed by the joint commissioners 
was that of a brother of the Aiwaii of Rahl who said that 
"the kols of Tamar and Bundu had received surmude from the
Saharaja ... desiring them to burn* plunder* and expel the
(2)foreigners."' His statement was discounted because it was 
based on hearsay and no confirmatory evidence could be found 
in the oarreana♦ Similarly they rejected the allegation of 
a Brahman of Basia named Soilra Migra who said that Lohar
(1) Ibid.
(2) Jt. Commissioners to Govt.* 16 Pov.1832, Para.86* B.C.1502/
58891
Singh Rautla and Kamal Singh Rautia had planned and 
Instigated the insurrection for the purpose of getting rid 
of the thanas and gentlemen (Englishmen)* and of the Suds 
(foreigners). This was dismissed because the man was not 
considered a good character and he could not adduce proof.
Such proof vat, however9 unlikely to be forthcoming in view 
of the wide influence of the Hagvansl chiefs. (After all no 
one had come forward in I8IB-I8I9 to give evidence of the 
ma^iaraja't complicity in the murder of a witch).
Yet, as Kussell* the Jungle Mahals magistrate pointed 
out* "if the insurgents were not urged on and supported by 
some such influential individuals* it is difficult to account
for the insurrection (becoming) so extensive and
(2)slioultaneous• '  He had learnt that for a Ion*: time before 
joining the joint commiesloners• camp* the maharaja had retired 
to the hills in concealment in order to avert suspicion from 
himself as party to the rebellion. He had also heard that 
the maharaja was displeased with the new system of police 
and that he was annoyed with Cuthbert for having Invested 
his subordinate# zemindars with police powers. Russell was 
therefore convinced that the maharaja was the chief instigator
(1) Jt. Commissioners to Govt.* 16 Kov.1832* Para.87» B.C.1502/
58691
(2) Kussell to draddon* 18 *pl. 1831. Para.23, B.C.1363/5^226
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of the rebollion*
J* aler, who succeeded Lambert as the commissioner of*
the P a t H a  division, also thought that the rajas had excited 
the insurrection* He, however, held that the maharaja himself 
was pooi, passive and powerless* It was designing persons 
among his connections and dependents who had misled the 
tribesmen who were later to await capital famishment. In 
support of his view that the Kagvanbl chiefs were at the 
root of the turmoil, he wrote, "Heavy pecuniary demands existed 
against them in favour of the foreign settlers and the 
expulsion of the latter promised to remove from the debtors 
a burden of endless embarrassment* Vhilst the country was 
in flames too, the lives and property of most of the Raja's 
relations were scrupulously preserved from mischief and 
molestation, a circumstance which argues tacit participation 
or most culpable supineness in neglecting; the adoption of 
effective measures for cr thing the rebellion in its i n f a n c ^ ?
It may, therefore, be surmised, in spite of the lack of 
any direct proof?that the maharaja and the lesser raja®, 
irritated with the British authorities and goaded by their 
financial difficulties instigated the tribesmen to revolt*
In the words of Blunt, the maharaja "may have considered the 
summary expulsion of the Mahajuns and the destruction of 
their houses,papers, and effects, the most convenient way of
(1) Master to Govt., 17 Jan.1833, Para 16, B*C.1502/58833.
Also Bentlnek M.S., Box 15*
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squaring all accounts with then, to many of whom he la 
understood to be much Indebted and as to the loss of revenue 
it is the loss only of one year, and he has no doubt 
calculated on a remission of the public demand very possibly 
for some years to c o a e ^
But it should be borne in mind that the Nagvansl chiefs 
oould not of themselves have caused an insurrection without 
some heavy grievances among the tribesmen. It is time now 
to turn to a rather more detailed analysis of what those 
grievances were, for so far attention has been directed 
rather to the attitude of the British, of their agents and 
of the ehlefs than to the people themselves. Professor^ 
Halroendorf has said, of the causes of tribal rebellions,
"in Chota Nagpur it was land in Kajshahl sex - yet in both 
cases violations of a tribal system led to a similar conflict 
with * law and order*• 7 Though land was certainly not the
only issue in chota-Nagpur it was of primary importance, and 
land therefore will be the first issued considered.
In the years preceding the outbreak of I83I many ryots 
had been dispossessed of land. The plainsmen who had poured 
into Chota-Nagpur - as traders, craftsmen, priests, or 
officials- ami the relatives of the chiefs, had been given
(1) Blunt, Minute, 4 Apl. I832, Para.34, B.C.1363/54227*
(2) fAboriginal Rebellions*. Man in India. Rebellion Number XXV 
No.4, Dec. 1945.
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land which was really tribal property* and "the landed
rights* of the aboriginals with which their village system
r ~ „
fwaSJ closely bound up suffereb. The total lane! thus 
alienated Included 4,288V villages in Chota—Nagpur proper 
'i.e. owned by the maharaja), 393 in Sonepur pargana, 321 
in ?>R8ia, 253 in Jaahpur, 1156 in Khukhra and so on. ^  ^
Moat of the grantees, other than the relations of the ruling 
families, were outsider*, whether priests, offioials or 
traders. All alike sought, whenever possible, to dispossess 
the tribal landowner* within the villages. Blunt commented,
"I am decidedly of opinion that the insurrection originated 
in the dispossession of the Mankees and Moondas of Sonepoor 
and the adjacent Pergunnail.» from their hereditary lands,
He admitted that in a more 'civilised' part of the country 
such a transfer of possession was a normal feature, but in 
such jungly estates with so little civilized a people, "the 
experiment of transferring such lands to farmors and 
foreigners is highly dangerous, and wherever it has been
attempted, it has invariably been productive of the same
2 (3)
injurious consequences to the ace of the c o u n t r y *
[h j ' ^  ™
(X) Appendix I, J.A, Commissioners to Govt,, 16 Nov. 1832, 
B.C. 1502/58891
(2) Blunt, Minute. 27 Apl. 1832, N.C.1363/54227.
(3) Ibid. With this view the joint commissioners actively
agreed, "we attribute to a desire of recovering those 
estates and villages \oi which the Blucinha's ha«Lb<ien 
dispossess* the commencement of the late disturbances."
Jt. Coi’&i i8*ioitovto tovt.a 16 N©v• 1832, Para.if#, B.C.I502/
58891. 111
la vide on in I839t on the basl s of his intimate knowledge
of the area* definitely stated that "'the disturbances in
Nagpoor in 1832 were caused by no one cause so much as the
dispossession of the Moondas and Mankies who are the
Hhooneae (sliuinhaV} of Sonepoor of their lands. w ^ ^
In Sonepur par to n e . all the mankla (one of them for
three years back end the rest for about seven years) had
been deprived by 1832 of their hereditary estates by Hamath
Shhl, the Kunwar of Govindpur, wJio had farmed them to thlkad&e^
The most cl aring case was that of Singrai Manki who was
deprived of his twelve villages* "These Teokadek had
rendered themselves obnoxious not only to the Mankies but
to the cultivators* They would not permit the former to
have even the fruits of trees which (they) themselves and
their forefathers had planted* and having only a temporary
interest in the lawJLthey naturally raised from it the
highest possible r e n t s * i n  the words of Singrai, "they
have taken away from us our trees, fishes, lands and jaglrs*
(k\They lend us 1 Rupee, but take three from us." Thus the
real "germ of discontent may unquestionably be traced to the 
arbitrary resumption of lands by members of the ruling family
from certain Mankies in Sonapore who conceived that their
rights were established by hereditary tenures, and to the
Tavidson to Ouseley, 29 Aug. 839* Para*#, fisc. ^espatcl
(l) Book, >0.2^7 G.C.'a Agent’s office, latvla Archive*.
(?) Jt.CeramiaBionera to Oovt. 16 Nov. 1832, * 5',
1502/58891. Al*o etatement* of Sagar S w u  (B.C. 13*3/ 
54227) and of Singrai (B.C.1363/54226J .
(4) Jt.Commi»*ion«rs to Govt.16 Nev.1832, P a r a . 73. *0.1502/
(5) Statement of Singrai, B.C.1363/54226.
introduction of aliens in the capacity of Theekatias to
the exclusion of the parties thus harshly anr precipitately
dispossessed."^^
The foreigners, who thus secured the revenne*farm81 
were not satisfied with the customary share of the produce 
from the cultivators, and they having attacked "the most 
vulnerable points " of the village system, came to enjoy 
an absolute right to the village, introduced the ’’foreign
idea of rent" ami the ♦Hajhas1 and the Manjhihas* tenures
( 2 )thus originated.' ' Naturally enough, the tribal people
who were unusually conscious of their Inherent right in
(3)th© landw ' developed a hatred towards those foreign
intruders. Their "blood boiled with indignation" at the
sight of these foreigners "whom the Maharaja had let loose
over th© country and who sought to reduce them from their
posstion of village proprietors to an inferior status.
And their fierce hatred of these aliens, the Munclas expressed
in indignant songs ... in which the unwelcome strangers
are compared to the greedy vulture, th© ravenous crow, the
(b)
upstart peacock, and the ominous owl."'
(1) J. Master to Govt. 1? Jan.1833, Para.8, B.< .1502/58893*
Also Bentinek. M.S., Box 15*
(2) Rakhal Dee Haidar1s Report, Supplement to Calcutta Gazette 
1 Dec. 1 80. In 1839 Havidson explained Manjhihas as 
Aground allotted to the landlord or his theekadar* and
Pajhas as "the land paying rent to the owner or his 
representative•' But later on th© thikadar began to 
cultivate the latter category of land; Pavidaon to
uuseley, 29 Aug. 1839, Para.lJ. fnrrK, Mo* 1^/
(3) A (4) See over.
3 G *
(3) According to an anonymous writer of "kols of Chota 
Ka£~p°r®" Calcutta Review. XLIX* 124, they adhered to 
the hinuuTaw«*givcr Manu’s principle, "The cultivated
land ie the property of him who cut away the wood, or 
who cleared and tilled it." ?oreover, nlike Russian 
peasants, (they) are wide awake to their right to the 
land"i Ibid.112.
(4) Roy, ffundas, 168-169* The English translation of one 
such songt
hook where thou wilt, dear, wherever eye graces, 
Tfpto the sky or below to the earth,
(hen of «»ean blood wilt thou meet in high places) , 
Owls pose as lords, dear, the owls of low birth. 
Look how the crow rules as diguar (village watchman)
eaoh village 
Peacocks are grown great beings on earth 
Rules the vile crow now as Kotwar all over, 
kow hath eaoh village for Dlgwar a crow.
Mundas of hamlets now tremble and shiver,
They that were owners of hamplets ere now.
Phuinhas all over now quake and quiver,
Terror supreme now doth reign the land over,
Mundas of hamlets have lost their old cheer.
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The influx of tiie«e hated out aider a gfcye rise to the 
system of yub-letting two or three village® to small 
farmers or thi adara - a practice which eventually crushed 
out all lndigeiious village organisation? $he thlkadar was 
usually a Muslim and the "kola bore that sort of hatred to 
him which the Irishman bears to the interloper who gets 
possession of hi* hut aacl c r o f t . T h e  Hindus were 
mostly traders an moneylenders9 hated for their enormous profit 
and asurous interests: "The mahajens who advanced money and
l^rain managed within a twelve month to get from them 70 per
( P )cent and sometimes more*"' ' According to a newspaper report, 
the mahalen often wrote in an option to take either money or
pXtkXn in the harvest season and "if he takes money, being
the only purchaser, %he first buys the grain at his own price
(3)
and thus gets his money back either way.* Another
correspondent wrote of these maim.1 an3 , shroffs and others, 
who had come from Patna, Gaya and Sherghatl, that they 
captured the trade of this area and "by means of loans, 
exorbitant interest , etc* even the land and villages 
eventually became t h e i r s a n d  the tribesmen were reduced
to mere s e r f s W h e n  the tribesmen had thus become
(1) Suther 1 and to Govt. n* c? • , B. 0 * 13^3/5^227 •
(2) Jt.Commissioners to Govt, 16 Nov. 1832, Para*75, B.C*
1302/5889^
(3) *01d Orundyf, 6 Karch 1632, India Gagetie* 16 March 1832*
An Interest of 75 P*c« per annum was charged, though the
interest permissible by law was only 12 p.e*
(k) A letter in India Gazette, 19 March 1832.
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deeply involved i« debt to th* p l t l n m n  and they had 
been pressed hard for paymert, many of them "had executed 
"Sewukpattas*, that is, had sold their services till the 
debt was diecharged, which was in fact binding themselves 
to give their whole cam l o f t  to their creditor receiving 
from him food and clothing, or [toj work for him exclusively, 
thue becoming hie bondsmen for life.’* ^  Little wonder that 
som<? contemporary neve papers described this rising as a 
helots* war against the masters* !ven the Joint
commissioners who in 1832 tried to argue that though the 
tribesmen did not resent the exorbitant rate of Interest 
(75 to ion p.©.) as oppressive, agreed that it could not 
tut hmve been severally felt by them* " w '
Yet another grievance of the tribal people was the 
manipulation of the currency. VIth the introduction of a 
money economy, for thf payment of revenue, they were exposed 
to numerous frauds by moneychanges and revenue officials*
They complained to the Joint Commies loners ’‘against the 
r.emlndas and Jagheerdar for having within the last few years 
increased their land rent, by collecting malgoosarrl* in
(1) Jt* Commissioners to Govt* 16 ^ov.1832, para.75, B.C.
1502/5^891
(2) fJassos*, k March, Bengal EU.rkaw* Xh March 1832*
(3) Jt* Commissioners to Govt* 5 Apl* 1832, Para* 2*, B.C.
1363/5*227
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Hicea which was formerly paid in 5 m t  ^ r u p e e s 1 
chan^a also involved an actual increase or 35 p*e* in the 
land rovtthuo burden* «nt, in hie separate remarks* rioted*
"the fluctuations in the copp«r currency have bean complained
of by the Coles* the coin is a mis-shapen piece of copper*
d 2
without any impression* (averaging about k Prams X serupe
r\
athopecarit* weight) stated to have been originally 
manufactured at Kiraapore by a bunea of the name of Muddeo 
;a Vice* It is not current In the adjacent districts**x
The thikadaa and officials also misused their power in 
ways even more personally wounding. There were numerous 
accounts of women being seduced or carried off by the Muslim 
and Sikh thikadaxs. findrsti» the t.aanki ©f Xatva, in Tandgeon 
admitted frankly that he became desperate because Jemadar 
«• huciabakeha and the arkandases* Jagarnati.* and Mu# an 81 took 
away one of my women to Bundgaon and at night took her 
'Hoormut* (honour)1** and th&t he could not find her in the 
Jungles* He confessed that this wee why he killed Jafar All*
(1) ibid. Pmra 19« "the evil wee "felt more sorely from the
depreciation of the copper coin* 13 Tucka or 26 pukka pice 
were formerly equal to a sonat ttupee and received in 
payment of rent as such* The present value of the sicca 
Ptipee is 20 Tucckas; the rents being collected in copper*"
(1) rent* Separate remarks* 5 «Jan. 1833* 8*0*15^2/58891
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the °r Baiw»lfeon, plundered and burnt hie liouse, and
thumbegan the disturbance.(l! b a r H e r  he had told Bahadur 
‘ interpreter) , who had been sent by the authorities 
to (tt lii touoh with hi*i that two af his wives lad been 
carried off by the Munshl and his Muslim peons who had 
ravished the younger one and ill-treated her in bestial 
fashion. Mor-ovt-r the Singh (the Sixth t r a d e r ) cf Surgeon
bad ta«;en avay two of his by force and retained then
at his place.
One may woxid^r, as Mete«lf«i did, why those aggrieved 
people did not seek redress In the court of lew or from
* police thanag;. Bit these departments were, as has been 
already noted, honeycombed with abuses, and the poor 1 
cribmmman had no hope of Justice there* ass, the ^atir
of the s^sgftyfa court9 surpassed all others in oppression 
extortion,
-------, ■ - ■■■■ ■ „ , ■ ■■■   M  ----------------------------  ■   - -
statement, iindrai, 19 Apl 1832 » r . c ,1363/3**27.
*.2) Statement, Biodrai, Bahadur, Fnelosure, Jt, Commissioners 
to Government, 12 Feb. I832, B.€. 1363/5*22?. Faijnath 
Manki stated before the Ramgarh magistrate and the Patna 
commissioner that some Sikhs ’took from Sing Rae Manki 
his daughters and kept the® in their houses.19 According 
to a newspaper report, on the other hand, his sisters 
and wives were taken away and one of the wives was treated 
with unheard of and unparalleled bariwarity.* 9P*,
Bengal, })urc«ru, 15 Feb. 1832.
(3) glasses’, yuskaru. Ik Mare I832. Ke was mainly
instrumental (in a negative way) in producing the rising,
ai*d tftill he was a lowed to continue in office. "Jassos,"
reng&i, Hurkartt. 30 Apl. I832.
he police officers were similarly famous for their 
extortions* M u n t  admitted in 1832* "the most grievous 
oppressions and exactions have been practised by the native 
officer* of Government« especially the ; oliee arognhs'
e
which alone* amidst a people so poor* ^ight well account for 
any general feeling of discontent.^1 J
A few examples will show "the hopelessness of the 
aboriginal population over obtaining any redress from the 
local potentates who were then in practical possession of
( 2) v
the country.*' ' :>ui* the amn^a of Fehagutu stated to
Bahadur Pohhasiai *1 gave a tola of gold to buttle Cols of
' oomang of Soneporet in exchange for whleh he agreed to
give mm a fair of buffaloes during three years. 1 applied
to hies seversi times for them in vain* for which reason
X carried off a pair of his buffaloes. For this 1 was
considered a thief by hohammad Ally Hi Ik of £oomag« who took
from me the buffaloes* anti tied and took me to hie house.
The next day he suspended tas from a tree by a rope tied to
m y  hair/ subsequently cut me down, when by the fall one of
m y  toes of my left foot was broken. 1  was kept in the
stocks five days suffering; great torture* and only obtained
tay release on giving a bullock and a buffalos. 1 immediately
went andcw l a j i w d  of th. trMtaw.t ; Ji».i r e c d » Q a . _ t f e i
(1) Blunt, Minute, UApl. 1832, Par..12, B.C.1363/5*1227.
(2; <eld, ^aiecM ■aa.ttl.gj.n.t Report, r«rn.
oorah.aut (Forahat in Slnghhhiuti) Raj ah, and wished to be
informed by him how ) was to recover my gold, a»i what
redress I should have for Maho-omed Ally*# conduct towards
me, who had taken luttle’e (part), as he belonged to his
village. he uaja said he could not send for either
? ahoe^med Ally or battle, but that hi.si Moonshee and Jemadar
of the Chuekeriher-^ore Tham*a, when they vent to Bandgeon,
would Investigate and settle ay business* the voonshee
and Jamadar caste to Bandgaon In the month of fthadow 1236
Fasellly, and X went to them* In place of paying attention
to my petition they fined me five rupees* 1 was satisfied
the Moonshee was taking his frlemfb part, and that my
t U v . . c .  would not bo r.dr....d.-U )  houeh Swl’ 
cross-examined after his arrest in April 1632, gave rather a
( 2 tdifferent statement, the tenor of both the eta tenants was 
the same, revealing a helplessness and desperation which - 
inevitably led to violent action*
The second statement was by hlndrai Hasskl, another 
leader of the insurrection* He stated to Faliadur, the 
Interpreter, thus, *1 borrowed a pair of old buffaloes from 
Murju ania of the Bonepur ^ argana • This man came to my 
house accompanied by 60 men am! took from me six cows and
(1) Statement, Sul Hrnuia, Enclosure, Jt* Commissioners to 
Govt. 12 Feb. 1632, B.C.1363/3^227.
(2) Statement Sui, 19 Apl. 1832, Ibid* The difference was 
only In details regarding beating etc. by Hohammad^All. 
He also stated before vilklnaon that he did not complain 
to the higher authorltles^of fear.
and myself, and took us to his house. w# succeeded in 
sffsctlng our escape, but ray cattle was not released. 1 
complained to Koomkera Singh, Raja of nandaon (in Slnghbhun), 
of the nai ia'e treatment of ue. J’e listened to ae and gave
UT
mm 33 Hen for my protect ion with whoa I wont to Sweg&on, 
where not finding the Boniat wo seised two men and a pair
of bullocks which wa took to th© Raja. For this an
u*
inhabitant of ?wegaon, named Singh (a eixh thjkadar), 
preferred a complaint against us at Sherghatl. My brother 
Sln^irai and self and nahadur were seised by the Chakradharpur 
*;unshi and Jamadar who cane to Bandgaon for the purpose. X 
requested them to send ue to Sherghatl, if our selaure were 
in consequence of orders from there. They replied that they
vv/)
would give no answer on paying them ICO rupees. After 
remaining confined in the stocks for fifteen days and 
suffering great pain, we escaped• . • *'*' Hindrai further 
stated Uov his wives and sisters were ill-treated and how 
the i drafts t raja** <:lya!» told him, on being approached, t ist 
"ve might do as we pleased, Imt be careful not to Involve 
raja Achet Singh in any difficulties by our conduct.**' 7
These Incidents not only reveal the inefficiency of the 
police of Chota-Nagpur and Singhbfmm, but also the
{ state ent, indraft n losnre, Jt. otmniseionsrs to Govt. 
12 Feb. 1832, B.C. 1363/5*227.
(2) Ibid.
the h triple*ffxier-s ei thm lnghbhim raja. Ilka hla cosap^r In
A
ho ta-Nagpur, before the manoeuvres or hie divan and tha 
turbulanca of hie tribal chieftains. Incidents like these 
put the spark to the fusesof discontent. Bindrai and Singrai* 
naturally enough, assembled their brethren of Singhbbum and 
ramar* and resolved to do or diet "We returned Home* 
invited all the kols our brethren and caste to assemble at 
the village Lankan in Tamar* where we had a consultation.
The Pathans had taken our honour and the Singh our slaters 
and the Kuar, Itaranath Sahl* had forcibly deprived us of 
our estates of twelve villages* which he had given to the 
slngh. Our lives we considered of no value* and being of 
one caste and brethren* it was agreed upon that wo should 
commence to cut* plunder* murder and eat. Ve said* if any 
were Hanged it would be us four* if any put in Irons* we 
should be the .our* Ve four should be answerable* and if 
the gentleman sent for any* it would be us who were ready to 
attend and submit to whatever might be the sentence. It is 
with this resolution that we have been eiurdtYlng and plundering 
those who have deprived us of both honour and homos* 
conceiving that (tyj committing such outrages our grievances 
would come to light* and that if we had any master* notice 
would be taken of them and Justice rendered."'*
(1) Statement* Blmdrei* Enclosure* Jt.Commission re to Govt.
12 Feb. 1832* B.C.13*3/5*227.
The complaints of oppression preferred against the thnua 
establishments, particuJnrly In ths remote parts of Chota- 
Nagpur, wars "vary loud" and "considerable sums are stated 
to have bean taken by the Daro^ha, and Jemadar, as Sul l a m e ©  
aaid in bribes irem all classes.'^*' 3f many people who had 
paid {yrib©*, were reluctant **to come forward with their 
complaints irom an apprehension that proving their 
correctness will be attended with much trouble and 
lMonvezkleM*aT^2  ^* there must have been many cases like 
that of Layiiram I©1 of Chhattarkol. :le stated that ’'in the 
month of Shadow last one of his bankas {jphan^ar ^ols}9 
returning from work went to a tank, fell into it and was 
drowned* 'he circumstance was reported at the Thanna of 
Jeekoooiuittle {Jhlkoohatti) in oonaequonce of which there 
came a i itok^ndaze to examine the corpse* etc. - accompanied 
by 1C to 15 Ko*wars (Kotwals) - and remained eight days in 
the village. ’’ They consumed 15C s©er%of Vana (coarse) 
rice, 75 seers of Arwa (fine) rice, *chee. worth two rupees, 
anc salt worth one rupee, besides, the sepoy realised 5#26
( ) Jt. Commissioners to Govt, 3 Apl. 1832, Para.18, Ibid.
(2) Jt. Commissioners to Govt. 16 Kov. 1832, Para. 78, P.O.
1502/58(91.
(3) I M d , Para. 79- The raaharaja had opposed the introduction 
of village chaukldars (kotwals) because every village 
already had a i.oralt or village constable who was 
sufficient for village watcht ^ent, separate remarks.
5 Jan.1833, B.C. 1502/58891.
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a»n*a h on th. throat of ..tiding tho Kol to Shergimtf for 
execution.'‘'
Kor wore abuses practised only upon individuals. The 
aahtgg, ^ahans an*, ilanartars were required annually to 
register the names of the Kpfcwals and ^oraits of their 
villages in the thana. This registration was made an 
oceasion by the Tarogas for the exaction of a fee of one* 
rupee or more, according to the else of tho village, as
f t & a M  or «orftU JUUsiEl*(21
Metcalfe made light of these •'excessive or undue or 
Illegal exactions "made* by the Rajah and the Jageerdas, 
and by our police and Revenue officers in ehota tfagpoor,* f 
declaring them "UaiHlly sufficient to eau&e auch an 
insurrection as this, which has not been directed towards 
a redress of grievances, but to the utter annihilation of 
the Government, and extermination or expulsion of every 
inhabitant of the country, who case under the designation
i wof Foreigner.* '*J He later pointed ou that "shameful as 
some of these exactions undoubtedly are, they are not so
rare In India as to have been exclusively inflicted on the
(h)Coles.*' ; what he failed to recognise was the strength of
(1) X M d *
(2) Jt. Commissioners to Govt. 16 Kov.1832, Para.SO, 15*c..
*302/5^891
(3) Metcalfe, Minute, 30 arch 1832, B.C.1363/5*227.
(k) Metcalfe, Minute, 1** Apl. 1832, 3 bid.
the i ol s. Irl t of independence, and their tradition of 
tribal exclusiveness# The seven cuts inflicted on their 
victims by the hols on account of seven obnoxious "taxes suggest 
that the extortions and abuses were not unimportant to the 
insurgents* (The cuts vers given one for eaeh tax: for
the M t t a  on changing copper for silver9 the excise tax on 
spirits, the proposed tax on opium, the fines for supposed 
or real crimes, the village salable* the forced labour 
on the roads and the postal taxes on the villages) ^ *^# Host 
of these were new taxes*
The most galling of these was the tax on hanria or
rice beer which, as the local authorities arid even the
I 2)
Bengal Government admitted, * was almost a necessity of 
life with these tribal people* Cuthbert, by reviving this 
tax as a house-tax in 183C had, in fact, infringed 
regulation X of 1813 which provided only for duties on tho 
manufacture and sale of spirituous liquors, and not on 
domestic brewing* Since no samlndar had imposed such a tax 
before, this was ascribed to British rule, which was thus
made obnoxious# Accustomed as the tribesmen had been to
(1) Sutherland to ovt. n.d* n#C.13^3/3^227. A similar 
Instance of barbarity can be found in the eanthal 
Insurrection of 1855-57« Uin Oayal Kay's limbs were
chopped off bit by bit with such remarks# '*VitIi these 
fingers you counted your interest and ill-gotten wealthI 
kith this hand you snatched away food from the months
of *he hungry poori* K#K# Katta, Santal I insurrection, 31*.
(2) Bengal Govt, to Court of rirectors, 25 Sept# 1832, B.C. 
1362/5^223.
hanrla "from their infancy* becoming through tine 
almost necessary to their existence* it was hardly possible 
to expect t at the foies would make so great a sacrifice 
as almost wholly to resign the use of their favourite
beverage.*^ }
The Board of Customs* salt and opium had sanctioned 
the levy of four annas on every house with e full knowledge 
of the oppressions perpetrated by the excise staff asui 
farsserst "The inhabitants or Chota Ht^cpore. • are stated to 
bo subjected under the present abkaree system of this 
pergunttah to various oppressions* such as being forced by 
the farmer to take out licences for the sale of liquor when 
they know nothing of the way of manufacturing it - of being 
afterwards compelled to pay the tax for the license so 
forced upon them* in advance for half the year at once* and
of being further subjected to extortions on behalf of the
(1)farmers by their Peadas."w /  But since there was a possible 
increase of Government revenue to be had* the Board cheer­
fully swallowed Cutherbertfs assertion that it would be a 
'popular tax." ^
(1) oru&Mtonti* M.S. Statistical Account* Chapter VI#
(Ko page no.)
(2) Cuthbert to f ovt. n.d. Enclosure* Jt.Commissioners to
Govt. 5 Aprl. 1S32, B.C. 1363/ 5*227.
( 3) Board of Customs to Patna Commissioner. IB dime 183G* P#C. 
1363/5*^29.
(*) A writer (»a looker on’, camp Chota Kappur* IB March 1832) 
in the Bengal Burkaru* 30 March 1832* described Cuthbert 
as "another pealou^ servant of the rising star* who 
discovering these Coles to be eons of Bacchus and lovers 
of Intoxicating Julco* conceived It to be inconeietent/ovei
r; *)inroe* •« T< i'S 1
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Urn reports of .he joint co^mi ssionex* rove * led Siov 
useful a s instrument of oppression the tax of four annas 
a house became in the hands of the tax collectors* The 
^.aOas sent to count the houses, exacted bribes from the 
village heads, the latter instead of taking four annas or 
ten ejftbuo (or large pis) took twelvet even sixteen debus( *
i very village paid a cash salami to the tahsildar and
( 2 )psedee* orten a goat as well.' ' As Sutherland put it,
‘ All taxes of tltls nature are intolerable to the Coles to
wliom they are new, and who are not sufficiently civilised
quietly to bear the infliction of new taxes.”1 **
Cuthbert, when asked for his comments, replied that at
the time of the excise settlement he had questioned hundreds
(At
of kola without finding one who complained of tin* tax.
Nor had the xamindar* expressed ony dissatisfaction with 
the plan. In the newspaper controversy over the causes of 
the outbreak there were some who defended Cuthbert, arguing 
that even if the tax gatherers had taken twelve annas 
Instead of four that was not the cause of the outbreak,
(1) Jt. Commissioners to Govt. 5 Apl. 1832, para. 8, f.C* 
1363/5^227-
(2) Jt. Comsat esioners to Govt* 16 Nov. 1832, Para. 75*
B.C.15^2/58891
(3) Sutherland to Govt, n.cu B.C.1363/5^227*
(h) ruthbert to Covt. , 29 'torch
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and that many prisoners had said th§> ttdid not know what 
they were fighting for."^*^
But the evidence suggests that though only one of 
several factors, the abkari tax was a major one. Of the 
village heads questioned by Major Ulackall after the rising 
had been suppressed 20 referred to the great exactions of 
the collectors, who took 12 annas, or oven a rupee where four 
anna* alone wore due,' ' aid the Maharaja ox Chota Nagpur 
also pointed to the tyranny and oppresalon of the abkarx 
tahalfdars as a cause of the popular discontent.^ ^  If© 
had opposed the tax from the beginning pointing out that 
the poor labouring tribesmen had "neither the means of 
preparing nor purchasing liquor, < ut in the same way that 
they support life by eating rice, so that they mix that 
same rice with jungle productions and giving it the name of 
"handea** therewith satisfy their wants. To collect promptly 
the four annas which has now been imposed on each house is
difficult, snd injury and oppression of the poor are the
( b )necessary results of the demanding it.1*' The Calcutta
Courier certainly believed that here was a major grievance.
(1) *Pf camp Pitoria, John Bull, quoted in Bengal 1 Curkaru.
XS larch 1832.
(2) Mackall to Cuthbert, 8 Apl. 1832, W.C .1363/5^227.
(3) Statement, Maharaja Jagaimath Sahi, n.d. Ibid.
(b) Petition, Maharaja Jagannath Sahi, 6 Apl.1832, Enclosure, 
Dent^ separate remarks, 5 Jan. 1833* fl.C .1502/58891 •
r'Tt is not pretty veil ascertained that the tax on houses 
substituted for the spirit tax, was the inciting cause of 
the insurrection... It is assessed, the tax was collected 
in a very oppressive way b> the agency of Hoosuliaans and 
other foreign agents and that... these merciless extortioners 
levied a poll ta* ad libitum.w^ '
Besides this liquor box, anothor grievanceof the 1 ols 
was the forcedpoppy - cultivation and, according to
Sutherland, another cut was given to the victim* body on 
tills account. Though Cuthbert had introduced it as a 
valuable cash crop which would improve the condition of
the peasants, "the thing was disagreeable to the Coles, who
(2) /knew nothing of the manner of making it*M‘* ent found
the soil quit© unfavourable for its cultivation and strongly 
recommended its discontinuance). It was made more 
disagreeable by the pressure which Cuthbert put upon the 
cultivators, despatching ^er^wanas to the xamindars, 
ia.-.ftiare. and police officers to extend its cultivation* 
ilia bola pleaded that the Officials "might take their
^  ...
Ihotees (loin-cloths) and pugreee (turbans) aJLaost the 
only things they had to give* but that they would not
(1) Calcutta Courier, 11 Apl. 1832, Editorial
(2) I>ent, Separate remarks, 5 Jan. 1833, B.C*1502/58891 • fhe
statement of opium produce in Chota Nagpur (Appendix,
Joint commissioners to Govt., 16 Nov* 1832, B.C.1502/
56891 s-ows that in 1628/29, 1829/30 and 1830/31 the
average produce was a! out 1 16 seers, 3 Mda,
jl seers ano 5 Mds. respectively.
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cultivate the .loppy."v) 'Hit the subordinate officials 
continued to prose then* amS even after Cuthbert had Issued 
\nstruetlena that the aalag should not force those who did 
not produce opium.
The contemporary newspaper reports con firm the view that 
this new opium policy was a cause, albeit a minor one, or 
the unrest, and that it was particularly disliked by the 
tribal p e o p l e . ^  (one good reason may well have been that 
the Company paid only ??$.3 annas 8 per seer for opium 
pro duced in this area).^'
The Joint commissioners corroborated the reports that 
opitua production was disliked. In April 1832 they admitted 
that the thaimdtfo had been in the habit of taking from 
almost every village within their Jurisdiction nfrom one to 
two rupees for exempting the Coles. They further 
adr it ted that it was quite uzicertain whether Cuthbert#a 
Instructions not to use compulsion had boon obeyed, and in 
' overaber 1832 having found other classes as averse to poppy 
cultivation as the hols, they "ordered it to be discontinued 
in (shots) Nagpore." ^
(1) Sutherland to Govt. n.d. 8 .C.1363/5^227.
(2) Ibid. Also see Blunt, Minute, k Apl. 1832# Ibid. One
* Ignoramus* (in Bengal Hurkaru. 23 Feb. 1832 argued that 
the Kola rejoiced in poppy cultivation, which was in no 
way true.
(3) cf. Report from Camp nenta HaJam, 16 March 1832, “vnn&l. 
iiurkarui 23 March 1832. • A looker on» , Camp Chota Nagpur. 
18 March 1832, Bengal Hurkaru. 30 March 1832.
(A) Letter from Camp Bundu, 27 reb.1832, fkmaml Hurkaru.
5 March 1832. According to f01d Gru«f>• (€> March 1832,
t 16 Marsh 1832 it was jnly 2 rupees per »</tr
<3) J t .cor oil si oners to Govt. 5 Apl. 1832, Para .28, B.C. 1363/ 5^5 2
A correspondent of the Bengal : nrkaru summed up the matter 
by saying "This obnoxious measure (liquor-tax), together 
with the compulsory means adopted for the cultivation of 
opium, has driven the Coles to the desperate resolution of 
taking Justice Into their own hands, and now they are 
making the country smoke for it.**1 ^
Other grievances of the tribesmen were the demands and 
exactions made by the nazlr. the daro^ag. and their 
subordinates under the term 1 Ounah^arl * i.fc* fines for 
offences real or pretended• Mo wonder the rebels
inflicted a out for this on the bodies of their victims.
If a person committed suici- © or even died a natural death, 
some one in hla village would be accused of murdering him 
and would only escape on payment of a ^ r i b © * ' ^  It was a 
common 'fight in the countryside to see the daro^ae travelling 
in a palanquin carried by the Kola with th© baharart-loads 
of rice, ghee, fowls, ©to. the forced contributions from the 
villagers, following them*^1' £ach village had its own 
catalogue of such payments and the darc^as lived lavishly 
in spite of their petty salary* There was hardly a daroga 
"who* on his 25 Rupees a month did not keep his palanquin,
(1) A lawk stager, Bengal Kurkaru* 28 Jan. 1832.
(2) Sutherland to <»ovt* n.d* 13*0,1363/5^227*
(3) Ibid*
(b) ISid.
and hardly a peatiah, who on hi a 3Hs* a month, did not keep 
>iia torse. Th* fdnaex^ftr® aalct to have emulated the 
^buhfttet, the Ha Jail's brethren and Jagttrdara •M ^ ^
Lutherlan thought that this system of Chain jrt gar 1 was
(2)perhaps that from which the people suffered most." 9
The next two outs were far manipulation of the copper 
currency and for the salami* a yearly nazar of Rs«l| 
reallsod from each village. Vet another for which a
cut was inflicted on the body of die victims, was the forced
(labour on the roads exacted without any remuneration*v 
(It was an irony of fate that some of these roads materially 
facilitated the operations by the troops against these very
people in 1832)* There were some other types of forced
th\
labour too w M o h  came to light in 1839 and to whioh the
(Senior Assistant Commissioner of Lohardugga referred in 1859 
three days9 ploughing, three days* spade work, three days* 
planting and so on* The seventh grievance, for which a cut 
was Inflicted, was the Dak~eollectlont a contribution of V  
rupees taken from certain villages to keep open the
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid*
(3) Ibid. The Joint commissioners also heard complaints about 
***** be/cars Jt* Commlsslohers to Govt*> 5 Apl.1832,
Para.21, (*>.€• 1363/5^227* Already in I830 Cuthbert had 
reported that the villages near the roadside were *much 
deserted* owing to the practice of sepoys and offices 
"pressing th© villagers as Begareea* ** The people "made 
previous complaints1" to him on this head* Cuthbert to 
Govt. 15 Apl.1830, Para.^O, Beng.Cr• Jucil.Cons• 27 of 11 May
1830(139/51.
(4) S a Chapter II, P.\v>x
(5) ’ Is of CUota MagpflT* , Calcutta Review* M X .
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(1*communlcation between Shtn hati end Chota-: agpur.' ;
According to Tent, the total demands were never realised, and 
since the tax was not general, it must have been the more 
felt by those who had to pay Till January 1S30 the
collections were made by the Chota-Bagpur chief, but In 
oonequonce of some irregularisles, they were handed over to 
the Police officers, thus opening another avenue for their 
exactions*
Of these seven obnoxious tax-1terns, the liquor-tax,
forced labour and the iaK-collactions, according to
('11Sutherland, were sanctioned by the Cover went'. Blunt
thought that it was doubtful Whether any of these had the
i h)clear sanction of the* Government. 7 But whether officially 
sanction© or not, their collection by Company officials 
necessarily made British rule hatetfult each item might 
seem drifling in itself, but together they were an intolerable
burden•
In fine, this unrest, though unusual in its unanimity 
and rapid progress, was, like all other revolts, not 
accidental or spontaneous in its origin* That the tribal
(1) Hiis tax had h©en imposed in 1829 (though the Dak had 
been established two years back) under Peg*XX of 1817*
The total collections from nine villages of Chota-Kagpur 
were SO.5%95 up to 1831* lent, separate remarks, 5 dan.
1833, B.C.1502/58691.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Sutherland to Covt, n.d., B.C.13<>3/5^227.
(4) Blunt, Minute, k Apl. I832, Ibid.
38*
peopl* had serious (grievances a ainst the administration 
cannot b* doubted. Certain proxlciate causes ( however, wore 
accidental and they served to kindle the flasie. Three 
such incidents, already referred to, were the arrest and 
maltreatment of Sul Musk to and the two brothers, *indrai 
Manki and Singral Manki (whose women were also dishonoured) 1 
Similarly in lasuar, where the rajafs death in September 1831 
had caused great confusion, the conduct of the Bamgah aaair 
acted aa the match which set fire to the train. He took no
notice of the feelings of the aggrieved Lindas and mankis
(2) .
in ' auiar' ; not even mentioning the outbreak of December 1831
(1)in his report on 2 Jan. 183* • instead he used trickery
Govlndpttr vent to Baijnath and said, "Come with roe to the 
Thatnah, Where tl»e Nazir and Thaimarfar are, and your villages
(1jstatements, Ghasl Man^hia before the nszir» Xh Jan.1832: 
Statement, Shaikh Pina, an intelligence messenger of the 
Agent, S.W.F. 7 Jan. 1832^ Statement, Salm^ Mahll, before 
Bhairo Singh Jamadar in Tamar, f no. Jt.Coram. to Govt. 1ft Feb. 
1832, Ibid.
(2)Tamar was one of the worst danger-spots of the area. Colvin 
had reported in 1821 that the people of this par/:ana •’are
a degree more civilized than the tribe of Luwp Cole 
inhabiting the territory of Slngbhoom, but a similar prone­
ness and inclination to plunder and lawless excess of every 
kind and a like Inherent contempt of all subordination and 
obedience to authority obtain amongst them as amongst the 
latter.•• At the sound of their immediate superior*s drum 
(they) instantly assemble and will not hesitate in the 
Commission of any acts of violence or outrage...” Colvin to 
Govt.10 Apl.1821,Paras.7-8. Beng.Cr•Jtt 1 .Cons.16 of 8 June
1821 (134/53*
(3) Report, Nazir, 2 Jan. 1832, ne. Jt. Coraw .to Govt. 5 Apl. 
1832, B.C. 1363/54227.
(4) Statement, J aijnath Manki, J'nc.Jt.Comm.toGovt.12 Feb.1832.
to secure the arrest of dnignath Hanki. The barkandaaes of
jot which he had been dispossessed] will be restored to you
7 bid.
U U  irom© lately on Baijnath's a rival at the thana . he
was put in Irons* "I told them I had neither committed theft,
nor murder, that they should Imprison me," said Baijnath,
"but myjr ©monstrances were disregarded and 1 was se it a 
prisoner to Sherghatty.#f* * This trickery", the Joint 
Commissioners reported, "so irritated his sons that they 
exerted their Influence with their brethren, and prevailed
on them to extend the devastation to the ut oat of their
(2)power." The Patna commissioner, after hearing Baijnath,
commented that "the apprehension of Br^Jnauth Mankee, one 
of the most influential persons among the Coles by the 
Magistrate’s officers, on a charre preferred against him 
after the disturbance had commenced, caused the extension 
of the outrages beyond the Estates of the Baja** uncle. "v*,/ 
Thus, nalton rightly remarks that this unrest, "though no 
doubt, only the bursting forth of a fire that had long been 
smouldering, was fanned into flame" by these unfortunate 
episodes* ' **'
Her© was Just the sort of oconslon to turn smouldering 
resentment into active resentment. The Kols, long exploited 
and looked down upon by the non-tribal people, at last turned
(1) Ibid*
(2) Jt. Commissioners to o©vt. 12 Feb.l83C# B.C.1363/5*1227 •
(3) Lambert to Govt. 15 Peb.1832, B.C.1363/5^227.
(h) 3>alton, thnoloaa , 171 •
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on their oppressors* nd though outrivalled in craft and 
cunning, they were irresistible when once the arrows of war, 
like the fiery cross* had passed among then, rousing the 
whole countryside to arms *"■* ^
Palamant-
It has already been seen (in the introductory chapter) 
that in 1831 everything was still in a state of flux in 
Palamau* Cuthbert* with a group of amine, was still
examining the land tenures of this estate when the unrest
( 2)troKo out in Chota-\agpur. 7
The history of Palamau had been s disturbed one* 
marked by suoh resistance to Government as the outbreaks of 
1801* 181? and of 1823 by Shoo Baksha Bhogta^-^. Yet in 
April 1827 Cuthbert had thought fit to write that "should 
it be satisfaotorily made out that Government is entitled to 
an Increased land Revenue from the Pergunnah* it may be
( h )levied without hazard to the tranquillity of the country,"v 
and from Rs»9*000 in 1818 the revenue demand had risen to 
Rs«33t326 in 1830,■ The landholders who suffered from 
( r^dley- W ,  Chfffn--ngl>orq, 6.
(?) Cuthbert to bambert, XI Jan. 1832. B.C.1362/54223.
(3) Cuthbert to Govt. 15 Keb.1823, Deng.Cr.Judl.Cons.19 of
26 Jen.1826 (137/38(.
(It) Cuthbert to Hoard, 13 Apl. 1827, Pare. 10, Beng.Cr.Judl.
Cons.54 of 14 June 1827 (138/22).
(5) Cuthbert to Govt. 15 Apl.1830, Beng.nev.Cotis.46 of 25 *y
1830 (61/60)
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this financial squeeze* and who could count on the obedience
(1 )of the tribal masses '* rose against the Company in 1832* 
Keatt» alter hie invest!getion, admitted that all the Chero 
and Kharwar laglrdara of Palamau between Mankearl and about
tvo koa south of arhasl* with their ryoti* were concerned
( 2)in the rising. ; Even those who* because of disputes with 
their fellows did not join the insurgents* were not 
prepared to obey Keave*a orders to repel them. They would 
not take any risks, nor would they incur any serious outlay 
on behalf of the Company. ' eavc was left to complain* *it
is much to be regretted that the large jag^rdare did not act
( 3)with the unity and energy of which they were capable.w  
The absence of any regular troops or even of effective police* 
gave them an excuse for not acting In co-operation with the 
Company. When a few of the jaglrdars* after repeated issue 
of* parwanaa did go in to Leslle&anj they rendered trifling 
service. Mo cover the Intrigues of the subordinate local 
officers* prevented these landholders doing even the little 
they might have done if left to themselves. They even 
commanded certain .lagirdars not to exert themselves against
(1)Cuthbert to Hoard, 13 Apl.182?• Para.67* Beng.Cr.Judl.Cons. 
54 of 14 June 1827 (138/22).
(2) Keave to Jt.Commissioners * 10 Apl. 1832* B.C.1363/54228.
(3) Keave to Jt. C o w l e s  loners * 28 Apl. 1832, Para 6.XBI P
the rebels* Cosnequently, only after the insurgents 
from Chota Kagpur had crossed the Tissa gliat were any real 
exertions made* (As the L&rka Kols of Slnghbhum* who had 
entered Chota-Kagpur* had constituted the heart of the 
rebel army there* so in palamau several Kols cf Cheta-Hagpur 
entered to Incite and support the Cheroa and herwars).
Zn his detailed report of 28 April 1832* Keave* like 
his superior Cuthbert* chose to attribute the rising in 
Palaauwl not to any specific grievances of the people but to 
their general tradition of turbulence. Keave argued* for 
instance* that the fact that they had voiced no complaints 
to Cuthbert* who was in Palaman settling revenue matters* 
and that they had not risen until five weeks after the out­
break in Chota-Kogpur proved that "the Palamov after the 
outbreak in Chota-Kagpur proved that "the Palamov people 
were not driven to this sudden flood of nesting ^mutiny) 
by any grievances whatever* but that they were Induced to 
join the Coles by a love of plunder and a hope of impunity 
and to this it is that they themselves attributed. He
specifically declared his belief that thoy had no relevance 
either against the spirit tax or against the cultivation of 
the opium poppy. He had reached this conclusion* he said* 
after questioning those who were arrested.
(‘ ) Ibid.*
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lie thought that the abkarl sy«tea In Palamau vaa quite 
cliff©rent from that of Chota-Nagpur, and since he had seen 
no slena of poppy cultivation he did not even think it 
necessary to makt any enquiries about it. feavo also 
reported that there were no complaints about the police and 
argued that "the Cheros and Herwas of Palasso are of a 
different race of people to the Coles and are far too 
independent to suffer themselves to bo trailed upon without 
calling for redress
There certainly seems some truth in his observations, 
but t;h*t the pressures of the Company's administration were 
felt in FalamataL as in ail the neighbouring tribal areas seems 
equally certain. Keave had in fact received a petition from
certain Palamau villages, on the borders of Chota-Pagpur,
(2 )against the form of the .bkarl settlement . The joint 
commissioners found that in fact more opium was produced In
Palamau than in Chota Kagpur, though the yield per acre was 
very low and the price offered by the Company was a poor
one, and in November 1832 they recommended "that the people
( 3)
in Falamow should no longer be oalled on to cultivate it•"
It can hardly be believed that the wolmrirs and tahsildars
(*) jEbid. Para*4.
(2)Cuthbert to Govt. 29 March 1832, B.C.1363/5*227. 
i')) %i t..(’onwi^sioncr$ to * o •- t ♦ 3 6 ov*183'$, Par* #76, B*«. *1502/58891
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and the thana police were less ready to abuse their powers 
in Palamau than in Chota-Nagpur • Nor does the murder of* 
mahajans in Lesliegang and Latehar suggest they were less 
obnoxious to their debtors in Palamau than elsewhere.
The main cause of* the rising, however, was the 
inefficiency, negligence and even connivance with the 
rebels of the local subordinates officials. "The intrigues 
and misconduct of the Sheristadar of the Ramghur Cutchery 
and of the Qanoongoe of Lesllegunj", the Bengal Government 
noted, ’'are mentioned to have materially assisted the spread 
of the disturbances. Neave put the main emphasis on the
conduct of the sheristadar and ganungo who not only sent 
false reports to the higher authorities, but also took part 
in the deliberations of a council of rebels at Leslleganj. 
"The system of falsehood which these two men practised 
towards the authorities in regard to the Rajah and those 
who had really done their Duty,*1 wrote Neave, "is highly 
culpable and might have led to serious results had full 
credence been placed on their reports•"' * They created a 
misunderstanding and misapprehension in the minds of the 
authorities and thus prevented the unity and cooperation
(1) Bengal Govt, to Court of Directors, 25 Sept.1832, B.C.
1362/5 2^23.
(2) ibid.
between the well-intentioned jagitiars anti the officer* 
in scMsnd.
That the subordinate staff was corrupt and inefficient 
cannot be denied. lint there taust also have been oertain 
specific grievances of the people which goaded them to risei 
otherwise the degree of destruction would not have been so 
large. The list of villages destroyed or partially 
affected, shows that the loss in the Government villages 
was larger than in others because they contained more 
foreigners. ^ * * Unless these foreigners had nade themselves 
obnoxious to the tribal people because of their exactions,
wiiy should their wrath have fallen so heavily on them?
%
(Almost all the persons killed were Hindus and Muslims).
So Neave was wrong in asserting that the (ffceros and f han?/s 
were Induced "by a love of plunder* alone.
Slnghbhum:~ The history of the last India Company's 
connections with Singhbhum before I83I has shown how far 
from being subdued or paelfleti the Larks folo were, even 
though they had executed agreements which promise*; quiet.
As the Infiltration of non*tribal outsiders increased, anti 
fchalr ov chiefs turned against them, the chances of 
continued qui* t in Sin&hMntw steadily diminished.
(tj Ibid. Appendix, Neave to J.M. Commissioners, 28 Apl. IH32,
T T FT l3 6 3 /5 4 2 2 6 .
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When the outbreak began in Chota-Nagpur > the Larka 
©Is of Slnghbhum, under Bindral, Slngral* khandu, Pater 
and others took the lead. (Ve have seen already that the 
raja and the £ lwan of Forahat positively encouraged Bindrai 
in his rebellion) • Their very names were an encouragement 
to the Dhangar Kola* who used the words Ik>hai Khandu Pater*1  ^
(victory to Khandu Pater) as their war ory9 and rumours of 
the Larka Kola* arrival was enough to terrify many non- 
tribals into instant flight.
One important grievance of the Lurk a *ol« against the 
non-tribal thjkadare of the southern parts of chota-Nagpur 
was the ill-treatment of their women who went to sell iron 
in Bonepur narirana. Thus, Jafar All of (empire* who bought 
iron in large quantities from orhu Bazar for export* used 
to take away all the iron of the women from Slnghbhum,
f
and /indignantly’ threw into their baskets only two pice
for each seer of iron taken, in spite of the protests of
(3)these women.v /
Another important cause of unrest in Slnghbhum in this
period was the dispute between the Bamanghatl chief and his
(k)suz«riiwr\ the Baja of MayubUanJ. Hals dispute was
(1; Sutherland to Govt. n.d. , I3.C *136 3/5^227•
(z) Wilkinson to Neave* 20 Jan. 18.32* b.C.13<3/5^227*
( 3 - '<oy> Huptias • 20 3-2^4.
Ik) Tliis dispute was 25 years old* but from April 1832 to
April 1833 it took a violent form. Bang.Govt, to Court 
of Directors, 23 Oct. 1832* Deng. Letter Reed.Vol.No.120
aggravated by the division of control between tho Political 
Agent on the South-Vest frontier and the superintendent of 
the tributary Mahals (i.e. the Cuttack commissioner)^*^
The main issue in the dispute was the attempt of the raja 
to recover some Kol villages from the Mahapater of
( 2)bamanghatl9 and the attempt of the latter to resist It. 1 
Though the dispute had been compromised in 1825, at the 
mediation of the Cuttack commissioner, both parties, with 
different intentions, had purposely abstained from 
particularizing in the documents exchanged between them
of what villages - has Pea and Khoarder Peg (the disputed area)
(1)consisted•w /  The raja*s grant of several villages in the
(4)disputed area to Brahmans and temples' ' therefore re­
opened the quarrel«
The revival of the dispute necessarily involved the 
Larka Kols of the area. According to their own statement 
"For a length of time we paid our rent to Neerunjun ^ s s  
Mahapater (father of Madho Das) who was placed over us 
(in 1821) and adhered to the engagement..., but lately 
emissaries of the Mohurbunge vaja having come into our
(*•) Ibid. Stockwell, the Cuttack commissioner, resigned 
his Office in Juno 1832 on this very issue.
(2) Wilkinson A Ricketts, Arbitrators in the dispute, to 
Govt. 1 Apl. 1833, Beng.Cr•Judl.Cons.1 of 6 Apl. 1833
(ll»0/31).
village, gave us bad advice and tempted us, and ve were 
prevailed on to desert the service of the Mahapater and 
adhere to the Rajah-Disturbances were the consequence*••
Yet another cause of their unrest, especially in 
north Slnghbhum, was the misunderstanding between the chiefs 
of Pgrahat, Khar^awan and Saralkela and the weakening of 
the control of the Pgrahat raja* This led to frequent raids 
by the Larka tola into chota-Nagpur and other neighbouring 
areas in 1832-1833* They also attacked the villages of 
one chief at the instigation of the other* When Gangs 
Karain appealed to them for help in I833 they prepared to 
move - and doubtless would have done so had Gangs Karain 




The Outbreak of Unrest, Its Progress and 
Suppression - the Second Phase«
April 1832 to April 1833?
The first phase of the tribal unrest in Chota- 
Nagpur, its dependencies, Palamau and Patkum, and its neigh­
bouring parganas had hardly been suppressed through intensive 
military operations, when away to the east "disturbances 
broke out in the Jungle Mahals, assuming the most serious 
character and spreading over part of the Midnapore District 
and the adjoining tributary states, "V. This second phase 
of the disturbances commenced with the cold-blooded murder 
of Madhava Singh, the half-brother and diwan of the zamindar 
of the Barabhum pargana, at the hands of Ganga Narain Singh, 
a disgruntled cousin of the zamindar and the diwan. The 
murder took place on 26 April 1832, and Ganga Narain took 
care to implicate his ghatwal followers. As eye-witnesses 
later stated, Ganga Narain first delivered a blow and then 
"he caused each Sirdar present to fire an arrow into the
body of Madhub Sing thinking thereby to secure their con-
2tinued cooperation and their not betraying him." He and 
his followers remained at the heart of all the subsequent
1, Court of Directors to Bengal Govt., 16 Sept, 1835, Para.2, 
India & Bengal Despatches,\i*tNo.6, pp.363-364.
2. Dent, Jt. Commissioner, to Govt., 4 Sept, 1833, Para.12, 
B.C.1501/58886.
troubles in the Jungle Mahals and Dhalbhum, giving them a 
personal focus which had been lacking in the more generalised 
movement of protest in Chota-Nagpur proper and Palamau.
Russell, the Magistrate and Collector of the Jungle 
Mahals district, reported this new outbreak of 1 serious dis- 
turbances1 early in May. His information, received from the 
Daroga of Barabhum on 28April,was that Ganga Narain, the 
original and the chief actor of the outbreak, had kidnapped 
Madhava Singh because of some private feud. On 1 May he had 
led his followers against the munsif1 s cute he ry at Barabazar,
killing the peons, burning the court, and plundering the
2bazar.
The local authorities were very ill prepared for 
dealing with so serious an outbreak. Russell at Bankura, a 
hundred miles from Calcutta, sixty from Midnapur, was vir­
tually single-handed, and the Burdwan Commissioner Braddon, 
to whom he ought to have been able first to turn for help,
A
was sick. Nevertheless, after warning Calcutta^ that military 
assistance might be required, Russell set off through the 
heat for Barabazar to see what personal example and 
influence could do.
He had remarkably few other resources which could
1. Russell to Govt., 5 May 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
2. Ibid. Also see Russell to Major Blackall, commanding a 
detachment of the 50th N.I., 7 May 1832, B.C.1501/58887 
and An officer of the 50th N.I., 13 May 1832, India 
Gazette, 19 May 1832.
3. See Hamilton, East India Gazetteer, I, 129 and Tassin's 
map, 1841.
4. Russell to Govt., 5 May 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
at once be called into play. At Bankura itself there were 
no troops worth the name. The treasury and jail guards on 
duty there, could be of little help in suppressing an out­
break forty-five miles away as the crow flies, especially 
when those forty-five miles involved an arduous climb into 
the hills. (The civil station at Bankura was "situated on
the verge of the hilly tract that forms the western boundary 
1
of Bengal." There was a detachment of regulars under 
Horsburgh at the headquarters of the neighbouring district
p
of Midnapur - but they were under orders to join Col.
*5
Doveton in Bamanghati, as soon as they had been relieved 
at Midnapur. Further south still, Stockwell, the Commission­
er of the Cuttack division, was already in the field at 
Bamanghati, restoring order in the tributary mahals for 
which he was responsible. The nazir of the Midnapur court 
was away in Ghatshila, to the north-west of Bamanghati and' 
fifty-five miles west of Midnapur seeking with a tiny force 
of 14 barkandaaes and a jamadar to ensure supplies for 
Stockwell.
The irregular and local forces offered Russell 
little more hope of effective support. The barkandazes under 
the police darogas, who should have prevented disorders,
1. Hamilton, op.cit., 129* The hills of Choukerghatta and 
Pooncha lay m  the way from Bankura to Barabazar,
2. Midnapur was 50 miles from Calcutta and 60 south of 
Bankura.
3. J.H.D1 oip_y, Acting Magt., Midnapur, to Govt., 11 May 1832, 
Para.7, B.C. 1501/58887* The Larka Kols of Kolhan in 
Singhbhum, instigated by the Raja of Mayurbhanj, were 
fighting against the Mahapater of Bamanghati.
were few in number and ill qualified for such duties. The 
sardar gjiatwals responsible for guarding the passes, and the 
sadials or digwars and tabedars who constituted the _ zamin­
dar i police were no better armed than the insurgents, and 
were often sympathetic to their fellow tribesmen, especially 
the ghatwals who became in many cases the chief supporters 
of Ganga Narain. As for the zamindars, many had antagonized 
their tribal tenants and were uncertain about their own 
safety, while Chitreswar3hal, the zamindar of Dhalbhum and 
Baleapar, who being nearest to the scene of the outbreak, 
and in charge of the police of his pargana, might have given 
them the necessary lead, was incompetent, even perhaps dis­
loyal. Hence while his own estate was being threatened, he 
remained a silent spectator of events. (In a petition to the 
Cuttack commissioner asking for a remission of revenue, he 
just casually mentioned the murder of Madhava Singh and the 
rising of the Bhumijes of Barabhum under Ganga Narain).^
Thus the situation demanded tact and promptness. As 
had happened at the outbreak of the first phase of unrest, 
there was a dearth of troops at hand to nip the rising in 
bud. Moreover, the outbreak had come at an advanced season 
of the year. Until the monsoon broke fodder would be diffi­
cult, but once the rains commenced, many rivers and nullahs 
would become difficult to ford, the heat and humidity would
1. G.Stockwell, Cuttack Commissioner, to D fo.yly, 7 May 1832, 
Ibid.
make any march of the regular troops from the cantonment 
at Barrackpur, a hundred miles away, very trying and malaria 
would he deadly to the European office#, Russell, therefore, 
first tried all the possibilities of persuasion, issuing 
parwanas to the ghatwals, ordering them to disperse and 
return to their duties, and then he took his military pre­
cautions.
Major Blackall was then returning with the right 
wing of the 50th regiment from Chota-Nagpur to Barrackpur 
after months of operations in the disturbed areas. The de­
tachment was thouroughly worn out, its quarter-master 
sergeant had been drowned, and the one thing the men wanted 
was to get back to cantonment. It was not even properly 
supplied and equipped and all its spare ammunition had been 
left with the detachments which remained in Chota-ITagpur for 
the rains,^ But these troops were the only ones immediately 
available, so on 7 May Russell sent an express ordering 
Blackall to change his route. Prom Sinkabazar, on the 
Bankura road, he was to strike south, through Palma and 
Dhakakand, across the hills and the Kasai river, to Barabazar
in the disturbed pargana of Barabhum, twenty-five miles
2
away. The wisdom of Russell’s move was agreed and approved 
by the Bengal Government what Blackall fs men thought was 
another matter!
1. An officer of the 50th N.I., Barabazar, 13 May 1832,
India Gazette, 19 May 1832.
2* Russell to Blackall, 7 May 1832, B.C.1501/58887,
3. Govt, to Russell, 15 May 1832, Ibid.
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Meanwhile what had originally appeared to he a 
private feud assumed all the features of an organized and 
extensive insurrection. G-anga Narain had already collected 
enough grain to support his forces for some time before he 
had launched his first attack.^ Now he had collected "a very 
considerable number of chuars" with whom he was in force in 
the hills and was "extorting grain in large quantities from
p
the villages. " He was reported to be "in high feather" for
an attack on the Company's troops.^ "Nearly every Bhoomij,
whether Ghatwal or Ryot, had by this time joined Gunga
Narain who announced his determination to clear the country
4
of police Thanas as far as the great Benares road."
Russell, stranded because of inclement weather at 
Pooncha, 20 miles north-east of Barabazar, ultimately reached 
Barabazar on 7 May. He had sent parwanas ahead of him calling 
upon the ghatwals to disperse and to attend their duties - 
but these had produced no result. Arrived at Barabazar, he 
tried his best to make personal contact with them, but no 
one turned up. On the eleventh he wrote to the Burdwan com­
missioner, "Every Ghatwal and Bumeez, whether Ghatwal or 
Ryot are, I hear, to a man concerned, and in fact there
appears to be a regular choarree system throughout the
1. Bent to Govt.-, 4 Sept. 1833, Para. 13, B.C.1503/58886.- 
2o Russell to Govt., 7 May 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
According to an officer, 13 May 1832, India Gazette.
19 May 1832, these hills were "covered with jungle" and 
separated from Barabazar by a thick,"almost impenetrable 
jungle". These hills were probably Janteepaharee: See 
Tas.sin's map, 1841. Also see Chapter I.
3* Bengal Hurkaru, 9 May 1832, Editorial column.
4. Sent to (iovt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.14, B.C. 1501/58886.
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the pergunnah [so] that not a single Ghatwal has as yet
made his appearance and I entertain but slight hopes of
their coming in"\ Nevertheless he did not relax his efforts,
and on the 13th he was able to find messengers who were
prepared to carry his appeal to the head ghatwals of the
principal passes of the Barabhum pargana to seize Ganga
2Narain and to come in to him without fear.
But signs of an impending clash were already in the 
air.The drums of the insurgents were heard in the vicinity 
of the magistrates camp throughout the night of 12 May, and 
matchlock or musket shots were also heard. On 13 May, too, 
the drums were occasionally heard in various directions, 
and a few insurgents were seen on the outskirts of the 
jungle. An officer of the detachment of the 50th N.I., now 
arrived in Barabazar,, wrote, "This is the commencement of a 
new war, and how this single wing, short of ammunition and 
supplies, and completely worn out by incessant fatigue, 
endured in a march now going on for five months, will be 
able to accomplish this task assigned to them, in subduing 
the Bhoomijes of Burrabhoom, entrenched in the midst of 
jungles, with the rains threatening the troops every minute,
*3
I leave you [the Editor] to judge."-*
Early next morning the camp was "aroused by the 
presence of considerable number of choars under Gunga Narain
1. Russell^ to W.Braddon, 11 May 1833, B.C.1501/58887.
2. Russell to Govt., 14 May 1832, Ibid.
3. An officer of the 50th N.I., India Gazette, 19 May 1832,
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Sing”*1". They surrounded the camp on all sides, and then
proceeded to launch an attack. Russell tried to pacify them.
He advanced to a small party of rebels and told them that
he wanted to secure the rebel chief and his main accomplices,
but that others might be pardoned if they surrendered. The
ghatwals, he promised, would be retained in possession of
their jagir lands and a reward of 800 rupees might be paid
if the culprits were seized and made over to the authorities.
But his terms were rejected outright and several parties
attacked the camp with matchlock-balls and arrows.
Russellfs official account of this affair baldly
states that the assailants 2 - 3,000 strong were driven off
without any difficulty. But the newspaper account is much
more vivid and interesting. Already on the 13th night the
chuars had burnt some huts on the south-western extremity of
Barabazar "probably with the intent, as we may gather from
their conduct at daylight, to decoy the troops to the fire,
while they might enter the camp in the opposite direction
2from the jungles, which skirt us on all sides." Then towards 
the morning Ganga Narain advanced to the camp with Nagara 
or drum beating and trumpets blowing and his large body of 
followers, with flashing swords, battle-axes, bows and 
arrows and other weapons. They came "with horrible shouts, 
yells, beating of drums, so directly upon us, for the 
express purpose of attacking the camp. Some of them
1. Russell to Govt., 14- May 1832, B.C. 1501/58887.
2. An officer of the 50th N.I., 14 May 1832, India Gazette,
19 May 1832.
3. Ibid.
danced with large swords and shields in their hands "in an 
attitude of defiance.
The insurgents, from the cover of a large tank, then 
opened fire with matchlocks, even perhaps with slings, for 
one injury suffered was a hit in the arm with a stone sus­
tained by Lt.Macdonald. The Russut [supply ] guard 
returned the fire from within the village, and then the 
grenadiers company and another party under Macdonald, ad­
vancing down either flank of the tank drove off the chuars,
2
who carried away their dead.
So ended an action which one delighted officer 
reported as fit to "stand pre-eminently exalted in the 
annals of sepoy warfare" - the rout of a multitude by only 
300 men.^ It was significant, rather, for the determination 
of the initial insurgent attack, and for their refusal to be 
dismayed by their losses, for the very next morning they 
returned to harassing the camp, seeking to cut off its 
supplies.^ Ganga Narain seemed to have been able to persuade 
his followers that he was invincible, and Russell, at least, 
was impressed by the influence he exerted over his tribal 
people for he proceeded to proclaim Ganga Narain a rebel 
and offer a reward of Rs.1,000 for his apprehension, dead or
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.Rasad or Russut =a store of grain provided for, or 
sent to, an army.
3. Report from Camp Barabazar, 15 May 1832, Bengal Hurkaru, 
22 May 1832.
4. Russell to Govt., 15 May 1832, B.C.1501/58887. Also see 
Report from Camp Barabazar, 15 May 1832, Bengal Hurkaru, 
22 May 1832.
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alive. He also issued new parwanas to the ghatwals to 
surrender and to deliver up Ganga Narain so that they might 
he left in possession of their lands. At the same time he 
wrote to Government to ask whether a general free pardon 
might he granted to the ghatwals if they surrendered without 
bringing in their followers and whether he could hold out
any promise of pecuniary rewards to the ghatwals:for securing
2the person of Ganga Narain and other culprits.
Since it was clear that the disturbances were not 
quickly to he suppressed Russell wrote asking for four more 
companies with two guns, and further supplies of ammunition 
to he sent to him at Barabazar. On the same day Braddon, 
from Burdwan, wrote to Government to ask that a small 
military force he despatched to Bankura to restore the con­
fidence of the inhabitants of that district.^ D'oyly, at 
Midnapur had likewise asked for a body either of regulars, 
or of the Calcutta Militia to he posted on his borders with 
the Jungle Mahals, ready to move under his orders to any
5
threatened spot.
To these requests the Bengal Government replied by 
ordering "a detachment consisting of a wing of a Regiment of 
Native Infantry and two six-pounder guns, manned with 
Golundauz, and equipped for field service,1 to march ,fas
1. Russell to Govt*, 14 May 1832, B.C.1501/58887*
2. Russell to Govt., 15 May 1832, Ibid.
3- Russell to Govt., 14 May 1832, Tbid.
4. Braddon to Govt., 14 May 1832, tara,2, Ibid.
5* D'oyly to Govt., 13 May 1832, Para.7, Ibid.
4 0 i i
early as practicable from Barrackpore to reinforce the wing 
of the 50th Regiment" employed in the disturbed area,^ The 
force, under Lt.Col. Cooper was ordered to act as directed 
by Russell, though it was laid down that "all military 
operations will be under the exclusive direction of the 
commanding officer," who would be "the sole judge of the 
means to be used to effect the object and of the expediency
of undertaking any operations that may be necessary for
2its accomplishment." During the rains, however, the Gov­
ernment expected Russell to station the troops at some 
healthy spot, and to rely upon the zamindars who should be 
asked to recruit more paiks. Other mercenaries, capable of 
withstanding the climate, he might recruit directly at Gov­
ernment expense - a course which had proved very effective 
during the 1812 to 1818 disturbances.^
The Government, however, still had hopes that a 
policy cf conciliation might prove more useful than force* 
They suggested that ghatwals who had joined the rebellion 
should be pardoned if they atoned for their misconduct, and 
the promise given to head ghatwals who surrendered that 
they would not be displaced. Prisoners who had grave criminal
1. Military Deptt. to Astt. Quarter Master General of the
Army, 17 May 1832, Ibid,
2. Govt, to Russell, 20 May 1832, Para.10, Ibid.The Govern­
ment admitted that these re-inforeernents were "with dif­
ficulty furnished from the Presidency stations Govt, to 
Jt.Commissioners, 17 May 1832. B.C.1363/54228.
3» Govt, to Russell, 20 May 1832, Para.11, B.C.1501/58887.
Also see D*oyly to Govt., 11 May 1832, Ibid.
records should be detained for future trial, but inferior 
agents and lesser offenders might be released with suitable 
admonitions and under adequate security for their future 
good conduct.1 As for Russellfs offers of a reward for
seizing Ganga Narain dead or alive - an offer which Braddon
2had approved - that the Government forbade. "It is object­
ionable in principle", they wrote, "to set a price upon the 
head of an offender, because assassination is likely to 
result and means to be adopted for the attainment of the 
reward which it is not possible to sanction. It will be 
sufficient to offer a reward for his apprehension, and if 
in the attempt to apprehend him resistance should be made, 
and death be the consequence, it will then remain for con­
sideration whether the circumstances which attended the 
event were such as to justify the result, and to entitle 
to the reward or otherwise."1 Braddon, writing almost at 
the same time, was less ready to forgive than the Calcutta 
authoritiess he believed that the ghatwalst who had had a 
duty and obligation to help stop the disturbances, should be 
punished for their complicity in Ganga Narain1s rebellion
A
by the loss of their lands. Nevertheless, though he had 
heard from Russell of the ghatwals1 impertinent rejection of 
his overtures, he too would not sanction any active measure
1. Govt, to Russell, 20 May 1832, Paras. 4-5, Ibid.
2. Braddon to Russell, 14 May 1832, Ibid.
3. Govt, to Russell, 20 May 1832, Para.6, Ibid.
4« Braddon to Govt., 19 May 1832, Para.3, Ibid.
5. Russell to Braddon, 21 May 1832, Ibid.
warning Russell to avoid any effusion of blood.'*' As for the 
press, that spoke with an almost unanimous voice, "in depre­
cating the indiscriminate destruction of villages and grain,
which but too often attends an incursion of troops into
2
what they consider an enemy's country."
The march of the detachment from Barrackpur for the
3
disturbed area created a momentary stir of alarm in Calcutta 
quickly stilled, however, by the false report that "the 
affair of the chooars has been happily adjusted.But when 
the troops, the 25th Regiment N.I. and detachments from the 
31st, 33ra and 48th reached Bankura on 23 May, they found 
plenty to do. Fifty men of the 33**d were immediately pushed 
forward to Barabazar, and most of the rest of "the formid­
able number of 572 fighting men," with the two guns, soon 
followed.^
Their presence was needed, for Ganga Narain had 
meanwhile been establishing contacts with the zamindars of 
the parganas in the neighbourhood of Barabhum. For instance 
he had written tc Chetan Singh, the Thakur of Kharsawan in 
Singhbhum, to the south-west of the Jungle Mahals, that he 
had taken up arms because the Jungle Mahals magistrate had
1. Braddon to Russell, 21 May 1832, Para.2, Ibid.
2. Calcutta Courier, Quoted in Bengal Hurkaru, 24 May 1832. 
This view was expressed in support of the India Gazette !r; 
views.
3. See, for example, articles in Calcutta Courier,
Editorial, 19 May 1832, and comments to the above John 
Bull;quoted in Bengal Hurkaru, 24 May 1832.
4> Calcutta Courier, Quoted in Bengal Hurkaru, 24 May 1832.
5. 'A Sub1, Camp Bankura, 27 May~lo32 Bengal Hurkaru,
2 June 1832.
insulted the zamindar of Patkum hy searching his private
apartments (during the first phase of the unrest in January-
Pehruary 1832). He had also written two petitions to
Russell to prove that he had some legitimate grievances and
that he had the sympathies of the Barahhum zamindar's 
2family.
Russell used the contact provided hy these petitions 
from Ganga Narain to send into his camp the proclamations 
ordering the ghatwals to return home, and offering pardon 
if they did. When on 28 May a large body of insurgents 
surrounded the Barabazar camp, but without attacking it, 
Russell again got in touch with them, through intermediaries, 
to offer free pardon if they submitted. Their simple answer 
was that they were the tabedars (henchmen) of Ganga Narain 
without whose advice they could not commit themselves to 
anything. The fact seem© to have been that the ghatwals. 
apprehensive of being lodged in prison like their brethren 
in Patkum in the first phase of the unrest \ would not come 
forward for submission. They retired, however, with the 
promise to send a reply next day. But no answer came, none 
of the rebels surrendered. Russell made his last effort on
1. Braddon to Govt., 4 June 1832, B.C. 1501/58887;
T.Wilkinson, Acting Political Agent, S.W.Frontier, to 
Russell, 17 May 1832, Ibid. Aslo see anonymous letter 
from Camp Barabazar, 2A May 1832, India Gazette,
30 May 1832.
2. Translated Petitions, Appendices 1 and 2, Dent to Govt.,
4 Sept. 1833, B.C.1501/58886*
3. An anonymous letter dated camp Barabazar, 24 May 1832, 
India Gazette, 30 May 1832.
4. See Chapter III.
5. Braddon to Govt., 31 May 1832, Para.4, B . C.1501/58887.
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the 30th evening when two sepoys were sent into the jungle 
with guides to bring the chuars to reason. The rebels, 
however, armed and hostile, shot at the guides. Next day, 
after three weeks in Barabazar, and a fortnight in which he 
had not used the regular troops with him, but had sought to 
win over the insurgents, Russell had to leave, disappointed 
and ill.’*’
The following day the servant of a head ghatwal 
informed Captain Barker that six of the leading ghatwals 
would come in next day to explain their attitude. But they 
never turned up. Martin then issued fresh parwanas to the 
ghatwals and others, stating that with the exception of 41 
ringleaders, all others would be pardoned if they submitted. 
But this also had no effect. The bearers of the parwanas 
were threatened with dire consequences by the insurgents. 
Martin saw but a gloomy prospect of achieving a settlement, 
because of the unanimity of the parties and because of the 
climate and the nature of the country.^
Moreover, reports now coming in from the Bamanghati 
tributary mahal,50 miles to the south-west in the Singhbhum 
area, were just as depressing. Like the Barabazar outbreak, 
the Bamanghati disturbance of the Larka Kols at first seemed 
trifling. ^ The Cuttack commissioner Stockwell had expected
1. Russell left for Bankura and his assistant, Martin, was 
placed in charge of the Barabazar camps Braddon to W.H. 
Martin, 31 May 1832, Ibid.
2. W.H.Martin to Braddon, 2 June 1832, Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4* India Gazette, Editorial, 2 May 1832. Also see Calcutta 
Courier, 2 June 1832.
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to settle it by going to the spot with a company of the
47th.^ But they had scon found themselves reduced to straits,
by the cutting off of their supplies, when the rebels
occupied a strong pass in the rear. The 38th regiment had
then to be called up from Midnapur to relieve the situation.
At the end of May Stockwell induced the refractory
zamindar to submit, but the cost of this minor success
proved heavy indeed. For "the extreme unhealthiness of the
country proved, ..., more destructive than any hostile
force, and such was its unsparing severity, that not one
officer of the corps was capable of exercising command.
Several died; and the rest escaped death only by an immed-
2
iate return to their headquarters at Midnapore". The Bengal 
Hurkaru reported that "out of seventeen Europeans, only one 
escaped fever - the Commissioner Mr. Stockwell. The hand of 
death has been busy, and numerous beyond all precedent have 
been the casualties. Dead - Surgeon Macra, Lts Mesham and 
Fullerton, Ensign Manningford, Cadet Finder, and Quarter
Master Sergeant Curtis. Six dead out of seventeen in a little
3
more than a fortnight." The dangers of the climate had been 
made worse by the lack of adequate medical attention: "so 
many deaths - so many sick", as a newspaper commented in 
its editorial, "and only one medical man (Craigie) to attend
1. 'Miles1, Calcutta, 10 June I832, Bengal Hurkaru, 14 June 
1832, Also see Bengal Govt, to C our t of Direct or s, 23 
Oct. 1832 (Judl. letter 23 of 1832), Letters Received 
from Bengal, No.120.
2. Wilson, Mill's History of British India, 1858, IX, 237. 
Also see 'FTtz-Ge^rge', Midnapur, 6 June 1832, India 
Gazette, 9 June 1832.
3. 'Miles1, Calcutta, 10 June 1832, Bengal Hurkaru, 14 June, 
1832,
■to them all*
When sickness broke out among Capt. Impey's detach­
ment of the 50th at Barabazar, and similar losses seemed to
threaten, the Bengal Government urged the Burdwan commis-
2
sioner to withdraw the troops. The Jungle Mahals magistrate 
was told with equal insistence that "the season of the year 
and the nature of the climate render it highly expedient 
that the troops should be withdrawn as early as may be com­
patible with the peace of the district and the safety of its 
inhabitants*"^ Such a toll of sickness, for so little accom­
plished, also produced considerable criticism of the whole 
policy of punitive expeditions conducted by regular troops.
A writer in the Bengal Hurkaru denounced the policy of dis­
banding the irregulars and of transferring the duties of 
the police to regular sepoy battalions. "We ought to bear in 
mind," he said, "that in expeditions of this dismal nature 
there is nothing to cheer and animate the soldier - no 
fighting, no glory, no triumph. No foe that will stand for 
a minute before him, nothing to be encountered but death in 
its worst form, and with its most horrible accompaniments,
A
fever and delirium. "
It had, in fact, become evident to the officials, 
that a withdrawal of the troops into cantonment was
1. Bengal Hurkaru, 6 June 1832, Editorial column.
2. Govt, to Braddon, 26 May 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
3. Govt, to Russell, 20 May 1832, Para,2, Ibid.
4* !Milesf, Calcutta, 10 June 1832, Bengal Hurkaru,
14 June 1832.
essential. (The troops from the tributary mahal had already 
been withdrawn ). Nevertheless, Martin was unwilling to 
withdraw without at least one attempt to use his troops to 
frighten the rebels into submission. Accordingly on 2 June, 
with the headquarters of the 25th or Marine Regiment, Capt. 
Barker*s detachment of the 33rd, a part of the 31st and the 
Artillery, Martin moved off against Band-dihi, 7^ miles 
south-west from the Barabazar camp, which was Ganga Narain1s 
own village and where the rebels were then reported. Captain 
Haslam was left with parts of the 50th, 25th and 31st Regi­
ments to guard the camp.1
On the first day the troops advanced through the
2
deserted villages to Berada on the Punj-Sardari pass, 4 kos
away. In the afternoon some sixty rebels under Shital
Ghatwal appeared. Martin tried to reason with them, they
refused to listen. On 4 June, when Martin*s force advanced
again, the rebels, from the jungles and hills, used their
bows to such an effect that some 19 sepoys were wounded.
The counter-fire - grape and musketry - had little effect
4
because of the thickness of the jungle.
1. Martin to Braddon, 3 June 1832, B.C.1501/58887. Also see 
Braddon to Govt., 4 June 1832, Ibid. Also see anonymous 
letter, Barabazar, 5 June l832,HBengal Hurkaru.
12 June 1832.
2c 6-J- miles to the south-west of Barabazar in the pargana 
map of Barabhum, 1865-66.
3. Martin to Braddon, 3 June 1832, B.C.1501/58887 . Also see 
*A Sub*, Barabazar, 7 June 1832, Bengal Hurkaru,
15 June 1832.
4. Martin to Braddon, 5 June 1832, Para.2, B.C.1501/58887.
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On arrival at the important village of Bamni, Martin 
again tried to treat with the insurgents, but gave it up
X
when a ghatwal attempted of a sudden to shoot him. The
detachment was now close to Ganga Narain1 s village, but
Martin was so convinced of the set hostility of the people
and so worried by the setting in of the monsoon that he
decided to withdraw. This unexpected movement was at first
unopposed, but in later skirmishes three sepoys and a number
of insurgents were wounded. Supplies coming up to him by
bullock cart and elephant were also attacked and plundered,
so that a further force had to be sent to cover their contin-
2
ued withdrawal.
The first military effort had thus proved indecisive 
and not without cost. Supplies had been looted, some twenty 
sepoys and many more camp followers woundedJ and the whole 
force severely tried by an advance in heat and rain through 
difficult hill jungles which made it impossible to provide 
tents. Ganga Narain*s stronghold had escaped attack, all 
attempts to win over the ghatwals had failed. The only 
success had been that a handful of insurgents, including 
such ringleaders as Boli Pater and La^khan Naya had been
1. Ibid. Para. 3.
2. Martin to Braddon, 6 June 1832, Ibid.
Also see Braddon to Govt., 7 June'1832, Ibid. 1 Lt.Col.,
1 Naick, 7 sepoys, 11 campfollowers and a few horses 
were wounded on 3 and 4 June; Report from Barabazar,
5 June 1832, India Gazette, 11 June 1832.
3. *A Sub1, Bar alcazar, 7 June 1832, Bengal Hurkaru,
15 June 1832. Also see Martin to Braddon, 5 June 1832,
B.C.1501/58887.
killed.1
On his return to Barabazar, Martin wrote to the
commissioner urging that the troops should be withdrawn now
2
that the rains had set in. He argued that the unhealthi­
ness of the area must lead to widespread sickness - Capt. 
Impey and It. Graham of the 50th N.I. and Lt. Wilson of the
■3
33rd had already succumbedJ and gone on sick leave - that it 
would be difficult to ensure supplies and impossible to 
protect the pargana with regular troops during the monsoon. 
He suggested that instead a force of at least 400 men 
including barandazes of the late Burdwan provincial batta­
lion should be recruited, together with a sapper force of 
50 beldars for clearing jungle tracks. Sanction was granted 
by the Bengal Government for the raising of 200 or more 
irregulars ^  under Ensign Prancis, to take over when the 
sepoy force withdrew. The Calcutta council again expressed 
itself anxious to see an early withdrawal of the regular 
troops, and on 7 June they marched from Barabazar for 
Bankura.
The action of Martin in suddenly terminating the 
campaign, and thus leaving Ganga Narain triumphant was so
1. Martin to Braddon, 6 June 1832, Para.l, Ibid. Also see
Report from Bankura, 11 June 1832, John BulT, quoted in
Bengal Hurkaru. 15 June 1832.
2. Martin to Braddon, 6 June 1832, Para.2, B.C. 1501/58887.
3. Report from Camp Barabazar, 5 June 1832, India Gazette.
11 June 1832.
4. Govt, to Braddon, 6 June 1832, Para.2. B.C.1501/58887. 
These irregulars might be armed with muskets if they 
could be trained in their uses Ibid.Para.3*
impolitic in appearance that an explanation was demanded 
"both by the Burdwan commissioner and by the Government. 
Martin took cover behind Russell's instructions not to inter­
fere in military matters, and claimed that "Colonel Cooper, 
was decidedly of opinion that it was useless to proceed 
and ... I concurred in the propriety of that opinion."*** He 
supported the wisdom of Cooper's decision by stressing the 
difficulties caused by the swollen nullahs and miserable 
tracks. But in that case, one might ask, why had he agreed 
on the 3rd to the operations being undertaken if by 7 June 
it was necessary to stop them? The effect upon the chuars 
could not but be to reinforce their belief in Ganga Narain's 
claim that he was an Avatar or Kol (an incarnation of the
God of Death) and under the all-powerful protection of the
2
goddess Kali. Whatever reason Martin might assign for not 
hazarding a further advance the fact remains that his fail­
ure had left the district exposed indeed to the depreda­
tions of a "rebel, who has defied the British Government, 
assumed the title of Rajah, is de facto zemindar, receives 
the revenue, and disposes of the lands, the property and 
even the lives of the population at his despotic will and 
pleasure."*^ Hence, as it was neatly put by a commentor, "the
A
end of the rope, at least in this quarter, we have permitted
1. Martin to Braddon, 9 June 1832, Para. 1, B.C.1501/58887.
2. Anonymous letter dated Dhaka-Key\d, 8 June 1832, India 
Gazette, 14 June 1832.
3. Ibid.
to slip through our fingers, and it will require no small 
degree of energy to seize and secure it again.
After the withdrawal of the sepoy force there were 
only fifty men, including the jail barkandazes, whom the 
commissioner could send to take their place. The commission­
er did continue to collect irregulars "to protect the
2
peaceable and well-disposed inhabitants of Burrabhum", but 
meanwhile he could not expect much from his tiny forces, 
when ten times their number of regulars had failed. As the 
Bengal Government later admitted, "the services of this 
force were not found in the first instance effectual to 
deter or oppose the insurgents.
Nor was the position made easier by the growing
signs of disaffection in the native officials of the pargana
Of the ghatwals, who were to assist the temporary force,
4
all but twenty-seven had deserted by 9 June. Some of the 
zamindars, notably those of Manbhum and Pachet, were also 
clearly wavering, and the Patkum zamindarfs appeal for help 
to the zamindars of Singhbhum and Tamar was suspicious in 
the extreme. Indeed, the daroga of Patkum emphatically 
declared that both ghatwals and zamindars were in league 
with the chuars. Bent, the joint-commissioner, emphatically
1. Ibid. There was, of course, a wing of the 50th N.I., with 
two guns, at distant Bankura, but that had no effect on 
the rebels
2. Braddon to Govt., 7 June 1832, Para.4, B.C.1501/58887.
3. Bengal Govt, to Court of Birectors, 31 March 1834, Para.7 
B.C.1501/58885.
4. Braddon to Govt., 9 June 1832, Para.2, B.C.1501/58887.
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asserted in his final report that in this period Ganga 
Narain was busy negotiating with the surrounding zamindars 
Mall of whom there is not a doubt were in communication 
with him* "***
Efforts to recruit irregulars were necessarily in­
creased, and up-country men from neighbouring districts, as 
well as local men were enlisted. By 10 June 200 of these 
irregulars were stationed at Puncha, a village on the Kasai 
river, twenty miles north-east of Barabazar, and on the 
flank of the great mass of hills between the upper Kasai and 
Subarna rekha rivers. Troops there, with those at Bankura, 
could be expected to prevent any northward movement of the 
rebels. Robert Francis, who after a squabble about his allow­
ances, had accepted the command, was instructed nto act on 
the defensive unless the Insurgents may attack his force,
or attempt^ to plunder or commit other depredations in any
2
village in the neighbourhood, where he may be posted.1 The 
ringleaders were to be seized, the less implicated ones were 
to be prevailed upon to dispense and full information about 
the movements and designs of Ganga Narain had to be pro­
cured.*^
Francis1 own view was that the utmost that could be 
done was to prevent the insurgents from encroaching on the 
neighbouring parganas. His force would contain them on the
1. Bent to Govt*, 4 Sept. 1833* Para.16, B.C.1501/58886.
2. Braddon to Govt., 11 June 1832, Para.9, B.C. 501/58887.
3c Ibid.
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north, and he recommended that the zamindars of Manbhum, 
Pachet, Patkum, Chota-Nagpur, Silli, Tamar and Singhbhum 
should continue the cordon from his position westwards, and 
in a great sweep round to the south of Barabazar.'*’ By 20 
June a second batch of up-country recruits was reported
ready for despatch to Francis, and Braddon had also ordered
2
the selection of yet another hundred men. The Bengal 
authorities sanctioned the arming of Francis* men with 
carbines^ to give them a superiority over the tribal bowmen, 
and a second levy post, Gopalpur, four miles north-west of 
Barabazar, was selected to carry the defensive line from 
Bankura yet another twenty miles westward.
While these dispositions were being made, there had 
been a period of quiet: the Bhumij were busy with their 
ploughing and sowing, then in full swing, while Ganga Narain 
was reported busy preparing the marriage of his daughter.
But at the end of June, disturbances flared up, this time 
in Patkum, to the west of Barabhum, where the most stren­
uous efforts of the daroga failed to keep the area quiet.
On 22 June Tulsi Digwar and Berah Singh ^  with perhaps 500 
of their tribal followers were reported marching to attack 
Patkum. On the 25th Ganga Narain was reported to be at
1. R. Francis to Braddon, 18 June, 1832, Paras. 1-3, Ibid.
2. Braddon to Govt., 20 June 1832, Para.9, Ibid.
3* Govt, to Braddon, 20 June 1832, Para,3, Ibid.
4, They were the ringleaders during the first phase of the
unrest in this pargana, but they could not be apprehend­
ed despite the best efforts of the authorities.
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Kurdadang, with 1,000 men, preparing tc attack the thana.
Prom the 25th to the 27th reports continued to pour in of
large insurgent bodies preparing to attack, and finally, when
the Patkum zamindar had refused to shelter the daroga for
fear of being himself attacked, the latter fled to Kharsawan
2in Singhbhum, 15 miles away*
The local authorities suspected the Patkum zamindar 
of complicity in these developments* Russell, from past 
experience of the zamindars1 and ghatwals1 disloyalty during 
the first phase of unrest, found in these events "a convinc­
ing proof of the intrigue of the zemindar to remove the 
Darogah from the Pergunnah. He pointed out that the insurg­
ents* avowed object was to attack the thana only and not to 
secure their former lands (as stated by the zamindar in his 
last petition of 30 June)*
Be that as it may, Patkum continued to be in commo­
tion till early July. The insurgents drove away cattle from 
Lepafckhurd, terrorised people in Dulmi, Odaldi, Jundihi and 
Kudlang and finally came right down the Karkari valley to 
Inchagarh on the 30th June to secure,according to a report, 
certain promises from the zamindar about their former land,^ *
1. Patkum zamindar to Russell, 28 June 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
2. Petition, Thakur Che tan Singh, Kharsawan, to Wilkinson,
29 June 1832, Ibid. Also see Petition, Shaikh Supam, 
Daroga of Patkum, 30 June 1832, Ibid. Also Petition, 
Patkum zamindar, 30 June 1832, fbid.
3. Russell to Braddon, 10 July 1832, Para. 2, Ibid.
4. Petition, Daroga Shaikh. Supam, 30 June l832T,~~Ibid. Also 
see Petition, Patkum zamindar, 30 June 1832, Ibid,
However, no one was killed during these raids.
The authorities could do little to check the depre­
dations. Though Braddon, like Russell, thought that "the 
whole affair was schemed and brought about by some of the 
relations and dependants of the zemindar, chiefly with a view 
of causing the removal of the Patkum Thanah, and preventing 
the court’s obtaining the attendance of the witnesses re­
quired in the trials of the prisoners concerned in the form-
1
er disturbances [in January-February 1832] in that pergunnah", 
he was not in favour of any attempt to re-establish the 
police thana there: "It would hardly be possible at the
present moment to keep a sufficient force on the spot for 
the protection of the Thannah and therefore under such 
circumstances I shall refrain attempting to re-establish it
until it can be effected with a greater probability of
2
success." The Bengal Government regretted that the Patkum 
daroga had withdrawn, but agreed that no effort should be 
made permanently to reinstate him - indeed they blamed 
Russell for having established the thana at all: "the main­
tenance of a Thannah in the jungle estate of Patcoom is 
opposed tc the general system of police established in that 
tract of country [i.e. the zamindari or ghatwali police]",^
In the end it was local influence that restored order in
1. Braddon to Govt., 10 July 1832, Para.2, Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. TxOvTJ. to Braddon, 17 July 1832, Para. 4, Ibid»
Patkum, when Chetan Singh, the Thakur of Kharsawan, brought 
pressure to bear, impressing f,upon the mind of the Patcoom 
zemindar the guilt he will incur by joining or aiding 
directly or indirectly Gunga Narain Sing or any of his 
adherents. n^"
Before Patkum had been restored to tranquillity, 
Singhbhum to the south-west comer of the district was dis­
turbed, when the Larka Kols spilled north from Kolhan on a
sharp foray against Saraikela, killing 28 of the zamindar1 s
2
men, and driving off cattle . This was followed at the end * 
of July by another flare up at the opposite corner of the 
Jungle Kfchals, this time by Ganga Narain. On 25 July he was 
reported to be in force in Ambikanagar pargana, with Bahadur 
Singh of Koilapal, and to be preparing, with other chuars 
mustering in thousands on the Barabazar road at Bhaka-kend, 
for an attack on the levy at Puncha.^ On 26 July similar 
reports reached Russell from Supur and Raipur pargana s. west 
and east of Ambikanagar - which was attacked that very day by 
about 3,000 chuars under Ganga Narain.^- They burnt down the
1. Braddon to Russell, 14 July 1832, Para.4, Ibid.
2. Petition. Kunwar Ajambar Singh of Saraikela, -fco Wilkinson,
6 July lo32. Enclosure to Wilkinson to Govt., 13 July 183S 
B.C.1503/58097. The zamindar was advised not to retaliate 
during the rains, and the troops at Kishanpur remained 
inactivev though their subadar sought to conciliate the 
Kols: Subadar Shaikh Kadir Baksha to Wilkinson, 10 July 
1832, Ibid.
3. R.Prancis to Braddon, 26 July 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
Also see Petition, Zamindar of Manbhum, 26 July 1832, Ibid.
4. Petition, Daroga of Raipur, 26 July 1832, Enclosure,
Russell to Braddon, 28 July 1832, Ibid.
Also Petition, Zemindar of Supur, 26 July 1832, Ibid.
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thana and the mahafiz department with all their papers,
1
looted the bazar and murdered Mathura Rai, a physician ♦
According to a later report the large and flourishing town
2
of Ambikanagar was entirely pillaged and plundered* When 
Ganga Narain followed this success by taking possession of 
the important village of Ankro, the Manbhum zamindar's nerve 
broke. There was a "wretched state of dissension and dis- *
3
union in the Rajah1 s family and even among his own children" 
and he therefore thought resistance useless, and even 
returned the 50 men sent to his aid by the Supur zamindar.^ 
The example of the Manbhum zamindar was followed by 
the Supur Chief, who came to terms with Ganga Narain. There­
after, though Bishnupur, down river from Ambikanagar, was 
saved by Russell's exertions, no other zamindari held out. 
Ganga Narain was able to move steadily south, attacking 
Raipur, whose raja presented him a horse, Sham-Sundarpur and
c.
Phulkusma. His forces thus traversed the whole eastern 
flank of the Jungle Mahals from Pune ha to Phulkusma almost 
unopposed: They were joined by the Bhumij of the parganas 
they passed through, "whc, in conjunction with those of
1. Petition, Guardian of Ambikanagar zamindar, 13 Sawan,
1239 Pasli, Enclosure, Russell to Braddon, 30 July 1832, 
B.C.15W58887.
2. Bent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.16, B.C.1501/58886.
3. Ibid.
^a Petition, zamindar of Supur, 26 July 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
5. Braddon to Govt., 30 July 1832, Para.5, Ibid.
Also see Russell to Braddon, 1 Aug. 1832, fara.4, Ibid.
6. Ibid. Paras. 1-2.
Silda and Koilapal, commenced a general system of plunder
and choarce which continued till the 34-th Regiment Native
Infantry reached Riepore in the end of November.
The zamindars of the area proved almost as ready as
their Bhumij tenants to join Ganga Narain. They had lost
any heart for resistance when Government withdrew its troops,
and in any case many were near relations of Ganga Narain.
Moreover, as the commissioners admitted, somany of them
were deeply involved in debt, that they were not loth to see
2
the money-lenders destroyed.
The actions which the Government now took must only 
have encouraged the defection of the zamindars. The levy at 
Puncha had done nothing during the attack on Manbhum, and 
the appeals for regular troops from Bankura had been refused 
Prancis by the commissioner. On 30 July the levy was ordered 
to abandon Puncha and fall back upon Chaukaghati, ten miles 
nearer to Bankura. The commissioner recognised that under 
the circumstances it was "almost too much to hope being able 
to check their career."-'
This withdrawal encouraged Ganga Narain to push on 
south into the Midnapur district, to Dampara. There was 
par.ic in Silda, Balrampur and the neighbouring thanas more 
especially when the rumour spread that the chuars of Bogree,
1. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833. Para.16, B.C.1503/58886,
2. Braddon to Govt., 28 July 1832, Para.5, B.C.1501/58887.
Also see Chapter VI.
3. Braddon to Govt., 30 July 1832, Para.5, B.C.1501/58887*
1
famous for the most atrocious acts of "rapine and murder" 
were associating themselves with his forces. The despatch 
of troops from Midnapur (in fact only 20 men with a few 
spare muskets for the thana barkandazes) was enough to 
head Ganga Narain off westward, but not to check his depre­
dations. He left two or three hundred men under his lieuten- 
ant Raghu Nath Singh at Dampara, and set off north-west for 
Barabhum via Dhadka ghat * While the Bengal Government and the 
press ^  were bewailing the ill effects of the too precipitate 
withdrawal in June of the regular troops, which had 
"instilled into their minds an idea of having compelled
their retrograde movements, which idea gave an air of invin-
(5
cibility to them" , the insurgents were proceeding to take 
full advantage of the unprotected state of the country.
Ganga Narain, with thousands of his followers, entered 
Pachet pargana to the north of Barabhum with the encourage­
ment of a rival faction in the raja's family. The rani's
1. Hamilton, East India Gazetteer, I, 155*
2. D royly to 2*.Hunter, Cuttack Commissioner, 31 July 1832, 
B.C.1501/58887.
3. B'cyly to Ranter, 8 Aug. 1832, Ibid.
Ragjiu Nath was put in forcible possession of the jagir 
of Dampara which had been escheated in the past, ana 
Ganga Narain directed the Dhalbhum raja to grant him a - 
sanad for the same: Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833> Para. 16, 
5^3715 01/5 8886.
4. A private letter, August, Calcutta Courier, 15 Sept. 1632, 
Also see Govt, to Braddon,~13-,-Aug. 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
5. Bent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, para.l8, B.C.1502/58886-
6. Braddon to Govt., 6 Aug. 1832, B.C.1502/58887.
Also see Joint Petition of the brother and uncle of the 
Pachet raja, 24 and 25 Sawan, Ibid.
adherents fled with the raja to Raghunathpur on the new
i
Benares road. Consequently Copal nagar and Puncha were 
attacked without any opposition and Kesargarh, 7 miles north­
west of Puncha, the residence of the raja, was also 
threatened.
Now the blunder committed by the local authorities 
in withdrawing the levy from Puncha was realized. Russell 
issued a parwana to the zamindar and his diwan to return 
forthwith to Kesargarh to put heart into his demoralised 
followers. He also requested the commissioner to send 
regular troops from Bankura to tackle the worsening situa-
p
tion in Pachet.
The commissioner sent out a party of 80 men of the 
Bankura detachment^ and two hundred men of Prancis* levy to 
Pachet, He also wrote to the Joint Commissioners in Chota- 
Nagpur to ask the zamindars on the borders of the Jungle 
Mahals to prevent the insurgents passing through the ghats. 
Moreover, he directed Russell to write to D foyly in Midnapur
4
to do the same from the south-western direction.
But D foyly was himself facing a sea of troubles 
created by Raghu Nath Singh in Dhalbhum. There was a serious 
dissension in Raja Chitreswar Bhal1s family and there was
5
no local check to the movement of Raghu Nath.
1. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.18, B.C.1501/58886.
2. Russell to Braddon, 11 Aug. 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
3. Braddon to Govt., 12 Aug. 1832, Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. E *oyly to Hunter, 13 Aug. 1832, Ibid.
D'oyly did, however, strengthen the northern 
borders of his district and so seek to contain Ganga Narain, 
sending a jamadar and twenty barkandazes to reinforce the 
zamindari police of Jhargram and Jambani, the estates between
i
Dhalbhum in the west and Silda in the east. Moreover, to 
prevent the flight of the insurgents from Pachet and Bara­
bhum to Dhalbhum and Singhbhum in the south-west, he sent 
44 men including treasury guards under a daroga direct to 
Narsing-garh, the residence of the Dhalbhum zamindar, who 
was directed to collect paiks to protect his frontiers.
D^yly also got an assurance from Col. Doveton, commanding 
the 38th N.I. at Midnapur, that he would go to the aid of
p
the treasury guards and the police in case of emergency.
Dy the middle of August, with troops in position at 
Bankura, Puncha and Kesargarh in the north, and parties 
holding the line from Silda to the Dhalbhum in the south, the 
Burdwan commissioner felt himself able to act offensively 
against the insurgents in the Jungle Mahals. With a detach­
ment of the 50th N.I. he reached Kesargarh on 13 August, to 
the north of the Kasai.^
The insurgents, having plundered and burnt several 
Pachet villages now withdrew to Barabhum pargana, causing 
such alarm that "on the sound of the ‘Nahara* or drum being 
heard, the inhabitants of every village (though it may
1. Ibid.
2. B 1oyly to Hunter, 14 Aug. 1832, Ibid.
3. Braddon to Govt., 15 Aug. 1832, Ibid.
contain 3000), desert the place and leave their all to be 
pillaged, without waiting to learn whether many or few of 
the enemy are near, The insurgents were able to withdraw 
unharassed because for some days Braddon could not cross the 
flooded Kasai, However, by 19 August he was across and had
reached Chakaltor, 14 miles north of Barabazar. There he had
2
his first brush with Ganga Narain, It was a slight affair, 
and a night attack by Braddon was foiled by Ganga Narain*s 
flight to Sagma, to the south-west. A party of the levy with 
a body of ghatwals and their men was pushed on and catching 
up with him at Sagma inflicted some losses, though Ganga 
Narain and his sardars escaped.^
Encouraged by the result of this affair, Braddon 
continued to exert himself personnaly in the disturbed areas 
of the Jungle Mahals. He was particularly pleased that the 
irregulars of the Levy and the ghatwall forces had defeated 
Ganga Narain, for he was anxious to show the well-disposed 
in the area that it did not need regular troops to deal with 
him. He had also been careful to ensure that the Government 
forces did not plunder or make reprisals, and he was very 
optimistic about re-establishing the authority of the Gov­
ernment in this area, though he admitted that the hilly and 
jungly nature of the area and the favourable attitude of 
the zamindars towards the insurgents were formidable
1. Letter from Jungle Mahals, 15 Aug, 1832, John Bull, quoted 
in Bengal Hurkaru, 25 Aug. 1832.
2. Braddon to Govt,, 19 Aug, 1832, B.C.1501/58887*
3. Braddon to Govt,, 22 Aug, 1832, Ibid.
obstacles*^
Several of the inferior ghatwali stations were re­
established in Barabhum and Kasipur parganas* The eldest son 
of the Barabhum raja was put in possession of the town of 
Barabazar and the open country around it* Some of the delin­
quents were seized* Moreover, a thana was established at 
Balrampur with the help of the followers of the Sardar 
Ghatwal of Tinsaya who had deserted the rebels*AU these
gave strength to the young raja and prevented incursions
2
into Pachet*
But while Ganga Narain was being defeated and the 
north-western Jungle Mahals pacified, his lieutenant Raghu 
Nath Singh continued to keep the south in turmoil. ^ The 
daroga sent to Dhalbhum with 40 musketeers had driven him 
off from Narsing-garh, but he could do nothing further be­
cause of the inactivity or disloyalty of the Dhalbhum raja* 
MoreoverP D foylyfs plans to re-inforce Daroga Nitai Singh 
with regulars was defeated by the weather. He had written to 
the Cuttack Commissioner, “With thirty regulars and thirty 
provincials at Nursinghur the town would be quite safe and 
there is reason to believe that such a force would drive the 
chooars away from the surrounding villages and it then would 
be quite practicable to send Neetye Singh [the Daroga] with
1* Braddon to Govt., 24 Aug, 1832, Ibid*
2. Braddon to Govt., 6 Sept* 1832, T5i5*
3. Raipur, Shamsundarour and Silda were disturbed. D foyly to
Hunter, 23 Aug* 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
his remaining 60 muskets and as many pikes [paiks] as he 
could collect to Huldeepoc:kur, hut when Col. Doveton
ordered out a relief party they were unable to cross the
2
flooded Subernarekha.
The Jungle Mahals remained comparatively calm due to 
the ‘active and spirited exertions1^  of the Burdwan commis­
sioner^. The circulation of his proclamation in Barabhum, 
"inviting and requiring the inhabitants of that Pergunnah to 
come forward and acknowledge him [the eldest son of the raja] 
as his [the raja*s] representative, and explaining to them 
that it was neither the wish nor intention of Government to 
visit with severity the conduct of those persons who had not 
been concerned in any of the more flagrant acts of violence 
and atrocity committed by the Insurgents, but might have 
been induced to join them by motives of fear, or from defer­
ence to the orders of their leaders and assuring them there­
fore of pardon, upon condition of their coming in immediately 
to my camp, or to Barabazar, and of their being handsomely 
rewarded if they would seize and bring in any of the princi­
pal offenders, and finally warning them, that if they failed 
to take advantage of the present requisition, they would 
render themselves liable to exemplary punishment," produced 
a salutary effect, the people gained some confidence and they
1. Ibid,
2. E'c-yly to Hunter, 3 Sept. 1832, B.C.150l/58887-
3. Govt, to Braddon, 4 Sept. 1832, Ibid.
began to flock to the young raja at Barabazar."** 4«31j
Of course, minor skirmishes continued in this period’ 
too. For example, Ganga Narain once tried to dislodge the 
young raja from Barabazar and twice did he attack the Gov­
ernment forces (composed of the Levy, matchlockmen and
ghatwals) which had gone to reinstate the former ghatwal
2
of Tinsaya. But the insurgents were repulsed on each
occasion with some casualties. Again, the insurgents were
chased for three to four hours and thirteen of them were
killed and fifteen wounded when they had an encounter with
the force headed by the Patkum raja with two police darogas
at Adhardi (Aryadih?)*^. The Levy forces operating further
south at Ambikanagar also achieved some successes, as in the
defeat of an insurgent force by Jamadar Zalim Singh at Bal-
4
rampur on 14- September.
The successes were unfortunately not conclusive. To­
wards the end of September Bahadur Singh of Koilapal, aided 
by chuars of Dampara, attacked the Levy at Ambikanagar and 
forced it back upon Supur - the ghatwals who should have
5
aided it joining the insurgents instead. On the Midnapur 
borders Raghu Nath Singh® continued his depredations in 
Silda and Ghatshila. Further south still there were disturb­
ances in Dhakenal, one of the tributary estates of Orissa, in
1. Braddon to Govt., 6 Sept. 1832, Para.l, Ibid.
2. Ibid. Para.5.
3. Calcutta Courier, 19 Sept. 1832, Editorial column.
4. ’Francis to Braddon, 15 Sept. 1832, B.C.1501/58888.
5* Russell to Braddon, 22 Sept. 1832, Ibid.
6. Hunter to Govt., 11 Sept. 1832, B.C7I5T51/58887. The Midna­
pur authorities, with the approval of the Government, of­
fered a reward of Rs. 1,000 for the apprehension of Raghu 
Nath.Govt, to Hunter, 18 Sept.1832, Ibid.
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which as W.Wilkinson, the Cuttack collector reported, the
1
paiks and other fighting inhabitants had Joined,
Early in October, when Bahadur Singh's chuars again 
plundered Ankro, despite a defensive action by the Raja of
2
Manbhum's forces, Braddon prepared to act on a large scale.
Be sent a hundred matchlockmen to Manbhum, and posted a 
party of Jail barkandazes at Raipur. Then his health broke 
down, and the commissioner had to be replaced as the direct­
ing authority by the Joint Commissioners of Chota-Nagpur, 
W.Dent and T.Wilkinson. They took over on 7 October with the 
powers of a magistrate and superintendent of police. Russell 
was placed under their orders and Martin was appointed their 
Bead assistant.^ As scon as Dent had had a chance to visit 
Calcutta to ascertain the views of the Government, the troop 
movements initiated by Braddon - were renewed. Martin
4
advanced to Chakaltor with two companies of the 50th, 
while Francis was relieved as commander of the levy by an 
Ensign Alexander. At the same time other regular troops of 
the 38th under Subadar Mangal Singh, advanced from Midnapur 
to Dhalbhum. A week later, moreover, plans were laid by the
Cuttack commissioner to deal with the Larka Kols disturbances
in the Dhakanal, Bamanghati and MayurbhanJ tributary mahals 
by despatching the detachment of the 47th at Cuttack to
1. W.Wilkinson Acting Cuttack Collector, to Hunter,
31 Oct. 1832, B.C.1501/58888.
2. Russell to Jt.Commissioners, 11 Nov. 1832, Ibid.
Also see Braddon to Govt., 15 Oct. 1832, Ibid.
3. Govt, to Braddon, 2 Oct. 1832, Ibid.
Also soe Govt, to Dent., 16 Oct. 1832, Ibid.
4. Jt.Commissioners to Govt., 22 Oct. 1832s tara.3, Ibid.
5. Transl.Report, Mangal Singh Subadar, 29 Oct, 1832, Enclo­
sure, Wilkinson to Govt,, 6 Nov. 1832, B.C.1503/58902.
Dhakenal, and part of the 34th at Nasing-garh to Balasore.^*
At the same time as these piece-meal moves were be inf- 
made, Dent had made efforts to secure a peaceful settlement 
by issuing another proclamation of full pardon to all except
the ringleaders, on condition that the insurgents assisted in
2
the seizure of the ringleaders* These efforts failed, and a
series of clashes occurred between Subadar Mangal Singh of
the 38th and the insurgents, who were beaten back with minor
losses first from near Narsing*-garh, then from Kalkapur,
further to the south-west and then from the Haldipokhar pass,
■a
still further to the west*
These clashes were but the precursors of more con­
certed operations planned by the joint commissioners now 
that a more favourable season had arrived. To support the 
military force the Magistrate of Midnapur was asked to joir. 
the troops marching into Dhalbhum, ^  while the joint commis­
sioners1 hand was strengthened by the appointment of Lt* 
Ouseley as an assistant to them, with an enlarged native
staff. An extra line of dak runners was called for from Ban-
5kura to Chakaltor, and considerable supplies of ammunition
1. Hunter to Govt,, 3 Nov. 1832, B.C.1501/58888.
Also see Hunter to Wilkinson, 1 Nov. 1832, Ibid.
2. Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 22 Oct. 1832, Para.3 Ibid.
3. Transl. Report, Mangal Singh Subadar, 29 Oct. 183*57 
Enclosure, Wilkinson to Govt., 6 Nov. 1832, B.C.1503/ 
58902.
4* Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 12 Nov. 1832, Ibid.
5. G.Cheap, Deputy Post Master, Bankurajf to Jt.Commissionersf 
6 Nov. 1832, Ibid,
Also see Dent to Govt., 9 Nov. 1832, Ibid.
Also Govt, to Dent, 20 Nov. 1832, rbicT7
were sent up to Alexander and the Bankura Levy, Regular
troops from outside the area were also mobilised: both the
34th, at Barackpur, and the 24th at Benares were ordered to
march to Banina. In total the force assembled was "three
Regiments of Infantry and 8 pieces of ordinance1 for the 50t!
tinder Major Blackall, except for the two companies at
Chakaltor, was also to close on Bankura. ** With the Levy
under Alexander other local forces raised by the civil auth-
2
orities, and a detachment of the 5th Local Horse from Malwa, 
there was a very formidable mobilization of resources*
The Bengal Government had laid down that the insur­
gent leaders should be induced to surrender, but if they re­
fused, they were to be attacked at once and their strong­
holds seized.^ (The Jungle Mahals and Midnapur districts 
once pacified, the troops would move to the Cuttack tribu­
tary mahals to restore order). Lent made his offers of par­
don, as has been seen, without success. So, making a list 
of the ringleaders, he moved to attack.
The first attack, made on 14 November by 139 bayon­
ets of the 50th, 36 swordsmen and matchlockmen of the Levy 
and 35 ghatwals upon the stronghold of Jirpa Naya "the most 
influential and daring of the insurgents and the main sup­
port of Gunga Narain Singhfs p a r t y , w a s  accompanied by
1. Govt, to Jt. Commissioners, 13 Nov. 1832, Paras. 3-7. Ibid.
2. Ibid Para.4.
3. Ibid. Paras. 9-10.
4. EerfE; to Govt., 16 Nov. 1832, B.C. 1501/58888. K.P.Mitra, 
insurrection of the Coles, 1 B.P.P. LXII, gives a wrong 
date for this attack as well as that of Band-dihi (16-18 
Nov.).
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Dent himself* The chuars and their leader were not surprised* 
hut their !lneat and comfortable dwellings1 at Berada were 
destroyed*
On the 15th Band-dihi, twelve miles south-west of 
Chakalt£r was attacked from the Patkum side by the amin 
Shaikh Shujaat Ali. The village was destroyed, Ganga Narain1s 
property was plundered, his house reduced to ashes. Two 
sallies by the rebel leader were both beaten back. This was 
followed by the destruction of the villages of the two 
Patkum insurgents, Tulsi Digwar and Berah Singh, with nine 
others,^
Near Barabazar, too ,the insurgents were defeated by 
Jamadar Matadin Tiwari and a party of the Levy, matchlockrie:.] 
and ghatwals. Bhuni (in the Satrakhani ghat) a post of the
insurgents, 4 miles to the south of Barabazar, was burnt and
2
117 head of cattle were seized and brought away* Thus the 
simultaneous attacks begun on 14 November on the three im­
portant strongholds of the rebel leader proved very suocess- 
*
ful. Dent renewed his offer of pardon, but this last-minute 
effort at a peaceful settlement also ended in smoke, ^ Shortly 
afterwards, worn by months of activity with no chance of a 
rest first in Chota-Nagpur and now in the Jungla Mahals,
Dent was taken ill. At the beginning of December he set off
lo Transl. Report, Shaikh Shujaat Ali, 17 Nov. 1832,
B.C.1501/58888.
2. Dent to Govt., 18 Nov. 1832, Para,6, Ibid.
3. Report in India Gazette, 24 Nov. 1832.
4. Dent to Gov't,, 18 Nov. 1832, Para.7, B.C. 1501/58888.
for Hazaribagh for a change of air, handing over his charge 
to the other Joint Commissioner, Captain Wilkinson.
The newcomer found that Dent’s successes in the 
THorth, at Band-dihi and Barabazar, had neither prevented a 
movement of the Bhumijes to the south, nor broken their 
spirit. Disquieting reports of renewed plundering poured in 
from Supur, Ambikanagar, Raipur, Shamsundarpur, and Phulkus- 
ma, right down the route from Barabazar to Midnapur 
through the Kasai valley.^ Moreover, since mid-November Dent 
had been hearing that the rebels were shifting their families
and the newly harvested grain into arals, or temporary camps
2
in the hills and jungles. It was evident that the same sort 
of campaign would have to be fought in the Jungle Mahals as 
had been fought in Chota-Nagpur - a deliberate war to destroy 
the enemies' supplies and to harass them into surrender. It 
would be a tedious war, with much marching and counter­
marching, skirmishes and ambushes, but no hope of any large, 
decisive action.
The first task in preparing for such a conflict was 
to ensure essential supplies - once active operations had 
began, there would be no time to look to personal comforts. 
Supply depots were therefore prepared, and stocks carried 
to them by bullock - even on pig back. Boats were arranged 
for fording the rivers, dak connections strengthened, and
1. Dent to G-ovt., 15 Nov. 1832, Ibid.
2. Dent to G-ovt., 21 Nov. 1832, Ibid.
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English and native doctors were brought up to look after the 
troops and levies.
The troops were then divided into three columns - 
the 24th Regiment forming the right, the 50th the centre and 
the 34th the left, each being equipped with guns and supplied 
with a body of irregulars armed with muskets or matchlocks. 
Col. East of the 24th Regiment N.I. was put in overall com­
mand.
Capt. Bird, commanding the right column, marched on
5 December to attack the strongholds of Singh Sardar, Tulsi
2
Digwar and Dina Singh, the insurgent chiefs of Patkum. The 
passes of the hills on different sides of that pargana were 
guarded to prevent infiltration or flight of the insurgents. 
Eor example, Amin Shujaat Ali was stationed at Kedla, 12 
miles east of Inchagarh to guard the pass on the Barabhum 
side and Anand Singh, the zamindar of Matha pargana to the 
north-east was put in charge of the passes on that side ^  
with a re-inforcement of 50 barkandazes from Dulmi thana , 
miles south-east of Inchagarh, One Subadar Singh who had 
lately distinguished himself in fighting the rebels, also 
joined Capt,Bird.
However, the chuars could not be surprised, and they 
even tried to harass the party on its return march, A few 
shots cf the Light infantry, however, silenced them. The
1. Bengal Hurkaru, 17 Dec. 1832, Editorial Column.
2. Wllkinson to Col.Past, 3 Dec. 1832, B.C.1501/58888.
Also see Capt.Bird to Brigade Major, Jungle Mahals Pield 
Porce, N*D.f Ibid.
3. Ibid.
arals and the village of Bara Chatarma were completely des­
troyed. At Chatarma, however, there was a skirmish in which 
a man and a woman were killed and a woman with a bahy and a 
lad were captured.. The captain, however, realized the futi­
lity of such partial and unmeaning skirmishing1', released
p
these helpless prisoners and withdrew his men. Shujaat Ali 
also was not idle in this period. He sacked Jogilow (Jogit- 
ala?) and its neighbouring villages. Moreover, the bowmen 
of the Patkum raja chased some chuars who tried to harass 
them.
In Barabhum two companies of the centre column under 
Capt. Johnson, with 60 men of the Levy under Jamada3f Matadin 
and 40 ghatwals under Srikant Marljia attacked Agui Dangra, 
the haunt of the chief insurgents of the Satrakhani ghat, 
some 9 miles from Barabazar. Its chief, Kishan Singh, stxdial 
ghatwal, was one of the proscribed sardars. Johnson was 
directed by the joint commissioner "to destroy the village 
and bring from thence as many cattle and families of the in- 
surgents as may be captured."-' But again the chuars could 
not be overtaken, though they fired upon the troops from 
some distance.^ Six irregulars were wounded and the detach­
ment returned without "having succeeded in the object for 
which it was detached with the exception of having burned the
1. 'Miles', camp Chelyama, 16 Nov. 1833* Bengal Hurkaru,
24 Jan. 1833.
2. Bird to Brigade Major, J.M.F.F., N.D., B.C. 1501/58888.
3. Wilkinson to Past, 5 Bec3 1832, Ibid.
4. K.Johnson to Blackall, 6 Dec. 1832, Ibid.
village, no chooars or property having been found in it 
except 5 or 6 bullocks.
In the same night Lt. Trimmer with a party of 2 
officers, 4 havildars, 4 naiks and 60 sepoys and 40 men of 
the Levy under Ensign Alexander attacked an aral about five 
miles south-east of camp Balrampur. The place was almost
deserted; but the houses were destroyed and two insurgents
2were killed.
Two main drives thus got under way - one involving 
the centre column in an advance from Balrampur, southwards 
through Barabazar to Berada,^ the other involving two com­
panies of the 34th under Lt. Timins marching from Dhadka to 
Amchuri while the rest of the 34th under Lt. Young closed 
upon the same objective from further to the west.^ The two 
objectives were the strongholds of Ganga Narain in Barabhum 
and of Raghu Nath Singh in Dhalbhum respectively* Both ad­
vances were accompanied by systematic destruction of arals, 
by skirmishes and raids. The troops in the usual way would 
"penetrate into the strongholds and fastnesses of the 
chooars without opposition, b u m  Arrals and villages, destroy 
as much grain as is possible and return to camp." Por full 
two months the troops knew no rest. There was no decisive
1. Blackall to Capt. Impey, 6 Dec. 1832, Ibid.
2. P.Trimmer to Impey, b Dec. 1832, Ibid.
3. A correspondent, Camp Berada, 19 Sec. 1832, John Bull, 
Quoted in Bengal Hurkaru, 27 Dec. 1832.
4. Ibid. Also see It.W.Young to D*oylyt 16 Dec. 1832, B.C.
T3W58889.
5. Bird to Impey, 14 Dec. 1832, B.C. 1501/58888.
action worth the name.^* The tribal people constantly resorted 
to guerilla tactics. Like wasps or hornets they would try to 
sting the vanguard or the rearguard of the troops, hut as 
soon as the troops became alert they would fly away into 
their fastnesses. It was very difficult to overtake or over­
whelm them, and the Bhumijes born and bred in the jungles 
and hills, seemed to know no need of rest.
All through December operations continued. The 
centre column, operating to the north of Barabazar burnt the
villages of Baidihi and Digardi, and destroyed several arals,
2
full of grain. It then moved south-west against Beradi 
and Berada, burning several further villages, seizing or 
destroying the grain stores in a number of arals and carry­
ing off cattle. In addition the column, consisting of 434
rank and file with a brigade of six-pounders captured 40
•5
women and five children.
The left wing, forcing its way through the Satrakhani 
ghat, through the barricades of the chuars, sacked Bansgarh 
and Chur da, and so reached Lakhipur.
The right wing under Timins took Dampara - destroying 
the chhapars cr huts, seizing many cows and oxen, but killing
1. An officer later on commented, "It would be useless even 
could I recollect them (...) to enumerate all the petty 
dours, skirmishes, and burnings that took place, at tins 
time without any satisfactory effect." A Subaltern,
Sketch of the campaign1, East India Journal, No.V, Parti, 
476. '!
2. W.W.Hees to Impey, 13 Dec. 1832, B.C. 1501/58888. |
3. Past to Lt.Col. Beatson, Adjutant of the Army, 15 Dec. 
1832, Ibid. j 
,J_so see Trimmer to Impey, 15 and 16 Dec. 1832, Ibid.
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only three rebels.“ Lct. Young operated in similar fashion 
from Kalyanpur and the Haldipokhar estate.
The effect of these two drives was first to secure 
a few submissions by insurgent leaders - as for example 
those from the Tinsaya tara^ and from the Pun j-Sardar i ^  - 
and then to push the two main rebel groups towards each other 
in the centre of the Jungle Mahals. Against them the right 
column operated from a base at Chelyama, 13 miles south-west 
of Barabazar, and the centre column from Berada. The troops 
moved out almost daily to scour the hills and jungles to 
their south, and destroy villages and arals? The only 
lull was when Capt# Bird with the right column, ran short 
of supplies, and the troops had for some days to be set to 
collecting grain from the arals. (They had to rest content 
with dhan, coarse, unhusked rice).^ Thereafter Major Black- 
all, with the 50th, attacked Sonakhand aral, "where Gunga 
Narain Sing and some of his principal sirdars had taken up
5
a strong position on the h i l l s. T h e  result was as ever, 
the escape of the insurgents, the seizure of grain and 
cattle, some harassing of the rearguard as the troops re­
turned to camp. As a correspondent to John Bull said, all 
such campaigns were "more or less successful in destroying 
the stores of grain; burning the villages, and bringing in
1. G.Timins. to Past, 17 Dec. 1832, Ibid.
2. Wilkinson to Govt., 16 Dec. 1832,"THId.
3. J.Bird to Impey, 16 and 18 Dec. 1832# Ibid.
4. Bird to Impey, 20 Dec. 1832, Ibid.
5. Blackall to Impey, 18 Dec. 183 Ibid.
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herds of cattle, etc., the produce of the chooarfs incur­
sions during the rains, " but the insurgents were f,too ten­
acious of their lives, and too well aware of the best means 
of preserving them by keeping close in the creeks and 
corners of the hills and jungles.1 Prom the south the left 
column, despite serious sickness in the camp, pushed equally 
hard. On 20 December Captain Wheler attacked Khunia, and 
next day Capt. Croft attacked Goghi Barul, killing and 
wounding a number of chuars, destroying many huts and grain
p
stores. Purther sweeps were made on the 26th with equal
success. By the end of December Ganga Narain and the other
principal insurgents had been driven from the more open
country into the Dalma Hills.
The operations had not been without loss to the
British forces, though the losses had never been heavy: a
havildar of the 50th wounded on 13 December,^ officers and
4
sepoys wounded by the "invisible enemy" on the 20th, three 
more of the left column on the 26th, Turnbull, adjutant 
of the 24th, killed on 1 January. But the strain was contin­
uous. The country was often very difficult, the jungle dense
1. A Correspondent, Berada Camp, 19 Dec. 1832, John Bull, 
Quoted in Bengal Hurkaru, 27 Dec. 1832.
2. J.G. Croft to Impey, 20 and 21 Dec. 1832, B.C.1501/58888.
3. Past to Col. Beatson, 15 Dec. 1832, Ibid.
4. Bird to Impey, 20 Dec. 1832, Ibid.
5. Croft to Impey, 26 Dec. l832»*"~Tbid.
6. A Subaltern, op.oit.477: "This day afforded a good specim­
en of jungle fighting, for*the iron flew, from bended 
yew", in whole showers, and yet not a man was visible. 
Crouched amid the bamboos on each side of the rocky del],, 
they sent with impunity 'their arrowy fleet1 among their 
opponents, who could not return the fire with any success, "
■there were stockades to he cleared and a constant danger of 
surprise. As a result the exasperated troops gave ever freer 
rein to the worst tendencies of the human heart, destroying 
and pillaging ruthlessly. There was also for a while the 
risk of cholera to he faced, though the main victims of 
the outbreak in the Lakhipur camp of the 34th were the ill-* 
disciplined, ill-cared for, badly dressed camp followers.1 
(They were the main victims also of the ahuar attacks as they 
went out foraging, or lagged behind advancing columns.)
At times the officer almost despaired of adapting 
the troops to the unfamiliar form of warfare and certainly 
despaired of seeing an end to the operations. Captain Bird, 
writing on 20 December, when Lt. Spry, a native doctor and 
sepoys Gauri Shankar, Shaikh Pir BakAha, Diwan Khan and 
Sheo Dayal Misra had been severely wounded, and a havildar, 
two naiks and several sepoys slightly wounded, said "regu­
lar troops are in a country like this, placed most complete­
ly at the mercy of the chooars who, screened by the thick 
jangle and quite protected by precipitous hills, engage at 
comparatively little or no risk to themselves, whilst the 
troops rendered conspicuous by their dress and compact order, 
offer a fair mark without being able to return a fire with 
any certain ef fe ct .T hou gh  a great deal of damage was 
done to the property of the insurgents, their spirit remained
1. Dr.R. Tytter to Impey, 21 Dec. 1832, Ibid.
2. Report, Dr.H.A.Bruce, 20 Dec. 1832, B.C.1501/58888. Also 
see A Subaltern, op,cit. 477: The chuars "kept up a heavy 
fire cf arrows on the approaching column. "
3. Bird to Impey, 20 Dec. 1832, B.C. 1501/58888.
unbroken, because they so rarely suffered loss in personnel: 
"it is seldom that any party can take them by surprize, they 
get notice of our approach, separate, and conceal themselves 
in the holes and caverns of the thick jungles until our 
return towards camp, when they creep out to take a sly shot 
at the rear column."1 Another correspondent even wrote,
"Most probably we are further off from our object [of catch­
ing Ganga Narain] than ever, for every dour that we have 
hitherto made has only proved to him the strength of the
jungles In fact the regular troops are quite unfit for
2
this irregular warfare."
Such complete despair was perhaps scarcely called 
for; the operations had already, in fact, driven the chuars 
into an ever smaller area of the hills, and Ganga Narain had 
several narrow escapes from capture. He had been driven from 
Kukru Kucha in Bird's attack of 20 December, to which he had 
retreated, with heavy loss in supplies, after being attacked 
on the 17th at Sonakhand. On 28 December Capt. Griffin 
attacked Ghora Banda, and though once again Ganga Narain 
escaped, his hut and personal possessions were taken, includ­
ing a silver mounted huqqah? and much clothing and cooking
1« Anonymous letter, Camp Amjo, 2 Jan. 1833, John Bull,
Quoted in Bengal Hurkaru, 11 Jan. 1833*
2, 'Miles', Camp Chelyama, 16 Jan. 1833* Bengal Hurkaru,
24 Jan. 1833. In the words of an officer who fought here, 
"The same desultory fighting continued on every side, 
where the troops were stationed. Parties were daily out
to attack Kochas or surprise small parties of the Insurg­
ents, but it was of no avail, as Gunga Narain himself
still escaped their stratagems:" A Subaltern, op.cit.477.-
equipments. Moreover, under the repeated attacks of the 
troops a number of his leading followers were giving way. On 
27 December, Kadamjore and Kaljore (Ratanjare), the strong­
holds of Nabbu Digwar, who had already made tentative signs 
of surrendering, were stormed and sacked by Captain Wilson
p
and Shujaat Ali. "The stirring up Nubboo Digwar got," led 
to the surrender of Govind Digwar  ^of Toan Kocha.
"We are," wrote Capt. Wilkinson to Major Benson, the 
private secretary of the Governor General in a private 
letter, "now close under Dulma, with Bareeda hills to our 
rear. Yesterday^ work has so alarmed Annund Deegwar & Jirpa, 
that at 8 last night they sent me ore [word] they would seize 
& bring in Gunga Narain. I told them to do so by 12 o*clock 
today, as our work must proceed little faith can be put in 
the rascals but we shall see what they will do. Nothing 
happened of this promise and on the same day (after the 
appointed hour) a twin attack was launched upon Kocha and 
Neota Kocha, and cn the following day Lt. Hampton and the 
Levy destroyed what was left of Bandi (Band-dihi) and 
Danbira near Amjor. On 3 January a son of Anand Digwar was
1. Griffin to Lt. Turnbull, Adjutant, 28 Dec. 1832, B.C.1501/ 
58888. Also see Wilkinson to Major Benson, Private
secy. Lord Bentinck, 29 Dec. 1832, Bentinck MS., Box 23.
2. Ibid. Also see Bird to Impey, 27 ^ec. 1832, B.C.1503/ 
58888. At Kadamjore a body of chuars were surprised with 
much loss.
3. Wilkinson to Benson, 29 Dec. 1833, Bentinck MS., Box. 23.
4. Ibid.
5. lasT to Lt .Col. Beatson, 3.0 Dec. 1832, B.C. 15 01/5 8888.
6. Lt. Hampton to Impey, 31 Dec. 1832, Ibid.
taken in a most successful attack upon the arals of Jirpa
Naya and Anand Digwar, just to the east of Chelyama.
For most of January the whole of the Jungle Mahals
field force concentrated their attacks upon the Dalma Hills.
The left column had reached Ramgarh, south-east of Chelyama,
and close to the Singhbhum borders and of the Dalma range on
18 January. The centre column, with a detachment of the
50th under Captain Johnson then arrived at Amjor, on the
2
Barabhum skirt of the Dalma Hills on the 19th. From these 
two bases the hills were ravaged day after day, arals being 
burned, small parties of chuars driven through the hills, 
and their women and children, cattle and household goods 
carried off. The right column then joined in from near Dagu 
Kocha,^ while Alexander and the Levy operated further to the
A
north-east in the Ambikanagar area.
From 23 January five parties from the various 
columns commenced a drive. A detachment consisting of four 
companies of the 50th Regiment N.I. two companies of the 
24th, two from the 34th and 160 men of the Bankura Levy with 
about 300 ghatwals attached, took part under the overall
1. Griffin to Impey, 20 Jan, 1833* B.C.1502/58889.
2. Hampton to Impey, 22 Jan. 1833, Ibid.
3. Bird to Inpey, 22 Jan. 1833* IbiST
4. Ensign Alexander to Impey, 29 Jan. 133* Ibid. The Levy 
suffered its most serious reverse on 22 January when Jam- 
adar Kale Khan, who had been left with a party at Ambika­
nagar lost six men, with fifteen of the Levy, and two 
ghatwals wounded. Wilkinson to Benson, 25 Jan. 1833* Ben­
tinck MS., Box 23. Also see Wilkinson to Govt., 29 Jan, 
1833* B.C.1502/58889.
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command of Capt. Johnson. Wilkinson wrote in a private
letter on the 23rd, "I have this morning had parties sent
out from all our positions, to occupy posts round a place
in the hills called Burra Jerrea, they will remain out three
days & return on the 4th, sending out half of their men daily
in search of Gunga; at the same time young Alexander with 150
of the Levy & 350 ghatwals will search in the hills & jungles
in every direction* Most earnestly do I hope that their
exertions will be attended with success, for no officers or
men would go to the work with a better will although it is
harassing in the extreme. Large quantities of grain have
been destroyed in the hills & many cattle brought out of
them, which will I hope soon bring those unfortunate
wretches to a proper sense of their duty The hills a.vc
very strong & covered with jungle & high grass, & our
2
enemies can be found with difficulty.”
On the first day Lt. Sharpe with two companies of
the 24th ascended the hills, destroyed arals and siezed arms 
3
and cattle. On the second Capt. Johnson with the main part 
of the 50th, destroyed arals full of grain and seized arms
1. Johnson to Impey, 27 Jan# 1833* Ibid.Also see a Private 
Letter, Disturbed districts, 24 Tan7 1833* India Gazette, 
31 Jan. 1833* Also see Wilkinson to Benson, 25 Jan. 1833* 
Bentinck MS. Box 23s The columns operated from a post 
south of the Dalma Hills, from Tumolu, "some six miles 
further to the west, at Ramghur, half way between the 
Dulma & Suburnreeka [sic], distant from both less than 
two miles.”
2. Wilkinson to Benson, 23 Jan. 1833* Bentinck MS., Box 23. 
He also wished he could meet the Governor General at 
Hazaribagh but for his preoccupation, but he hoped that 
Dent would explain the state of affairs properly.
3. Sharpe to Johnson, 27 Jan. 1833* B.C.1502/58889.
on the opposite side of the Dalma range. ** On the same day
Sharpe captured a woman and six children. A subadar of the
detachment of the 24th also had a skirmish with the chuars,
2
after which three women and one child were captured. 
Alexanders Levy, which had returned from Ambi^nagar, oper­
ated on this day in three parties, scouring the hills oppo­
site Dalma, burning arals, capturing women and children and 
seizing arms.^ On the same day the two other parties from 
the left column, consisting of 100 sepoys each, under Cap­
tains Croft and Wheler, marched to Goi Ramfs aral and 
Tamak-patur. They burnt Bhota, killed a sardar chuar and 
wounded many of his followers.^
Intensive operations on the fullest scale possible 
were continued until the 28th. Every day arals were burnt,
1. Johnson to Impey, 27 Jan. 1833, Ibid.
2. Lt. Hannyngton to Griffin, 27 Jan. 1833, Ibid.
Also see Griffin to Impey, 24 Jan. 1833, THcT.
3. Alexander to Wilkinson, 28 Jan. 1833, IbicH
Also see Alexander to Johnson, 28 J an.""18331 Ibid.
4. Lt.Col. Cooper to Impey, 26 Jan. 1833, Ibid.
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grain taken from hidden stores, women and children
captured.’*' (The destruction of villages was stopped because
of the orders of the Governor-General, though Wilkinson
believed that some of the chuars of Tinsaya and Punj-Sardari
had surrendered only after many villages had been burnt and
2 N
after they had given the insurgents no rest in their arals".) 
But though they all but came up with Ganga Narain, following 
the hoof-marks of his pony, and attempting to surround him 
when news came in of his presence at Phuljhar, north of 
Ghatshila, all they actually got their hands on were some of 
his papers and his pony. A very great deal of the property 
was destroyed, but the wanted men escaped. As Johnson wrote 
the country “presents every obstacle to the movement of our
1. Meanwhile the following instructions were given to the 
commanding officers on the basis of Major Benson's note 
to Dent of 10 January: "The Governor General wishes that 
no villages should be destroyed, or rather that as 
little injury should be done to the country as possible, 
thinking it upon the whole impolitic.1 But while Wilkinson 
prohibited "the burning or destruction of villages, or 
destruction of cultivation," he explicitly mentioned,
"this prohibition does not of course apply to the tempor­
ary arrals of the chooars, or the grain which they have 
collected in or near them with a view of subsisting 
themselves, whilst in open rebellion against the 
Government," Wilkinson also frankly wrote to the private 
secretary of Lord Bentinck, "We have hitherto destroyed 
and carried away all the grain found in the hills, & 
brought in the cattle. This course I propose continuing 
unless it may be considered objectionable, as the best 
[means] to distress the insurgents, as there is utmost 
difficulty in our coming on them by surprise." But at the 
same time he asked his friend, "Pray let me Inow what 
Lord Wm's [William Bentinckfs] wishes are, regarding the 
manner in which we should proceed that I may not run 
counter." Wilkinson to Benson, 25 Jan. 1833» Bentinck
MS., Box 23.
2. Ibid.
troops, while it affords every facility of escape and con­
cealment to the chuars..., it is impossible to overtake them, 
unincumbered as they are, and possessing the double advantage 
of a perfect knowledge of the ground and long habit of 
moving over such ground with celerity.”^"
The troops, by their concerted drives, and by bivouC- 
king in the Dalma Hills themselves for days on end so as to 
leave no part unguarded day or night, had put the insurgents 
in great straits. The hills were traversed in every direction 
and the insurgents were deprived of their grain and every
p
other necessary of life. Their losses, after the whole 
available British force, regular and irregular had been 
poured into the one area of south Barabhum, undoubtedly were 
very high. Yet still the invisible enemy showed no sign of 
relinquishing his sanguinary struggle, and continued to defy 
the whole British strength in the Jungle Mahals. Worse still, 
their example of resistance led to disturbances in Singhbhum 
where the Larka Kols of the Kolhan under their turbulent 
leaders were active in undertaking raids in the neighbour- 
inging areas, and more particularly im taking sides in the 
dispute between the Bamanghati zamindar and his overlord the 
Raja of Mayurbhanj on the one hand and between the Raja of
1. Johnson to Impey, 28 Jan. 1833* B.C.1502/58889.
2. According to a military officer, Mthe exertions of the 
officers and men of the scouring parties had made the 
whole range of hills too hot to hold Gunga Narain and 
his followers.” A Subaltern, op.cit. 478.
Porahat and the chiefs of Saraikela and Kharsawan on the 
other.
When, however, the crack in the insurgents1 morale 
came, it was amongst the southern group that it first 
appeared. While the Palma Hills were being scoured, Lt. Tim-
p
ins, with the 34th, was busy in Phalbhum. He succeeded, in 
the main, in inflicting rather heavier casualties on the 
enemy than the northern forces had - seven in the Kaniarota 
hills on 27 January, another six or seven at Kamalpur on 
the 30th, five more and a number of persons on 2 February, 
and so on* More important still, a number of the leaders 
were killed or seized. Man;}hi was killed in the attacks on 
Gardi Mundafs posts north of Haldipokhar, Madan MuXari was 
captured on 2 February and from 5 February first Gardi 
Mundafs stronghold of Larjhori was taken, with one of his 
sons, cousin and various servants, then his eldest son sur­
rendered and his wife was captured, and finally on the 8th
1. Bindrai was the ringleader of the Larkas of north Singh- 
bhum, and the ahiefs of Porahat, Saraikela and Singhbhum 
trembled with fear at the mere mention of the name of 
this Rob Roy. These chiefs had been threatened one by one 
that "if you send for the Sahib (English) or go for himf 
your ■fehur (house) or villages will not remain, and you 
shall yourself be killed:" Petition, Raja Achet Singh of 
Perahat to Wilkinson, 22 Oct. 1832, B.C. 1503/58902.
Also see Wilkinson to Govt., 31 Oct. 1832, Ibid. Again, 
Bindrai, Khandu Pater and other Larkas burned ten village 
of Kharsawan in December 1832. (Wilkinson to Govt., 26 
Pec. 1832, Ibid.) Wilkinson repeatedly requested the Gov­
ernment to permit him to attack the Larkas, (Memorandum, 
Wilkinson, 1 March 1833, B.C.1502/58889). but the latter, 
after the sad experinece of the Jungle Mahals, did not 
like to undertake such a difficult task.: Govt, to Wilk­
inson, 31 Pec. 1832, B.C. 15 03/5 8903 5 Govt,, to Wilkinson, 
28 Jan. 1833, Para.4, B.C. 1503/58904. Also see Pol. Lette 
to Bengal Govt, to Court of Pirectors, 13 March 1834.
B.C.1503/58906.
2. Timins to Impey, 10 Feb. 1833, B.C.1502/58889.
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Gardi Munda himself surrendered. "These three chief Sirdars", 
wrote Timing, "ought never to be allowed to be at large 
again in my opinion. They were (particularly Gadie Moonda) 
as influential in producing rebellion as Gunga Narain Sing. 
They have burnt villages, destroyed property and laid waste
i
the country in the neighbourhood of my camp."
This considerable success was followed up by even 
more vigorous drives against rebel strongholds, and at last 
matters began to take, for the Company, a more favourable 
turn. Captain Wilkinson, using his knowledge and experience 
of the tribal folk of this area, and probably also of the 
Bhils of south India, began to win over certain of the
chiefs by timely bribes. A number of them, such as Bikal
2Sardar and Gambhir Singh joined joint commissioner as 
guides, with a consequent increase in the efficiency of the 
troops1 movements. "The sight of coin", Captain Griffin 
wrote, "has excited their zeal and they will prove themselves 
all I can w i s h . M a n y  of the officers still doubted,
1. Ibid. Other chiefs who submitted this day were Ramoa, * 
isman sardar, Hango, Murga Koon Digwar, Ram Sardar’, and 
others.
2. Wilkinson to Govt., 30 Jan. 1833, B.C.1502/58889# Bahadur 
Singh had already been working with Capt, Wilkinson since 
the beginning of the first phase of the unrest, and he had 
become one of the favourites.
3. Quoted in Wilkinson to Govt. 30 Jan 1833, B.C. 1502/
58889* The accession of reliable guides was very welcome 
for Ganga Narain had caused many spies to desert by kill­
ing any such, even women, who fell into his hand: "The 
difficulty of obtaining correct information is great, and 
has been lately much increased by three men of the Intell­
igence department having been murdered and three confirm'd 
by Gunga Narain1 s followers1: Wilkinson to Govt., 30 Jcvr-. 
1832. Ibid.
however, whether Ganga Narain could be taken, though the 
troops, as one said, had become "very successful in sur­
mounting steep precipices such as our troops never scaled 
before", and others were finding the constant work of 
destruction increasingly distasteful, and could not but feel
"some degree of pity for these poor, superstitious and mis-
2
guided men, whom we are hunting like wild beasts*" And 
then, quite unexpectedly news came in, on 7 February that 
Ganga Narain was dead* He had fled to Singhbhum to seek the 
aid of the Larka Kols, and on the way had been killed, not 
by British troops as some writers boasted,*^ nor by any 
traitor among his followers but by the forces of Thakur
4
Chetan Singh of Kharsawan, at his thana of Hindusahar,
1. ‘Miles1* Camp Timolia, 30 Jan. 1833, Bengal Hurkaru 
9 Feb* 1833,
2. Report from Camp Amjor, 30 Jan* 1833, India Gazette*
6 Feb. 1833.
3* Bengal & Agra Annual Guide and Register, 1841, II, 36.
4* According to an officer who fought here, "Gunga Narain 
- deserted by almost all his followers - of whom some 
were killed and many had submitted or been taken 
prisoner - fled to Singhboom and endeavoured to rouse 
the Coles to join him. To this they would not agree 
unless they had a specimen of his talents as a leader, 
and they proposed an attack upon Thakoor Cheytun 
Sing's estate ... "One of his Namhatas or personal 
servants, subsequently taken, mentioned the particulars 
as follows: - 'That on the attack being made ..., the 
Thakoorfs forces repulsed them, and that Gunganarain 
who was already hit with two arrows, endeavoured to run 
away across a gram field. That he was pursued and over­
taken by Cheytun Sing's barber who sprung on him and 
held him to the ground, while some of his friends cuir 
his head off.'"
The news was so unexpected, so much a holt from the "blue, 
that the thakur was at pains to have as many people as pos­
sible identify the body before he sent the news to the 
joint commissioner*1 His message was followed by the s-jvered 
head of the rebel which was identified in camp by Ganga 
Harain's son-in-law, several other relatives and at lea^t a 
hundred other individuals. The thakur, three of whose men 
had been killed and 30 men and horses wounded, wrote to the
commissioner for the promised reward, and for adequate pro-
2
tection of his person and property. Wilkinson, expressing 
his sense of relief, thought the thakur entitled to the re­
ward of Rs.5,000, though he admitted that the intensive 
operations since 19 January had been indirectly responsible 
for the consummation of this object.
Operations had still to be continued for some time 
to secure the capture or surrender of the other chief insurg­
ents. But the announcement of Ganga Narain*s death had a 
demoralising effect upon all of them, and the Punj- Sardari 
rebels (except for Jirpa Naya), and those of Satrakhani sur­
rendered.^ The success of It. Timins in the direction of
1. Chetan Singh to Wilkinson, 7 Feb. 1833, B.C.1502/58889.
“The Thikur had the pleasure of sending his head to
Captain Wilkinson, with a letter quite in the style of 
Falstaff when after the battle near Shrewsbury, he said,
1there is Percy, If your father will do me any honor
so; if not, let him kill the next Percy himself. I look
to be either Earl or Duke*. Dalton, Ethnology, 175*
2. Chetan Singh to Wilkinson, 7 Feb. 18B, B.cJ7i502/58889.
3. Wilkinson to Govt., 10 Feb. 1833, B.C.1502/58889.
4. Jt.Commissioners to Govt., 15 Feb. 1833, Ibid.
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Kaljanpur and Haldipokhar led to the submission of many
rebel chiefs in that p o c k e t Y e t  another turbulent chief
was seized by the Dhalbhum raja north of Narsinggarh in the
vicinity of Dampara. Tulsi Digwar, the insurgent chief of
Patkum who had taken Ganga Narain to Singhbhum, died of
wounds f Raghu Nath Singh, the Dampara chief, for
whose apprehension a reward had been announced, was taken on
19 February, "by the craft of a Brahmin while Lai Sardar,
another proscribed sardar, was, with his son, seized on the
2
same day, "by some ghatwals in water."
At last it became possible for the joint commission­
ers to plan the dispersal of the forces collected under their
command. Two regiments they suggested might be sent f Orth­
'S
with to Tamar, Singhbhum and other disturbed quarters*
While Wilkinson was in Calcutta, mopping up opera­
tions continued. On 16 February Kosi was attacked, and after 
losing 23 men, Surar Sardar submitted. Three days later 
Mauldia, a stronghold in the hills in the Bamanghati estate 
was attacked,^ Thirty two dead bodies were counted, and
1. Timdns to Impey, 10 and 17 Feb. 1833, Ibid.
2. Wilkinson to Benson, 21 Feb. 1833, Bentinck MS.Box.23s 
only Durup Kahar and Kishan Singh of Satrakhani now 
remained at large.With the apprehension of Raghu Nath, no 
focus of resistance remained in Dhalbhum and other 
sardars surrendered and took the oath of allegiance
he fore Lt.C ol.C o ope r, the commander of the left column:- 
Cooper to Impey, 4 March 1833, B.C.1502/58890.
3. Jt.Commissioners to Govt., 15 Feb.1833,B.C.1502/58889.
The troops did go to Singhbhum and Tamar, but the disputes 
were settled by arbitration: See Wilkinson to Govt.,
2 Apl.1833, B.C. 1502/58890. Also see Govt, to Wilkinson,
6 Apl.1833, Ibid.Also Wilkinson to Fast, 20 Apl.1833, Ibid 
Also Wilkinson to Govt., 20 Apl. 1833, Ibid.
4c Timins to Impey, 17 Feb. 1833, Ibid. The insurgents had 
taken refuge there.
further sardars^ submitted and bound themselves not to chuar 
again. Those chiefs who were still at large were now 
fugitives rather than effective rebels. ,fSeveral of the in­
surgent chiefs are still abroad," wrote a correspondent of 
the India Gazette, "but attended only by their respective 
families. Attempts are still being made to lay hold of 
Tirpaniah [Jirpa Naya] and one or two others, but I think it 
is of little consequence whether they are caught or not, as
they have had too severe a lesson lately as to our mode of
2
punishing offenders ever to trouble the country again. "
There was great rejoicing in the camps at the death 
of Ganga Narain and seizure of Raghu Nath Singh and the pros 
pect of a return to cantonment - a rejoicing which turned to 
bitter complaint when it was realised that there was still 
work to be done in Singhbhum and the Cuttack tributary 
Mahals. The newspapers for March and April were full of 
angry comments of the officers detained in those disturbed 
areas through the hot weather, with prospects even of 
further work in the rains.^
1. Some of the sardars who had submitted by 20 February were 
Gopal, Kalyan., Mad a, Binu, Karji, Tuhar, Buru, Ram, Surar 
Mataru, Juli, Rup Singh, Lakhan, Bahadur, Pura, Senru, 
Baraga, Puran, Madan, Gop and Nagga. Another batch sub­
mitted by 9 March: Timins to Impey, 2 March 1833,
B.C.1502/58890.
2. Report from field force, 21 Feb. 1833, India Gazette,
25 Feb. 1833.
3. fSilexr, Bankura, 24 March 1833, Bengal Hurkaru,
28 March 1833- Aslo see An off ice r, J.M.F.F., C amp 
Chelyama, 30 March, John Bull,Quoted in Bengal Hurkaru,
5 Apl* 1833. ---------
Also *A convalescent1, Bengal Hurkaru. 20 Apl« 1833.
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It was indeed hard upon the troops, especially the 
50th which had "borne the burden of a campaign in Chota- 
Nagpur before being sent into the Jungla Mahals* A number of 
promising officers had fallen to the chuars♦, or became a 
prey to exertion and an unhealthy climate - the saddest loss 
of all, perhaps, being that of Ensign Alexander who died 
right at the end of the campaign with his Bankura Levy, on 
25 March. As Dent said, the Government "lost in this young 
man an officer of considerable promise and one who during 
the late campaign displayed a zeal and activity highly to 
his c r e d i t . T h e  sickness among the sepoys had also been 
heavy, especially in the 34th which had been hard-hit by 
cholera.
The burden borne by the Company was no light one 
either. An officer, writing under the pseudonym fJohn Kol1 
to the Indian Gazette, had pointed out the absurdity of Gov­
ernment 1 s keeping three regiments in the field, with their 
appropriate establishments, at a cost of about Rs.25,000 a 
month when the whole revenue of the district barely amounted
to Rs. 8,000 - even if the zamindars did not secure a relief
2
from revenue demand as compensation for their losses. Quite 
apart from these regular outgoings, there had been a contin­
gent bill of Rs.3,815 charged upon and sanctioned by the
1. Dent to Govt., 27 March 1833, B.C.1502/58890.
2, 'John Kolf, Disturbed districts, N.D. Bengal Hurkaru,
16 Peb. 1832.
Government for extra establishments of barkandazes and other
miscellaneous items for the months August 1832 to January
1833 for the protection of the western frontier of Midnapur
alone.'1' Then Commissioner Braddon had incurred expenses
attendant on the disturbances in the Jungla Mahals amounting
to Rs. 22,511^ and from November 1832 to April 1833 the joint
aommissioners, who took over from Braddon, had incurred a
further expenditure of Rs.28,715.^ Though the detailed items
show how very cheap carriage, foodstuffs and the wages of
native employees were, the total, when added to the salaries
allowances etc. of the military and civilians engaged in the
campaign, was quite formidable.
Moreover, though, as Wilson points out, the campaign
4
was from the military point of view a very minor affair 
of skirmishes with tribesmen armed only with bows, arrows, 
and axes, in point of destructiveness it was a very full 
scale one. Thousands of acres were laid waste, thousands of 
houses and huts were destroyed. Great quantities of grain 
were seized, scattered or burnt, so that even seed grain was 
not available in some areas after pacification had been com­
pleted. No effort was at any time made to preserve stocks 
for sowing against a return to normality. Similarly cows, 
bullocks, goats and sheep were always seized when a village
1. Hunter to Govt.* 5 Feb. 1833» B.C.1502/58889.
2. Russell to Braddon, High Commissioner, 29 May 18339 
B.C.1502/58890.
3- Lent to Govt., 6 July 1833*^33.0.1502/58890.
4. Wilson, Mill's History of^Tndia. 1858, IIX, 238.
or aral was attacked. Most of them were sold, and the pro­
ceeds distributed among the troops,^ When Wilkinson 
enquired from the Calcutta authorities whether he should 
permit this, he was told that he should exercise his own 
discretion in the matter, though he might restore cattle to 
their real owners, if they had not been concerned in the in­
surrection, The loss of working cattle was necessarily a
2
serious blow to the whole agricultural economy*
Initially the losses in killed and wounded among the 
insurgents do not seem to have been heavy: it was only twice 
or thrice that the chuars directly attacked the troops* 
During the rains, when the regulars were withdrawn, the 
levies, thana police and barkandazesf not heavily armed and 
largely inactive, inflicted little loss. But in the later 
operations, such as those in the Palma Hills, when large 
bodies of regulars, with supporting six-pounders, were 
employed losses grew heavier, (Nor, it may be supposed, did 
the troops always discriminate between the peaceable and 
hostile villagers), Bhumij casualties must certainly have 
run into thousands.
1. Wilkinson to Govt., 27 Jan. 1833, B.C.1502/58889.
2. A number of Bengal newspapers were roused to protest 
against the wholesale destruction of villages and crops, 
but in such country, and operations against a people so 
recklessly intent upon vengeance upon all outsiders the 
Government argument that no other methods were open to 
them, was not implausible.
CHAPTER VI.
The Origins of the Unrest in the Jungle Mahals
and Dhalbhum.
The risings in the Jungle Mahals and Dhalbhum had a 
multiple origin: in the personal grievances of a gifted 
leader, Ganga Narain; in the feuds and dissensions of petty 
rajas and zamindars; and in the general discontent of the 
tribal people under the pressure of alien social and politic­
al systems. The tribal discontent was two-fold: with the 
administrative system and its alien officials imposed upon 
them by the East India Company, and with the hinduization of 
their chiefs, which had set disruptive forces at work at the 
very heart of their society. All these pressures and 
reactions were simultaneous and interacting, but in trying 
to understand the origins of the disturbances of 1832 and 
1833 they will be considered separately.
But before considering these in detail attention 
should perhaps be drawn to the extraordinary ignorance of 
the British officials, and the indifference of some of the 
local rajas to the various causes of discontent. Even after 
violent unrest had flared up in Chota-Nagpur and Palamau and 
had spread in the early days of 1832, into Patkum, no special 
vigilance was exercised, no enquiry made, no re-disposition 
of troops ordered in the Jungle Mahals. When Madhava Singh 
was murdered, the incident was regarded as no more than a
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local affray, a private feud quite unexpected loy Russell at 
Bankura but certainly not seen, in the first place, as the 
signal for a widespread expression of anger and distress by 
the Bhumij as a whole. The utter lack of contact between the 
tribal people and the district authorities was certainly 
one reason why the unrest so soon got out of hand.
That lack of contact was due in part to the over­
burdening of the handful of British officials in the dis­
tricts. To the collector of Midnapur, of Burdwan or Birbhum, 
almost single-handed settling the large, populous and 
revenue - productive plains areas of their charges^ , the 
remote, difficult and unrewarding Jungle Mahals were a nuis­
ance, to be pushed on one side whenever possible. Even after 
the creation of a separate district called the Jungle Mahals, 
by Regulation XVIII of 1805, Dhalbhum and, except for a few 
years, Dampara were still included in Midnapur, and for some 
years longer the Birbhum authorities continued to exercise 
control over the new district. Even when, after 1823, the 
aollectorship of the Jungle Mahals was made a distinct 
office,"1* the magistrate-collect or had his court and head­
quarters at Bankura, on the edge of the plains. Neither he 
nor the Midnapur magistrate could keep an effective control 
over Barabhum or Dhalbhum from their distant bases, and 
neither showed much inclination to tour such difficult and 
unhealthy parganas.
1. Beng. Rev. Cons. 24 of 17 July 1823 /59\
Moreover few of the officials thought it was worth 
while to attempt inspection and control, for they had a 
fixed idea that the inhabitants of the hills were irredeem­
able criminals, turbulent chuars or freebooters. Since they 
never made any close acquaintance of the Bhumijes they never 
found it necessary to revise such views. Other than Blunt, 
Magistrate of the Jungle Mahals from 1806 to 1810, no offic­
ial seems to have had either sympathy for or understanding 
of the tribal people. Hamilton1s account of the inhabitants 
of the Bogree pargana,written in 1816, ran, "the leaders of 
the choars continued to act as if they had been independent 
of any government* and endeavoured to maintain their inde­
pendence by the most atrocious acts, and frequently by the 
murder of individuals In revenge for evidence given against 
them. Besides thus perpetrating rapine and murder in the 
prosecution of their ordinary vocation, these miscreants 
were generally ready to become the instruments of private 
malice among the inhabitants when the malignity of their 
hatred stimulated them to assassination, which they were too 
cowardly to perform with their own hands.1 He. summed up 
the people as "shy, sullen, inhospitable and uncivilized"
and their chiefs as "grossly stupid, debauched, tyrannical,
2
and slaves to the most grovelling superstition."
No less typical of the official attitude was the 
account of the tribal people, particularly of Dhalbhum, given
1. Hamilton, East India Gazetteer, 2nd Ed., I, 154-155.
2. Ibid. 346.
In 1817 by the Midnapur collectors "The seclusion in which 
the jungle population live, tends to separate them, both in 
fact and in idea from the inhabitants of the open country 
and from their attachment to long prescribed custom and 
local usages; innovation or anything bearing that appearance 
In [is] particularly hateful to them, the ferocious nature 
they display when under the influence of passion dictates 
•the expediency of avoiding any occasion to excite the irri­
tation of a class of men easily thrown into outrage and 
disorder and very difficult when once aroused by wrongs 
<either real or imaginary to be quieted. The nature of the 
(Country opposes [poses] obstacles to the efficiency of the 
authorities constituted to maintain public order...
Russell, in charge of the Jungle Mahals from 1828 
to 1833, showed no greater sympathy or understanding. When 
the Bhuinijes took to violence he attributed it to their 
criminal habits. In August 1833, he accordingly wrote to 
Dent, "whenever any disturbances have occurred in this 
district, they have always originated either with the 
jageerdars of Coleapal [Koilapal] or in the Pergunnahs of 
Pate00m and Burabhoom. Their inhabitants are chiefly of the 
Bhoomeez class, notorious in former years for plunder and 
rapine, and late events have shewn how prone they still are
1. Beng. Rev. Cons. 70 of 16 Jan. 1818 /57\ : The collector
was opposing the introduction of 
qanungoes in these jungle estates,
to join in any predatory expedition.Dent's long report as 
Joint Commissioner, presented only a month later, showed 
how superficial Russell's view was by revealing the genuine 
grievances which at long last had driven the tribal folk to 
revolt.
While the tribute or quit-rent was regularly received 
from the zamindars and there were no major outbreaks of 
violence or crime, the British officials were content to 
leave the inhabitants of the Jungle Mahals to their own 
devices. They did not tour the district, they accepted the 
reports of their subordinate officials, they noted that in 
the thirty-three years after 1800 the Dhalbhum zamindar who 
was in charge of the police, had sent up only two or three 
cases a year to Midnapur - "and the enquiries into those are 
conducted with so little discretion and prepared in so slov­
enly a manner, as rather to defeat than answer the ends of
p
justice" - but did not actively wonder whether justice was 
being ensured in the Mahals. It was only after the out­
break in 1832 that it was recognized that the tribal people, 
in face of oppression "would rather submit than prefer com­
plaints in consequence of a repugnance to quit their jungles 
and visit the haunts of civilizsd man." Haimendorf,
A
1. Russell to Dent, 10 Aug. 1833, Para.2, B.C. 1502/58891.
In another letter of 13 April 1833 to Braddon (Beng. C:r„ 
Judl Cons. 29 of 3 June. 1833/140\Nhe stated that 'the 
lower classes' of his ‘“32"
district were very'prone' "to join any system of plunder..1
2. W.S.Alexander to Hunter. 28 Feb. 1833, Para.3, B.C.1502/ 
58890. /
3. Ibid.
writing about aboriginal rebellions in the Deccan, argues 
that “the responsibility of the administration lies in coun­
tenancing a state of affairs in which unscrupulous new­
comers can grow fat at the expense of the aboriginals''^* That 
responsibility could certainly be laid at the door of the 
Company officials in charge of the Jungle Mahals,
Where the British official was ignorant of the opp­
ression which lay behind the 1832? outbreak, the rajas and 
zamindars who whould have been a defence to their people 
failed them through indifference or incapacity. In the 
eighteenth century some of the rajas had led their fellow 
tribesmen in a brave resistance to the Company. In the 1820*8 
and 1830's they no longer led them against the outsiders, 
hut with their new claims to be Rajputs and good Hindus often 
even sided with the alien intruders. Unlike the Chota-Nagpur 
raja, who had made extensive grants of villages to Brahmans 
and pandas (priests in holy places), we have no evidence of 
these Jungle chiefs making such grants. Nevertheless the 
Brahman priests had begun to dominate the social life in 
several estates, and the pahanst nayas and other tribal 
religious heads lost their importance. In the northern parts 
of the Jungle Mahals, the Brahman immigrants generally came 
from the eastern districts, though in the beginning of the
1. 'The Aboriginal Rebellions of the Deccan, ' Man in India, 
Rebellion Number, XXV, No.4, Dec. 1945.
19th century some Brahmans also came from Tirhut (Mithila) 
in north Bihar. On the other hand, in the southern parts and 
in Dhalbhum, ^  they generally came from Orissa. Once they 
came, they established themselves as tenure-holders, 
tenants, money-lenders and even as diwans. The tribal
sardars and the general masses felt this encroachment on
2
their age-old rights and liberties as galling. The diwan 
in Pachet was a Brahman, in Barabhum a Bengali Hindu both 
before and after Madhava Singh’s tenure of office, and in 
Dhalbhum Madhu Thakur was a Brahman. Moreover all the 
creatures of these diwans were either Hindu or Muslim, and 
Were out to amass fortunes at the cost of the tribal inter­
ests. As an extreme example may be quoted the history of 
Dhalbhum. With the hinduization of the zamindar's family 
many adventurers had come into the pargana from outside, had 
got a foothold, and had then proceeded to make fortunes at 
the cost of the tribal peasants. Prom 1825, when a minor 
succeeded, the process was accelerated by the manager of 
the estate Thakur Jugal Kishore, who used outsiders to help 
him in exploiting his position of trust.
One such adventurer was Shamshir Khan, who had come 
to Narsing-garh as a merchant in the time of Baikunth Dhal, 
the predecessor and brother of the minor Raja Chitreswar.
He was so cunning that he made both Baikunth and Chitreswar
1. D. G.Manbhum, 80.
2. Dalton, Ethnology, 168.
3. Petition, Raja Chitreswar, Appendix 6, Dent to Govt.,
4 Sept. 1833, B.C.1501/58886.
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his friends, exchanging turbans with them. Later Shamshir 
also became intimate with the Bara Thakur Jugal Kishjfore and 
secured the post of diwan in the place of Gadadhar Panigrahi. 
But the Khan soon became unpopular because of his oppressive 
steps against the ryots. At this time another adventurer, a 
fakir named Maqbul Ali Shah, arrived at Harsing^-garh. The 
Bara Thakur was so impressed by him that he “attended him 
twice a day and looked up to him as a peer," and the two 
“occasionally retired together into the jungles to consult.
It was under the influence of the fakir that the Bara Thakur 
totally neglected the affairs of the estate and remained
p
busy with puja (worship). Moreover, at his advice, he ex­
ploited the unpopularity of Shamshir Khan, by taking money 
from the ryots as a fee for replacing the Khan by Banmali.
But when only half of the promised amount A'0,000) had been 
paid by the ryots, the Bara Thakur, on the advice of Maqbul 
Ali, turned out Banmali and his sheristadar and appointed 
Kalu Mian and Madhu Thakur as diwan and the naib diwan res­
pectively. The raja later made Madhu Thakur the diwan. ^
Again, it so happened that at the time of the unrest, 
and in the years immediately preceding the outbreak, a number 
of the Jungle Mahals chiefs were in one way or another 
incapacitated as rulers. In Dhalbhum Chitreswar Dhal until
1. Ibid.
2. TBjl3, It was at this very time that the Maharaja of 
Chota-Nagpur was spending most of his time in worship, 
and had given a foothold to the priests, traders and 
others.
3. Ibid. Also see Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833* Para.46,
B.C.1501/58886.
1829 was a minor and in 1833 Dent was to write of “the weak­
ness of the young Raja’s intellect and his utter unfitness 
for all business."’1' In Barabhum Raja Ganga Govind Singh had 
resigned all the affairs of his estate into the hands of his 
stepbrother, who became diwan with the express purpose of 
amassing wealth. In Pachet the raja had similarly handed 
over all responsibility to his wife and his diwan, having, 
as Braddon reported, “reduced himself from excessive indulg­
ence in the use of intoxicating and stupefying drugs, to a 
state of infirmity of mind which would almost warrant his 
estate being placed under the management of the Court of 
Wards."2
In such circumstances the rajas were incapable of 
defending the interests of their tribal tenants - and the 
latter no longer felt it possible to secure redress from 
their chiefs. The tribesmen’s only remedy seemed to be in 
violence, and when all else failed that remedy they not 
surprisingly chose in 1832* ^ Haimendorf *s remarks, made in 
another context, might very aptly be applied to the Jungle 
Mahals: “...Any one with first hand experience of conditions 
in the backward areas and the appalling oppression and ex­
ploitation to which many aboriginals are subjected at the 
hands of more advanced populations must be surprised, not by 
the occurrence of risings, but by the infrequency of violent
1. I M d ,
2. Braddon to Govt., 24 Aug. 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
reaction on the part cf the aboriginals to the loss of their 
ancestral lands and to their economic enslavement.""*"
That enslavement had followed almost automatically 
from the action of the Bengal Government in extending the 
Permanent Settlement and the Cornwallis code to these unde­
veloped areas, without taking any note of tribal interests, 
needs and customs. As Hutton says, the early British admin­
istration "did very great detriment to the economic position
of the tribes through ignorance and neglect of their rights
2
and customs." Though it was the Indian subordinate offic­
ials, the amlas of the courts, thanas, and excise and revenue 
services who actually harassed and exploited with the new 
and complex regulations, and though in tribal eyes they were 
the chief villains of the piece, it was the British administ­
ration which, as O fMalley says, "was ultimately responsible 
as it facilitated contacts with tribes which had hitherto 
been unaffected or only slightly affected by them. It was 
only the presence of the British power which permitted *the 
administrative frontier1, fthe traders1 frontier1 and fthe 
settlers1 frontier*^ to encroach upon the tribal territory. 
Cornwallis placed the greatest stress upon the importance of
1. *The Aboriginal Rebellions of the Deccan*> Man in India,
Rebellion Humber, XXV, Dec. 1945, No.4. “
2. 0*Malley (Ed.) Modern India/ and the West, 438.
3. Ibid. 737.
4. (these expressions are from F.G-.Bailey, Caste and the 
Economic Frontier, 230-235.
“the judicial side of the administration and the setting up 
of courts of law free from the play of personality and of 
uncertainty in the law itself. Yet it is clear that in the 
Jungle Mahals the introduction of British Courts - and of 
shrewd darogas and munsifs - was hy no means a blessing.
With the opening up of tribal territory moneylenders and 
traders appeared. By 1828 Hamilton was already commenting 
upon the oppression of the tribal people of the area by im­
migrant moneylenders: "... all that their vigilance can pre­
serve from the ravages of wild beasts, is extorted from 
them by the rapacity of the moneylenders. They were 
charged 100 p.c. interest for their food and nearly 150 p.c. 
for their seed, with the result that when their crops were 
ready little or nothing remained beyond the bare means of 
■subsistence. But neither the Government nor the local auth­
orities did anything to check the rapacious spirit of the 
moneylenders, rather their courts and laws facilitated the 
collection of debts or the compulsory sale of lands on pay­
ment of the usurious claims of the moneymenders.
Moreover, the chiefs and rajas of the Jungle Mahals, 
who had played a part in introducing outsiders into their 
estates, often themselves suffered at the hands of money­
lenders or of their stewards and agents. Exposed to the , 
action of the sale laws for non payment of revenue to the 
British authorities, they often lost their lands to scheming
1. Hamilton, East India Gazetteer, II, 229.
2. Ibid.
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estate officials, cr, having recourse to the moneylenders, 
became hopelessly involved in debts. If some of the chiefs 
did very little to prevent the attacks of the chuars upon 
the moneylending class it was perhaps not so much from power­
lessness, as from a lack of will to act on behalf of a class 
which had them too in its clutches.
The rise of the Brahmans, or of Muslim merchants to 
positions of authority in the feudal estates of the Jungle 
Mahals, and the oppressive activities of the moneylenders 
were much resented by the Bhumijes. But to them the most 
obnoxious class of non-tribal people was that of the 
amlas or petty officials in the service of the East India 
Company. From their positions of petty authority in courts, 
police thanas and excise establishments*harassed the people 
in a multitude of ways. A correspondent of the India Gazette 
commented upon "the aversion that the natives themselves 
entertain and perpetually manifest against the administration 
of justice by their own countrymen [i.e. Bengali or up- 
country munsifs, darogas and the like]"^ *. Another contempor­
ary argued in similar fashion, "an insurrection in the Jungle 
Me hauls, as well as in Chotah Nagpore, has been produced 
through corrupt native influence, there being in truth, in
those distant regions, no insaf [justice], no adawlut [court],
2
and no feringhee [English] to speak to. " The constant
1. keport from Camp Dhaka-Kend, 8 June, India G-azette,
14 June 1832.
2. An officer of the 50th N.I., 14 May, India Gazette,
19 May 1832.
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attacks upon police thanas and court houses when the rebel-- 
lion broke out has already been noted.
The menial staff of the munsifs, the peadas, and the 
Muslim police barkandazes were certainly guilty of acts of 
oppression when deputed on duty to the villages. These acts 
might be no more than the forcible provision of fowls or 
kids for their tables, but might extend to the levying of a 
regular toll upon all the villages in the district. The 
police daroga set the example by taking a rupee or so from 
every village on appointment and much larger sums when he 
was on the mofussil; His subordinates immitated the daroga 
and found pretexts for exacting their petty ^ines1 from the 
ghatwals^ and villages. The police officers might thus coll­
ect as much as two or three thousand rupees a year from a 
pargana,^
The salt daroga and his subordinates at the chauki 
were other officials who abused their powers and suffered in 
consequence. In Barabhum, for example, the ghatwals accused 
the daroga of taking ten rupees a year from each person 
carrying salt for sale. Dent thought their accusation exag­
gerated, but even he admitted that the salt daroga collected
1. They would accuse a ghatwal of neglect of his duty of 
guarding the passes - and then accept hush money.
2. Braddon to Govt., 12 June 1832, B.C.1501/58887. Also see 
Dent to Govt., 4 Sept* 1833, Para.23, B.C.1501/58886s 
"The usual annual payments of two to three rupees from 
each village according to its size were made to the police 
at the time of entering the revised lists of Ghatwals and 
Chokidars collectionss in making local investigations, 
payments to be exempted from proceeding to Bancoorah were 
here as elsewhere sources of emoluments to the police."
a fee called Minkara of one anna per maund on all salt im­
ported into Barabhum and cne rupee annual salami from each 
person selling salt, besides a douceur paid to the salt 
chaprasis,^
The explosion of 1832-33 may in general terms he 
attributed to the pressure of outsiders upon tribal life, 
and the misguided action of the East India Company in sub­
jecting the people to the complex regulations of judicial 
and revenue systems worked out in other more developed areas. 
Had the tribal people been left under their chiefs, - the 
sardar ghatwals, or had British officials maintained a 
close control of their subordinates, disaster might have been 
avoided. It must be recognised, however, that in Barabhum in 
particular special conditions operated to bring dissatisfac­
tion to a head. The early success of the Kols when they rose 
In revolt in the neighbouring areas of Chota-Nagpur and Pala- 
rnau, and then in Bamanghati and in unsettled Singhbhum, 
could not fail to cause a stir in the Jungle Mahals,It is 
difficult, indeed, to establish any direct connection 
"between the risings of the Dhangar Kols in Chota-Nagpur, and 
cof the Cheros and Kharwars cf Palamau with the Bhumij 
risings. But it seems very likely indeed that the Court of 
Directors were correct in asserting that "the insurrection 
in the Jungul Estates doubtless had its origin in the
1, Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.23, B.C.1501/5bd86.
disturbances which still prevailed in Moherbunge [Mayurbhan;)
Bamawghati and Kolhan], and which had been only recently
suppressed in Chota-Nagpore".^ The second phase of the 1832
rising, popularly known as Ganga Narain's Hangama (or
turmoil), thus falls into place as a natural continuation of
the earlier resistance to the British system.
But the fact that in popular legend it is always
linked with the name of Ganga Narain serves as a reminder of
the particular part played by the personalities of Ganga
Narain and of Madhava Singh. Had there been no pre-existing
general discontent among the tribal masses, Ganga Narain
o
eould not have obtained such influence. But without a 
Ganga Narain, equally, the discontent might have continued 
tc simmer without boiling over into violence.
When Bussell, the Jungle Mahals magistrate, first 
gave his views on the causes of the rising, in May 1832, he 
made four points. ,TThe disturbances appear to have arisen 
at first,1 he wrote, ,fout of malice towards the zemindar's 
half-brother Madhula Sing, between whom and Gunga Narain 
Sing a most deadly hatred has existed for some years past, 
which has increased cf late."-' He then referred to Madhava 
Singh's oppressive methods of moneylending^ which made him
1. Court of Directors to Bengal „Govt., 16 Sept. 1832, Para.8 
India and Bengal Despatches/*i?o.6, p.374.
2. An officer of the 50th N.I., India Gazette, 19 May 1832*
3. Russell to Braddon, 11 May 1832, B.C.1501/58887a
4. Also see Braddon to Govt., 28 May 1832V Para.4 luld.
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obnoxious to the ghatwals and to the general Bhumij masses.
Thirdly he referred to a decision of the munsif of Barabazar
in favour of MadLava Singh in money suits against the 
1Bhumijes. Lastly,he suggested that the attacks upon the
thana and police officials had a double motives they arose
from "the spite towards the police officers from the nature
of their calling" and were designed to force them "to leave
the pergunnah through fear and to deter them thereby from
2
making any investigation into the disturbances." Each of 
these four points requires some examination, taking the 
'malice* of Ganga Narain first, as the most important.
Martin, the Assistant to the Jungle Mahals 
magistrate, thought that "the state of the Rajah's family 
and the conduct of Madhule Singh" was the cause of unrest.- 
The raja was "deficient in intellect and totally incompetent 
to manage his own affairs", and his son was "also weak in 
intellect tho1 not in the same degree as his father."^ Con­
sequently the management of the zamindari had fallen entirely 
into the hands of Madhava Singh,the raja's step-brother, "a 
shrewd, cunning and avaricious person, who was besides 
engaged in trade to a considerable extent. " This Madhavet. 
had dispossessed Ganga Narain of the lands by custom allotted
1. According to a correspondent in the 50th N.I., these 
injust decisions were a primary cause of the outbreaks 
India Gazette, 19 May 1832.
2. Ibid.
3. Martin to Braddon, 5 June 1832, Para.6, B.C. 15Oj / 58887.
4. Ibid.
5- Tbid.
to the ’Hakeem* ^  which Ganga Narain had inherited from his
father Lachhuman Singh. Then Madhava had persuaded the raja
not to provide Ganga Narain even with the means of daily
subsistence. Consequently the latter had been reduced to
such distress that he had embraced orthodoxy and become a
Vaishnava (a follower of God Vishnu) and had gone on a pil-
2grimage as an ascetic. On his return he took to smuggling 
salt from Orissa^ to gain his subsistence. According to his 
own statement, he had once been accused by the mukhtar 
(agent) of the Raja of Barabhum of introducing illicit salt, 
for which he had been apprehended by the British troops 
though he had later been acquitted.^"
rajas will show the relationship between the three main 
characters, Ganga Narain, Madhava Singh and Raja Ganga Govind
1. The younger brother of the raja in Barabhum and Dhalbhum 
was called the ’Hakeem*.
2. Martin to Braddon, 5 June 1832, Para. 7, B.C.1501/58887.
3. fA Subscriber1, 20 June 1832, Bengal Hurkaru, 29 June 1832 
4* Petition, Pubeen Singh and others 7 Enclosure, Braddon to
Govt., 12 June 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
5. Pent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.8, B.C.1501/58886
A brief resume of the genealogy of the Barabhum
c
Singh. The common ancestor of the three was Raja Viveka
Raja Viveka Narain
1st marriage I 2nd marriage
r
(died in Midnapur jail) 1st
Lachhuman Singh Raja Raghu Nath Narain 
 marriage 1 2nd marriage
1. Ganga Narain 1.Madhava Si
(the rebel leader) (Piwan,
1.Madhava ngh Raja Ganga 
 Govind Singh
murdered 1832) 
2.Bhawani Singh2. Sham Lai Singh 
(imprisoned for
rebellion). due to his 
father’s imbecility
Narain, Ganga being his grandson by his chief queen or pat- 
rani, Raja Ganga Govind and Madhava his grandsons by a second 
marriage* In the 1770's Raja Viveka Narain was forced by 
the British to quit his gaddi in favour of Raghu Nath Narain^- 
his eldest son, though born of his second wife. According 
to the local custom, Lachhuman Singh, the son of the pat rani, 
had the better claim to the gaddi. In 1832 Ganga Narain, 
therefore, asserted that "his father ought to have been suc­
ceeded to the zemandaree," but that Raja Viveka Narain "at 
the instigation of bad advisers," had put forward as his suc­
cessor Raghu Nath Narain the son of his younger wife and that 
"in ignorance of the usage of the family the Gentleman [the 
English officer] took an engagement from Rughoonath Narain
to pay 829 Rupees revenue to Government" and so recognised
2his succession. "
Lachhuman Singh, thus dispossessed, for some time 
received an allowance from his half-brother, the new Raja 
Raghu Nath. But, "designing people" later caused a misunder- 
standing between the half-brothers J and when Lachhuman came 
of age, he challenged the decision of the British in 1794 
and with the help of his tribal supporters he remained in
1. Midnapur collector to Board, 10 Apl. 1800, Para.6, Beng. 
Rev. Cons. 4 of 22 May 1800 /54\
Lachhuman Singh was .
11 years old at that time.
2. Petition, Pubeen Singh & others, Appendix 3, Lent to Govt., 
4 Sept. 1833* B.C.1501/58886. Vivek Narain later tried to 
rectify his mistake, but in vain. However he built a 
house for Lachhuman at Paharpur, and himself lived at 




arms for some time* At last his stockaded fort at Band-dihi
2was stormed* After some fruitless attempts at further 
resistance, he was apprehended and he later died in the Mid- 
mapur jail. Bharat Singh, his brother, however, continued 
■the struggle for some time longer, being assisted by all the
4
major sardars of Barabhum* The Midnapur magistrate found
the troops and the police helpless in the face of such a
•combined opposition. "Until the five sirdars [taraf sardars
<of Barabhum] ... with Gomaun Gunjun the head of the chuars
at Daudka [Dhadka], Borsing at Simlapaul and Tirbobhum Sing 
[Tribhuvan Singh] at Zatajaur are apprehended," he wrote,
"the Jungle Mahals in this District will be always liable to
the depredations of these chuars as also the contiguous
districts of Burdwan and Pachete."^ Even when a battalion cf
troops was stationed at Barabazar the rebels could not be
1. Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 16 of 17 Oct. 1794 /128>
1$
;2. Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 2 of 1 Aug. 1794 1128\
3. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para. 9, B.C. 1501/58886.
4. Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 26 of 11 March 1796 /128n
Referring to the strength of these  ^ 27
sardars, the Magistrate of Midnapur wrote that "these five 
sTrdars used to pay the zemindar the sum of 250 Rupees 
annually and had villages given up to them in the jungles 
by the zemindar under the term of ^ookneendy* [Sukh- 
Nindi, i.e. f/ee for peaceful sleep], which implies a 




overawed,^ for Bharat Singh’s stronghold in the Dalma Hills 
could only he approached from the south hy a path "ascended 
hy the help of roots of trees," while through the western
hills there was "no road though the chuars can climh it
2
singly," Later a jamadar's party stationed in Barahhum was 
reinforced by Sebund/y corps of two jamadars, 3 havildars,
3 Naiks and 75 sepoys to restore order,^
In 1798 Raja Raghu Nath Narain died and again the 
succession was disputed, A struggle began between Ganga 
Govind Singh, the elder son (16 years old in 1800) but born 
of the younger wife, and Madhava Singh (15 years old), the 
younger son by the elder wife* The tribal sardars again sup­
ported the son of the patrani.^ But the Bengali diwan and 
the ill-advisers of these minors fanned the flame of conflict. 
The British authorities, whose plimary interest was revenue, 
played a game of expediency. In April 1800 the Midnapur 
magistrate wrote, "There have always been the greatest dis­
orders in the zemindary owing to the number of powerful
1. Beng, Rev. Cons. 12 of 13 May 1796 /53\ ; Beng. Cr.
Judl. Cons* 4 of 15 July 1796 (128)
' 28 : The diwan of
Barabhum, Bansi Maiti, a Bengali Hindu, was a special 
target of attack.
2. J.Pendell, Midnapur Magistrate, to officer commanding at 
Midnapur, 8 June 1796, Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 3 of 15 July 
1796 /128 n
(“2B}
3. Bendell to Govt., 14 Nov. 1796, Beng- Cr.Judl. Cons, 22 
of 2 Lee. 1796 /128x
4. I.Imhoff, collector, to Board of Revenue, 16 Apl. 1799, 
Beng. Rev. Cons. 20 of 3 May 1799 (54)
Lai Singh, sardar ghatwal of
Sauri, and Goman Gunman of Lhadka were the main supporters.
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Surdars who live in different parts of it, and are constantly 
committing depreda-tions upon each other, and to the disputes, 
which have always existed between different nr&enbers of the 
zemindar's family, and frequently occasioned a great deal of 
fighting and bloodshed. In this state of things it is 
obviously desirable that there should be a zemindar in the 
pergunnah whose superior power and influence may control and 
keep in awe so many turbulent surdars. Even when the Mid­
napur collector found that "the zemindars of Manbhum, Shoe- 
pore [Supur], Gutsillah [Ghatshila or Dhalbhum] and most of 
those lying in the same direction said that their estates
and Burraboom had always devolved to sons by the first
2wives in preference to older sons by younger wives1 , he 
dismissed this evidence. This, despite the fact that the only 
known precedent in favour of the law of primogeniture was 
the succession of Raja Raghu Nath Narain, a succession which 
he admitted had been forced upon Raja Viveka Narain by the 
Company,
Regulation X of 1800 forbidding the partition of these 
jungle estates among brothers did nothing to solve the prob­
lem of succession - and indeed complicated the problem by 
preventing any compromise. The case was then taken to the 
civil court by Madhava, and the District Court decided in
1. T.H.Ernst, collector, to Board of Revenue, 10 Apl. 1800, 
Para. 3* beng. Rev. Cons. 4 of 22 May 1800 (54 \
TT}
2. Ibid. Para.6.
his favour as the son of the patrani. But the sadr Diwani
Adalat decided otherwises "the estate was the right of the
eldest sonbcrn in wedlock, no matter whether his mother was
p
first or second wife." Ganga Govind Singh was then installed 
as the raja with the help of a military force, and one 
Krishna Das was appointed the manager of the estate.^
Madhava Singh was offered a maintenance grant, but 
he refused to submit so tamely.^ Consequently disturbances 
continued and most of the tribal sardars and zamindars of 
the area helped Madhava, whom they thought to be the right­
ful heir. In April 1805 Raja Ganga Govind Singh wrote3 "The 
chooars have made Madhala Singh their sirdar and all the 
chooars being in league, plunder the houses of the Ryots in 
the villages of Burrabhoom. He has also prevented the pay­
ment of the revenue of the Punj-Sirdaree and Sutrakhanee and
5
pergunnah Chuleema [Chelyama]". The police daroga of thana
Radhanagar also represented to the magistrate that the
depredations of the Bhumij sardars were on the increase, and
£
that the ryots were flying in terror.
1. Petition, #Madhava Singh, Reed* 16 June 1805, Beng. Cr, 
Judl. Cons. 4 of 27 June 1805 /129\
2. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.10.
B.C.1501/58886.
3. Hunter, Bengal MS.Records, Nos. 11889 and 11890.
4. Petition, Raja Ganga Govind Singh, Reed. 16 June 1805, 
Beng. Cr.Judl. Cons. 4 of 27 June 1805 /129\
v 14/
5. Petition, Raja Ganga Govind, Reed. 27 Apl. 1805, Beng. 
Cr.Judl. Cons. 4 of 27 June 1805 /129\
 ^ 14
60 Petition, Daroga Janmayjay Ghose, Reed. 17 June 1805, 
Ibid.
4 Si.
It is from this period that the personal enmity 
between Madhava Singh and Ganga Narain Singh began. Since 
the former had become the hero of the tribal sardars, the 
latter came over to the side of the raja, The tribal chief­
tains (especially of the Punj-Sardari) had, in fact, no 
grievance against Ganga Narain, whom they had supported at 
his fort at Band-dihi after the apprehension of his father, 
The magistrate reported about this episode, "I do not learn 
that they had any cause of complaint against Gunga Narrain.
It is believed that they determined to provide for Madhals 
Singh because they considered him as injured by the zemind- 
aree being decreed to his brother. They accordingly disposed 
[^dispossessed?] Gunga Narrain and established Madhala Singh 
in his place. Gunga Narrain immediately attached himself to 
the zemindar, and with him procured assistance,1 (It was 
in this period that Madhava Singh, as Ganga Narain later 
alleged, dragged Ganga*s wife out of his house and took 
possession of his hearth and house.^
Another cause of the chiefs of Satrakhani and Punj- 
Sardari supporting Madhava Singh was that their enemy Lai
1. Another Petition, Daroga Janmayjay Ghose, Ibid.
2. Midnapur Magistrate to Govt., 3 July 1805, Beng, Cr. Judl. 
Cons. 2 of 11 July 1805 /129\
3. Petition, Pubeen Singh and others. Appendix 3, Dent to 
Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, B.C,1501/58886.
Singh Sardar 1 was being supported by Raja Ganga Govind
Singh. Thus, Ganga Narain, his relation, the zamindar of
Manbhum, and Lai Singh Sardar joined the raja, while Fakir
Sardar, the new chief of Satrakhani sardars and the chiefs
2
of Punj-Sardari were supporting Madhava Singh.
This meant many a tribal fracas leading to bloodshed. 
The police daroga of Barabhum could not suppress the unrest 
- often he could not even secure any intelligence.^ Troops 
could not be stationed in this unhealthy pargana during the 
rainy season. Appeals to reason could not take the place of 
the use of force; the magistrate reported, "They are mere 
savages, and have but a faint idea of obedience being due 
from them to Government; it is in vain to expect that people 
of such habits, and inhabiting such a country as they do,
1. Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 2 of 11 July 1805 /129\
Formerly Lai Singh was their chief. But
he had been expelled 3 or 4 years before this for 
murdering four of their chiefs. Now he was invited from 
his exile in Singhbhum through the agency of Goman Gunjan 
by Raja Ganga Govind.
In 1832 this Lai Sardar was supported by this raja 
in a civil suit in which the raja stated that he and his 
ancestors had granted "the Sookhneendee grant of 100 
beegas to Lai Surdar." On the basis of this evidence Lai 
Sardar won the cases J.V/.Ricketts, Principal Sardar Amin, 
23 Apl. 1832, No. 2067, original suit, Zila Jungle Mahals 
India Gazette, 15 Feb. 1833*
2. Midnapur Magistrate to Govt., 3 July 1805, Beng. Cr, 
Judl. Cons. 2 of 11 July 1805 ,129\
3. Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 4 of 27 June 1805 1129\
can be perfectly subjected.
The Government, alarmed, informed the magistrate 
that if Madhava Singh would not be satisfied with the pecun­
iary allowance sanctioned by the courts decree, then the 
zamindar of Barabhum and his supporters should be asked to 
exert themselves in his apprehension. Similarly, the other
zamindars of the area and the daroga of Barabhum were to try
2for his arrest.
Soon after this Madhava was captured by the support­
ers of the raja, including Ganga Narain.^ Now he realized 
that he could not capture power by force, and so, becoming 
reconciled to the raja, he secured the post of his diwan.
But a decade of struggle left its traces in the life-long 
enmity between Madhava and Ganga Narain. In 1805 Madhava 
had complained to the district authorities that the raja had 
oncensent against me as far as Midnapore with a design to 
kill me Gungah Narrain Singh of Bandheea [Ganga Narain Singh 
of Band-dihi], a notorious robber who killed the company's 
sepoys ....He has now given Gunga Narrain Singh who is a
1. Midnapur Magistrate to Govt., 3 July 1805, Beng. Cr. Judl 
Cons. 2 of 11 July 1805 ,129 >
2. Govt, to Midnapur Magistrate, 11 July 1805, Beng.Cr. Judl 
Cons. 3 of 11 July 1805 ✓ 129\
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3- Petition, Pubeen Singh & others. Appendix 3, Bent to 
Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, B.C.1501/58886.
notorious chooar a house near his own.
Naturally enough, Madhava Singh made it a point to
take revenge upon Ganga Narain. He was already his *heredit~
2
ary enemy1, now he became his fpersonal and private foe* .
So the first thing that he did after becoming the diwan was 
to seize Ganga Narain and to send him to the Jungle Mahals 
magistrate on various charges. When Ganga Narain was re­
leased by the magistrate, he was deprived of the Punj- 
Sardari, which he "had been permitted to hold after his 
father*s death.According to Dent, "Gunga Narain was not 
perhaps strictly entitled to it, but as a member of the 
family he had at least a right to a suitable provision for 
his maintenance", of which Madhava Singh had deprived him. 
Mad^hava Singh vexed Ganga Narain in several other ways, re­
ducing him to beggary. To quote Ganga Narain*s own words, "I 
was destitute of food and if I asked any person in Burrabhoom 
for anything the Zemeendar and Madhutl Singh fined him 1 
Rupee 4 annas, and forbade his giving me anything in future. 
Madheels Singh Baboo has all along oppressed me, and I
1. Petition, Madhava Singh, Reed, 16 June 1805, Beng, Cr. 
Judl. Cons. 4 of 27 June 1805 (129\
He asserted that the tribal
sardars were supporting him because he was the son of the 
late Raja Raghu Nath Narain by his superior wife, and 
because the raja had exacted Rs.lpOOfrom them to compen­
sate himself for his expenses in the late litigation.
2. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept, 1833, Para.11, B.C.1501/58886.
3# Petition, Pubeen Singh and others, Appendix 3, Ibid.
4. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept, 1833, Para. 11, B.C.1501/58886♦
5. Ibid.
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represented the circumstance to the Zeemindar who said as
long as Madhul© Singh remains he could do nothing for me,"3’
Thus, Madhava Singh secured "to himself the lasting enmity
2
of a hold ... powerful man."
Moreover, Raja Ganga Govind Singh and his family 
also could not readily forget the harassment caused them hy 
Madhava Singh for a whole decade. There may not he any truth 
in the allegation of Ganga Narain that he killed the diwan 
at the orders of the raja,^ hut the raja may well have 
heaved a sigh of relief at the exit of his diwan who had
4
usurped all real power and who had made the raja his debtor. 
According to Dent, the raja could not forget that Madhava 
had opposed his succession and the wife and son of the raja 
were "jealous of the uncontrolled influence and sway" of the 
diwan who "contrived hy his oppressive and unfeeling conduct 
to render himself almost equally ohnoxious to every indivi-'
1. Petition No.3, Ganga Narain, Jeth,1239 Pasli,
Enclosure, Braddon to Govt., 12 June 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
2. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, B.C.1501/58886.
3* Petition, Nos.2 and 3, Ganga Narain , Enclosures,
Braddon to Govt., 12 June 1832, B.C.1501/58887# In the 
latter petition he stated that he was even rewarded after 
this hy a pan-patta (grant) of Punj-Sardari from the raja. 
Later on he told his ghatwal supporters that Shrikant 
Sharma (a favourite Brahman of the raja who was later 
rewarded hy Dent in 1833), the raja*s son and wife had all 
ordered him to do away with Madhava Singh, for which they 
restored him to the estate of Punj-Sardari: Petition, Puh- 
een Singh and others, Appendix 3, Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 
1833, B.C.1501/58886.
4. Dent thought that "Gunga Narain Sing may have heen well 
satisfied in his own mind that the death of Madhuhe Sing 
would he an acceptable occurrence to the zemindarfs family 
from the state of thraldom and dependence in which they 
were kept hy him:" Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833,
Para. 24, B.C.1501/58886.
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dual throughout Burrabhoom from his brother the Raja and his
family to the lowest Bhoomij.""^
Another effect of the succession struggles was that
the tribal chieftains, who were alienated by the Companyfs
overriding of their succession customs, became aware that it
was possible to defy the Company with some impunity. This was
particularly true of Ganga Narain, who had a double
grievance, over his fatherfs death in prison and the harass*
ing of his uncle, and by their rejection of his own claims,
2
despite the presentation of five or six petitions,
Ganga Narain had a grievance against the Raja of 
Barabhum as well. He still vividly remembered that his 
father had been seized and ill-treated with the connivance 
of the father of the raja and that he himself had been ill- 
treated by the troops several times at the request of the 
raja or his diwanp No wonder, therefore, that he made 
several allegations against the raja and his family, and had
A
once even tried to seize the person of the rajafs son.
Ganga Narain1 s long years of destitution made him a 
man of iron will, and he was always planning his revenge. 
First he extended his family connections, with the neighbour­
ing rajass one of his wives came from the Bishnupur rajafs
1. Ibid.
2. Petition, No.3, Ganga Narain, Enclosure, Braddon to Govt., 
12 June 1832, B.C.1501/58887,
3. Pubeen Singh* and others, Appendix 3, Pent to Govt.,
4 Sept. 1833, B.C.1501/58886.
4. See Chapter $7^ pv
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family and the other from Manbhum. One of his daughters was 
married to one Kanu Babux of Ambikanagar, the second to 
Hari Babu of the same pargana, the third to Amru Babu of 
Manbhum and the foarth (by a concubine) to an illigitimate 
Babu of the Pachet raja's family.1 These matrimonial
alliances stood him in good stead, and he was "generally
2
countenanced by them" during the unrest. Even during those 
stormy days he won over the zamindar of Ambikanagar with the 
offer of marrying his son to the latter's daughter.
Then he developed the closest contact with the 
tribal sardars and the Bhumij masses. In course of time he 
came to possess "great influence among the Bhoomjis [sic], 
and was latterly indebted to their kindness, ..., for almost 
the necessaries of life."^ They could not therefore ignore 
the recall of "their favourite, their abused Gunga," espec­
ially when they themselves were very much looking forward to 
having such an able, cool and stern leader.
Indeed, Ganga Narain was popularly held to be "a 
victim of circumstances" - his "nearest relations dishonor­
ing [sic] and oppressing him * debarred by his rank from 
seeking employment either in trade or in the profession of 
the army what course could he adopt?". Through years
1. Babu was a title of the maintenance grantees, generally 
relatives of the zamindar.
2c Bent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833» Para.8, B.C.1501/58886.
3- / b i d .
4. A private letter, Aug., Calcutta Courier. 15 Sept. 1832.
5. A Subaltern, East Indian Journal, V„ Part I, 475-
6. Ibid.
of suffering he had become cruel at heart and at the same 
time cunning, making him peculiarly capable of leading a 
ferocious band of tribesmen. (According to an eye-witness 
account of the murder of Madhava Singh, "after striking the 
first blow he caused each Sirdar present to fire an arrow 
into the body of Madhuto Sing .
2He was also "of violent temper" and during the un­
rest he was directly responsible for the murder of several 
people* His passwords for putting anybody to death, according 
to an anecdote, was "Ghaut par kur" (show him across the 
pass)* Thus "whenever a prisoner was brought before his tri­
bunal on the Dulma [hill], and when he had heard all he had 
to say and urge, he either dismissed him with that or some 
other significant phrase. No man who heard Gunga order him 
•to be shewn across the ghaut* ever heard mortal voice an 
hour afterwards* He was led down the hill and killed at the 
bottom.
1. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.12, B.C.1501/58886. 
Madhava was kidnapped at the house of Gopi Naya of Sirka. 
The plan of murder was arranged at Barida. "Advantage was 
taken of Madhula Sing*s going into Punj-Surdarree to 
inspect a large quantity of oorn which he had collected 
from his debtors there, he was seized at the house of the 
person who was acting as Head Ghatwal from Annund Patur 
(who had obtained a month*s leave of absence) was carried 
into the Jungle and murdered by the hand of Gunga Narain 
at a place cal3.ed Bamnee Damree, a hilly spot in the 
jungle about £ Coss from Bamnee"s Martin to Braddon,
5 June 1832, Para.7, B.C.15CO/58887*
2. Martin to Braddon, 5 June 1832, Para.7, B.C.1501/58887.
3* A Subaltern, opoit. 480.
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However, had Ganga Narain not possessed several
qualities of a leader he could not have led his people
successfully against a mighty power for several months# He
may not have heen !a patriot5*1', hut he undoubtedly "saw his
friends groaning under the oppressions of Mahduht Sing
[Madhava Singh] - and perhaps wished to aid them and at the
2
same time revenge himself ." He undoubtedly showed •consid­
erable organising ability ... in his brief career".^ He 
struggled up to his last breath, even though deserted by his 
friends and relations* According to Thompson, he was long 
remembered for his exploits: "Good-looking women were sure
Of his esteem, and when I was in India he was still rever­
enced for his gallantry."^
It may seem odd that in these exploits Ganga Narain 
was able to secure the .support of the tribal chiefs against 
Madhava Singh, the man whose cause they had supported from 
1798 to 1805# Their revulsion against Madhava is explained, 
however, by his misuse of power as diwan and by his having 
taken to the ignoble profession of money-lending* The pro­
fession was degrading in their eyes, and where they them­
selves suffered by being his debtors, was doubly obnoxious. 
As a military officer put it, "It may seem inconsistent with 
the respect paid by the Bhoomjis [sic] to the persons of
1. Ibid.
2. TbTcL
3- Thompson, Life of Metcalfe, 306.
4. Ibid.
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their Rajah's family their joining in the murder of Madhula 
Sing, hut if we recollect that Gunga Narain, who was hy many 
believed to have a better right to the Gudhee [sic] than its 
present possessor was their leader and that Madhute Sing, 
disregarding the prejudices of his family, was a tradesman, 
and one too far from upright in his dealings, and that he 
was naturally disliked hy the Bhoomjis most of whom owed
l
him money or grain, our wonder will cease . . . " It is nec­
essary now to consider this second of the causes of revolt 
as defined hy Russell.
Madhava Singh was undoubtedly "far superior in intel
2
lect and energy to the remainder of the family1’, hut he 
applied his talents almost entirely to the amassing of 
wealth, and misused his position as a chief and as diwan to 
those ends. In his "extensive and lucrative trade" his 
position as diwan "gave him a complete monopoly."*^ It was 
"the merciless severity with which he enforced" his claims, 
particularly against the ghatwals that made them his
4
"inveterate foes", for against them he used every advantage 
which the British legal system afforded to a creditor.
Land is nearly always considered the basis of tribal
1. A Subaltern, op.cit. 475*
2. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833r Para.11, B.C.1501/58886.
3. Ibid.
4* Ibid. Also see Martin to Braddon, 5 June 1832, Para.7, 
B.C.1501/58887: "Both ryots and Ghatwals were his debtors 
and as he was rigorous in the execution of his debts 
the detestation in which he was held by the whole popula­
tion was extreme."
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society, and the original clearers of land have a permanent
claim to it* The unfeeling and cruel attachment and sale of
a debtor’s property in land which he enforced was a rude
shock to these "ignorant people, particularly attached to
their lands.""1' They were ready to pay according to their
means, but "they could not comprehend the justice which
2
turned them out of house and land." "The house and effects 
of the debtor were attached and advertised for sale on an 
appointed day, previous to which the claim was generally 
adjusted by the private transfer of a village or piece of 
land in satisfaction of the claims, and an urzee  ^was given 
into the moonsiff (through whom all these processes were 
executed) begging that the sale might be suspended as the 
claim had been settled."^ Such adjustments could not long 
continue. The debtor reached the point where he had no more 
land to spare, and where he refused to sell further house­
hold property. Then the diwan took to other more degrading 
methods. Two cases in the family of the minor sardar ghatwal 
of Satrakhani which occurred just before the unrest showed
to Dent how "utterly regardless Madhula Sing was of their
5
feelings and prejudices."^ In the first case the household 
property and the family-mansion at G-ulargosi in the heart
1. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.21, B.C.1501/58886.
2. Ibid.
3- Arzi = petition.
4* Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833» Para.21, B.C.1501/58886.
5, Ibid.
of Satrakhani was attached and sold in satisfaction of a
decree against the minor's father# As little was realized
by this, a second attachment in the same account was taken
against other properties including the sardar1s thakurbari
(temple) and an idol of the God, which were all sold. When
this case came before Dent as the judge of the Jungle Mahals,
he cancelled the sale on the grounds that it would "outrage
the feelings of the Ghatwals."’1' But if this extortion was
halted there were others which did not come to the notice of
the British authorities. Dent admitted in 1833? "Our law of
debtor and creditor severe perhaps in itself was rendered
doubly so when applied to these rude and ignorant people and
Madhul® Sing did not hesitate to avail himself to the utmost
of the entire power it gave him over the property of his
2
debtors in compelling payment."
Madhava Singh's lust for wealth was unsatiable. Not
satisfied with the huge profits of his lending business, he
used his power as diwan to extort further sums from the
ghatwals. On the plea that the rents of the four main
sardar ghatwals were very light, he doubled them, calling
o
the additional cess 'mamoolee T. This was naturally 




3. Ibid. Rents paid so far for Dhadka were Rs.120, for 
Satrakhani Rs.240, Punj-Sardari Rs.160, and Tinsaya 160.
P.*± J
In the beginning the local officers assigned the 
cause of the unrest solely to the mutual enmity between 
Ganga Narain and Madhava and the latter*s unpopularity among 
the Bhumijes. Martin, in June 1832, thought that the rising 
against Government was solely the effect of the crime Ganga 
Narain and his associates had committed! and that Ganga Narain, 
realising that his crime was unpardonable, was trying to
i
engage the people in excesses to shield himself. But the 
petition of the ghatwals in reply to the magistrate's 
parwana in the same month showed that their own grievances 
were many.
This brings us to the third of Russell's points: the
hostility of the tribal chiefs and people to the Barabazar
munsif and other company officials. The ghatwals charged the
Raja of Barabhum, the police officers, the munsif and the
2
salt daroga with various acts of oppression. The zamindar 
was accused of extorting "in addition to the regular Panchak, 
a considerable excess, as well as other large sums -under the 
denomination of house tax and other illegal cesses amounting 
in the aggregate to about 8 or 9000 Rupees a year; in con­
sequence of which oppressive conduct they are, they say,
1. Martin to Braddon, 5 June 1832, Para. 8, B.C. 1501/58887.
2. Bent thought that the insurgents had a sanguine hope 
(after their partial success in the beginning and after 
the hasty withdrawal of the troops early in June 1832} 
that they could not be apprehended, and that they would 
eventually make terms with the authorities: Dent to Govt.,
4 Sept. 1833, Para.18, B.C.1501/58886.
2. Petition No.5, 11 Jeth 1239 fasli, Braddon to Govt., 12 
June 1832, B.C.^OT/Sl^ST.
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reduced to. the greatest distress.""*' The diwan in some cases
o
had compounded the house-tax (ghar-taki) in many villages. 
There were several other exactions (abwalas) under the gener­
al denomination of mangan or voluntary subsidy, etc; for 
example rates for the raja's purchase of elephants, and
•i
horses. In so far as these were within moderate limits, 
the tribesmen did not murmur. But these exactions had been 
taking on the form of permanent taxes.^ In their catalogue 
of grievances they included the fact that, besides the above- 
mentioned horse and elephant taxes, there were a khushi-taki 
or rejoicing^tax, for instance when the raja was enjoying a 
tiger or other hunt, etc.^a hal-taki or plough-tax, shadi-
5
taki or tax upon marriage and so on. Needless to say, the 
diwan was mainly instrumental in enforcing these demands.
The tribal sardars also accused the subordinate 
servants of the Government posted in this pargana of oppres­
sion and exaction. The munsif of Barabazar was charged with 
having colluded with Madhava Singh, and "passed decrees in 
his favor [sic] in the period of three weeks after the in­
stitution of the suits and with forcibly enforcing his decis­
ions thrice over, and sharing the amount with Madhava 
Singh. " On an examination of the records of the district
1. Braddon to Govt., 12 June 1832, Ibid.
2. Bent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, ParaTXI, B.0*1501/58886.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5* Letter from Camp Barabazar, 24 May 1832, India Gazette,
30 May 1832.
6. Braddon to Govt., 12 June 1832, B.C. 1501/58887.
civil court for the last three years, Bent found that no 
specific charge of corruption had been preferred against the 
munsif, but several applications from the tribal defendants 
in the civil suits were found, asking that their suits should 
be transferred from the munsif's court to that of one of the 
sadar amins at Bankura "on the grounds that the munsiff 
favoured^Madhub Sing and from the influence of the latter 
they could not expect a fair trial.Since the character and 
power of Madhava Singh were "well known to the European
authorities at Bancoorah", these requests were invariably
2complied with. Por that reason only a few cases of Madhava 
Singh's had been decided of late by the munsif.
But it is strange that the district authorities, who 
were in the know, did not stop the munsif altogether. Bent 
noted in 1833, lfit is extremely probable that the munsiff 
favoured Madhula Sing but the general prejudices against him 
(the Munsiff), I should say, was [sic] occasioned *fcjy his 
being the instrument for the execution of the decrees of the 
Judges, Registrars and Sudder Ameenfs Courts, which in all 
countries is a disagreeable and unpopular duty. All these 
factors gave a notion to the simple tribal folk that the 
munsif was out to ruin them. Even when he was acting under 
the orders of the superior courts the ignorant tribesmen
1. Bent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para,22, B.C.1501/58886.
2. Ibid,
3* Ibid„
thought that it was by his own whim that he took action. 
Naturally enough, in case of repeated attachments and sales 
of properties in satisfaction of the same decree (the pro­
ceeds of the previous sales having been found inadequate to 
the demands), the Bhumijes thought that he was executing the 
decrees thrice over, little knowing that he was acting under 
orders of the superior court.^ Where such misunderstandings 
existed it would have been well for the authorities to have 
made the situation clear.
The Burdwan commissioner thought that the ghatwals 
should have represented their grievances to the European 
authorities at Bankura who had never ignored their com­
plaints: "I have no reason to believe that any complaints 
preferred by the Ghatwals did not receive from the European
public functionaries that degree of attention to which they
2
appeared to be entitled." Dent, on the other hand, thought
that had not the diwan and the raja been their chief oppres-
3
sors, several minor abuses would have been kept within bounds. 
But no one blamed the European authorities for leaving the 
pargana at the mercy of the non-tribal subordinate officers, 
tax-farmers and others. In fact, the encroachment by the 
administrative frontier in the form of regulations and taxes 
had jeopardized the very existence of the tribal society.
1* Ibid.
2. TSraSdon to Govt., 12 June 1812, Para. 15, B.C. 1500/58887.
3. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para,23, B.C.15O0/58886.
Naturally enough, the reaction of the tribal peoples was 
violent*
In 1833 Dent admitted that the mode of levying the 
abkari tax was ffar from satisfactoryf, and that the then 
fanner (a Muslim named Shaikh Khitab) used 'considerable 
oppression and extortion in realizing the amount from the 
villages and Soondees." In fact, the non-tribal abkari 
farmer here, as in Chota-Nagpur, made it a point to derive 
the maximum profits possible at whatever cost to tribal 
interests.
Russell's final point, about the reasons for the 
attacks upon the police has already been made earlier* The 
police in Barabhum were not strong enough to impose order, 
when that was necessary, but were strong enough to harass 
the people with their petty abuses and exactions. The attacks 
upon them made in 1833 were natural, perhaps even merited.
The problems of Barabhum were made particularly 
intractable by the personal failings of the leading figures 
in that district, and it was inevitably in Barabhum that 
disorders first broke out. But there were similar occasions 
for unrest in a number of the other parganas of the Jungle 
Mahals, and to these some attention must more briefly be 
paid, remembering always that certain grievances were common 
to most of the area. As Braddon reported in July 1833, "Many 
of the zemindars of the Jungle Estates are deeply involved
1. Dent to Govt., 9 Apl* 1833? Para.5, B.C. 1502/58890.
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in debt, most of their creditors are the principal Mahajuns
in their respective estates and in consequence their houses
are generally marked out for plunder,
Patkum, on the borders of the Jungle Mahals and Ram-
garh districts, was disturbed during both the phases of the
■unrest, for its people were akin both to the Mundas of Chota-
Nagpur and Tamar and to the Bhumijes of Barabhum, The
specific grievance in Patkum was, however, found in the
actions of the non-tribal sazawal appointed by the Court of
Wards during the long minority of the raja. The "general
enhancement of the rents of all inferior holders without
regard to the rights of the parties or the usage of the
2
country by the surzawal "was particularly felt. Moreover, 
the villages held for their support by the different members 
of the raja's family were resumed and brought on the rent- 
roll of the estate.®
A second cause of unrest was the chief's indebtedness 
to the mahajans, brought in by, or at least protected in 
their exactions by, the sazawal. No notice was taken of 
their penetration of the tribal economy until the disturbs 
ances began. When notice was taken it was in a way scarcely 
sympathetic to the tribal people; Russell spoke of the early 
unrest having "originated in ill-will and out of private
1. Braddon to Govt., 28 July 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
2. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.27, B.C.1501/58886.
pique towards the native Mahajuns and other respectable and 
wealthy inhabitants who have settled there. (One may note 
the frequent appearance in official reports of the words 
•respectable inhabitants - meaning non-tribal traders and 
usurers.)
Some of the leaders of this unrest were the sons and 
descendants of the former holders of villages (the muras 
or mundas and mankis) who had been ousted from their possess 
ions by the non-tribal settlers. Once these outsiders had 
settled in these villages, they took to money-lending and 
the tribal people soon became heavily indebted to them. In 
the words of Russell, "It is well known that the Ryotts are 
all at the mercy of their Mahajuns, from whom they are under 
the necessity of borrowing money for carrying on their agri­
cultural pursuits, and that the latter demand an exorbitant 
rate of interest, and generally are at the harvest season 
paid in kind, taking one half, if not more of each Ryott’s 
produce, who is again compelled to borrow, and thus remains 
involved without any hope of extricating himself from his
p
difficulties." Before the coming of these outsiders, the 
Bhumijes had carried out their shifting cultivation with the 
customary assistance of their village and circle headmen - 
eking out a bad season by a little cattle-lifting. Now they 
declared they would not permit any of the outsiders, the
1. Russell to Braddon, 18 Apl. 1832, Para.28, B.C. 1363/54226
2. Ibid.
thikadars, to stay: "They have possessed the landed property 
of the Moorahs, Mankees. So drive them from hence."’*'
At the time of the first outbreak the zamindar of 
Patkum was at Bankura to discuss matters connected with his 
taking over charge of the estate from the Court of Wards* The 
diwan was also out of the pargana. The police mohurir, find­
ing all the ghatwals joining the revolt, fled for his life. 
Thus there was nobody with authority to arrest the wave of 
hatred which swept over Patkum.
Some of the zamindars of the neighbouring estates 
were also in league with the insurgents. Many had a family 
tradition of hostility to the British authorities, but their 
main motive was to get rid of the heavy burden of debt. Thus, 
in pargana Bagnrundi "the brother of the late zemindar with 
the Moorah and 3 or 4 leading men of the village caused an 
arrow to be brought to the neighbourhood, which was repre­
sented to have been sent by the Coles who were said to be
o
immediately at hand, and would murder the Mahajans ..." The 
sole object of this was 1 to cause them to leave their habita­
tions, which were consequently plundered during their 
absence, and [some] of them burnt down by the people of the
*5
village as a cloak to their own actions. V.11J
1. Statement, Singrai, Enclosure, Russell to Braddon,
18 Apl. 1832, S.C.1363/54226.
2. Russell to Braddon, 18 Apl. 1832, Para.9# Ibid.
3. Ibid.
The zamindars of Torang and Jhalda also established
contact with the insurgents of Silli (a dependency of Chota-
Nagpur) through some of their servants, causing the spread
of the unrest to their estates. The reason for this conniv-
1
ance was that they were indebted to the mahajans at Elu.
2Thus Korung Mura, an agent of the Jhalda zamindar, and an
active leader in Silli, brought a party of about 100 Kol
insurgents to his village in Jhalda, created a large tribal
army there, and with it attacked and burnt the houses of 40
non-tribal money-lenders at Elu.
Russell also got evidence that the zamindar of Jhalda
had personally gone to talk to his agent about the plans for
the outrage. '’The evidence against him [the Jhalda zamindar]",
wrote Russell, "showing his participation in the outrages
that have taken place at •Eloo* is of such a nature that I
have deemed it an indispensable part of my duty to bring him
into Bancoorah a prisoner.Not only was his complicity
later conclusively proved, but he was also found to have
caused the plunder of refugees from Chota-Nagpur who had
entered Jhalda with such of their possessions as they could 
5carry.
1* P id-
2. Grokul Mura in statement, Singrai, Enclosure, Russell to 
Braddon, 18 Apl. 1832, B.C.1363/54226.
3. Russell to Govt., 29 Jan. 1832, Ibid.
4* Russell to Govt., 22 March 1832/Para.3 Ibid.
5. Russell to Braddon, 18 Apl. 1832, Paras. 12-14,
B.C.1363/54226.
In Patkum proper, the mother of the minor zamindar 
and his diwan were found to have been directly responsible
for the outbreak. The latter had caused several cartloads
of plundered property, about 1000 head of cattle and two or 
three thousand rupees in cash to be brought to the zamindar*s 
house at Ichagarh, and had personally encouraged and super­
vised several outrages."1*
On the basis of this evidence Russell came to the
rather hasty conclusion that all "the disturbances in Pat-
coom have been caused by the principal officer [the diwan 
and late guardian, Subur Singh] of the zemindar and dependent 
petty zemindars or Ghatwals, those in the Pergh. [pargana]
of Bagmoondee by the brother of the late zamindar, and those
2at Eloo by the zemindar of Jhulda and other individuals."
He should surely have mentioned the blunders committed by the 
sazawal, the inefficiency of the police, and the popular 
irritation with the lawfs complexities and the use made of 
them by outsiders.
Moreover, not only had the example of apparently 
successful risings, revenge and plunder been set by the Larka 
Kols of Singhbhum and the Dhangar Kols of Chota-Nagpur, but 
individual rebels from those areas, especially from Tamar, 
had come to Patkum to incite and support the outbreak. The
1. Ibid.Para.5. In 1807-8 also this diwan had helped the 
rebel chief Mukunditya.
2. Russell to Govt., 22 March 1832, Para.3, B.C.1363/54226.
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presence of an insurgent force at Palbagan in Tamar, only 
seven miles distant from the boundary of Patkum gave the dis-» 
gruntled tribal sardars of Patkum an opportunity to seek 
their help in plundering and taking vengeance on their 
enemies and yet to attribute all such actions to the insur­
gents from outside.'*'
The second phase of unrest in Patkum was only a con­
tinuation of the first, though the wind this time blew from
Barabhum and not from Tamar. Not only were the zamindar, his
2mother and his diwan again suspected of complicity, but two 
of the ringleaders, Tulsi Digwar and Be rah Singh, had also 
been the leaders of the earlier unrest. They had remained 
at large, even though Russell had offered a reward for their 
apprehension. ^
There were also several incidents of the second 
phase connected with those of the first. Por example, Ganga 
Narain claimed that he wanted to take revenge for the insult 
done to the Patkum zamindar, whose private apartments were 
searched by Russell after the first phase of unrestt More­
over. the ghatwals of Barabhum did not trust the words of
1. Russell to Braddon, 18 Apl. 1832, Para.l, Ibid. The house 
of all non-tribal people, Bengalis and upcountry mahajans, 
were plundered: Ibid, Paras. 1-3.
2. Ibid. Paras 6 and 10, Also see Russell to Braddon*
TTTTuIy 1832, B.C.1501/58887*
3. Russell to Braddon, 18 Apl. 1832, Para. 19, B.C. 1363/54226* 
4» Braddon to Govt., 11 June 1832, B.C.3.501/58887.
Russell in May 1832, when he offered pardon, because hundreds 
of their brethren in Patkum had been arrested by him, ^ Not 
only that, the tribal rebels of the second phase tried to 
prevent the court's obtaining witnesses for the trial of
p
prisoners concerned in the earlier unrest.
There was also a continuity in the basic causes of 
the unrest, The ghatwals and tenure holders who had risen 
against the sazawal's oppression in the early months of 1832, 
rose again in the second phase, this time against their raja. 
He had meanwhile attained his majority and had been placed 
in possession of his estate, but once in power he refused to 
undo the wrongs inflicted by the sazawal by restoring the 
khorposh villages to his relations and reducing the enhanced 
revenue demand upon the lesser chiefs.^ This led the dis­
gruntled elements to call in the Barabhum insurgents.
Another major cause of trouble was Russell's estab­
lishment of a police thana with upcountry barkandazes in
Patkum, in February 1832. It was designed "to strengthen the 
4
police" but in fact alienated both ghatwals and people, the 
more so as the Muslim daroga was a "strong man". The Burdwan 
commissioner recognised the error when he reported in July
1. "The Ghautwars of Patcomb plundered grain and committed
other excesses and atrocities, of which they accused 
the Coles; but. these having been clearly traced to 
themselves, they were apprehended, and are at present in 
confinement in the Bancoorah jail.1 Calcutta Courier,
6 June 1832, Footnote.
2. Braddon to Govt., 10 July 1832, B.C.1503/58887.
3. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.27, B.C.1503/58886.
4. Russell to Braddon, 6 July 1832, B.C.1503/58887.
1832 that the whole turmoil in this par^na was caused "by 
!,the relations and dependents of the zemeendar, chiefly with 
a view of causing the removal of the Patcoom Thanah.
However, once concessions had been made to the 
grantees by the raja, and once the thana had been withdrawn 
by the authorities, the pargana was soon pacified.
The zamindars of Bagmundi, Kasipur, Pachet, Manbhum,
Shamsundarpur and Phulkusma, who had inherited a tradition
2
of resistance to the British, and who were often related to 
the Barabhum insurgents, were nearly all encumbered with 
debt.
Bent in 1833 found both the mankis and the Raja of 
Bagmundi much involved and their lands extensively mortgaged, 
and he saw "little hopes (under the existing system) of 
sales for the discharge of these debts being avoided,"*^ To
1. Braddon to Govt., 10 July 1832, B.C. 1501/58887. The 
daroga had to flee to Singhbhum in fear of his life, 
while the ghatwals joined the insurgents.
2. In fact, all the leading figures of this unrest were close 
ly related with the leaders of the earlier disturbances: 
Ganga Narain's father and uncle had fought the British 
for a long time; Raghu Nath Singh of Dampara was the 
nephew and heir of Baijnath who defied the British auth­
orities/more than a decade 5 the father of Pratap Singh of 
Raipur, Brindavan Bigwar of Kursul, had also fought 
against the authorities for long; BirSingh, the father
of Bahadur Singh of Koilapal was a noted rebel; the fore­
fathers of the zamindars of Barabhum, Bhalbhum, Manbhum, 
Pachet, Shamsundarpur and Phulkusma had invariably 
resisted the British penetration at one stage or the 
other. Thus* there was a family tradition of resistance 
against the constituted authority which encroached upon 
their age old freedom^ See Chapter I. Also see Russell to 
Bent, 10 Aug. 1833, Paras, 5 and 6, B.C.1502/58891-
3. Bent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.28, B.C. 1501/58886.
make matters worse* the resources of the estate were/ 9
Y 'f ,
"greatly absq^ed in providing for the younger branches of 
the family*
Similarly, in Kasipur the expenses of a protracted 
civil suit pending before the Sadr Diwani Adalat, and the 
improvidence and extravagance of the raja had "inextricably
p
involved him in pecuniary difficulties." Many of his 
finest villages had been mortgaged. Naturally, he, in con­
junction with his relations in Pachet, had invited Ganga 
Narain to this area.
Shamsundarpur and Phulkusma were also disturbed 
because the zamindars were much embarrassed by their debts 
to their mahajans and they wanted to get rid of the import­
unities of their creditors.^ Similarly, in Jhalda and 
Chhatna the sale and attachment of property in respect of 
usurous loans were the causes of irritation.^ The sale of 
these two estates had been averted only by private transfers 
and mortgages, but by 1832 they were hastening towards the 
brink of a disaster. "Large portions of the estate were held 
by the Baboos and other relatives of the family as *Khuro- 
pash1, others had been mortgaged or granted as Putnee Talooks 
on very inadequate jummas to satisfy former claims, and in 
the portion which remained under the Baja the rents had
1. Ibid.
2. TET3. Para.29.
3. TienT to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.34, B.C. 1503/58886.
4. Ibid.Para.37.
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generally "been collected in advance for one and two years."’*' 
Moreover to avoid the sale of their estates, the zamindars 
were still borrowing from the mahajans on most disadvantag­
eous terms. No wonder, therefore, that these chiefs made a 
desperate bid to drive out the mahajans and to overwhelm the 
authorities, whose legal processes they skilfully used.
Yet another cause of the unrest spreading to some 
of these estates was the existence of family feuds in the
zamindars1 families. Like Barabhum, ^ sflabhum, Ambikanagar,
2
Pachet and Dhalbhum suffered on this score. In Pachet, 
especially, "the dissensions in the Raja’s family were the 
chief cause of Gunga Narain being invited to visit the 
Pergunnah.
Had there been an efficient system of police, the 
infiltration of the insurgents might have been checked. But 
the ghatwals who constituted the indigenous force were dis­
gruntled by the presence of official police in most of the 
estates, and where the zamindar was the sole head of the 
police, he preferred to check the insurgents.
In Dhalbhum, as in Barabhum, a number of factors 
prepared the ground for the unrest. The elements of irrita­
tion and discontent against the prevailing system were the 
same as in the Jungle Mahals, but the peculiar local
1. Ibid.
2. TEicT. Paras. 30-32, and 42.
3. YEicT. Para.30. The brothers, uncle and other relations did 
not like the dominance of the rani and her favourite young 
diwan. and they even alleged a criminal connection
"between the two.
problems were many.
This estate had also been exempted from Regulation 
22 of 1793 regarding the police darogas, and Regulation 2 of 
1816 and 12 of 1817 regarding qanungoes. but all other reg­
ulations were applicable to it. The result was that non- 
tribal excise and salt officers oppressed the tribal people 
at their will, since the district authorities hardly ever 
cared to visit this distant, inaccessible area. Worse still 
proved the influx of outsiders encouraged by the zamindar*s 
family after its hinduization, to which some reference has 
already been made. To cap all, from 1825 onwards there was 
a minority. The Court of Wards entrusted the management of 
the estate and police to the minor*s uncle, the Bara Thakur
Jugal Kishore, while another uncle, Narsingh Dhal was given
1
charge of the person of the young raja. Divided responsibi­
lities caused many evils, for Jugal Kishore proceeded to dis­
miss the old and trusted diwan. Gadadhar Panigrahi, and his 
assistants, so as to entrench his own power with the aid of 
agents brought in from outside, while Narsingh, to secure 
his position, pandered to the pleasures and passions of the 
young raja.
This state of confusion went on even when Chitreswar
1. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.42, B.C.15011/58886.
Also see Petition, Tarni Singh (the son of Bahadur Singh 
who was murdered by Raghu Nath Singh of Dampara) of 
Pyraghoyt taraf, Appendix 8, Ibid.
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Dhal attained his majority in 1829 and the Bara Thakur was
removed from his post. The young raja could not break the
undue influence of the Bara Thakur, get hold of the official
seals, or find and appoint an able and honest diwan and
naib. "The weakness of the young Raja’s intellect and his
utter unfitness for all business, rendered him still the
tool of his crafty and designing uncle."1 This led to a
family feud. The raja, who had now fallen into the hands of
2
intriguing advisers as scheming as his uncle, tried to 
coerce the chief of Ballaipahari, who had been paying the 
rent to the Bara Thakur, to pay it directly to him. The sar- 
dar, presumably at the instigation of the Bara Thakur, called 
in the Barabhum insurgents to defend himself. Dent rightly 
thought that the Bara Thakur, who had taken possession of 60 
or 70 villages and four stone quarries, was at the back of 
this move.-*
Of course, the Bara Thakur directly accused the raja 
of complicity in the crimes^ and of having personally had a 
hand in inviting the insurgent chiefs to enter the pargana. 
But the trial of the raja and his brother Rup Babu on the 
charge of having murdered two individuals and of having had 
his tribal drums repaired with their skin, revealed that the
1. Dent to G-ovt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.41, B.C. 1501/58886.
2. One such person was Madhu Thakur, who, according to the 
Bara Thakur, advised the raja to oppress the traders of 
stone-quarry at Ballaipahari, and to insult the Santhal 
ryots there s Petition, Thakur Jugal Kishore, Appendix 
No.5, Ibid.
3. Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.50, Ibid.
4. Petition, Thakur Jugal Kishore, Appendix No.5, Ibid.
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Bara Thakur had conspired to implicate the raja in order to 
get possession of the estate. He had been helped by Baroga 
Nitai Singh in this conspiracy on the promise of a reward.
The judge recorded, “Of the enmity of the Bura Takoor, and of 
the Barogah Netaie Sing, towards the Rajah, there can be no 
doubt . I have no doubt in my mind, that it was this 
enmity whioh caused this prosecution, and as little doubt 
that it was the real cause of the chooaree having extended 
to Bulbhoom.
That the Bara Thakur should have so acted as to impll- 
oate the raja^made more probable because the raja had recent­
ly begun to curb his power. The rajafs accusation  ^against 
the Bara Thakur of actually extending the invitation to the 
insurgents to come over to Bhalbhum may not be correct, but 
Dent^s surmise that the Bara Thakur, being an ambitious and 
avaricious person, might well have tried to get rid of the 
raja^ seems to be logical. Tarni Singh and Atma Ram of Pyr- 
aghori and Kalkapur respectively emphatically stated that the 
Bara Thakur had a regular understanding with the chuars.^
1« A.Bick, Sessions Judge, Midnapur, to Govt., 26 July, 1833* 
B.0.1502/58892.
2« Ibid. Capt. Wilkinson, however, thought that though the 
‘Sara Thakur, because of his peculiar character, might be 
suspected of encouraging the woman to prefer the charge 
of murder against the raja? the daroga could not be sus­
pected of being an accomplice in this conspiracy: 
Wilkinson to Govt.P 12 Aug. 1833, B.C.1502/58892.
3# Petition, Raja Chitreswar Bhal, Appendix No. 6, Bent to 
Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, B.C.1501/58886.
4* Bent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Ibid.
5. Petition, Tarni Singh, Appendix" 8, Ibid.
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Raj Narain Ghose, the salt darogatalso wrote that he had en­
couraged the chuars. Lastly, Lt. Timins, commanding a force 
in Dhalbhum, reported that the Thakur had thwarted some of 
his measures for apprehending the chuar leaders*^ The weight 
of evidence and opinion would seem to prove that the Bara 
Thakur was indeed in league with the chuars *
As for the accusation against the raja, he got a 
clean acquittal on the charge of murder, hut two charges 
were proved against him; firstly, that he gave arms and food 
to the chuars when they came over to Narsing-garh, and 
secondly that he gave the jagir of Dampara to the rebel
2leader Raghu Nath Singh at the orders of Ganga Narain,
But a weak and docile creature such as the raja was only 
too likely to have yielded to this extent under threats of 
fire and sword.
The Judge, Dicks wrote, "the extension of the late 
chooaree as [or] Jungle insurrection into Bhoulbhoom I 
attribute solely to the family feuds of the zemindar.'1^ But 
he was surely wrong, A fuller explanation of the long support 
given to Ganga Narain by the Dhalbhum sardars and masses is 
required, Lt. Timins, from personal enquiry, held that the 
real cause of the discontent and rebellion was the oppression
1. Timmins t o , 8 Jan 1833# Appendix 7$ Dent to 
Govt.? 4 Sept. 1833, B.C.1501/58886.
2. Petition, Thakur Jugal Kishore, Appendix No.5, Ibid?
Also see Dent to Gcvt., 4 Sept. 1833? B.C.1501/58bS6.
3. Dick to Dent, 26 July 1833, B.C.1502/58891.
of the Bara Thakur and his puppet Muslim diwans*^ These men
had "deprived of their lands certain ryots who had possessed
2
them for generations*1 They had also hit the whole body of 
the people by enhancing salt prices, in collusion with the 
salt darogas* Salt formerly available at 6 or 7 seers a 
rupee could not be held at less than three or four seers a 
rupee, once they were installed in power.^ When the tribal 
people cut their salt consumption, the darogas put pressure 
on them, threatening them with the collector's displeasure 
if they did not use more.^ Orders were issued in the name 
of the raja that his twelve taraf-sardars must increase con­
sumption, and the salt-darogas laid down that each ryot 
must take 2i tolas a day.^ To secure exemption from such 
impossible orders they had to offer substantial bribes to 
the officials.
There was indeed a thoroughgoing system of organised 
extortion. The salt darogas when they gave a retail licence 
to a village mutia, refused to allow anyone else to sell 
salt* The retailers had therefore to bribe the darogas to 
give them a licence, and to overcharge the ryots to recoup 
themselves. Thus Ganga Ram Das Mutia testified that he had
2. Appendix 7, Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, B.C.1501/58886*
2. Appendix 8, Ibid. Two specific cases of dispossession of 
Runu and Kurunga sardar are cited in Appendix 7, Ibid*
3. Appendix 7, Ibid.
4. Statement of AbKiram Patnaik, former servant of the raja, 
Appendix 9:. Ibid.
5- Appendix ll,~ IBid, Also statements of 109 persons, Wilkin­




had to pay Rs. 7 salami to the salt-daroga , besides the
annual eight annas or one rupee dasturi which the daroga
2exacted from all mutias. More aver, the salt chaprasis 
(peons) levied a dasturi of one rupee per village per annum 
and three to four rupees from each mlttia.^ They also took 
from each ryot one seer of rice and one fowl per month, and
4
at the close of each year eight annas to one rupee from each# 
The Bara Thakur not only shared the illegal incomes 
of the salt-darogas and retailed , but also took similar 
advantage of the abkari or liquor tax# It was Bara Thakur 
who extended this tax to hanria (the home-made rice beer of 
the tribal people). He gave the farm to one Ketu Modak who, 
♦‘agreeably to a hint from the Bura Thakur, forcibly collected 
Handeea Puchae from Bhoomijees, Sountals £Santhals] and 
others at the rate of land 2 Rupees per village."
Besides these, several abwabs were collected from 
the ryots, by the non-tribal diwans and fortune-seekers.
Thus, Pheru Pandya introduced a Sonea (Sobha) Salami or 
Ind Salami in the time of Raja Baikunth Dhal, and a Bara
1. Statement, Ganga Ram, Appendix 10, Bent to Govt., 4 Sept. 
1833, B.C.1501/58886,
2. Appendix 9, Ibid.
3. Appendix 10, Tbid.
4. Wilkinson to B'oyly, 2 May 1833, Appendix 12, Ibid.
5. According to Bent, "the money thus obtained instead of 
being employed in liquidation of the arrears of revenue, 
and the debts of the minor Raja, was squandered away by 
his manager or found its way into the pockets of that 
manager's dishonest and greedy dependants." Bent to Govt., 
4 Sept. 1833, Para.44, B.C.1501/58886.
6. Wilkinson to B'oyly, 12 May 1833s Appendix 12, Ibid, Also 
see Bent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.42, B.C.15W58886. 
Also Appendix 11, Ibid.
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Thakur Salami during the regency of the Bara Thakur, while 
Shamshir Khan introduced a diwan dasturi.3, These innovations 
were much resented by the people, but neither the collector 
nor the Court of Wards ever attempted to check such extor­
tion. Since the amlas and the surbarakar (the Bara Thakur) 
always represented that their actions were sanctioned by the 
Government, the tribal people naturally despaired of securing 
justice and revolted as a gesture of despair. Lt. Timins 
rightly stated, "the people have been driven to revolt by 
cruel oppression, the Government has been a charge and 
burden to them instead of a protection and it cannot be 
wondered at these causes producing refractory subjects and 
rebellion. The discontent and rising of the people will 
cease as soon as the corruption carried on in the name of 
Govt, ceases. When that is checked and the grievances of 
the people listened to and redressed^ tranquillity will 
prevail."^ Captain Wilkinson also thought, 1 it is quite 
out of the question that the ryots should patiently submit 
to such gross and weighty oppressions.
Por all these ills the district authorities provided 
no remedies. The rapacity of the Bara Thakur was left unres­
trained, just as Madhava Singh's had been in Barabhum.
1. Wilkinson to D'oyly, 2 May 1833* Appendix 12, Ibid. 
Moreover, Patnaiki dasturi (probably in the name of 
Abhiram Patnaik, a peshkar of the raja) was levied: Bent 
to Govt., 4 Sept. 1o33, Para.42, B.C.1501/58886.
Also Hakimi dasturi : Ibid. para,60.
2. Appendix 7, Dent to Govfc ., 4 Sept, 1833* B.C.1503/58886.
3. Wilkinson to D'oyly, 2 May 1833* Appendix 12, Ibid.
Agents though they were for minor or incapable rulers with 
whom the Company was in treaty relations, they were allowed 
to enhance rents, establish new cesses, and use their 
official positions to make private fortunes. No restraint 
was placed upon the outsiders, Hindu or Muslim, who became 
diwans, salt traders, liquor merchants or usurers. Little 
supervision was exercised over the exercise of their author­
ity by the Company's own private officials.
Prom the Company's point of view such neglect of 
moral duty might still have been productive of no great ill 
had the growth of tribal grievances been matched by the 
growth of adequate coercive power in the hands of the dist­
rict officials. But in 1831* the police force was powerless 
of itself to deal with a general rising, and by that date the 
Company had largely withdrawn its regular troops from the 
Jungle Mahals,
The tribal or ghatwali police, which Henry Strachey, 
the Midnapur magistrate, had first restored in 1800, and 
which had been ccnfiimed by Regulation XVTII of 1805, proved 
a broken reed in 1832. That followed from the fact that 
they themselves were very often the principal sufferers from 
the alienation, by hinduization, of their nominal leaders, 
the rajas and zamindars, and from the greed of moneylenders 
and revenue farmers. Indeed the ghatwals of Barabhum repre­
sented that they were the victims of oppression "to such an 
extent, that they were actually forced to sell the rings
from the fingers of their wives and daughters.11'*' Naturally
enough, a majority of them joined the rebels in the early
stages of the unrest, and even those who at first helped
the authorities could not long resist the pull to join
their brethren.
As for the regular police under the darogas, first
introduced in 1793» they failed miserably, A daroga from
A
upcountry, with a handful3barkandazes, set in a hostile, 
unfamiliar country with an unhealthy climate, could do 
little. In 1799 the Barabazar daroga and his sebundy sepoys 
had been so terrified that they had absolutely refused to 
afford any protection to Bansi Maiti, the diwan whose life
p
was threatened. Again in 1805 the Hadhanagar daroga showed 
himself helpless in the face of the depredations of the 
Bhumij sardara.^  In 1814 the Jungle Mahals magistrate 
admitted that because of the turbulence of the tribal people
and the inaccessibility of their retreats the official police
a
could do nothing to control them. Yet, though they were 
useless in a crisis, they were retained in being, side by 
side with the ghatwali police, a constant irritation to the
1. Letter from Camp Barabazar, 24 May 1832, India Gazette,
30 May 1832,
2. Deposition of Agha Mohammad, Thanadar of Balrampur, Beng, 
Cr. Judl.Cons. 9 of 10 May 1799 f128s
3. Petition, Daroga Janmayjai Ghose, Reed. 17 June 1805,
Beng. Cr. Judl, Cons. 4 of 27 June /129\
' 1'4
4. Beng, Cr. Judl.Cons. 48 of 29 Apl, 1814
the ghatwals, and hated for their petty tyrannies and 
exactions by the Bhumijes whom they could not, in the event, 
control. They were the first target of attack by the tribal 
rebels, and, as the Government said, "the reports from this 
district exhibit the police during the period under review 
in a very unfavorable [sic3 light ".**■
Despite the known inefficiency of the thana police 
- most strikingly demonstrated when they were left to hold 
the fort alone during the rainy season of 1832 - the regular 
troops who should have backed them up, had by 1831, largely 
been with'drawn. In a minute of 6 August 1832 Blunt stated 
the position clearly. The security of the British empire in 
India depended, he argued, "wholly upon the strength and 
fidelity of our military Establishments", for "the turbulent 
and disaffected are incited to disturbance and revolt by the 
absence of all military protection or of even the appearance
of a military force or any measures of re-enforcing obedience
2
to the civil authority." The barkandazes, as substitutes 
for sepoys, he thought, "are regarded by the natives with 
derision and contempt, and with no other means of preserving 
the peace and good orders of our possessions, the safety of 
the state might be exposed to imminent hazard ... "J In his
1. Govt, to Register, Nizamat Adalat, 20 March 1832, Beng. 
Cr. Judl. Cons. 5 of 20 March 1832 /140\
2. Blunt, Minute, 30 Apl. 1832, Beng. Secret Cons. 8 of 6 
Aug. 1832 (367)
3. Ibid.
(days as magistrate in the Jungle Mahals
from the Ramgarh Battalion was stationed throughout the year, 
chiefly for purposes of police at Jeldah [Jhalda], where the
Bentinck*s economy measures and the reduction of military 
establishments had involved the withdrawal of that force, 
and Blunt was left to lament that f,the reduced strength of 
the Regiments of the line, and the objections which exist to 
the employment of the Regular Native troops on civil duties, 
whereby they are liable to be dispersed in small detachments 
over the country, together with the abolition of the provin­
cial corps^ have left the preservation of the peace of the 
country almost exclusively dependant on our stipendary police 
Establishments the inefficiency of which on any occasion of 
serious local disturbance has been sufficiently manifested#11J
had been much reduced in strength may well have decided the 
Bhumijes to follow Ganga Narain*s lead. "There can scarcely 
be a doubt, "Bent remarked, 1 that the Bhuls who are the same 
in nature, habits & manners, as all the other tribes in the 
Jungle Mahals, had viewed with an eye of interest the—inter­
est* the disturbances which successively agitated
1. Apl. 1806 to Aug. 1810. Register of the E*I.Co*s. 
servants 35'"3^  i '
2. Blunt, Minute, 28 Jan. 1832, Para.13, B.C.1363/54227#
3o Blunt, Minute, 30 Apl. 1832, Beng. Secret Cons* 8 of
p
country is open, well-cultivated and healthy." But
The knowledge that the regular troops in the area
6 Aug. 1832
0
Baumunghautty which adjoins them on the west, Chota-Nagpftr
and the more immediate district of Burrahhoom, and that they
1were ready and ripe for revolt." We have seen how much 
they had suffered, and, as Dent pointed out, they were not
of a temperament "to sit easy under the deprivation of their
2
estates." They were ready, it was true, to pay quit-rents 
and occasional abwabs which might "add to the appearance and 
dignity of their Lord or master", but they could "not under­
stand why the demand for excessive and successive subsidies 
should be made, and a failure to answer the demand he fol­
lowed by sequestration of the lands" which had "always been 
considered their hereditary property.''^ When they realised 
that "they were trifled with" and that "their complaints 
were unattended to, their wishes disregarded and their wealth 
taken from them under false pretences [Rs. 40,000 by the 
Bara Thakur] it is scarcely to be wondered at that they at
4
length took a part in the disturbances going on around them."
In fine, it may be stated that though the local 
problems in the estates of the Jungle Mahals and in Dhalbhum 
varied, the discontent against the system of administration 
was general. Wilson was right in asserting that "the cause 
of tho rising of the chuars was ... the strong dislike





entertained by the chiefs especially, for the judicial regul­
ations of Bengal by which their rank was disregarded, their 
privileges circumscribed, their power impaired, and they 
were made personally amenable to the processes of the court 
and the authority of the police.” But he was surely wrong 
in dismissing the grievances of the tribal masses as unimp or-
tant and in admitting merely that "the people took part with
2
their leaders."
The Bengal Government had from the very beginning 
received proofs of the unsuitability of their regulations 
for this undeveloped area. But they did nothing more than 
tinker with remedies for a few evils. These people should 
not have been left untouched as anthropological specimens in 
their primitive system, but once outsiders had been appointed 
as police darogas, salt-daroga, etc., adequate safeguards 
and eternal vigilance by the higher authorities should have 
been provided.
The tribal peasantry of the western parts of the 
Jungle Mahals and of Dhalbhum in 1832 was seething with dis­
content against all foreign encroachments and anomalies. The 
Bhumij had been shorn of all the tribal privileges and 
immunities he had enjoyed in the past. He was looked down up­
on by the new masters, and was oppressed from all sides.
Armed revolt represented his last bid to escape from the net 
closing round him.
1. Wilson, Mill’s History of British India, 1858, IX, 237.
2, Ibid. =
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Thorntoni ‘ tliWi t%n*i ©ih«r# their V*eltef
tiial the events «>f 1 6 J M 1  w©r« a wart? epeenodic 
expr* eater* of tribal pao^lae* iaf«i|»rf am? j^o^en»Hy to 
piundor* far t u t  «n§ th« enee or not ?«r» already
in part been diectta*«C by a m i « «  of thi* connection 
<>f tfu* triba l ar^£i of agyaar and the •iimgU
M%hal» irith th« Eeet India CoA^ny« of th* autbraal of 
uuraat and the * armor niid cimre* of ite *ep;>r***ioxt«
* brief review rowelne to bo nod# of juat what the 
tribal people did when they broke evtt in violence anil 
a&'fiinst *he& their on^er via directed* Buoh a review 
wi.il ahem that they wore indeed aetag* in their attack# 
upon their one**!#** s a v e ^  perhaps from despair of 
securing Justice by peaceful and orderly neani* hut it 
will a loo. show that the outbreak v«t* not an «n«on#l<terii| 
« pj&e^todic affa.lr« hut one very ctneely connected with 
the eppreeeion which they hod suffered* The tribeeewm 
hod no hope of redroe* because tHe police were Heee 
svnd corrupt, the Uwcourt amine were in ell
eorta of illicit gains end the revenue officials tried 
to lo«?ce th#a« bribery wee the accepted code of
cottftucl f®r the*« p*t ty In the fees of
thin combined «y«ten of oppressive forelUo
dl$po»«et0ion or property* obu»« and peraonoi vioUnco
a n d  » varlaty of aittlUr tyrannies* the tribeawen found
n& othor altoroatlfe than to RiAko a dooptrato attempt to
•scnpfi frow ihi# I'aliinj; situation* Thoir re* tolistion*
thoroforoi woo a* violent and unpreoodottiod a# the
opproooiona on thaia had boon*
Thornton described the riain^a no x an or^0 of
wutual olaughtori in which* th« honi of every nan wno
a^ainat hit neighbour^. 1 Tina Bernal OoYonusont naiad
of the rifting that "during thm whole of ita cauraa
and pro? ro0o» though perhaps in a loss dtffta In falamow
tna« within tUa Chola Hagpvr# conntry» the worst
aioataat attandad it* In iha lattor tract» from ana
part of it to the othert ms tho Insurrection advanced,
the i.oplo of the rudft triba of lha Coioa*** aaerifiaad
numbers of those who fsll into their htnda, to thoir
2
excited passions of revenue and hatrod* * There was a
Thornton, ?lstory of British India* If, > 3
Bsat&*l <k>vt* to Court of hirs«torsf 25 ’opt. 1&32*
«*C* 1362/54223*
sort of »»dti«s» and bltndn««e and tHoy tould »• longer 
t»t# th« light of r»aoon, The Patna oos«ai«t(ioii(»r»
Ma»t#rt reported the rising in lurid tera* j *f*eetloe*# 
wild and ferocious, they ruehed into an l o i u m c t l o o  
scarcely paralleled for ferocity end oa^or for plunder, 
uaivortt^Xly prone to inebriation mad infurlottl by reel 
or Ianfinery wrongs, the whole population yielded to 
the unobitmetod tide of rebellion • fire, rapine and 
fsurdor tiork«4 their pnthe, nor woo their viwfiotiv# 
spirit conflnod to thoae to whom their injurtoo wore 
^aerihed, hut «wliy extended to unoffending few#lee 
and helpless infante with the aubtle determination of 
extirpating the whole raee***
A munher of the taiiee brought to trial meftled 
the au'Vfctfo nature of the attack* to which any who failed 
or wore tumble to dee were expeted, the comoneet feature 
wee the hctekin# to death of rletl&s who were killed even 
theuf h they wade no resistance. Cme Wahl^r tnxh wnm 
Irx^atf out of Hiding# givcx two award cute across hie
heck9 two on the neck end finally hie heed wee ctruok
2off by a f-nlwa . fhaikh ^ r a r ,  found lildin^ in the Jungle
1 Man tor to Ootrt., 1? Jaw. 1333# ps*r» 13# B.C. 1502/38893.
Also eee Hontinek % x  15#
Hester to ballet or t K i x a ^ t  Adalat, *2 bet. 1832, Trial 
Ho. 7 1 B.C. l502/5tH93, the handle of Ouftds* wee
always lon^, while shorter shafts of varyiiu else© 
were attached to * >*tv# and fulmmt Ibid. •?©# 6. 
a# the photograph* of thee© wcspsnc In India Gazette
lar-umt. 2« Irtareti 1*32.
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vis carried beck to his village and there murdered by 
biova of a hfilwn,1 Xn Jbilio ehfttti, a father and sen 
were |>Mled froa their but9 atrollotaly beaten# end finally 
killed by uavinf, their heads hawked off with bal»ii>
Hie headless trunks were then dumped b«t«r« the house 
b.i ch the Kolico officer *u*. occupied# at I ikoc a is
utiUppy creatures# die towered sheltering in a hut were
1
■'’cruelly and v natval) butchered* in another cnee a 
l ualle family of el&ht» Miul* wad female# one advanced 
in years# several in the blat?.-* at youth* and some In 
unconscious infancy"# was coepUtaiy annihilated# The 
laeeband of a *oor female rhna a rope of str**twisted 
round his neck by which he wee forcibly dragged fro® 
hie house end taken to the bed of a river at a abort
followed by hie districted wife### Ottugroo with a 
Zhalva severed his legs fro® hie body# In this Mutilated 
condition ho wee able to eaetalia# fye» are received on 
destruction# Kill »y wife who at unde there weeping9# 
on hear in,; which a third aeeerrplice ••• out off the
tBuffftrsr1* head with a sword*# fco«*en# children# the
1 ibid. *0# 13
2
bid# So# 16
3 ibid# Wo# 33
J* **o# 103
ncn« war# On# woman** hi»t<! cut off
*te b« pr«»tsil#<l to • 9»olft (p<ht3*t tbar« were hftlf
e’T?
a nu«fti» ea*ee of infant* rmd fttbei Iji «nai* b©i»|’ ^ U U d »
0%»*i of ireftc»ory end Hru to lily were in fact ftry
3ftoftiftft tturlng the wnr^it* In »«# lnnUaftt a mem* tribal 
family, whioh had returned froe i>arxmnm Jeehpur after 
supposed tranquillity, vao ©ffarad pretended iioeplt&lity 
t»y » Sol and than the head of lh« f a ta l ly  v»,» murdered la
it ■
••14 blood* In &aoth«r inalanftft iaft insldieuo Information
belti# conveyed to a excluded party In turn hi 11a, the
frailly h*&nn iti r a turn Journey, hat no «o«n<> r had a member
of 4ho family approached the villa#* than ha wounded
§evt r«l jr and the aaaallanta *thon emitting him avmm and
I«g» dragged him to a mall into which they threw him and
hooping upon him earth and a tone a thuft ter®Inoted tin
eratehe-' nsm• a e x i e t e n e e # 2 m  yet another in* tense a i>nh^n*
who lad taken five rupees a* the prieo of protection
off live* and pro party of a fatally, efc**te lately assembled
6
the lol* and attacked the victims* it one plnee*
1 Ibid. So. 27
* a m u  *••• ft* M i  ft« a r  i a *  u i «
1 There wae at least one instance of benevolence on the 
port of a triheer.j.a who concealed and fed a non*tribal 
man for eeverel day a before he va* discovered and killed
aaoat brutallv by the other tribe ibid# Ko#
- m T
•i- **<-. 106,. Atom see 6b for a similar ease#
5 ..bid. St,. 115.
6 ' - -■■■>: , : ■ fe fe : \ ^ 4 JA I- id » hO# X .*> •
s*a«i *<%> »n Tot'm e, wtoen these attesipteef t© eeettfjo they
after tu* male members of a. party had been killed*
'lire was eat to et h&u*« in which their women end child re»*
_  
were ell murdered* The last mother of the f.roup* e 
yot4fr& M n ,  whs had isi<b©« up a tree, wee dealt with by 
•ttttinf down the ire# end fen#i«| him to piee«« on the 
cpet wher* be fell, Seventeen people in ell were tilled 
ivy fire and sward on this eceaeioe, in e ©see which the 
e ©wet tee loner of circuit rightly doeerihed a# pr«*ee inert 
in a t m i t y *  it eseeplified* he wrote, *i» the strong*«t 
liftCht the licentious eppetit* tlie ioenrgcat Colon for 
the blood of all foreign settlers *md the eyetemail* etudy 
of tut see ere which wee m  retted during, the rebel lien* *
Tin* wirier* oo»?sl tt.-fl were* *-o*t iwu*r««n la th»
.: of l****a end sevewbi, feoeMtttcie the nett*tribe 1
s»ee»g>le of this nrmm were *uite unprepared for the etteefc. 
Moreovert it bed been «t Churln, Chtiiii, fiadi&gtrb end 
oilier nieh import out pieces tivat the non* tribe t 
me reheat* end money lender# had nomtly resided end e» the 
v*K*g**FiC« of the *eie beeen* meet apparent thorn, rThe
eight t o&t hsmtlietlng to our Oie>mw|jl the! 1 have over
wiit«te*e*d% wrote ftitt her lend* "net such of the inhabitant*
of thee*. >1 ecee a* bed t ^ t u n ^  1 «* -nding with their 
-   — ~      ■-—  ■■
Ibid, $e, 32. Doe of t*«* anMr<tor*4 veien won pregnant.
ohiidron in the aid at of this seen© of deeol&tiea with
occasionally *n old »«d or woman who*# infirmities had
I jr*v«*nted their occowpanjin^ the r«»t of their flight, end
wSio, by the e&va&es, had risen to desolate their houses
■uni ravage their fields, hat. been tortured or burnt U
the verge of death - all calling tn on* loud voi*« for
redress of the grievances they had suffered, and in
r**p reaching on our bovejrwumt for having left them
unprotected# They wore told, not in scorn, that the!r
(WharejaJ should have protected tfcer*, and they
replied el nifleantly enough, «« had no flajati",*
A* compared to this svfut tale of misery In fhotn*
■‘*4.pur and it# dependencies, the estate* on lie fringe
«.ujffored aofiU lose# Ift fcangarH in the north it wa*
I i waited to the plunder of a few village* in Hole
b«caut« of the activity of the Haja of Hottgorh*2 On
tii# other hand, in the s&ell portion of lie Jungle ^aheie in
th# east, fatkum end Ha^la "suffered severely,
end T*.rou^ but slightly* The injuries
coennitled have been plunder and destruction of property,
but genet ally accompanied with sen loo awrifr* or 
*»
* trocities,* The houses of no lass than moneyleaders
1 S utherland to iovt*, n«d», B #* • 1 3 ^ 5 / 1 ^ 7
2 Jft« Cots* is* lone re to Oevt#, 16 f*ov, 18^2, Par* 25, i«^«1902/
5es f|
5 tevl. to nrwrfd.n, 15 **ay B.C. 13*3/5**26.
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«iwi other non*tri!al peewit were plundered end burnt in
the viilege Flu heel'ie* ei^ht in the nti^htiearinf
1
vilie^ee «»*> lour in Terenr, 51* ef th^ taeuj*e* hunt!
: p '•.' ^  ■/:• ’'i% '■/«: 2r {
in ^etkun b«len|f«4 to the nen»trihnl erpleyeee el the
■ A
m i n i t r *  They hid p r e i m n h  ly» tide theeeelve* 
otmoxioue te the tribe**.*** ^urin^ the minority ei the
raja )«
As In PutkuiB) »uu ether eetetee te the eeet el Uhote-
Fa^pur* §e in heleenu end Tori te the vest of ltf the 
inetiraent» ef C h e U  hmtzpur liret entered and fired the 
fn^gote. hut enee the Chrree muS hharvae vert excited, 
there wee the »tr;e ^eUneholy tele of plnmierf areon 
and nurff«r» H u e u | h  the vheir ef February ld}2* 
theeo areae were in ehr.ee *n s *Of the etate
of 1 © r % * %  wrote Neeve or? 23 February» *1 air at a leee 
te give any aetount wave ttmt it 1« in a etate ef
complete nation »•« the v i U a f t t  ere flrtdf and
1the road* ere blocked up and ell pa*•ere are plundered'1*
0»* the name day Cel* How trey wrote that aewerai village* in
k i
%t.mt »mr*rarta ’'were plundered and teretd” eon tit of hie
1 tiovt. to Hraddon, 13 J*»y 11)3. 8 .C. 1)63/ 5*22#.
1 Kuoooll to Pr*«Mon» 16 Apl. 18J3, Ibid.
-|
noted in tea gal evi* to Court of :Ireetors* S3 Fept*
18)2 , l«r«. 27. *»c. 1362/ 56323,
' riAwtrey to Jt.Comtlaeionors, 23 F«b.l8)t, B.C. 1362/56235
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Senr Ud*i£*gtj th»vii* also '? e fou» I the sasse seene of 
desolation » all the ndjaeont v i l l n ^ i  haw Inc keen burnt 
by the tribal people*1
it our than.** of Falfumttt, T*rhaelt Lesliesanj*
Shahyor and hurhwa wore affected* but the first two were
, *  S
«o*t hard hit A t&oa$&nd house* were burnt In oil*
The Government lose was much larger than Uiat ef any
indtvidual# both o* to the number of v l l U p n  injured*
-•ad the extent of injury in escU* this we,; because most
ef the foreign settler* were living in the OoveruMnt
vlilAlStft* As In h i b a w  mmt It* neighbourhoodf the Chore
and Jharvar rebel* also "burnt one or two house* of their
4 .
villa&es lb order to give an idea that they were
a j
Shoeaelve* sufferers end not the inflietors of Injury*
Thus« Latehar* Setbarwa and Mfmkaeri» situated In 
the midst ef the cluster* of villages inhabited by 
Chore« Kharwers end others * were partially destroyed*
Bat in the villas** with a mixed imputation, fttfti of the y 
Houses of the tribesmen woe touched* stoat of the parsons
Murdered were the non-tribal servant# of the ex-raj* and
I    .f • •
a m




the influtotial .furflrdar* who htd tri«4 to fi«hi thi
ft. -fut killing of |v«#Uu«r t<*»el le«;9 fartafPS of
pound#, trader#, and smalls* adveniui^rs vn» alao
r # p c r U d ,
Unlike tt»o trial «as»tf «f Cheta~h*£pur, the## ef the 
Jtaaul# Hah*. 1# end lihftlhtmm de not *t.i«ek ef neinmi# murder# 
*-**d a tree! tie# on trouee , eld intn >«nd cliildran* But a ftv 
stray ease# ef murder (htrt certainly are* for example9 
ti»r«e nrahoatu were killed by Gterdi MuimI e in t>hatblmi»,*
the raja ef that **t*te end hie brother were #u*peeted 
o! having lynched tee people* A few peeple were *1*0 
killed in the attack# ets i^ruhnaar, Aathlkiinaxer, eta* 
Greater, eo^e individual# were killed fer epylie/, en 
hehelf ef the antheritie# er fer he!pin# thee in ether
3
way*. The «*©#t t t m m n  offence* we# the plunder of 
cattle and property, hut that loo we# reduced to the 
«iniMita after the Intensive operation* by the troop#*
The official return# of per«oa# murdered, in Cheta* 
ha^pur chew tret 219 Hindu# end 7& Mu#lie# fell a victim
to the tribal wratl , beeide* 7 Hindu* end % kuelise
4
killed in novae* hut the Joint ooaw*i#»i<m*r* admitted
1 <>*oyly to fcilkinoon, 2*. i>©«. IHJ*, B.C. 15C2/5S69,
2
t' #e Chapter Vi, p. 50 9 
^ See Chapter V.
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ty p w d U , .!i. oMitiitntr* to uavi,, 16 Nm.lG}2| B.C.
1502/3 ScijU.
that the return* of were partial and ef Bar-wa stud
nrkttffarh ma nt t u m *  v a p k  r«e*lvaJ. Atftlit. th*a«h tha
the .report to bo parti*!* A contemporary n««i^p«r
report rightly no tod, "it in impossible to calculate the
$Ati*t#r of men »urci«r«*i, village* burnt» and property 
destroyed or pillaged*•* Nagpere, from fcein# a flourishing
|;#riur»mh| has now beet) rendered t desert, and year* will
- • ? * ^  Z -; ' ftot Hufficf to re* tore U s  pristine prosperity* *
it it unnecessary to give other detail* as example*
e f  the violence of the rising in and T*1ah*u«
asmI to * leaser degree, in the dungi* Mahals* Those which 
have been listed rthev the pattern of behaviour of the
tribal people* The terror an eh notions spread ota veil 
be imagined, and fro* the earliest stage those who
feared that they were possible victims could He found on
the move, carrying off such valuables as they could*
Their flight undent tedly served to set off yet wider
neve***ta of non-tribal p#©; Is* fend so to spread the
number of bouses burnt In Cheta-'vagpttr proper was 
officially put at l|OW| the number of cattle seised at 
i ? tO b  and the quantity of grains burnt at $22,992 maunds.
r**f;. U*« ati| #*rs^4ai» ?*♦ ***>• 1831*
aiuaoepfeere ef uncertainty and exc 1tc «<mt* It also 
««rvedi to rouse hopes of plunder m&tm& t h e  tribal people 
through whose mUint they had to pts« end so In piece* 
gave to a movement begun an n rebel lion against oppression 
tlte six' ef ordinary banditry*
Several methods wore eieptod by the tribal lee* ere 
tcs s p r e a d  the rising* one was the hue ting of the nf^^riyy 
or crra«l drums, another the circulation of a •dheori*
(a branch of & tree, usually mange) , tUleh t*§ ^despatched 
free one party of deles to another a* a signal for thee
ts Join expeditiously and to engage in ny contempi*tod
I 2exploit, 1 a third vt» to circulate nr rove of war.
Tits villages which wished to Join those by when the
arrows were sent, wore required to return these arrows
vinole, and those who wanted to oppose them were to 
return them broken* This was, in fact, $ cut tom of the 
: *-rV» olft of inghbhuie, and ha ' -uevur f afore been
fvemsrally adopted by the tifemnitar hols of
1 Hester t« Register, hlsanat Adelot, 22 Oct* l$32, Case *?».
tl, B.C. l5*2/$m93
Statement, Singrai, nrloeure, thxssell to flOVt,,
Id Apl. 14 32, »,C# 1363/54223
f atherland to f>ovt., n*d*, per* &, $*C* 13^3/54227
iri the first of unr$«if however» this practice began
1b  the ouepur pftr^HRg. arid %rrov» later circulated 
throughout C h e v a g j m r « *acm©»i*f*anl©d with a notice to 
all foreigners to quit* end threatening aeas&geii 
tfcose who eight repair or offer opposition.
The obvious nature of the tribal people wee to •© 
terror la© the non** tribal eel tier© as to «aak© tkea abandon 
everything and flee free the whole tribal area. In the 
large village of latte hasla# In hngsmndt# for exaMplof 
the Rtniil4tf,i brother connived with the aatraa or 
tribal head cm* n to circulate an arrow of war and to 
spread rumours that the Kola vtr* coaln& aoon to kill the 
wiaha Jana. This led to the flight of the non-* tribal 
settler*« and their property vas plundered at will.
Then they burnt the whole village at a cloak to their 
actlone# Moreover# whan the nen-trtbal refugee* with 
thrir faw portable poaaa«firm$ r©r*ch©t! the village
vhor. the ..minder*. brotli#r tlv«(■ Iht letter bUckn»il«^
.
tile, out of .over*! .rtielos worth i *» \kf rmii "fcy neans
of his servants end dependents plundered them ©f their
regaining property on the following night# all ef which
£
conveyed t© hie residence.** Other© who took 
lr. two »r t hr a* w i11 «t.* in the n«l fhbetrbawl
r----------------------------------- —
A t e
2 nu.Mll to -xadrion, IS Apt, IS}*, fc.C. 13*3/5*226.
were similarly robbed. tn Pmtlmn m m ! other neighbouring 
&>r« rar-wos there va» likewise muck deapollintf of thote vh» 
ver# * I«tin: from Tawer and Cheta^dajgrgrar« or of those who 
sought to <»acapp when the Uai» crossed into the J u n g U  , 
^ h a l f «  Indeed the first frit*** of the unrest let! to a 
serious refuses p r o b U c  in the n«igiib<mria^ f«rets*
(Some of the refugee* found they had escaped the frying 
pan only to fait into the fife - the fetupee from Tusar 
vf<»rr relievo ' of oil their fee Ion?Inga in Fatkus)# Several 
Calcutta papers described tae sad plight of the refugees 
fleeing with their families from g»l&M to place in m 
state of greatest want * *It 1* a setter of regret that 
of these victim* reny porlsked from wont of food* as 
the Cole* have studied to destroy all the grain which 
they vere unable to carry off*11
lit* spread of the insurrection so quickly and so 
widely was only mad# possible of course by the absence 
of any effective check. The result w«» most shocking.
A* a aewcpi psr correspondent noted* *Ctiota hampers is
'■ •'v * *• '%*
completely sacked by this *e*i«lc rbe roue race, who have 
succeeded to and dusting the respectable end
higher elaan of people, and aro theneelves the haiilks
— ------------ ------------ ■- „ . . . „  .. . i -----------------------------------------------------------------------   —
1 ■• »i t r t  fro m  Ctmp  > i t o r t a ,  26 i eb . I& ) 2 ,  *«
6 Kareh 1B32.
1
of the whole pfcrguntialw * Another eorraapondeat put
1 tf vFin4ifte «o Uttlft oppGfitioi) in their attack9 and
feh© soldier'd lif* to U# *a v«ry merry I ind of life, if
t%k«n *&ie& th ua<< rou*d*f 9 they proceeded from H H f t f t  to
village twmiiig and ^oo^erlng every reapeetable person*
< a<| every foreigner* and forcing every Cole by tb« fear
of ineta i*t 4oi«thv to Join their utoftd^rdo# thui the
fire of rebellien once lighted» the fioAto spread
rapidly* The villages* ever ready to fly to «ur&*9
and bitter thetaselvo* at the otperloncto of their k o o
ntiaoroui and more peaceable super i©r.n* oa^orljr soixstf
their tiovt and arrovi( end pursued a oourfto of the woot
coldblooded and hearties* barbarity9 in which they
received no check until the arrival at this place? of *••
2
tfre Joint Covasisslonere* • • " A a Sutherland acid# "this
luaurraetlou bad no lisnlt but that vhich it found in the 
el&oo of people by which it inatlasted* Had the
country between Chat* nappe*r and Csltlltli on the one 
u*md end Benares on the ot:.»r, bo«xi inhabited by fltnpr 
roles, the inaurrociion would have spread to than# place**
K*p*r% in feast i-autati. «.4.| uotawJ in i^4a,,.£«,y.£|.t«t»
25 rob. 1S'J2.
* *. Hitorio, «••».» '<<«,,ga i rtur' cni. 1 5 l'«b, J8JS,
,-utUor land to (>ov«. , n.rf., «C« J.303/ 5^227*
It was ft cottscioufcm**® of the lock «f any effectivo 
l>ow«r in the field to chock the r e U l s  vhich cauiid 
the unufctr* 1 » U r » «  MXt i© inposjilbl#, * wrote iuasell» 
to 4«^erlbt the terror and alarm occasioned by the 
disturbance* ttrou^i.ottl the district yuaelt Mtbtls]« 
in all the villftr.es 1 passed through on my way to 
I’ateaott, th« inhabitants had dug larg© pit* a 1 Jacont 
to their hou»«* to conceal their offacte in onac of 
iy*.* leave also reported froa PalaitftU 
that though only a simll portion of that estate was 
• •rioiuly as'fected, *y#t the villages to the vary 
northern estreeity of the Perp^inmh wore usually 
deserted frow fear” * Rumours vara at one tirae afloat 
that M i m a  pur near Setters a to the vast ef P & l w a t U*»d 
been sacked by the *©1# on 2 February, and that 
disturbances had occurred at Aaiotftarh. On 3 February 
it was reported to the Ms* rut Q h . ^ m i P  that for the l***t 
ton day* the ievrn of hivsapur and the surrounding area 
was ** thrown into fearf ul consternation by the Intel ligates 
of a body of matt to the ensue t of 5 or 5000 being
V  * ' .  .". f.'-v. i- 1 *ji$ l ' *’
<% e*i^  tabled at a *hert ?; interne*, carrying plunder and rapine 
before th«S| end Leaving desolation and &ifi#r/ in their
«3
     ■«...... ■  »              ...
1 Kuoooll to U r m M u m , I- a**I. ia32, Far a 13, *.13*3/ 3**26.
2 Memve to Jfc.Cochiseloners 2b Apl, 1032, h.C.1363/6522#.
^ fuoied in India Payette* 8 licrch 1&32*
Tu© uwUtt-taaafct* a©t*d In it* editorial celtuana. tro* 
Cnuta to tUo fr«nii«r« a/ Qudt tkorcr la ^ #otfcM*l
tation# (i:;ve« the pea>>X«ss of ikmares v«r«
5
pnrtioky X*&t they about d be attacked by iU<-? uoU*
4t one ,/oiut, It iU£wur«U that inn MaratkM v «y «
•-••* ' 3 V-, -V,- ■
aid# joining th# bole £wmm iim aou^wesi*'
The question naturally with a rising
wida»pr«<-d * au: Qv rti*ao«r oven tv ides; * witc tbor it van ^n
riniatgt ai» o*rly independence wovaoHftnt*
Wan there ouy cancertea pJUmb to throw uff the Tiritinli 
yoke* Maxtor, tho xtafcu* com i s*loner» around that the 
•In* aka ee*i giro led in vntt maybe re to i aicuttn and at nor 
hi#; alii* * in th of work, tauot ii»v« boon fansiliAi* with
the British anttrprilA# ieecurcct* anti power* and*
tiertftrti they could never hove Oteu&Ut at subverting
k
*uch a power. pcrhnpe voicing tk# opinion*
1 ,Mla. Hr r «• t.t«> * 9 ";>h. 1 • 1 ^ 32 # 1 11 toriel »
India. falette. 10 lob. 1&32* editorial*
3
k.«J. fs friojid, acted i n * H . J . f letter* India fou^tte.
a Xftrtk I&32. There were sceptics * however*
who held that it va» but a trifling affair* "a few 
cnee* of ’Hedge** < ajrdtal1 «m4 »<m# at * V^iuMmdykef • 
beet Chintz ~.t* would scon the ineur^eivt* t
See • p • y i iteri n * *• **n r ok 1 -• 3% 9 ball * q u oted in
1*cniy e 1 kurv.hru» 13 iktrnh 183-?*
M*«t*r to <5ovt., 17 *5&n» 1»3.3. Par* 2*, B.C. 1502/0669)
dao nee Bon tin ok 2tS * fioit 13#
55;-
of Sutherland, who had visited th# r m  per#orv&lly and 
•abisitted ft long report, be 1 ieved 9 how«y«r, that the 
insurrection really had rriginwted in I he spirit of 
Ind#ptftd»n6««»* and £inj[ 1 lief that the opportunity
o f  throwing of* our yelc« ha* I arrived* Blunt, as
2 . ■ _
tun* bn«n »««|i, disagreed vith this viow* ’Though
the predatory U-hi tn of thi* people (habits which
forwnrly prevailed nor« or ie#s in ail the dangla
»ute»}'‘, ho r m r k t d ,  " stay have rwnderea ttum ready
F.utiliftrlos to their discontented neighbours* in
$ onepoorf tait 1 cannot f o r  a mesaetit b e l i e v e  t;wt e ither the
Col--? oi iagt Wnocu-i or >a-;poor c o u l d  over have entertained
#o wild a project (a project eo far beyond their
comprehension as their ««»na) «# that of subverting
L 5ttio British 5 mpif e * * He, therefore, t « U e r n d  that
Xeio If®, -inute, 1% A.J.. 1^32, B.C. 1363/3*2?7. futh^r- 
land thought that wince the Fols •’had mad# incur* 1 m #
into the foreign poo**a#ions of f^tcoow on the ono 
hand and falniftow on the other*, and haul *taite#d of 
Calcutta and lh« form of Gctrms;«nt they were to 
establish*, they ftnd certainly a to throw off
tU# British yoke and *had they possessed either 
loader# or enterprise, they would undoubtedly haws 
e s ta b lis h e d  th c t.ss -lvss  a t  o u r s ta t io n s  o f  H asaree- 
boMi'h, tekotrah aa.d f he rg ho tty, perhaps at Oy&h 
(Gay»}, eeaattndlog the principal road between Calcutta 
and beuare# nr*4 ta k in g  p o s s e s s io n  e f  *o»o o f  th e  
o ld e s t  t e r r i t o r i e s  # f  the  Coapany** S u th e r la n d  I t  
tovt. n.d.t H.h* 13£)/ffc22?.
>er ohaptu * iV, $ •?>^!?
J lunt, ilnute, 4 a,1. U 32, B.C. 13*3/5*227.
thoy had no "feoyond ihf lj»»«<!lftta gratification
of tkair rcvengra agrlnst tkoi# by vhosi th*y had suffered
i
oppros»lc»n* • 2«id#«dt it would »«*» uloar thtft th#
ordinary of the tribal paapla wfr« ignorant of tka
complex &achlnary cf the British adssinlstratiotti geercoly 
kn»u a D r U l d b  official by feir,ht» se4 wore rising
, y
a ualnst st«eb i^oro imdtfete c*f*«K~i«s# Uian-dag or 
•ult dAro|»tf aiouey lenders or i m i  i M
would have gained moat fro** tb© da®truetion of the 
Company1r rule* th« qiic«~ And** pendent rnjna and 
.s*.‘:lrdava did not, in the evunti ally thw»»«lv«e with 
the tribal ? * * and though tbey would not taka a 
riek and actually eupport the British officials# they 
stood n#ntrtla ?o»c# indeed9 f;ot the heat o f  both world®« 
they used the tribal unrest to f r o m  theueelves f r o m  the 
elute horn of the *on*yiswdar*« and than carried narit 
with the fiuthoriiles by turning on the rebels# The 
Harni of F^tVum, called f the 0ra*t Kachia v a l tif by tmm
pv>wsj>aper corrcspotsdont®, was particularly efficient
1
2
nit ac^rcoiy i e s e m e  the >*»»* of an Insurrection when 
a body of man* #o*dad by the appmrant wont of redress#
rose not against the tfovarmwmt* but against ib?
*Aalnd*.rs» saafciim f the* vj id justice of faveraf c* •
•K©1» of Chat* ^ p o r t * ,  , ^qkUAftJaLTAttt
> . • ' * >
* ’old Grund; • , a#d.t |r^lj «BMII Wiki 21 Fab* 1832*
In «u«h doufeSordeallag# Kh® the h©rvicet of
the Kola in ousting foreigner* f res* h«r rotate and 
pluft4«rittg their property, and then had «*v«mty»fiv© 
of thorn r * m i t e d # The tsere important rulers in both 
the phases ©f the unrest i p jitmtly stood aside from 
the reh*1«; it was the minor ,1: ^trctara# the m*nkjU a©d 
r^nndaa who suffered with the coj«©en people at the hands 
©f both outsiders end Company olTlcl*U» An answer 
riven by the noted loader inrrai to a Question from 
l uenell »*y t t m  as t* saore answer* Bussell,
naked whether the Wahar^Ja ©f Cheta^aypur had said 
anything t« hist ebont fighting the a hit* I or* the 
iritish* Hi replied that the Me herein hod said ietllng 
of that sort* The only statement that the mhstretj* had 
astitde to hie wee that he, the ; nU^rttJa, would he answerable
to the British authorities, end not the etismon people#1
-v > »
There was, then, nothin#; s© grandiose about the tsricuu
j,»h* »©* of the ireurrootim* as « national rleing to
oeoure lni!if»fd«e«t trmn the British* The enemy which
was attacked wan a no re local nmi particular' one!
.    —  —   — — ■»
St touentf v:‘i»grai# n*4* TneInsure 'tasssll to Irodd©#?,
1 Apl* 1832, %< *i36j/'$hz::6+ fhtssell, the Jungle
Mahalg s.**?i.str.'-t«> was or. r a red by the «upinoness of 
the ehiefsf end would here invoked the severest 
puttiKhmeot poraiitted by the regulations upon the 
* wany pore ode who ought to have Soft*© forward at ©no© 
to support the civil author4ties, and to cheek the 
ays to,- of p loader sxut outrage's”, end whom h# held,
probably mistakenly to i*av© been *se sriwlsutily fund
deeply i.onoemed in there t ranoneti o n ? %
the outsider wti© hs,<i eUttped 1*1*3**If like a leach
on the body of tribal a*cl«»tyt and th* jpitfcyf 
extortionate p T e m e n t  official. Tit* voiat Ce&oRlaalaMra 
put it succinctly whon in 1 e t » m r y  l&JZ tUey *rrat* *The 
wkcl# of tUc I’e e u d M  ajftd Colo* vUe, wo b^ll^ve* camp&so 
about two**third* of the population* have tftke* up artta 
agniaet the respectable inhabitant* of t&o country, 
bernl and plundered iheir heusf» and property* and 
expelled ttMwa.** initially at leant, plundtt era* 
not the rmin object of the t r i b e ^ n *  Had it boon 
ik o n  tUe Ctva%*«»Sagpar r ia in # ©  would eurely itave
I© th e  r ic h  c o u n try  c c ro s *  th e  ^uharna3*ekh» 
r i v e r ,  abounding in  lo o t .  O r d in a r i ly *  h o v e v e rt  the  
lrt*ur&* nt* did not tstove very far from thoir can 
▼illa^o#, once they had e U e r H  thaw of the ehjiitleMlti 
foreigner#* ^onapvir w*« tbc on# great eat. option for 
there ueet of the proparty and the oattie taken w#r«
%
carried off into the neighbourlnjj Afeee of £lngt&biiua«
C ^  '
One# the expul*ion of th** foreigner* v«e well
under way their property wa« of eeeree thoroughly 
looted! "all the ro*p«Ki%*bl* looking Uou^»% In ike
village* have heea . raviaualy burnt by the Color *
*
Ji+Ctoiietioolofsojr* to laven, 9 ^ob#l&j2* Paru 2*
B.C. 1362/34*224.
J t •<-.:,uaia * t fm»> r* to ■<>vt., Id <»v• l8’J31 Parr-. ;J,
i*. P^int!?/588*1.
aad their uvii hut« *»re filled with *verf mp+ctm*
of - -rmJat which ihi# province* j rodueo*; and 
of lh«a are fe»ply auppliod with preserved a&a&o*ot
j
plcklee «•• and sundry other articles* ■’ UrnJ«*r 
Su t he r JU?tid t #4 * “ They had ash rAched vh©an*a 1v®»
with the g-polls of their oy<#&»1*#9 for *vtt& th<*y 
oonfti4tw all f or^ Agnftr**’ « ho volt tiiun 
d#gwitrat«<i into handi.tr y* the law urgent lender*
1 in&r&l| took fro© an# it?ow«y«l^ndai , fcmitokh
»
h*Kui &"* ’■*•■ l '• * .Vi than . $• t which . h**rt i»
3 .J,- * ' - i
salt b*.gs« * Y#t ®vc?a in tho Inter it is
significant of t hsstrtd ef the foreigners that
Ahair liiuiiii however v*dU*o.bi* § were almost tnfariably 
<I©strey<M by the i ri.hr. 1 people* who tapped to wish to 
trase &1X i l p a  of thair ha ted praoone# acson# th**&« &jr 
centrist th© property of the tribnl ehiafl wa* nearly 
svltrayo respected, though often. eftotlgt; after their 
hinduivntion they had btin ttitiitia origins of*
An villages with a populationt none
U l t * r  frwo C«*i ?ittri»• 15 i*b» 1*32, . m m  r«tll.«
Its Xw51 ■> G««.«»ttii, 23 #«h. 16}2i
2 -athorlftnJ to Covt., n.4., r.C. 1365/5*227.
3
$tai«a«Nilf :' inp;rai# tn:loaare» luaaell to
IS Apl, ldji, n.c. 1363/5^21*.
of the \ t*i the ti iV-\ * A'n touohed.
The aarest «te tu&n, in origin# S r volt «Mf the 
>••••:•' # * • ««<:• » m2 t ;•-• IvttOir. -'>• i. t *' «‘ir 'Rfta t-'r**
utnorland da:*eribed the Cheta<*HSjfli»»r I r flTj||srif)Sj 
" into.xiC5.iie ! ia«y were wi ti, liquor, viti »uc;e«i« 
and rising as they did like n *lav« popuis tloa 01* 
their » numbers ««i» *KSSS&er#<l in cold
bloods aud perhaps no feroi&tiar falitng into tiwir 
hisncls would have been The atutaasnt* of both
prlannon *tn*vittini *,*o v th&t the > raouii Kumiss#
••anils and otner Ckota trlbo^an fttsde the *udj|
their vietiftttt Honey lenders# atfdltattti and ahop**
keepers* 1 and ~ i, rnbb*r* and tsjt~f eriaers 9 these wart 
the people Attacked - tho*#> fori i ^ r r t  who had boon 
usefully itltgrtttd into tho tribal aconosiy, tUo 
o »auhldt-r^ • rsilknwm, and art is **a were £on<*rally 
•pared* Htvtttrf these who had old ad with the far* tenors# 
so tin# tueir or spies, suffered like their
ms-st^rs* Blrb«l, the chhu<itU.r of a ti 1 lags, whs
SttUMrlMd to Govt.t n. ., . .
J t * Cofisni a»i042 *?rs ta Uovt* , £6 Hay * X&3Z $ &* •# 1363/
5t22£* Ala# see Absti of irrUtncrt,
B.C* 1302/
attempted to protect the property of a foreign 
thi» dar of feh* village, was nttreked, pursuedl and 
Hacked to pieces* ? Similarly a certain onohar rln^t 
»«* A llied by the v h t U  < cl population of a village 
bee > ;»e, ae the pfed* or MttfMifer of a tttd landholder,
ha had the duty of soiling aha Eel rotate for arrears
2 «; . W  v
of rent* There also eaetnplaa ef these who
hat i»e»n b and- s r rva ri i w the ehoneo to dee trey
3thoir employers and their employer** fontlies*
The dee 1 axe in an It were another itpeelal target 
of attack, for ihoy had exalted the general nn$?er of 
the people by eel ling this cee»eu nwc*a*ary at an 
exorbitant rate* *fhen the hem* af a faulty ef • 11~ 
deal ere wee attacked. and the assailants found that ell 
hut one eld nan, had fled, they first aeked him 
to show them the spot where the salt vsf deposited,
4
and then they killed him *a**r©ile«ialy# So wore 
the moneylender*, wltoeo fleeced debtor* took a oarage
1 .. ,
Mailer to iiogieltfi Kitaail k h U t i  22 &et* 1^32,
Che* Ko, $2, r.C* 1 *502/58fc*3.
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ravtmgra* heftra Tiwari* <ma §uei. i&onoy Uml»r« w*»
with 8ton«?P| and than smrely wouudod an ha 
wats* in M i d  blood wail killed* *
Th# non*tribal landlord* v#r« th« third group
u p o n  wheat fch# Kola turned, Thorn war# nun®rous e^ otft2
© f  vholr revenue oolloeloro and agor.tt being
brutally Kurd*rod* 1 vrn th# aarvant# of th#
Maharaja of Chet»»"ft(ipur w^rt* not if th«y
Krtff* for«i^uert«i and a atmfear who had h»ra#*#d th#
In ralannu ng< ia th# do*truction of "Maaajuni 
and foreign#*** engaged lit m m k m  ratal trau*. 
w&# a prominent feature# One# again, too, th# for©!grt 
##rY«nt» of tti# «x*raja and th# landing J^.irdfcr** 
ndveaterrri and th# like, war# «ins)«d out 
for attack*
Though tho second ph of th® unrest waa X#s# 
violent, one# again th® non-tribal intruder® banana a 
apeci «1 target of attack in «lat«l every aatata* In
.     -I  -■ *!■ HI I  .1.1.1.! ... I. I
near® to U v t *  9 29 March# 1 ® 3 2 * i>,ro* 2 , 8 * C * 1 3 6 3 / $ % 2 2 $*
ryot# war# killed and their property looted* 3
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&  raheaar* !'cr the !unU« settlers? were
especial target# of* attmeli,* while th# he**### of the
, Kitnikp, lelwara a ml ether atrelltnlt and excise
I-, ' 5(
feneer#» and these of * reh&att# wore indi*cri«Anftleljr 
at t sicked. Thore were, hevever, fewer ouch ••tiUre 
in the Jungle Tohol*, there the noteworthy
f#«ture v»«f.a the nttocfc upon the nwlee of tfoo Company*
The Jungle Wnhela were sot afire by the nurder 
of cingh its a prlv te feitd, !mi private feud ,
#**& beenas* popular rising;* Vithin a few days the 
pollco the wtunnlff r» cu.tr! ery* ansi that of #Hlt~
5;.»roc* *t fhtrcbeenr had all he on an/eked* The wun^tf# 
poonm were I tiled, and an effort m«to to capture the
* v.j
5?police officer* In all this the flhfttwgj.# took the
leofl, at the «*uidac and .--ankle had «o often done in
Cbata*Hi^»ri for they hod the grievances r*$alr*#t
the lev officers who enfefead the claims of the
usurer or rack*.renting f a m t r .
They turned next :■gninat the official ro3i.ee
tnanae which Had minimised the ^bityaia’ ispertaaea*
  — , —  ---------- , . „ . . . ~ —     « » ■ -    —
* hn officer of the 5<>th K* .1* f E&rmk&Mr* 13 May 1&32»
Tndlr. Caret te* 1? *fiy i»3^e
2 Uu«**ll to ;ovt., 5 f.*y JH1J, *.C, 1>5«U/5B897.
Chapter V*
Bussell reported that they «hov#4 a particular *spite* 
toward* the dUg g^ag« ^ a© the Insurgent a advanced
they a-jakcd every pal ice tJU*na thajr vial ted - H»rf»fce*»rf
/ febikiumger, Keipur - while in Packet they thrai tened
ell the three t^n»a. it w*» symbolic thet Gomgn
' • ' ' ■t ""
’ pi rain died in m» attack upon a j|tena in Khereavnn* 
in Pttkuw else, «e we have already *ee»# the newly 
astablieued thmgs va* a tpeeUt target ef attack*
Xt Is perhaps necessary t& s lelt that with the 
tiMer*;*»•# ef ueng* Har«ln at a ^«lar figure, the 
revolt did teke » f.tuar ^erc ^litieal or •netienel* 
6»p«ct« Vhereas the prisoner* leitd In the first 
phut# could he thafftt with apcelfio set* ef local 
violence, in the second ih*> cb»rf• was often ef 
fiavlnf aided end -thatted Gan#?* Karoin - Guhi Border 
s n<! Surl Keys* hie adtlttrt in aertrftl eote of 
murder end atrocity9 (iovarlhsn f^asusij who seised the
envoy emit to nepotist* vA tb («aug« he re in and murdered 
alS| Bmarl Nay*» an under^vj & twal vho eoeoMpanied
Gang* herein** party to atluft tin ire ope et
; tv hasear in H«ty9 Hull Hmhto Jed re fthtusijl vhe
    -■»  »   ,
1 Ruaaell to ftreddeii, 11 >uty i$35t ibid*
ftncl abetted Qnn&n nmi n 1a tB# murder of
?
.'• V ■ h n v& S Inifh »
Again* where the attack* in th« flrsi p*u\ee had been 
&p<tr> tribal tyrants, and had. toeon locally i&ade* tU« 
in«urractioti ba^ua in Barabiiu^ ttofi apraavi all av#r tUa 
MahaXt and 0luilblHNi| And into Sliv^hlmuai*
6 t■«,■ n .©rain Actively ought hmlp in ail the neighbouring 
ir^a « •*»«* swat wit, *ofM? sueoaaa, y and ha nought that Ha Ip lit 
%Bo ©1 Hi a a ^ a a l  to ThaMtr Che ton Singh toy calling
far »*id in H rouging th© Is; au lied M > m m r * of tne £<u4imi*re. 
Mftrain ai*© exploited to in© at**©*! the
«ri;p#ratitiaa erp-iulity of th© staple tribru folk*
by clalaisig t© po*o*»© 9Up€rltMmstn power*. he ©van want 
to the limgth of iniitllllng "ini© the sditii of tB© ohooar*
♦ he eairaosviinr r y  idea that he poaaaaaod the power of 
ftne^nting the o«poys a.ml thoir steak© te» Thi* notion 
wa» implicitly believed by fcho«© credulous ^ityl# and
nothing except!n,£ ocular das-ionotr^ M o n  would convince
©
thee to the contrary* Con» ©fluently «von whan clanga
Sf^rain wae not proa out during an attack* t ho tribal
— ~ ~ —      ,n.
I • *-4
Trial cun©*, cncloaura* l>mmt to Covt.« 9 Apt, ib3%
B.C. 15S2/sfc8$0. 
u«P.rt f m  C«*p B.r.ba«.r, 15 ?«y 183?, jaaSaJL$3M8UtiDU ■
21 Hay* 163^,
r•#»!+ gave mt imprest* ion that ho ta? there,*
in both the phono* of the unroot, the ^ « n M t r «  .%nd 
tho ,*»; irtiare were *«!*(»« o ted erf hmxng in league with the
i.ji««rg#nt»# ieftonUn^ to a newspaper report, "ierhapo 
vith tho single exception of Ajutaber Hinfc (end probably 
Ttimk.ur CUotnn f ingt too) , «v<^ry other
assets to be a /:ainor \ y the ] nt««At (listyrbuicen, ood -
it i© thought ••• that they would be extremely sorry to
Ounft Harein brought in a captive f t*i »♦«:* hn ilgtt
toll iftlofl of «o«*e of th«mv -which would » o far to open
fc »c eye* of tho Cov«rna«nt to their duplicity*" Though
tho foot that a«i many of then wen* deeply in debt mmy
explain their tcolt support# it once a# in that there
«*.* in the Jtmgl* • ^hata a mor** concerted nttrtcV upon
tli** art Mini straiten* And once a^tln >,rain provided
a focus for politic*I *a well as economic tioeontont9 for
>* was cloaely related to <*a«y of tfc* chicfa of tho urea,
nn« other factor h a l e d  to turn local expression* of
grievance into oemethinir larger in settle, Thet was tho
bit i^tstts caused by tho unreal ttlng *nd bloody repression
by the regular troop* in thoir seeend oft^ ai^ u. far aere
than in the first .phase there #*» in the HaSufcie
eaapairnu iui element of roteliafcory retribution, and sowc
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at least of the troops had already experienced wi«
;*.arax sing, if iff % su It c« «aj «n i p  in eh* s p u r .  I «r^or*r , 
saints the guides and. interpreter® attached i© the corps 
w#rf mostly no:s~tribal people9 themselves #t«kiaf, vsn^s&ncs 
perhaps* it was easy to 1*&*I thn troops, unwittingly# intot '';
unnecessary acts uf vcm* »•*»**• Th* l#*vy loss of life#
H4t very discriminatingly inflicted# the thorough 
d««truction of property# the capture of women ond children 
- all there sadttd the sc con d ssmpslpft* They seem rttltir 
to hove stiffsued than weakened the tritnl wilt to resist* 
It is psrSsp# not without rolnmncs that whores * in the 
itrst phnmo the Crovernment offered a thonswnd rupee* 
rftvnrd for the ssirnrs of Thutdbn *?h«iyfct# five thousand 
r !??*#* wars offered for the rehsrtsion at floor* Wavsin# 1
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circle ftcadstsn - Sul Kondra, lugrsl KMfct# Hindrai 
MaulA# sic, dultUm - in the wnoond phase they
were © :rdar .rha t*RIs nw* tfhntwaia# an . minor Jnglrdsr;* 
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CHAPTER VIII 
The Aftermath of the Unrest - I.
With the ending of military operations, first in 
Chota-Nagpur and then in the Jungle Mahals, it became neces­
sary first to ensure a rapid return to normal economic life 
in the ravaged districts, and to make such minor security 
arrangements as would preserve that life in peace, then to 
decide how to reward the loyal and to punish the guilty, and 
finally to resolve all the conflicting claims between parties 
thrown up by the insurrection, or left unresolved because of 
it. Only when that had been done, and the reports of the 
officers had been digested, would it be possible to consider 
what changes in the administration of the tribal areas would 
be necessary to prevent in future such a growth of grievances 
as had been issued in violent rebellion between 1831 and 1833- 
The last two chapters of this thesis will deal the one with 
the immediate settlement which followed the ending of hostil­
ities and the other with the larger reorganisation of the 
whole administrative system,
Earlier chapters on the military operations and upon 
the extent and nature of the unrest have dealt in local 
detail with the great destruction of life and property which 
took place during the risings and in the course of their 
suppression. Official figures, for example, gave the number 
of non-tribal people killed in Tori, Lohardugga, Sonepur,
Palkote, Tamar and Doma alcne as 304. ^  Wilson in his edition
2
of Mill, put the figure at over a thousand. Probably both 
figures were underestimates many deaths being unreported in 
the long period of administrative confusion, when most 
officials had fled from their civil stations* On the insur­
gents' side losses were even heavier, though here again 
because of the tribes peoples' habit of carrying off their 
dead and wounded into the jungles, ^ no accurate total can be 
obtained* The loss of property was likewise very great, for 
large areas, especially during the rains, had been "almost 
entirely at the mercy of the insurgent chooars"^ who had 
"sacked every place worth plundering."^ As British authority 
was restored by military action, further material loss was 
inflicted, this time upon the tribal people, against whom 
the Hindu and Muslim troops acted in some measure as avengers 
of the 'foreigners' attacked by the Kols and Bhumijes* The 
destruction was so great as to rouse some disquiet among the 
officers engaged in operations,^ and there was for a while 
a lively controversy in the Press. Some denounced the puni­
tive measures: " ... the country is filled with blood-thirsty
1. Appendix, Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 16 Nov. 1832,
B.C.1502/58891.
2. Wilson, Mill's History of British India* 1858, IX, 234, 
footnote.
3. Braddon to Govt*, 6 Sept. 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
4. Govt, to Braddon, 3 Aug. 1832, Ibid.
5. Balt on, Ethnology, 175.
6. See Chapters III and $V.
55;-i
and plundering troops, and England the free, the noble
England pours her legions into Nagpore, and empties the phial
of her wrath upon the heads of the devoted and patriot
Coles! These poor unfortunates are hunted from their villages
to the jungles and from thence to the plains where they are
massacred like beasts of the f i e l d . T o  this those engaged
in the suppression of the rebellion replied defensively,
asserting “There perhaps never was an insurrection of such
magnitude put down by a military force ... where recourse was
had to so few measures of severity, or where there was so
little sacrifice of life and property - yet these ... are
the troops that Indian papers paint as ruthless savages, and
these the measures that they describe in terms calculated to
2
raise the indignation and contempt of all good men.1 They 
also took a legalistic line: “I have yet to learn that the
destruction of the supplies of every description which the 
insurgents had carried to their positions to enable them to 
protract their resistance, was not lawful, that the destruct­
ion of the habitations which they had there erected for their 
shelter was not lawful, and that the demolition of the vil­
lages in the immediate neighbourhood of their positions, 
which they had deserted, but where they found occasional 
shelter was not lawful likewise.11^ Others counter-attacked
1. k paper said to be published in Chota-Nagpore, qjuoted in 
Bengal Hurkai.u, 18 Apl. 1832.
2. "TST.N. 1 f Barrackpur„ 24 May 1832, Bengal Hurkaru, 30 May 
1832. '
3. Ibid.
the humanitarians, asking, “Is all the pity and compassion 
of the Builds correspondent to be expended on these ruthless 
murderers, who spare neither women nor children...? Is no 
compassion to be extended to the hundreds, whom they have 
killed, whose blood cries for vengeance; to the orphan whom 
they have rendered fatherless and the widow whom they have 
made so. Is no one to feel for the thousands who block up 
the roads and villages with their starving families, who are 
wandering about without a morsel of food and perfectly des­
titute of the means of getting it?"*** But whether excessive 
or justified, the destruction of houses, grains, equipment, 
cattle, etc. was certainly heavy: “so much blood has been 
shed, such almost irreparable ruin and devastation spread 
over a fine country which now is 'Greece - but living Greece
p
no more." The land could not be cultivated for want of 
seeds and bullocks, the crops were widely damaged and those 
that survived could not be harvested in time. “In every 
village," wrote Heave about Palamau, "the cropstfore standing 
ripe and there was none to reap them.
The first task of Government, under such conditions 
was to restore order and restart the economic life of the 
area as quickly as possible. Even before the full pacifica­
tion of Chota-Nagpur the local authorities had been
1. 'Tee-to-Tum. 1 Bengal Hurkaruf 13 March 1832.
2. 'Jassooz', 9 Apl. 1832, Bengal Hurkaru, 30 Apl. 1832.
3. Neave to Jo. Commissioners, 28 Apl. 1832, B.C.1363/54228.
instructed to seek to inspire confidence in the peopled 
"The main desire of the Vice President in Council respecting 
Palamau as well as other portions of territory in which there 
has been insurrection, is to re-establish tranquillity & 
secure good order for the future."'*' Major Sutherland, 
Metcalfe’s private secretary, stressed the need to prevent
2
"further depression and degradation of the Cole population", 
"Whether we consider their number or look upon them as the 
productive and industrial classes," he wrote, "their appeal 
to arms having so far failed to obtain for them redress of 
those grievances which in their estimation had become intol­
erable, there will be a reaction against them .... They will, 
unless protected by the hand which has reduced them to sub­
jection, •. • be reduced in the first instance to a state of 
greater debasement than ever, In the Jungle Mahals, as the 
leaders surrendered one by one in 18331 same emphasis 
was laid upon reconciliation and rehabilitation in the 
devastated areas. Early in March a military officer, Lt. 
Timins, was saying "all that now remains to secure tranquil­
lity to the country is to settle the Ryots again in their 
respective villages, and pardon those who have been concerned 
in the insurrection, making an example of some of the prin­
cipal sirdars of chooars to prevent others committing similar
1. Govt, to Neave, 7 Apl, 1832, Para,2, B.C. 1363/54228.
2. Sutherland to Govt,, n.d., B.C.1363/54227.
3o Ibid.
offences,Steps were accordingly taken to restore the 
thousands of maunds of grain and the cattle recovered from 
the insurgents to their rightful owners, so that cultivation 
might be got under way. (In Patkum alone 12 - 15,000 maunds 
of grain were recovered, and in Tamar 4,000 head of cattle.)* 
As police and other officials were again posted in the dis­
tricts they were instructed to aid in the recovery and res­
toration of property - though with caution, for there were 
many claims and counter claims, and the tribal people fre­
quently protested that they were "being deprived of all 
their own property after having given up their plunder.
Indeed in May 1832 the squabbles about the restora­
tion of property assumed such proportions in the Barkagarh 
area that it was thought necessary to post troops there to 
prevent "a partial rising, which might extend were not 
troops on the spot."^ The hostility of the suds by the 
tribal masses was making it very difficult for the headmen 
and chiefs who had bound themselves at the time of their 
surrender to secure the restitution o£ all looted property 
within their villages. Moreover, the presence of troops, it 
was thought, would reassure the suds and encourage them to 
resume their normal occupations.
1. Timins to Impey, 2 March 18331 B.C. 1502/58890.
2. Russell to Braddon, 18 Apl. 1832, Para.16, B.C.1363/54226. 
Also see Col Bowen to Jt, Commissioners, 11 March 1832, 
B.C.1362/54225.
3. Jt.Commissioners to Govt., 6 May 1832, Para.5, B.C.1363/ 
54228.
4. Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 31 May 1832, Para.2, Ibid.
The officials were also ordered to "use their best 
exertions in concert with the landholders and heads of vil­
lages to preserve order andi conciliate all classes,"'** Here 
Cuthbert gave a lead in trying to get those who had suffered 
at one another's hands to live again as good neighbours.
(In May 1832 the joint commissioners had reported that the 
general convulsion had "completely disorganised society and 
destroyed all confidence amongst the different classes.") 
Cuthbert called together the Chota Nagpur raja and the mundas 
and mankis of the five dependent parganas , giving them all 
a patient fearing, promising redress of grievances. "I have 
succeeded," he wrote, "in allaying old and bitter animosities 
and in persuading those to be reconciled to each other, whose 
enmities are as detrimental to their own interests as they 
axe injurious to the peace and welfare of the country; I 
mean the Rajas and the Mankies and Moondas.
As in one area after another military operations 
came to an end and troops were withdrawn, it became necessary 
to establish a transitional security arrangement to protect 
the new-found calm. One method of doing this was to estab­
lish small temporary posts, such as that at Barkagarh. In 
Palamau, for example^ Neave dealt with the trouble spot of 
Lalrehar, by posting the daroga of Tarhasi there with a
1. Jt. Commissigners to Govt., 6 May 1832, Para.5, Ibid.
2. Ibid. Para.l.
3. 'SuiSibert to Oovt... 24 Apl. 1832, Para.3, B.C. 1362/54225.
dafadar and 19 barkandaze3; he posted another dafadar1 a 
party at Satbarwa in Leslieganj thana and a party of barkand- 
azes with the tahsildar of the khalsa mauzas or government 
villages. “*■ Before long he could report the whole pargana 
tranquil and the villages busy with peaceful inhabitants. By
July 1832 Government sanction had been received for these
2
reinforcements of the police, and for the building of the 
necessary accommodation for them.
In Chota-Nagpur proper, police amins with the neces­
sary establishments were appointed at Lohardugga, Jhikochatti 
and Barkagarh and, for the dependent parganas, at T a m a f c ^  The 
joint commissioners laid down that the amins should follow a 
conciliatory policy. The ilagadars, thikadars and other 
officials were to be restrained from using force in the per­
formance of their duties. There was to be no arresting of 
persons on mere suspicion, and trifling cases of assault and 
theft should be settled by the local panehayats.^ The amins 
were strictly warned against accepting gifts - of money or 
goods - from any one, and were ordered to prevent their 
subordinates from accepting any also. They were to maintain 
a diary, submit weekly reports, and work out tables showing 
the number of houses burnt, the amount of property plundered*^
1. R.Trotter to Jt. Commissioners, 18 June 1832, B.C.1363/ 
54228.
2. Govt, to Jt. Commissioners, 10 July 1832, Ibid.
3. Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 6 May 1832, Para3, Ibid.
4. Enclosure, Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 31 May lb3£« Ibid.
the number of persons killed in their areas. All this was 
approved of by the Government and the extra expense agreed 
to, though the posting of a detachment of troops at Barkagarh 
was disliked. "A post of that kind once established there,1 
the Government wrote, "afterwards [there may be] some risk 
and difficulty in withdrawing it and while continued it 
locks up a portion of our military force and tends to fritter 
the whole away in some detachments Our army is not suf­
ficient to be provided a multiplicity of small detachments 
to be stationed on every spot where it may seem desirable 
to have troops."*** In fact, the Government wanted "to keep 
its force collected in efficient bodies to be used where
required than to scatter it in small parties, like so many
2
Police Thannas, to keep the peace."
Besides these official police posts the zamindari or 
ghatwali police was re-established wherever possible. As the 
tribal chieftains surrendered they were asked to enter into 
fresh agreements with the Company. Thus Singrai Manki of 
Sonepur pargana, when he surrendered in May 1832, executed 
a kabuliat with Kunwar Harnath Sahi promising to be alert in 
doing service and in looking after his pass, where no plund­
ering or disturbance was to be allowed. He also undertook to 
obey all the Companyfs orders, to prevent the entry of
1. Govt, to Jt, Commissioners, 17 May 1832, Para.4,
B.C. 1363/54228,
2. Ibid.
3. Enclosure, Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 30 May 1832,
B.C.1363/54223.
dacoits into the twenty-two villages in his charge, and to 
report all crimes to the police officers. Similar kabuliats 
were executed hy Ghasi Manjhi, eight rautias and eight other
mankis,^  Even a leader like Bindrai was !fcoaxed and made much
2
of, had a puggree [turban] given him and a cheroot11, and 
was pardoned and re-established in his old duties.
In other areas it was to the rajas and chiefs that 
police duties were re-entrusted. Palkote and contiguous 
parganas were left under the Raja of Chota-Nagpur, Sonepur 
under the Kunwar of G-ov indpur, Basia under the Kunwar of 
that place, and Barwa under its raja. All were to keep the 
higher authorities regularly informed of the real state of 
the country.^ The Calcutta authorities were ready, indeed^ 
to push such arrangements further. "In a country", they 
wrote, "where the land revenue is received by the Raja, and 
where we receive only such a portion on that account as 
may more properly be termed a tribute, it seems equitable 
that the Raja should be at the expense of keeping the peace 
and expedient to make over the territory at present to the 
sole charge of the Raja." Such a measure would have the 
great attraction of reducing government expenditure upon the 
police, which threatened to exceed the revenues drawn from 
the territory. It was also hoped that the influence of the
1# Ibid.
2, *The ghost of the sons of Singrae Mankee and Bindrae 
Mankee1, Tartarus, Apl. 18.32, Bengal Hurkaru,
14 May 1832.
3. Jt. Commissioners to G-ovt., 6 May 1832, B.C. 1363/54228,
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maharaja, especially in the Palkote area, would lead to 
further recovery of property and an easing of the strain 
between the various classes of people.^
The various measures in Chota-Nagpur worked well, but 
with the signs of disturbance in the neighbouring Jungle 
Mahals they had to be extended beyond October - the date on 
which the extra police were to have been withdrawn* The off­
iciating Hamgarh magistrate argued that ,!where a revolution­
ary spirit has so recently shown itself and where the lower 
orders have so lately learnt their own strength when opposed 
only by the ordinary police establishment the extra force
cannot for some time to come with safety to the tranquillity
2of the pergunnah be dispensed with1', and the need to des­
patch a large part of the force of barkandazes from Tori to 
Barabhum in the Jungle Mahals reinforced the argument. The 
special arrangements were therefore extended by Government 
for another four months. They also promoted Lt. Ouseley, 
who had been acting as amln at Barkagarh, to be assistant to 
the joint commissioners, and to take over their supervision 
of Chota-Nagpur when in October they had to go to the Jungle 
Mahals.^
While the second phase of the unrest ran its course 
in the Jungle Mahals, Chota-Nagpur remained quiet. When the
1. Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 31 May 1832, Ibid.
2* Trotter to Jt. Commissioners, 30 Oct. 1832, Para.l,
B.C.1502/58893.
3* Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 31 Oct. 1832, Ibid.
Mahals in their turn had been subdued by military operations, 
much the same problems again faced the joint commissioners - 
physical destruction to be repaired, the police system to 
be strengthened. Thus in Dhalbhum, where there had been a 
daroga and 128 barkandazes by the end of the operations, a 
smaller body of 48 barkandazes was posted at Narsing-garh, 
and a mere handful at the salt-chauki'} Although it seemed 
that the Dhalbhum raja had screened the insurgent leaders, 
it was recognised that "the Rajah in point of fact is inde­
pendent in reality altho1 subject to the jurisdiction of
pthis £Midnapur] court nominally". Alexander, the joint
Magistrate of Midnapur, urged that control of the police
be wholly entrusted to the raja. In April 1833 Wilkinson
accepting the force of Alexander’s arguments, restored the
former police powers of the raja, taking a new Kabuliat
from him.^ In similar fashion the police of the Barabhum
pargana were placed under the zamindar and his new diwan>
who were strengthened in their authority by the retention of
50 men of the Bankura levy at Barabazar and 40 at Ambikan- 
4agar.
With order restored attention was turned to reward 
and punishment. Among the officials, Major Sutherland was 
the first to receive high praise for his zeal and public
1. Wilkinson to D ’oyly, 4 Apl. 1833, B.C. 1502/58892.
2. Alexander to Hunter, 28 Peb. 1833, Para.7, B.C. 1502/ 
58890.
3. Wilkinson to D ’oyly, 4 Apl. 1833. B.C. 1502/58892.
4. Dent to Oovt., 9 Apl. 1833, Para.8, B.C.1502/58890.
1
spirit. Neave, the Acting Magistrate of Ramgarh, was 
thanked for his services, especially in procuring provisions
p
for the troopso Lastly Lent and Wilkinson, the Jo^nt Com­
missioners, were thanked, the former perhaps less warmly 
than the latter. On the other hand Lambert at one stage had 
to supply a long explanation for having left the disturbed 
area, an explanation which was only grudgingly accepted, and 
Cuthbert, as has been seen, was bitterly criticized by Blunt, 
and was made something of a sc ape-goat by the joint com­
missioners.
It was then the turn of the subordinate officials 
of Chota-Nagpur. Neave asked that Shaikh Anwarullah, 
tahsildar of the Maharaja of Tekari, be rewarded for his 
"very great and important assistance” in providing supplies: 
"no method of securing the services of the people to Govern­
ment, " he urged, is "so sure and effectual as that of honor­
's
ary rewards to those who deserve them.I|J As the Patna com-
4
missioner also warmly supported Neave*s request, the Gov­
ernment asked him to convey to the Shaikh their approbation 
and to present a pair of shawls or any other honorary dis-
5
tinction to the value of 300 rupees.
Mitrabhan Singh, the zamindar of Leo, had rendered 
extraordinary services during the military operations, and
1. Govt, to Sutherland, 3 Apl. 1832, B.C. 1363/54227.
2. See Neave to Lambert, 30 Apl. 1832, B.C.1363/54229.
3. Ibid.
4* lambert to Govt., 3 May 1832, B.C. 1363/54229.
5. Govt, to Lambert, 15 May 1832, Ibid.
his zeal and loyalty were highly spoken of by the joint
commissioners. As his grandfather and father had also
served the Company well, it was recommended that he should
be granted an honorary dress of some splendour, with sword,
string of pearls and so on, as well as some villages or a
2
pargana, such as he himself had asked for. To this, too, 
the Calcutta authorities agreed, though they were doubtful 
whether it would be easy to find a suitable pargana which 
could be granted without injury to the rights of others.^
On the delicate issue of the value of the khillat, or dress 
of honour, the joint commissioners found a diplomatic answer, 
by making it the same as that conferred on Mitrabhan's father 
in 1816.4
Mirza Khan Bahadur Khan, an illegitimate son of
Mahaiaja Mitrajit Singh of Tekari, then appealed for some
recognition of his services in Palamau. Since there was much
official support of his claim to reward, it was agreed to
confer upon him an honorific title. In his case, too, the
exact form of the reward called for much consideration.
After a lot cf discussion as to whether a Hindu or a Muslim
6
title would suit him, the Governor-General finally authorized
lo Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 16 May 1832, B.C.2363/54228.
2. Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 21 June 1832, B.C.1363/54229.
3. Govt, tc Jt. Commissioners, 30 July 1832, Ibid.
4r Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 18 Aug. 1832, B. tT. 1503/58898.
5. Petition, Mirza Khan, to Lambert, n.d., B.C.1503/58899.
6c Lambert to Douglas, Judge of appeal at Patna, 15 Sept. 
1832, Ibid. Also see Douglas to Govt.. 24 Sept. 1832, 
Ibid. Xlso Govt, to Douglas, 8 Oct. lo32, Ibid. 
ancTGovt. to Douglas, 26 Nov. 1832, Ibid.
the title of Raja Khan Bahadur Khan Dilawar Jung.^" An appro­
priate khillat was also forwarded from Calcutta - though
for this the new raja had to present a nazar of equal value,
2i.e. 750 rupees.
Meanwhile the Maharaja of Deo had died,^ and the 
question arose of the best form in which to continue his re­
ward to his minor son. The grant of a pargana desired by the 
late Mitrabhan Singh seemed unsuitable, so a remission of 
revenue of a thousand rupees a year was made instead, con­
firmed by a sanad in perpetuity.^ The more imaginative propo 
sal made by Dent, that the sum might be spent in giving the 
boy a really suitable education was not adopted.
1„ G.G. to Raja Khan Bahadur, 20 Dec. 1832, Ibid. The letter
read; "My friend, In consideration of the public 
services which have been performed on several occasions 
by yourself and your father Maharaja Mitterjeet Sing, I 
have resolved ... to confer upon you the dignity of Raja 
by name, style and title ...." Also see Notification,
Vice President in Council, Political Deptt* 14 Jan. 1833# 
Ibid.
2. Govt.to Douglas, 4 Deb. 1833# Ibid.
3. Trotter to Dent, 8 July 1833# S7071502/58893•• "I cannot
here avoid expressing my regret at an event ty which a 
young man of the highest promise has thus prematurely been 
cut off and the district deprived of the good which must 
have resulted from his example and management."
A military officer paid a tribute to Mitrabhan Singh in 
the following words, "I have been fortunate enough during 
my pilgrimage to the East to meet with several very worthy 
and estimable native gentlemen, but certainly none who 
surpassed, if equalled, ... Mittrbhan Singh ....I may with 
confidence appeal to my brother officers, and fellow 
sojourners in Nagpore, to bear witness to his courage, his 
kind and obliging disposition, his genteel manners and 
the total absence of scheme and strategem in his conduct 
. A Subaltern, op.ctt. 187, Footnote.
4. Dent to Govt., 7 Oct. T&33# B.C.1502/58893*
Also see Govt, to Dent, 23 Dec, 1833# Ibid.
Next came the question of rewarding the loyal
jagirdars of Palamau. Neave had recommended in April 1832,
that the Raja of Palamau, whose estate had been sold up,
and purchased by the Government several years back, should
be given back his estate as a reward for his services.^* The
joint commissioners were cautious about this and suggested
that the feeling of the people of Palamau should first be 
2
ascertained. Government agreed, stressing that it was 
particularly important to ascertain the inclinations of the 
principal jagirdars.^ But ultimately the estate was retained 
by the Government.^
The other jagirdars were suitably rewarded at 
Trotter1 s recommendation since by rewarding them f,their 
assistance and good faith may be more surely relied on in 
the event of any future insurrection in the pergunnah.
Their balances were written off,^ those who had engaged 
extra troops etc* were re-imbursed, and an annual reduction 
of Rs. 240 was made in the revenue payable by Thakurai 
Chhatradhari Singh, Bhawani Baksha Rai and Thakurai Basant 
Singh, during their life-time*
One special award in Palamau was that of life
1. Neave to Jt. Commissioners, 28 Apl. 1832, Para.8,
B.C. 1363/54228.
2. Govt* to Jt. Commissioners, 29 May 1832, Paras.3-4, Ibid* 
3* Govt..to Jt* Commissioners, 29 May, 1832, B.C.1363/54228.
4. Bridge, Palamau Settlement Report, Para.82,
5* Trotter to Jt. Commlssioners, 17 Oct*
B.C. 1502/58893-
6. Khirodar Sabi, the chief of Chechari, was one of those 
who got such a remissions 
Beng. Rev. Cons. 62 of 20 Nov. 1832 /62\
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pensions to the heirs of the ton persons killed at Latehar 
in action against the insurgents, ** They received the stand­
ard rate under the pension rules of January 1831» of Rs. 2- 
8 annas a month - no very great sum for those who had left 
a number of dependents, though Trotter argued that living 
was cheap, and the persons were all men of no rank or 
position.^
When the second phase of the unrest drew to a close 
similar commendations and rewards were distributed to the 
deserving. Dr. Cheek - whose indigo factory had been des­
troyed - received great praise for his services to the 
troops, medical and otherwise, and he was granted an extra
*3
allowance. Gadadhar Banerjee* who had been in charge of
pargana Kasipur during the minority of the zamindar and then
diwan to Dr. Cheek, and who was warmly praised by the Burdwan
commissioner for "the interest he has evinced throughout the
whole business, the correct information he has procured for
4
me, and the valuable assistance I have obtained from him", 
was similarly rewarded.
1. Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 2 Nov. 1832, Para.3,
B.C. 1502/58893♦ The persons killed were Mansatadar Khan, 
Ismail Khan, Khan Bahadur Khan, Shoo Dayal, Biranchi,
Dana, Jaggu, Surdha, Bechu Khan and Adhin Upadhyay,
2* Trotter to Jt* Commissioners, 19 Oct. 1832, Ibid.
3. Braddon to Govt., 6 Sept. 1832, Para.10, B.CV1501/58887.
4. Ibid. Para.11.
Also see Govt, to Braddon, 28 Sept. 1832, B.C.1501/58887.
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Madho Das Mahapater^Bamanghati, who had come *to 
the rescue of Subadar Mangal Singh of the 38th N.I. and 
Shuja'at Ali who had been so active in the attacks upon
Ganga Narain, were also rewarded, the latter by promotion
2
to the post of amin. It. Timins was also particularly 
praised for his "zeal, energy and judgment" during the Dhal- 
bhum campaign.-^
1. See Chapter £V, Pp. 43*, W
2. Dent to Govt., 18 Nov. 1832, B.C.1501/58888.
One Srikant Sharma, who later became the diwan of Bara- 
bhum, was also rewarded* Govt, to Dent, 13 May 1833,
B.C. 1502/58890. Moreover, jtn Dhalbhum Tarni Singh, son of 
Bahadur Singh who had been killed by Raghu Nath because 
of his loyalty to the British Government, was granted 
some remission in his revenue.: Wilkinson to Govt., 12 
Aug. 1833, Para.8, B.C.1502/58892. Others who got pensions 
in this pargana were the widows of Kripa Baghal and Tulsi 
Das Bhisti who had been killed by the insurgents while 
carrying letters from Lt. Timins to Joint Commissioners: 
Rou^h Notes, Home Misc. No.724, p. 75r?. 
lastly, the zamindar of Bagankodar got a remission of 
Revenue (Rs.1280) "as being the more acceptable method in 
which the Government can express their approbation of his 
conduct [during both the phases of the unrest]," Beng.
Rev, Cons. 61 of 20 Nov, 1832 ,62\
Also see Russell to ',T r
Braddon, 18 Apl. 1832, Para.20, B.C.1363/54226.
3. Dent to Govt., 87 March 1833, B.C.1502/58890.
Moreover , Dent noted Col,Past's "friendly and cordial 
cooperation, seconded by the zeal and alacrity of officers 
and men under his command" and Capt. Bird's "judicious 
arrangements" for "re-establishing order and confidence" 
in Satrakhani and in apprehending the proscribed sardars. 
Moreover, the services of Bahadur Dubhasia both in Chota- 
Nagpur and the Jungle Mahals were praised: Dent to Govt.,
4 Sept. 1833, Raras. 84-86, B.C.1501/58886. This Bahadur 
was also recommended for an award in 1838 after the 
Singhbhum campaigns: Wilkinson to Govt,, 22 Feb. I838, 
Political Despatch Register, G,G. 's Agent (7 Jan. 1837 to 
28 Sept. 1839;, Better No,12, Patna Archives.
After these many awards had been nicely adjusted to 
the merits of the deserving, the Government had to turn its 
attention to the question of punishment for the guilty. What 
policy should be pursued towards the rebels had been dis­
cussed from the very beginning of the outbreak in Chota- 
Nagpur. First reactions had been harsh. Cuthbert in January 
1832 had written, "with reference to the sanguinary deeds of 
these freebooters, it appears to me that their trial should 
be summary" , and, as has been seen, the joint commissioners 
were given power "to apprehend, try and bring to immediate 
punishment without further reference to Government all per­
sons whom you may find in open resistance to the civil 
2
power." Second thoughts were more cautious and more sympa­
thetic to the insurgents. In a later note to the joint com­
missioners the Government directed that those who submitted 
without resistance "although they may previously have taken 
part in the insurrection, are either to be reserved, or dis­
missed without security for their future good behaviour or 
detained as long as may seem expedient at your discretion. 
Even when it was thought necessary to bring active insurgents 
to trial it was directed that "capital punishment should be 
abstained from, unless the particular case of the criminal 
to be condemned may appear to you to be of such an atrocious
1. Cuthbert to Govt., 19 Jan. 1832, B.C. 1362/54224.
2^  Govt, to Cuthbert, 24 Jan. 1832, Para.l, Ibid.
3. Govt, to Jt. Commissioners, 20 *eb. 1832, Ibid.
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character as to render the example indispensable.1 Por 
serious crime imprisonment with hard labour, banishment or 
transportation over seas should be the sentence, "subject
p
to the confirmation or revision of the Government." Again 
in April 1832 the Acting Magistrate of Ramgarh was instructed 
that "punishment for the offences which have been committed 
in the heat of the insurrection is only so far desirable as
3
it may conduce to the maintenance of tranquillity hereafter."
This change of attitude was the result of a realiza­
tion that the outbreaks had not been mere expressions of 
savagery but of protest against genuine grievances. Blunt 
had urged an early enquiry into the causes of the outbreak: 
"the earlier investigation is instituted, the less diffi­
culty is likely to be experienced in ascertaining the truth 
and of acquiring correct information as to the causes that 
have produced the disturbance or the parties by whom the 
insurrection may have been instigated."^ The enquiries made 
in Patkum and Palamau by Russell and Neave, and by Sutherland, 
Cuthbert and the Joint Commissioners in Chota-Nagpur and
1. Ibid.
2. TbTcL
3. TJov^ . to Neave, 7 Apl. 1832, Para.3, B.C. 1363/54228.
4. Blunt, Minute, 14 Apl. 1832, Para.7, B.C.1363/54227.
Tamar ^  did much to make the position clearer, and to estab­
lish the justice as well as common sense of Metcalfe’s 
refusal to follow a harsh or vindictive policy towards the 
tribal people, "Our duty towards those committed to our care 
by Almighty Providence," wrote Metcalfe, is happily the same, 
whatever their feelings may be towards us, we are bound to 
protect and cherish them, to secure them from oppression and
give them good government . ..* Humanity, duty, policy and
2common sense unite in prescribing the same course,"
Meanwhile the nunber of prisoners had been growing 
alarmingly. Prom Patkum and the neighbouring parganas 
alone some 650 prisoners had been sent to the Bankura jail 
by March 1832,^ and cholera followed upon over-crowding,^ In 
April it was decided, therefore, to release those against 
whom the evidence was weakest* (Russell had earlier released 
86, and Braddon 35 The same thing came to pass at Sher- 
ghati jail where by March 1832 there were 828 prisoners and
g
prison accommodation for only 600. There the joint commis­
sioners recommended the release of over 250 prisoners who
1. The reports they submitted were probably not entirely 
accurate reflections of tribal feeling: after months of 
fighting not even witnesses were likely to speak fully 
and openly. And as a radical Calcutta paper put it, 
"Among the requisites for knowing the true causes of 
this frightful Cole revolt, were men ’who would walk 
into the village, sit down under a tree, and talk over 
the matter with the people.*" Bengal Hurkaru, 30 Apl. 
1832, Editorial.
2. Metcalfe, Minute, 14 Apl. 1832, B.C.1363/54227.
3. Govt. to Braddon, 10 Apl. 1832, B.C.1363/54226.
4. Asstt. Civil Surgeon, Bankura, to Russell, 14 Apl. 1832, 
Ibid.
5. Braddon to Govt., 7 May 1832, Ibid.
Also see Govt, to Braddon, 15 May 1832, Ibid.
6c Heave to Lambert, 8 March 1832, B.C.1363/54229.
belonged to that part of Chota-Nagpur where tranquillity had
been restored and there was no danger to public peace.**'
Trotter provided the released prisoners with eight annas each
towards the cost of food for their return home, so that they
2
might not take "recourse to their old habits of pillage.1 
The release of the prisoners, and the provision of ration 
money were both approved by a Gavernment which had by now 
decided "to encourage the insurgents by kindness and per- 
suasion to return to their allegiance."^
The joint commissioners meanwhile had committed 179 
prisoners, mainly Mundas and Oraons, for trial, nearly all 
for attacks upon suds. By November some 364 prisoners were 
on trial in cases involving the killing of some 238 persons.^ 
The immediate problem of the authorities was to find the 
persons to dispose of the huge number of cases. The Burdwan 
commissioner agreed to deal with cases concerning the Jungle 
Mahals district, but when the Patna commissioner was asked 
what time he could devote to the conduct of the trials, 
Lambert reported none. He pleaded heavy arrears of business, 
and asked that some other officer be appointed with addit­
ional staff.^
The Government, taken aback, expressed itself as
1. Jt. Commissioners to Neave, 31 Iferch 1832, Ibid.
2. Trotter to Lambert, 6 Apl. 1832, ibid.
3# Trotter to Jt. Commissioners. 9 Apl. 1832, B«C.1363/54228.
4. Trotter to Lambert, 7 June 1832, B.C.1363/54229*
5* Lambert to Govt., 16 June 1832, Ibid.
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"at a loss to understand how the supervision of the revenue 
affairs of the two districts and of the small part of the 
third" could he sufficient to occupy the whole of his time.'*’ 
None of his explanations were considered to he convincing, 
and the Government reported his behaviour to the Court of
Directors: "we have not heen ahle to regard his explanation
2
on the subject as fully satisfactory."
His place was filled, however, by deputing Master,
a Calcutta magistrate, to hold the trials. He found that in
most cases the prisoners had made confessions, and that on
that basis the law officers had normally pronounced the
sentence of capital punishment. To the Nizamat Adalat he
emphasized the difficulties in the way of adequate invest!-
*
gation and a fair trial: "The possibility of investigating 
the cases according to the dates of apprehension or commit­
ment is precluded by the nature of the country from which 
the parties have been called, the difficulty of issuing their 
appearance and the extreme distance they have to travel with­
out reference therefore to numerical arrangement, I make it 
my duty to dispose of the trials as the persons concerned in 
each arrive from the interior."^- He also stressed that these 
cases had been committed for trial during the days of stress
1. Govt, to Lambert, 26 June 1832, Ibid.
2. Bengal Govt, to Court of Directors, 25 Sept. 1832,
Para.46, B.C.1362/54223.
3. The Muslim law officers were also known as Maulavis. Moha­
mmedan law continued to be the basis of criminal""Juris­
prudence at this time.
4. Master to Register, Nizamat Adalat, 22 Oct. 1832,
B.C.1502/58893.
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and confusion, and so lacked regularity because of the 
absence of inquests, the imperfect authentication of confes­
sions and other omissions. He therefore expressed the hope 
that "mercy will not be withheld from an uncivilized race
1
whose offences were committed during the heat of rebellion*1 
Again, finding in one particular case an exceptional number 
of discrepancies in evidence he wrote an explanatory note, 
stating that "allowance must be made for the uncivilized 
condition of the people, for their inability to stand cross- 
examinations and for the circumstance of their original 
statements having been required from them 7 and 8 months 
ago*"2
Master showed himself understanding in dealing with 
the tribal people, and often asked for leniency towards such 
unsophisticated folk. The law officers, however, had found 
no regard to the peculiarities of the tribal society and had 
rigorously followed the canons of Muslim, law. The Nizamat 
Adalat acted in similar fashion. "The Court of Nizamut 
Adawlat Judging of each case as it comes before them on its 
own merits, are bound to administer the full rigor [sic] of 
the law whilst they must be very imperfectly apprized of 
many circumstances connected with the state of the people."** 
The Bengal Government had therefore itself to intervene. It
1. Ibid.
2. TbI3. Case no.58.
3. GctFE. to Master, 11 Bee. 1832, B.C. 1502/58893.
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believed that the crimes "were perpetrated by an ignorant 
and barbarous people * at a time when they conceived that 
all civil authority was terminated, and when they saw no 
restraint opposed to the operation of their most malignant 
passions, (They may also have taken note of the plea fre­
quently made by the tribesmen that they had only acted upon 
the orders of their chiefs and leaders.) Fearing that "if 
the sentence of the law were in every instance carried into 
effect," the number of executions would be quite shocking, 
the Government ordered Master to suspend the execution of 
all capital sentences passed by the Nizamat Adalat. Those 
so convicted were to be kept in close confinement until he 
should have consulted the joint commissioners and submitted 
a report on the commutation of sentences.^ They even went so 
far in a letter of 11 December 1832 to suggest that a general 
amnesty for all offences committed before the re-establish­
ment of the authority of the Government might be given, as 
had been beneficially done in 1809.^
If the Government thus showed itself favourably 
inclined towards the tribal folk, their own ruler, by origin 
one of them, most certainly did not. In January 1833 the 
Maharaja of Chota-Nagpur wrote directly to the Governor-
1. Ibid.
2. Jt."Commissioners to Govt., 26 May 1832, B.C.1363/54229*
3. Govt, to Master, 11 Dec. 1832, B.C.1502/58893.




General to ask that the trihal prisoners he severely
punished* "If they are not punished," he wrote, "they will
in 3 or 4 years become more insolent and audacious. They will
destroy every man of rank who has as yet by some means or
other saved his life and property, and carry off whatever he
may accumulate in the meantime* They will not leave one out
of ten alive, and it will be impossible to prevent them from
1laying waste this kingdom and other territories besides*1 
In his keenness for retribution he urged that the same harsh­
ness as had been displayed at Nawagarh, Bijnaur and Silli 
should be practised everywhere. There was no evidence in his 
attitude that he had realised - as the British authorities 
had done - that neglect of the rights of the tribal people 
had caused the unrest, and that his failure to protect his 
people called for a reform in his own attitude.
But before these sentiments could reach the Govern­
ment, Master had submitted his final report on 17 January 
1833* In all he had tried 165 cases connected with the 
unrest, involving 429 prisoners of whom 164 were convicted 
by him subject to the approval of the Nizamat Adalat, 59 
prisoners were convicted without reference to that court, 
and 106 prisoners had either died or had been discharged or 
acquitted. In all 1,063 witnesses had been examined and six 
trials postponed. The prisoners whose cases had not been
1. Transl. Petition, Maharaja Jagannath Sahi, Chota-Nagpur
to Governor-General, 28 Jan. 1833, B.C. 1503/58907.
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referred to the Nizamat Adalat had heen sentenced to terms of 
from three to seven years.1
While r^Lecting on these trials, Master repeatedly 
emphasised the peculiar nature of these ignorant, uncouth 
and uncivilized tribal folk who "were apparently so wholly 
unconscious of the fearful and revolting nature of their
2
crimes as to excite mingled sensation of horror and pity."
He had been moved to pity to find unhappy men of very 
advanced age and extreme youth in the calender for capital 
punishment, and to find that many of the -unfortunate prison­
ers had been driven to commit horrible crimes through 
"obsequitous attachment to their employers or from servile 
fear" and he lamented that the real leaders had invariably 
"contrived to elude justice and to escape with impunity."^ 
Master went on to express his pleasure that in many 
cases where the Nizamat Adalat had not shown mercy, the Gov­
ernment had commuted the extreme sentences. The one body 
of prisoners for whom he did not ask for mercy were those 
from Palamau. These, he thought, had had no legitimate 
grievancesr their crimes had been wanton and unpardonable, 
and since they were cut off by impenetrable hills and woods 
from the contagion of Chota-Nagpur, and were of a different 
stock they could not plead that they had been swept away by
1. Abstract of Prisoners, B.C„1502/58893*
2. Master to Govt., 17 Jan. 1833, Para.6, B.C.1502/58893*
Also in Bentinck MS, Box. 15.
3- Ibid. Para.18.
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the general tribal uprising. However, in his note to the 
joint commissioners Master argued that "to enforce the execu­
tion of so many capital sentences would he impolitic, and 
productive of no beneficial consequences.,!^
The joint commissioners agreed with some of Master1© 
arguments, hut thought that "not-withstanding the lapse of 
time since these offences were committed we are decidedly 
of opinion that a certain number of executions to take place 
in chains in the Pergunnahs where murders and other atroci­
ties were most numerous will have the best effect in secur-
2
ing the future peace and order of the country.1 So they
recommended that 8 out of 32 prisoners who had received
capital sentences from the Nizamat Adalat might be hanged,
3
and that the remaining 24 should be imprisoned for life.
The Government agreed with these proposals, and the Ramgarh 
magistrate was ordered to arrange the executions while those 
who received life sentences were sent under safe custody to 
the Magistrate of the 24-Parganas, who would lodge them in 
Alipur jail. ^
The Government drew the attention of the joint
1. Master to Jt. Commissioners, 4 Apl. 1833, B.C.1502/58893*
2. Jt. Commissioners to Master, 10 Apl. 1833* Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Trovt. to Master, 6 May 1833, B.0,1502/58893* Ihe eight 
prisoners to be hanged were Partowa, Chugnu, Dullu,
Hadi, Etua, Gondela, Surwa and Chumra.
Also see Govt, to 24-Parganas Magistrate, 6 May 1833,
Ibid.
commissioners, however, to their letter of 11 December about
the expediency of publishing a general amnesty for offences
committed before the re-establishment of the Governments
authority in Chota-Nagpur.^ They thereupon stopped all
further prosecutions for crimes still unpunished which had
been committed before 25 April 1832. Then in June 1833 they
2
published, on the Government's instructions, a total amnesty 
throughout Chota-Nagpur. Thus to the relief of the authori­
ties and to the joy of the terrified people the work of 
punishment was completed in Chota-Nagpur*
In the Jungle Mahals the Government from the start 
made it clear that only those were to be detained for trial 
and punishment, who appeared to be "the most influentials 
the most bold or the most culpable of the party" and that 
"the suppression of disturbances and the restoration of 
tranquillity are objects of greater importance than the 
rigorous punishment of offences or the exact retribution of 
delinquencies.They also profited from their experience 
in the first phase, in that they sought to obviate delay in
bringing offenders to trials "many months elapsed before the
persons implicated in the last season both in Ramgarh and 
in the Jungle Mehauls were brought to trial and much of the 
salutary effect, which might have resulted from the example 
of their punishment has thus been l o s t . T o  prevent such
1. Govt, to Jt. Commissioners, 6 May 1833, Para.3, Ibid.
2. Govt, to Jt. Commissioners, 3 June 1833, Ibid.
3c Govt, to Russell, 2C May 1832. B.C.1501/5HH37.
4* Govt, to Commissioners, 27 Dec. 1832, Para 1, B.C.1501/ 
58888.
inordinate delay, they asked Dent to undertake the trial of 
those insurgents (both in the Jungle Mahals and Ramgarh) who 
were committed by the magistrate. While Dent was vested with 
the powers of a sessions judge, Wilkinson and Martin were to 
exercise magisterial powers for commitment. To hasten the 
process of commitment and trial, the Government wrote, "On 
the apprehension of any offender Captn. Wilkinson or Mr. 
Martin will proceed immediately to commit him and Mr. Dent 
who will be present on the spot, will with the least practi­
cal delay hold the trial in the customary form. By Regula­
tion VI of 1832 Government had rendered the presence of a 
Mohammedan Lav/ officer at a trial unnecessary, so that the 
complicated method of pronouncing fatwa before passing sen­
tence was no longer required. This marked "the end of the
Mahomedan Criminal law as a general law applicable to all 
2
persons," though the Government left it to the discretion 
of the sessions judge to call in a law officer it required. 
Moreover, to avoid any delay in cases referred to the 
Nizamat Adalat, the judge was instructed to refer such cases 
immediately, while the Nizamat Adalat was asked to deal with 
such cases at their earliest opportunity.^
By the end of April Dent, acting on these instruct­
ions, had completed the trial of the Jungle Mahals prisoners.
1. Ibid. Para.3*
2. Rankin, Background to Indian Law, quoted in Stokes,
English Utilitarians, 223• '
3* Sovt. to Jt. Commissioners, 27 Dec. 1832, Para.3,
B.C.1501/58888.
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Whereas the cases in Chota-Nagpur, arising from the first 
phase of the unrest, had required a year for their disposal, 
those in the Jungle Mahals were all dealt with within a few 
months* Of the 64 cases dealt with, one was dismissed, in 
consideration of the services rendered hy the prisoner’s 
family, 45 were summarily dealt with, and 18, those of the 
ringleaders, were referred to the Nizamat Adalat* which imp­
osed sentences of seven years hard labour and thirty-nine 
strokes of the rattan on 14 of them, and fourteen years hard
labour on the other four.^ * Ganga Narain had died in action,
hv
Raghu Nath Singh of Dampara was hanged, as were Prap SinghA
of Kursul, Balai Pater, Jirpa Naya, Kabi Ram Sardar and
2
Kishan Singh* Pour others were imprisoned for life.
In Midnapur Chitreswar Dhal, the Raja of Dhalbhum
who had been suspected of complicity in the disturbances in
Dampara, and his brother were committed to trial on the
charge of murder. They were, however, acquitted by the
judge. ^ When the Government received Wilkinson’s report of
the raja’s actions, and a long petition from the raja, the
judge was asked for his report on the trial. Dick, the judge,
gave his reasons for suspecting the evidence of the Bara
Thakur Jugal Kishore and the daroga Nitai Singh who had
engineered the prosecution, and recommended the re-instate-
1. Enclosure, Dent to Govt., 9 Apl* 1833, B.C. 1502/58890.
2* Marginate note* Appendix 5, ^ent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833* 
B.C.1501/58886.
3. Wilkinson to.D’oyly, 3 Apl. 1833, B.C. 1502/58892.
4. Dick to Ma^&wean, 26 July 1833, Ibid.
ment of the raj'a and the curbing of the power of his 
guardian, the Bara Thakur.^
Wilkinson tried to defend the daroga and reiterated 
his belief that there was sufficient evidence against the 
raja, quite apart from his confession of guilt, to justify 
his having been committed for trial. However, since the raja 
had helped the authorities in capturing Achul and other rebel 
sardars, and with supplies for the troops, he promised that
if the raja were restored, he would try "to make him a good
2subject of Government.1
At long last, on 14 April 1834 the raja was released 
from all restraint (after his release from jail he had been 
under house arrest at Midnapur) and allowed to return to the 
management of his estate, after executing a guarantee of good 
conduct.^ With that closure of a rather extraordinary 
proceeding the punishment of the insurgents responsible for
1. Ibid.
2. Wilkinson to Govt., 12 Aug. 1833, Para.10, BC. 1502/58892.
Wilkinson perhaps yielded because of the strong protest
of the judge who had written to the Government, "Had I 
had the power, I should most certainly have directed the
Magistrate tc release the Rajah forthwith .....The petit­
ioner [the raja] ... was apprehended at his own Gurh, or
Residence, deprived of his estates, forwarded under a 
guard to Midnapore, lodged in a common jail, charged with 
the most heinous of crimes, tried for his life, fully 
acquitted, and yet bound ever not to return to his home, 
but to answer to indefinite charges brought forward by no 
ostensible prosecutor!. Thus has this young man been kept
for upwards cf 3 months, afar from his home, while his
extensive estates have been delivered over to the possess­
ion & the mercy of those persons, whom he declared to be 
the instigators of those charges, which aimed not at his 
degradation only, but at his very life." Dick to Govt.,
26 July 1833, B.C.1502/58892,
3# Wilkinson to P.Nicolson, Principal Assistant to the G. G. 's
Agent} 14 March 1834. Ibid.
the second phase cf the insurrection can he considered 
completed.
A number of minor political and administrative meas­
ures required immediate attention, before any general plan 
of reforms could be instituted. To these some brief reference 
must now be made.
Cuthbert, when he made his report on Tama^ in 1832, 
had drawn attention to the problem of the succession to the 
Tamar gaddi, which had fallen vacant in September 1831* The 
Maharaja of Chota-Nagpur claimed that since the raja had 
died childless, the estate should revert to him. The tribal 
people and their mundas and mankis, who had declared that 
they would not pay their revenue either to the Tamar raja or 
to the Chota-Nagpur raja, but only to a Government official, 
resisted the maharaja's claim. They wished to see Pradha* 
Maninath Sahi, a relation of the raja, installed as their 
new ruler, (They also prayed that up to fifteen hundred 
rupees should be set aside for the support of the two ranis, 
widows of the late raja. )**“ There were two other claimants 
also in the field, Raghubar Sahi, another relation of the 
late raja, and Thakur Che tan Singh of Kharsawan, who for a 
long time had been laying claim to suzerainty over the tur­
bulent Kols of Kochang, Jamar ChitpeT^ Sonapet and Maram- 
2janga.
1. Cuthbert to Govt., 24 Apl, 1832. B.C. 1362/54225.
2. Memorandum, Wilkinson, 1 March i833» B.C. 1502/58889.
These conflicting claims were not, however, settled 
until Wilkinson, in his capacity as Political Agent to the 
Governor-General, came to Tamar in April 1833. The claim of 
Thakur Che tan Singh, be recommended, should he allowed, 
since he alone was capable of controlling the area. He then 
turned to the main question, to discuss which he had assem­
bled the Maharaja of Chota-Nagpur, the late raja's relatives, 
already referred to, and the chiefs of the five parganas 
of Tamar, Silli, Baranda, Rahi and Bundu, Two other claimants 
also appeared, Kanhai Sahi, the raja of Rahi, and Gopal Singh, 
the son of the Jaipur raja by the late Tamar raja's daughter* 
After a thorough investigation, Wilkinson selected Maninath 
Sahi to succeed to the gaddi, a choice which gave general
p
satisfaction, and to which the mundas and mankis gladly 
signified their agreement in an ikrarnama.^  Raghubar Sahi, 
who had proclaimed himself raja without waiting for the com­
missioner's decision was put under restraint.2*’ In June 1833 
the settlement was confirmed by the Bengal Government with 
much satisfaction.
1. Memorandum, Wilkinson, 4 March 1833, Ibid.
2. Wilkinson to Govt., 20 May 1833, B.6.1^02/58893* Interest­
ing facts came to light in the course of this investiga­
tion. Genealogical tables were produced and legitimacy 
challenged. Raghubar Sab, for example, stated that "there 
were scarcely any Rajahs in either Cuttack, Sumbulpore, 
or other jungly districts whose ancestors were not some of 
them illegitimate and on that account as his grandfather 
was the brother of the late Govind Sah, he hoped his claim 
might be preferred."
3. Transl. Agreement of the Tamar mundas and mankis. 30 Apl. 
1833, Enclosure, Wilkinson to Govt., 20 May 1833, Ibid.
4. Govt., to Wilkinson, 3 June 1833, Ibid.
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This was, however, only part of the settlement 
required in the south-west of the Jungle Mahals. It was 
necessary to strengthen the hand of the Thakur of Kharsawan 
- if only to erect an effective harrier between Patkum and 
Barabhum in the Jungle Mahals, and the Larka Kols of Singh- 
bhum. (The Kols had, of course, been "encouraged by the 
right of succession to the zamindary of Tamar being contested 
by three claimants"^ and as Wilkinson showed in a memorandum 
of 1 March 1833» all the chiefs in the area were using the 
Kols to feed fat their ancient grudges.) It was necessary to 
appease the mutual jealousies of the zamindar of Bamanghati, 
and his overlord the Mayurbhanj raja. The Mahapater had as 
ally the kunwar of Saraikela, who was in dispute with Mayur- 
bhanj raja over Kochang pargana, while the Mayurbhanj raja . 
had won over two of the Kol districts under the Mahapater 
promising them rent-free lands. It was necessary, or so 
Wilkinson thought, to inflict some signal reverse upon the
2
larka Kols such as should break them of their lawless habits.
On the basis of Wilkinson’s information the Govern­
ment passed a series of resolutions. They laid down that the 
chief of Bamanghati should be left undisturbed in his sub­
ordinate position vis-a-vis the Raja of Mayurbhanj paying 
Rs.500 a year for Nij Bamanghati, and as much again for
1. Jt, Commissioners to Govt., 15 Peb. I833f Para.7. B.C.
B.C.1502/58889*
2e Memorandum, Wilkinson, 1 ^arch 18339 Ibid.
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Khas Des and Khar&a Des, etc. To prevent future conflict, 
the raja was to he restrained from any interference in 
Bamanghati.^* (The two Kol tracts which the Mayurbhanj raja 
had been seducing from allegiance to the Bamanghati chief 
were to be restored to him: the raja could not control them, 
and left to themselves the Kols would take to plunder.) 
Ricketts, the Cuttack commissioner, and Capt. Wilkinson were 
to meet the parties to the dispute and produce a final 
report.
Towards the close of March Ricketts and Wilkinson
met the Bamanghati and Mayurbhanj chiefs on the neutral
ground at Narsing-garh and adjusted the disputes. A list of
all the villages belonging to Bamanghati was drawn, and
agreed to by an ikrarnama signed by both the chiefs and the
assembled Kol sardars. The four Kol districts were all placed
under the Bamanghati chief, but he agreed to pay Rs.lOl a
2year to his overlord, the Raja of Mayurbhanj for them.
Pinally Wilkinson entered Singhbhum with troops.^ 
There he met the Raja of POrahat. Thakur Che tan Singh and 
several leading Kol chiefs. Several notorious freebooters
1. Resolution, Govt., 4 March 1833* Ibid.
2. Wilkinson & Ricketts to Govt., 1 Apl. 1833* Paras 29-32,
Beng Cr.Judl* Cons. 1 of 6 Apl. 1833 /140\
“31
3. Wilkinson to Govt., 2 Apl. 1833, B.C.1502/58890.
Also see *An Officer of the 24th N.I1, Saraikela,
11 Apl, 1833 > Bengal Hurkaru, 18 Apl. 1833.
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were there handed over to Wilkinson,^ and the Kols, heeding 
Wilkinson fs dire warning- ’’entered into solemn engagements 
to exert their utmost endeavours to prevent plundering in 
future and to control the immediate restoration of such 
cattle and other property, as had during the present year*
been carried off by the Coles of their villages, from
2
Dulbhoom, Kursawa, Bamunghatty etc.” The Larka Kols did 
hand over most of the plundered cattle and property. A 
variety of other minor disputes over boundaries and suzer­
ainties were also settled at the same time, so that when 
Wilkinson withdrew he was in hopes that Singhbhum had been 
settled.
The hope was vain, for by June and July 1833 Larka 
Kol depredations had begun again. As Bent said, reporting 
these outbreaks, ’’the wretched state of anarchy existing in 
Singhbhoom where each holder of a fifty or 100 villages, 
exercises sovereign powers within their limits, gives but too 
much reason to apprehend that the people of Kochang and 
Jumoor Chitpul will receive aid from thence, not only in 
resisting the proposed attack, but probably also in renewing 
their forays in ChOta Nagpore.”^  In fact an effective 
settlement of the area had to wait until military operations
1. Wilkinson to Govt., 12 June 1833, Ibid. The Raja of Pora- 
hat and his servants were rewarded tor their help in 
apprehending Bindrai, Sui and other freebooters.
2. Wilkinson to Govt., 27 Apl. 1833, Para.3, B.C.1502/58890.
3. Dent to Govt., 28 July 1833, B.C.1502/58890.
against the Larka Kols in November 1836 and their incorpora­
tion in the South-West Frontier Agency in 1837* ** The 
various stages in the settlement of the Dhalbhum estate have 
already been referred to earlier5 they formed the only 
serious political problem requiring attention in the main 
areas affected by the second phase of the insurrection*
It has already been seen that as the depth of the 
insurgents1 sense of grievance became apparent, and with the 
penetration of European military and civil officers, in far 
greater numbers than usual, into the tribal areas, measures 
were taken first to record and then to remove evils. Thus 
we find the joint commissioners, in March 1832, ordering 
the officers commanding detachments to enquire into
complaints of oppression of the tribesmen by their landlords
2
and bring offenders to book* Blunt went so far as to sug­
gest that T,to secure the future .peace of the disturbed 
pergunnahs the first measure necessary appears to me to be 
the restoration of the Mankees and Moondas to their heredit- 
ary possessions.As has been seen, in Sonepur just such a 
restoration was effected in May, the mundas and mankis being 
re-instated as scon as the leases of the thikadars or
1. Rickett'StSelections from Records, No.XVI, 61.
2. Jt. Commissioners”to officers commanding Tikoo and Churia 
2 March 1832, B.C. 1362/54224. The amlns appointed in May 
1832 were instructed to find out how much had been col­
lected on account of zamindari dak, and what bribes the 
nazir and thana officers had takens Jt. Commissioners to 
&ovt., 31 May 1832, Para.7, B.C.1363/54228.
3. Blunt, Minute, 27 Apl. 1832, B.C.1363/54227.
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revenue-farmers expired.^
Another grievance came to an end in May 1832 when 
the joint commissioners suspended the tax upon home-brewed 
beer. They were also asked to consider whether the abkari
p
tax should be abolished altogether. In January 1833 Dent 
proposed a quite radical solution: that a fresh tax on land 
should be substituted for the abkari and dak collections, 
which had amounted to about 15,000 and 4,000 rupeess respect­
ively. Such a tax would eradicate the possibility of a whole 
series of illegal exactions. The domestic manufacture of 
hanria by the tribal people was to be freely allowed.
The joint commissioners also recommended the ending 
of poppy cultivation in Chota-Nagpur and Palamau, even though 
,fby the abolition of the Hundea tax and the destruction of 
the poppy cultivated by the Koirees, we can hope for little 
revenue under the heads of opium or sayer. The Government 
ordered that the cultivation of the poppy was to be discon­
tinued and the abkari collections and the dak cess were to
5
be suspended.
In the Jungle Mahals similar steps were taken. 
Wilkinson reported on the abuses in the salt and excise 
system to the Salt Agent and Collector of Midnapur, with a 
vigorous request "to apply a speedy and efficacious remedy,
1. Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 30 May 1832, B.C.1363/54229.
2. Govt., to Jt. Commissioners, 22 May 1832, Para.3- Ibid.
3. Dent. Separate remarks, 5 Jan. 1833, B.C.1502/58891.
4. Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 19 June 1832, B.C.1363/54228. 
5* Govt, to Jt. Commissioners, 3 June 1833, B.C.1502/58891.
as it is quite out of the question that the ryots should 
patiently submit to such gross and weighty oppressions.^
To the north, lent in Barabhum tackled the abuses in the 
abkari system by demanding that a Muslim speculator who had
oppressed the villages and sundis (liquor vendors) should
2
have his lease terminated.
Bent*s last major recommendation was that the prac­
tice of slavery - usually for indebtedness - should be pro­
hibited, and that all in a state of bondage should be 
declared free within two years from the time of the procla- 
mation. He also urged that the abolition of slavery should 
be extended to Bihar, from which it had been introduced into 
Chota-Nagpur.)
Such were the measures taken piecemeal, on an ad hoc 
basis, to cure the immediate evils of the situation in the 
tribal areas. They served to restart the economic life of 
the region, to ensure order and a return to confidence, to 
reward the faithful and to punish those few whose crimes 
could not be overlooked even by the sympathetic and under­
1. Wilkinson to D foyly, 2 May 1833> B.C. 1502/58890.
2* Bent to Govt., 9 Apl. 1833* Para.5, Ibid.
Bent had also urged the abolition of salt darogaship at 
Armai in Chota-Nagpur, and that*fa cheap supply of salt 
should be made available to the tribal people. I cannot 
understand why the unfortunate Coles of Nagpoor should 
be saddled with an Establishment to prevent their 
purchasing salt as cheap as their neighbours of 
Singbhoom and Sumbhulpore. ” }
Bent, separate remarks, 5 Jan. 1833* B.C.1502/58891.
3. Ibid.
standing, and to eradicate or at least suspend some of the 
evils which had prompted rebellion. There remained the 
larger task of recasting the whole administration so as to 
consolidate these gains. All the useful suggestions were 
discussed when proposals for a new administrative system 
for the whole of Chota-Nagpur, Palamau, the Jungle Mahals 
and Dhalbhum were under consideration later in 1833-
CHAPTER U
Aftermath -II* The Reorganisation of the 
Administration of the Tribal Areas*
Early in 1832 Major Sutherland, the private secre­
tary to Metcalfe, had expressed his opinion that with the 
suppression of the first phase of tribal unrest "a fit 
occasion” had arisen for devising new administrative arrange-* 
ments for Chota-Nagpur."^ The insurgents had been impressed 
ftby the exhibition which we have been called upon to make
of our military power", and would accept a new more
2
judicious administration if one could be devised.
At least one suggestion as to how improvements might 
be effected had the merit of simplicity: a correspondent of 
the Bengal Hurkaru suggested that the best way "to reclaim 
these people from their present barbarous state" was to 
drive a good road through the district and so bring them 
into touch with the civilized world. (He did add as an
3
afterthought^ "Education ought not of course to be neglected.") 
The Government, however, preferred a thorough investigation 
of the peculiar problems cf the area. Local investigations 
were carried on by several officers, both individually and
1. Sutherland to Govt., n.d., B.C.1363/54227.
2. Ibid.
3. X“c correspondent, Camp Chuk Bhawani, 14 Eeb. 1832, Bengal 
Hurkaru,24 Eeb. 1832. Nothing was done with regard to 
their education, though an effort was made to recruit 
them into the local battalion: Wilkinson to Govt.,
1 Sept. 1832, Bentinck MS. Box 23. Also see Wilkinson to 
Benson, 1 Sept. and 29 Sept. 1832, Ibid.
collectively, and on the basis of their reports Metcalfe and 
Blunt recorded their views in several minutes.
It was on 16 November 1832 that the joint commiss­
ioners submitted their report on the Chota-Nagpur unrest, 
and, "with great diffidence" their suggestions for the 
future management of Chota-Nagpur.
They dealt first with future police arrangements for 
the area. Por Chota-Nagpur they suggested that the maharaja 
"should be entrusted exclusively with the charge of the 
police of his country and should possess the power and auth­
ority to discharge and entertain his own Umlahs of every 
grade. He in turn would invest his subordinate chiefs of 
Tamar, Baranda, Bundu, Rahi and Silli with police powers
p
within their estates. They in turn would leave the manage­
ment of the police to their subordinate jagirdars within 
their respective jagirs. Each chief would thus be directly 
responsible for those lands which he held as Khalsa, i.e. 
unfanned, under his direct management.
Por Sonepur a similar arrangement was recommended, 
with the kunwar being subordinated in his police duties to 
the maharaja, and his rautias, mankis and other minor chiefs, 
subordinate to him, but all in direct control of their 
khalsa villages.-' Elsewhere in Chota-Nagpur the maharaja
1. Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 16 Nov. 1832, Para.98,
B.C.1502/58891.
2. Ibid. Para.99*
3. TbTcL Para. 105.
might establish thanas at important points, with a thanadar 
in control of the division.
Should disturbances break out, despite this elabor­
ate arrangement of indigenous police, the jagirdars of the 
dam and kam (cash and service) villages would provide men 
for the suppression of the disorders. Should they fail 
repeatedly in their duty, then their jagirs might, with the
approval of the European authority, be transferred to another
1
member of their family.
Within the village there was to be an equally clear 
administrative system. Each holder of a village would receive 
directions from above. He in turn would nominate his assist- 
ant, a gorait or kotwal whom he would remunerate either with 
land or a fixed annual payment in grain. To that payment in 
grain every ryot was to contribute according to the number 
of his ploughs. (The exact share of each ryot would be 
settled by the ilaqadar, circle headman, or the zamindar of 
the estate.)
When any culprit was seized he was first to be taken 
by the village headman to the ilaqadar, who would send him 
on to the head of the estate. If his crime was a minor one 
he would be kept in confinement, if a major one he would be 
forwarded to the European authorities. The ilaqadar would 
report each case either in writing or through a trustworthy
1. Ibid. Para.110.
2. Ibid. Para.101.
messenger. In areas where the thanadari system operated the 
village gorait would forward culprits to the thanadar whose 
functions would he similar to those of the ilaqadar.^
There would thus he a hierarchy of officials, with 
the maharaja exercising a general control over all, and every 
landholder responsible for protecting his own dependants*
The whole would he financed from the sums realized from un­
claimed property found in the jurisdictions and from the 
fines imposed upon offenders dealt with in them. Were these
inadequate then permission might he granted to make a levy of
2
from eight annas to three rupees upon each village.
The joint commissioners were very particular about 
the protection of the rights of the ryots and of the tribal 
chieftains. Since the mankis and the mundas had been put 
hack in possession of their estates, they thought that 
neither the maharaja nor the kunwar should have the power 
of depriving any of these chiefs of their lands. They * 
therefore requested the Government to declare null and void 
any transfer of land in repayment of advances of money. In 
case of recurrent misconduct, lands of such chiefs might he 
transferred to the nearest of their kin popular among the 
ryots. “Such a rule11, they wrote, “would prevent the assign­
ment of villages to men of capital in lieu of cash advances, 
and the non-confiscation of the lands of zemindars except in
1. Ibid. Para.105.
2. Ibid. Para.109*
favour of individuals of their own family, would ...
X.
obviate the apprehension cf the recurrence of disturbances.*?
Another important recommendation was with regard to 
the use of panchayats to settle boundary disputes among 
landholders, which disputes often led to local affrays of a 
serious nature. In case of a dispute between the maharaja or 
a raja on the one hand and an ilaqadar on the other, three 
to five ilaqadars of the area should decide the issue and 
their award should be final. In case of dispute between two 
villages within a petty estate the ilaqadar of that estate
was to selcet the heads of the adjoining villages of most
2
importance."
In civil cases involving money transactions they 
suggested that the maharaja and rajas migjht be vested with 
judicial power. But where they were themselves parties, a 
panchayat might be useful. ’ In ordinary cases the parties 
were to choose between judgment by panchayat or by the raja 
and a written undertaking to abide by their decision was to 
be taken from the disputants beforehand. A panchayat 1s 
decision was to be final, but an appeal could be allowed to 
the European authority from the decision of a raja.^
Investigations in cases involving landed property, 
such as the right of succession to estates, would be made by
Ibid. Para.112.
2. Ibid. Para. 113
3. Ibid. Para.114.
5 0 V
the European authority who was to refer the matter to the 
Government in doubtful cases or where the public peace was 
involved. But cases of minor importance might be referred 
back to the raja or to a panchayat.^
These recommendations for a new police and judicial 
system could be expected to bring justice to every man*s 
door, and so the expense and inconvenience of the old system, 
with its distant, unfamiliar courts, would be done away 
with. They thus embodied Bentham!s idea of "a summary, non­
technical method in which the suitor would orally state his
2
plea and personally confront the defendant.1 But the 
creation of such a hierarchy of authority also presupposed 
the concentration of undivided power in the hands of the 
European officer in charge of the area. Indeed, the joint 
commissioners themselves clearly saw this, and they asked 
that the officer in charge of Chota-Nagpur should be granted 
special powers, and that other officers with similar powers 
should be appointed to supervise a similar system in the iSS 
disturbed areas of the Jungle Mahals and Midnapur districts 
and in Palamau.^ Here was the genesis of the Non-Regulation 
system which was to be applied to the South-West frontier 
Agency, and of the special position of the Political Agent 
who was, with his assistants, to administer it.
1. Ibid. Para. 115.
2. ’3iokes, Utilitarians, 71*
3. Jt. Commissioners to Govt., 16 Nov. 1832, Para.116,
B.C.1502/58891.
This joint report was not the only report or body of 
suggestions made to the Bengal Government, Dent, one of the 
joint commissioners, submitted a note dissenting from some 
of the proposals outlined above***" His comments were not 
directed against the system proposed, as against the person­
nel who, it was intended, should manage it* Thus he argued 
that past experience showed the maharaja to be incapable of 
wielding police powers; he should not be entrusted with 
extensive powers again. If there were to be thanadars and 
thanas it must be specified that the officers should be 
selected from amongst the principal inhabitants of the thana, 
and that the subordinate staff should be residents of the 
division. The post of amin, for which he thought thakur 
a more acceptable title, should be filled by the maharaja, 
but with European authority retaining the power to confirm 
or remove his choice*
Dent also wished to stiffen the system somewhat. He 
pointed out the great distance of the sadr station from 
Chota-Nagpur, and showed from Rennellfs figures that the 
Ramgarh district formed more than two fifths of the whole 
area of Bihar* A non-’Regulation system, he agreed, was the 
best system for Chota-Nagpur, "from its great extent, the
p
peculiar nature of the country and state of the population," 
But it was necessary that the controlling European authority
1. Dent, separate remarks, 5 Jan. 1833, Ibid* 
2* Ibid*
'J 'U
should reside within Chota-Nagpur and that authority should 
he supported hy a hody of troops also stationed within the 
tribal territory.
His suggestions about a land tax to replace the 
excise and postal levies have already been noted, as also his 
wish to cut the burden on salt. His other major point, of 
an economic nature, was a plea for a reduction in rents, 
ctoupled with security of tribal rights in land . He suggested 
that it was necessary "to fix the rent of the Moondas and 
Mankees oocupying the hilly tract tof Tsaaar] on a very low 
scale which will make the payment easy and tend to prevent 
future disputes."^ Once such men had a real interest in the 
soil, the fear of losing these rights would prevent them 
resorting to violence and unrest again. For the same reason 
he proposed that a curb should be set upon the maharaja’s 
power to alienate the lands held by jagirdars, and that the 
lands of the raja and of the hereditary jagirdars. mankis and 
mundas should not be liable for their private debts, so 
that those who lent them money should do so at their own 
risk. These rules, Dent realized, would deprive the capital­
ist of the security of landed property and would tend to 
check cultivation and retard improvement but they were, in 
his view, necessary for the preservation of the public 
tranquillity. He forwarded a copy of the rules which had been
1* Ibid.
proposed by the Hamgarh, collector on 17 March 1814, and
which, with one exception - rule three - embodied most of
his suggestions.
Another set of proposals, informed by a very
different spirit, came from the Maharaja of Chota-Nagpur.
His first request was that the police administration of the
whole area, including all the jagirs and subordinate estates,
should be entrusted to him* He wished to have the power to
appoint all the amlast whose faults he would be responsible
for* He should also be responsible for entertaining invest-
igating and discharging all cases.
The jagirdars, he suggested, should be required to
give muchalakas or securities "that they will not conceal
any Muqdumas [cases], but promptly make them known, and that
they will make no excessive demands, or oppress their infer-
2
ior jageerdars or ryots, but remain in attentive obedience," 
and if they failed in their dirty their property should be 
attached. (In S one pur the rautias too should be compelled to 
give such securities, as they had been responsible for insti­
gating insurrection and for sharing in the plunder.)
To prevent any future tribal risings, the jagirdars 
should be required to entertain stout, well-armed barkandazes 
ready at their ghats. Bodies of regular troops should also 
be posted at Important points, and the mundas, mahtos. mankis




and pahans should be made to maintain the roads in their 
areas in such repair that the troops could easily be moved 
from place to place*
To defray the expenses of the police the jagirdars 
should pay according to their capacity, and although he 
proposed to reduce the number of village goraits or watch­
men, each village should be asked to contribute in grain 
towards the salaries of the subordinate police*
His other recommendations were that the smaller 
villages should be exempt from the dak charges and that the 
poppy cultivation should be abolished*
In a later petition he again pressed for the main­
tenance of regular troops in Chota-Nagpur to hold down the 
tribal people, perhaps with a cantonment in the Sonepur
pargana* Then "the rebellicusly disposed would never attempt
2
to carry their marauding schemes into execution*1 He 
pointed particularly to the experience of the four months 
of the rainy season of 1832 when, in the absence of regular 
troops, the barkandazes had entirely failed to prevent the 
sacking of some 20 villages by the Larka Kols of Singhbhum.
Yet another set of suggestions came from Master, the 
Patna commissioner, who had tried the oases connected with 
the unrest, He stressed the need for a more central sadr 
station, "providing ready access for the injured and more
1. Ibid.
2. Petition, Maharaja Jagannath Sahi, 28 Jan. 1833* B*C*
B.C.1503/58907.
speedy redress of their grievances. It would ensure during 
favorable [sic] seasons a more familiar intercourse with 
these wild tribes who would gradually be led to appreciate 
such extended kindness and conciliation and much would thus 
be gained by moral influence which physical power could 
never effect.11^  He therefore suggested that a joint magis­
trate and deputy collector should be stationed at Sherghati 
to look after "the internal management of the restless prov­
ince of Palamow, with a controul [sic] over certain other 
2Thannas." The former custom of holding courts for some 
months in each year at Chatre., which was much nearer to 
Chota-Nagpur, might be revived, A magistrate from this place 
(its climate was favourable to Europeans for some months) 
would be "alive to the wants or grievances of a singular 
race of people who, tho* nominally governed, receive little 
protection from laws which cannot be efficiently adminis— . 
tered, Master was quite conscious that these arrangements 
would entail extra expenses, but "when the peace of so ex­
tensive a district is concerned & the repose of so many 
thousands of inhabitants is at stake the trifling expense to 
be incurred by this arrangement, " he thought, "would surely 
be a point of minor consideration to a liberal and enlight­
ened Gove rnme nt,1'^
1. Master to Govt., 17 Jan. 1833, Para.27, B.C.1502/58893, 





In the suggestions of the joint commissioners, of 
Dent individually, and cf Master there can he seen applied to 
the problem of the tribal areas some of the ideas which had 
been worked out by Munro and Elphinstone or of Metcalfe, 
even of Bentham. Outside Bengal the reaction against the 
Permanent Settlement and the Regulations of Cornwallis had 
grown vigorous. Now that attack was pushed within the Presid­
ency. It is not possible to show whether Master or Dent had 
been in direct contact with Munro, Elphinstone or the other 
recognised leaders of the anti-Cornwallis school, though 
Dent, while serving at Allahabad might have become familiar 
with Metcalfe*s system in the Delhi Territories ^  or with 
the new arrangements in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces. 
Their movements - and those of Blunt who had only recently 
framed rules for Arakan - towards a Non-Regulation system 
may have been made on the basis of their direct experience,
for Dent and Blunt had both considerable spells of duty in
2
the tribal areas. In the case of Wilkinson, however, the 
link of ideas is clearer. He had served, at Nagpur for more 
than a decade, and he drew directly on his experiences, 
and upon the ideas worked out by Munro and Elphinstone. Thus
1. Dent was at Allahabad in 1817 (Register of E.I.Co.*s 
servants, 91), while Metcalfe system was at its height 
in 1815-1818 (Spear, Twilight of the Mughals. 88)
2. Register of E.I.Co. 's^ervantBT 91-92 and 35-36.
3* Hodgson, officers of the Bengal Army. IV. 472-473* He had 
fought in the third Ma’raSfa war {Ial7-l8) and had served 
with the Nagpur Auxiliary Horse from 1819 to 1830.
in a letter to Rosa Mangles written in 1837 he wrote, "In 
the Deckan where the offices of collector and magistrate 
were held by the same person, the collectors influence as 
such contributed much to promote the efficient performance 
of the magistrates duties, because the villages in his 
Division were generally the Khalsa of Govt., of which he had 
to make the settlements; he was thus brought in frequent con­
tact with the people and became well acquainted with them 
and he went on, "the Patel of a village was not only 
its Parmer, but at the head of the village police, and a 
neglect of his police duties, as well as a breach of his 
farming engagements, rendered him liable to be turned out of 
his farm. Here [in Chota - Nagpur] neither a Theekadar nor 
Ryot of a village have [sic] ever occasion to approach the 
collector as such, and the former is only liable to forfeit 
his farm when he fails in fulfilling his engagements to the 
zemindar.Ifl Here are laid out what he would have wished 
to see in the South-West Frontier Agencys a clear line of 
undivided authority and responsibility, and direct contact 
between European official and the people of his district, 
down to the village level. His appeal for experienced offic­
ers who should be accessible to the people at all hours and 
thus shield them from the exploitation by the petty officials, 
is in the best Punjab manner.
1. Wilkinson to Govt., 1 Oct. 1837, Para.5, Political Des­
patch Register, G. G. *s Agent (7 Jan. 1837 to 28 Sept.
1833)? letter No.48, Patna Archives.
Such ideas were also likely at this time to be well 
received by those in power in India, for under the reforming 
Bentinck were ranged such men as Charles Metcalfe, Vice- 
President of the Council, Blunt, the third member of Council 
and James Thomason, later famous for his work in the Ceded 
and Conquered Provinces, as Deputy . Secretary of the Judi­
cial Department. Of these Blunt, the least known, was cer­
tainly not the least important in pushing the views of the 
joint commissioners. He was a paternalist who attacked the 
Permanent Settlement vigorously: "How many ancient and highly 
respectable families" were reduced to want by the frauds and 
chicanery of our native officers and by the operation of 
our Revenue laws in bringing their Estate to sale."^ His ex­
periences in Ramgarh, the Jungle Mahals, the Cuttack Tribu­
tary Mahals and as the special aommissioner for Arakan were 
particularly valuable aids to the reformers, and, as will 
be seen, the rules which he had drawn up for Arakan were put 
to use in formulating a scheme for Chota-Nagpur and the 
Jungle Mahals.
The early burst of plans and proposals, designed 
to deal with the situation revealed and created by the unrest 
in Chota-Nagpur came for a while to a halt when violence 
spread into the Jungle Mahals and the joint commissioners
1. Beng. Secret Cons. 8 of 6 Aug. 1832, 3^67)
had again to turn their attention to military campaigns. But 
"by the middle of 1833 the G-overnment was able to take up 
again the consideration of the earlier proposals.
The first point considered was the suggestion made 
on 16 November 1832 by the joint commissioners that the 
parganas of Palamau, Chota-Nagpur and its dependencies, and 
the adjacent areas of the Jungle Mahals and Midnapur 
districts might be put tinder a separate administration, 
excluded from the operations of the general Regulations. On 
3 June 1833 the G-overnment, adopting the general plan, asked 
the joint commissioners to submit a detailed plan for a 
non-regulation area under the Political Agent for the South- 
West Frontier as commissioner aided by one or more assist­
ants,^ " They were further asked to consult the commissioners 
of the Patna, Burdwan and Cuttack divisions and the magis­
trates at Sherghati, Bankura apd Midnapur and others on the 
following points; the extent and limits of the new juris­
diction, the most suitable place for the station of the
commissioner and his assistants, as also the means of super-
2
vising and controlling their actions. At the same time the 
commissioners of Patna and Monghyr divisions were asked to 
give their opinion regarding the disposal of those areas of 
the Ramgarh district not included in the new jurisdiction
1. G-ovt. to Jt. Commissioners, 3 June 1833, B.C. 1501/58891.
2. Ibid. Para.3.
when the post of the Judge-Magistrate and Collector of
i 'Ramgarh was abolished.^
The joint commissioners were asked not to take the 
problems of Chota-Nagpur, Palamau, Dhalbhum or Barabhum 
separately, but non a consideration of the wants and pecu­
liarities of the whole range of country to be brought under 
the contemplated arrangement and with advertence to all the 
matters on which suggestions have been offered and which 
remains for determination, to embody in a distinct draft of 
rules, which you will make as simple and concise as possible, 
the provisions general or local which you would recommend 
to be prescribed by the Government for the conduct of the 
judicial, Revenue or police affairs of the Commissioner^
p
jurisdiction," In case of difference of opinion, each joint 
commissioner was to report separately*
The Government further made it clear that the 
Assistants to the Commissioner were ordinarily to exercise 
the authority vested by the regulations in the officers in 
charge of districts. The final say in any matter would lie 
with the commissioner, except in criminal trials where he 
would be subject to the Nizamat Adalat. In any revenue or 
civil matter affecting the general peace of the area, he was 
to report to the Government. The joint commissioners were
1. Govt, to Commissioners of Patna, Burdwan, Cuttack and 
Monghyr divisions, 3 June 1833, B.C. 1502/58891-;
2. Govt* to Jt. Commissioners, 3 June 1833, Para*6,
B.C.1501/58891*
most particularly warned that the new establishment should 
he on the most economical lines, especially as the charge of 
the police would he transferred to the rajas.^
Finally the Government called upon Wilkinson indiv­
idually to comment upon the points of dissent with the joint 
commissioners proposals which Dent had submitted in January 
1833. (It will be remembered that these had dealt with such 
points as the substitution of a land tax for the abkari and 
dak collections, abolition of rural slavery and restrictions 
on alienation of lands by the chiefs.)
This resolution of the Government set in motion a 
big territorial readjustment, in the course of which many 
vested interests had to be reconciled. The process was there­
fore quite a protracted one, especially as Wilkinson, a key
2
figure, was for some months detained in Sambhalpur.
The first to reply was D'Oyly, the Midnapur magis­
trate. He thought that only Dhalbhum, the largest pargana 
of his district, extending all along the western frontier, 
should be incorporated in the new jurisdiction. He admitted 
that there were thirteen other jungle estates in Midnapur, 
but argued that 11 of these, lying to the east of Dhalbhum, 
were nearer to the sadr station and readily accessible for
1. Ibid. Para.8.
2. Bent to Govt., 25 June 1833, seng. Cr$. Judl.Cons. 34 of 
22 July 1833, /140\ . Meanwhile, Dent asked for rules in
 ^ 35 force in Arakan, Assam, Nerbada, 
Sagar and Delhi territories (Ibid.) The Government, how­
ever, sent the rules for Arakan only because they were 
"more detailed and specific than any other 1 " Govt, to 
Dent, 22 July 1833, Beng. Cr. Judl. Cons. 34 of 22 July 
1833 /140s
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revenue collection. He ignored the fact that in earlier 
years several of these*. e.g. Bhanjbhum, Ramgarh, Bishnupur 
and Bogree had been seat3 of great tribal unrest.
Dick, the Judge of Midnapur, put forward an even 
more extreme opinion. He did not consider it expedient to 
place any portion of Midnapur under the new jurisdiction, 
arguing that Hazaribagh, the probable chief station of the 
new administration, was no nearer than Midnapur to 
Dhalbhum. Moreover, he thought the extension of the late 
unrest to Dhalbhum had been the result of a family feud and 
was not therefore ground for so radical a change. He strongly 
opposed the idea of deregulationizing any part of this dis­
trict, because the people of jungly parganas were becoming 
more and more acquainted with the laws and administration:
"It would be hard," he wrote, "to throw them back into a more 
rude state of social existence for surely it will be granted 
that that state which is under no published law is less civi­
lized than one under a Regular Established civil and crimi-
p
nal Code." It is interesting to contrast Dickfs ideas with 
the report from Alexander, the joint magistrate who a few 
months back had stated that he had no instance of a tribal 
inhabitant from Dhalbhum visiting the court at Midnapur.
Next, Russell, the Magistrate of the Jungle Mahals,
1. D'oyly to Jt. Commissioners, 24 July 1833, B.C. 1501/58891*
2. Dick to Dent, 26 July 1833, B.C.1502/58891.
3. Alexander to Hunter, 28 Peb. 1833, Para.4, B.C.1502/58890.
submitted his comments. He thought that Kcilapal, Patkum 
and Barabhum, with their mainly Bhumij population, were the 
most turbulent areas. Kcilapal he was specially anxious to 
see included in the new jurisdiction. With these three 
parganas gone, he thought, the remaining portion of the 
Jungle Mahals might be left under the regulations.
Nisbet, the Judge of the Jungle Mahals, though ad­
mitting that he had very little experience about the people 
and affairs of this district, again showed a judicial lack 
of enthusiasm for deregulationization: "... though no doubt 
the local experience and personal activity of the officer 
who now holds the place of Political Agent in the S.W. 
frontier give the best assurance that the transfer will be 
attended with immediate benefit, yet in the event of his 
relinquishing the situation it appears very doubtful whether 
the charge would be managed with equal effect by his suc­
cessor, and the probability is that it would be found nec-
2cessary to put matters upon their old footing." He thought 
that the people would prefer a permanent and invariable 
sy'stem to a transitional or uncertain state of administration.
On the Ramgarh district, Bent, in the capacity of 
the judge of that district, reported that Palamau, Ramgarh 
including Raindihi, Kodarma, Kharakdiha, Chakai and Kunda 
might advantageously be included in the new jurisdiction,
1. Russell to Bent, 10 Aug. 1833, B.C.1502/48891.
2. Nisbet to Jt. Commissioners, 12 Aug, 1833, Ibid.
whereas Sherghati, Siris-Kutumba, Charlrawa, Japla, Surjun 
and Be Ion j a might he left under the regulations.'*' He left 
Chota-Nagpur and its dependencies untouched because there 
could he no two opinions ahout the need to include them in 
the new jurisdiction.
Trotter, the Acting Magistrate of Ramgarh, differed 
on certain points with Dent. The first consideration of the 
Government, he thought, was "to provide for the tranquillity 
of the country and to secure the rights of the inhabitants 
for whose protection the introduction of a new system is
p
accounted necessary." In this light he did not think it 
proper that such a large territory as Dent haj* proposed, 
should he excluded from the operation of the regulations.
The northern parts of Ramgarh pargana, fertile, civilized, 
close enough to Sherghati, ought to remain under the regula­
tion systenu The Raja of Ramgarh might press for the whole 
of his zamindari to he included within the jurisdiction by 
pleading the inconvenience and expense of having to institute 
cases in different oourts. But on the basis of the Benthamite 
principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number, 
the question resolves itself into this," he said, "whether 
the convenience of an individual or the benefit of a large 
body of people is more deserving of the consideration of 
Government". Since the revenue of the whole zamindari was 
fixed there would be no administrative problem for Government
1. Trotter to Jt. Commissioners, 25 July 1833, Para.2, Ibid. 
2* Ibid.
in dividing it, while the maintenance cf an efficient police 
force in the Regulation parganas "bordering on Behar, one of 
the most fertile and populous districts in the country, would 
not only benefit the inhabitants of those pergunnahs, but 
materially tend to strengthen the police of the adjoining 
districts. Nor need Government fear that the same 
arguments might be used in support of a division of Chota- 
Nagpur, for "the same facilities do not exist of retaining 
the latter under the operation of the Regulations on account 
of its great' distance from any established court, and 
further, that the turbulent disposition which has lately 
been displayed by the inhabitants of the latter, and has 
been the immediate cause of the change of system, has never
manifested itself, nor do I believe exists in the least
2
degree in the portion of Ramghur now alluded to. "
Those areas of the Ramgarh district not transferred 
to the new Political Agent should, Trotter thought, be 
allotted to Gaya* The one exception might be pargana Kharak- 
diha, the lands of which had come into the possession "of 
Mahajuns and other monied men from zillah Bihar, and else­
where, who have new become the principal landowners ... by 
taking land in security for money but at exorbitant rates of 
interest to the old occupants by whom they are regarded with 
the same jealousy and dislike, as the Suds by the inhabitants
1. Ibidc Para.3.
2. Ibid,
of Chota Nagpore."'1- In fact, it had "been hinted to him many 
a time that had the insurgents extended their operations as 
far as Kharakdiha, whose southern portion was chiefly jungle 
and hill, the inhabitants would not have hesitated to join 
them* On this score, he thought that this pargana could be 
included in the new jurisdiction.
Trotter1 s views were in the main supported by Cuth- 
bert, But on one point he., differed sharply. Trotter had sug­
gested that Kunda and Chakai should remain Regulation, since 
the malikana (proprietary) allowance from them was received 
by the Maharaja of Giddhaur. Cuthbert, on the basis of his 
ten years1 experience of Ramgarh district held that the 
jungly, uncultivated pargana of Kunda, with its scanty and 
backward population was quite unsuited "for the general 
Judicial, Revenue and Police systems which I consider un-
applicable to their actual grade in the scale of moral im- 
2provement." He would like to see all the hill parganas 
Kharakdiha, Chakai, Kunda and Untari "brought under one 
uniform system of management, viz., that sanctioned by the 
resolution cf Government under date the 3rd of June last".^
He was in fact fervent in advocating "that no part of the 
Hill country, no portion of its population should again be 
placed under the Regular Adawlut system."^- The late disturb­
ances, he wrote, "have confirmed me in the opinion as to the
1. Ibid.




utter inaptitude of Regulation 2 of 1819 to such wild and 
barbarous regions. It is the bane of all improvements, tends 
to unsettle minds of the people by filling them with alarm 
for the stability of their property and checks that confid­
ence in the justice and beneficence of Governments which it 
is so desirable should exist in the minds of the hill people, 
the Regulation should be immediately withdrawn.1 ^
Lambert, the Patna commissioner, upheld Cuthbert*s 
views, and suggested that Palamau, "in consideration of the 
nature of the country and its population and with reference 
to its situation with regard to pergunnah Chota Nagpore and 
its dependency pergunnah Toree, and also that Pergunnah 
Koonda with reference to its adjoining pergunnah Toree as
wel?i_ as to the nature of the country should form a part of
2
the jurisdiction." But in view of Trotterfs arguments and 
of a petition of the inhabitants of Chatra objecting to the 
inclusion of pargana Ahori and its adjoining areas in the 
new unit, he thought that the northern portion of Ramgarh 
might be left under the regulations.-" He also concurred 
with Trotter in the suggestion of Kharakdiha being included 
in the new jurisdiction and of Chakai being transferred to 
Monghyr, Moreover, he agreed with Dent*s proposal to retain 
Sherghati and other neighbouring parganas under the general 
regulations.
1. Ibid. 4. Also see Chapter TY..
2. ISmEert to Jt. Commissioners, 9 Aug. 1833, Para.3r 
B.C.1502/58891.
3. j[bid. Para. 4
It was on 6 September 1833 that Dent forwarded these 
sentiments to the Government. On a consideration of these 
views he thought that Chota-Nagpur and its dependencies along 
with the following parganas of Ramgarh might be included in 
the new jurisdiction: Palamau, Ramgarh, Kodarma, Kunda and 
Kendi. Chakai should be transferred to Monghyr and Sherghati 
with the parganas to the west to Bihar district.^
About the areas of Midnapur to be included in the 
new jurisdiction Dent pointed out that though Dick and D*oyly 
opposed change, Government had already decided to include 
Dhalbhum in the new administration. Moreover, though Russell 
thought that only three mabals should be chopped off his dis­
trict, it was necessary to transfer some other mahals "in 
order to form a jurisdiction large enough for the services of 
an additional assistant who will be indispensably required 
to superintend those tracts, from their being so widely
separated from the other portions of the proposed new
2
district." So he proposed that the following parganas and 
mahals of the Jungle Mahals should be included in the new 
arrangement; Bagankodar, Hasla, Jhalda, Torang, Bagnrundi, 
Kasipur, Patkum, Barabhum, Koilapal, Phulkusma and Shamsund- 
arpur. If these mahals with Dhalbhum were considered suffi­
cient to form a separate jurisdiction, well and good; if not, 
Raipur, Manbhum and Silda (of Midnapur district) might also
1. Dent to Govt., 6 Sept. 1833, Para.2, B.C.1502/58891*
2. Ibid. Para.5.
be added to it."*" Moreover, as the proposed jurisdiction would 
adjoin Singhbhum, the officer in charge of it might have to 
discharge duties connected with that turbulent area too.
He discounted the arguments put forward by Dick and 
Nisbet that the inhabitants of transferred areas would 
suffer by passing outside the civilizing scope of the Regula­
tion system. He pointed out that "If the rules for the ad­
ministration are framed after the Arracan Rules which prob­
ably will be the case, they will embrace the spirit of the 
General Regulations with the addition of a discretionary 
power to be vested in the controlling authority which the
2present circumstances of these countries seem to require,"
His own long report on the Jungle Mahals disturbances, just 
submitted, would rather show what havoc the regulations had 
played in that area.
The new jurisdiction, he thought, should be formed 
into three subordinate divisions. Ramgarh, Kendi, Kodarma, 
Kharakdiha and Kunda should be under one assistant residing 
at Hazaribagh. The second division including Chota-Nagpur 
and its dependencies and Palamau were to be under another 
assistant at Lohardugga. If this division ''was found unman­
ageable, the northern half of Palamau might be transferred 
to the Ramgarh division. The third division should comprise 




river forming the boundary to the east© A suitable place on 
the banks of the Subarnarekha might be selected for the 
station of the third assistant. Por the station of the polit­
ical agent he suggested Amaidanda, Churia or Lohardugga or 
any other t'own in Chota-Nagpur, though the final say would 
lie with Wilkinson.'1'
Maenwhile Dent’s final report on the second phase of 
the unrest had reached Government. In it he made specific, 
suggestions for the future management of the tribal areas.
He took particular note of the mode for recovering arrears 
of revenue and the zamindar’s private debts and for making 
provisions for the maintenance of the younger branches of
the chiefs1 families. The sale of estate in this area, he
thought, was objectionable because the Government had flto
2
force upon the peoples as their Raja, an odious stranger ...1 
In any case he thought that these estates were not legally 
liable to sale for the recovery of the private debts of the 
rajas. Their property, he argued, should be treated as en­
tailed property, the chief having only a life interest in it.
Only in case of gross misconduct should an estate be liable 
to sale© But in that case it should be purchased by the Gov­
ernment with a view to conferring it upon some more deserving 
relation of a raja.-"
Dor the recovery of the arrears in ordinary cases, he
1, Ibid. Para.8.
2, ’J3enT to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, Para.64, B.C.1501/58886,
3, Ibid. Para.65.
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thought, the estates should he attached and collections made 
by an officer of the G-overnment until the arrears were real­
ized. He pointed out, however, that on the Jhalda and 
Chhatna estates heing attached, no collections ccould he made 
because the lands were generally in the possession of the 
relatiois of the zamindars, mortgagees and others. To prevent 
such difficulties he proposed that all estates should he 
divided into maltor revenue, lands, Khas Khamfrar, or privy 
purse lands, and lands for the support of members of the 
chiefly family, Brahmans and others.^ The lands allotted to 
the first category should he the most open, best cultivated 
portion of the estate, capable of yielding net collections 
exceeding the Government revenue demand by forty or fifty 
per cent. Such land, ear-marked for meeting the revenue 
demands, should be left to the free management of the raja,
so long as he paid his revenue, except that he should not be
2allowed to alienate any portion of it. Should revenue pay­
ments fall into arrears, the mal villages would be attached, 
and the tenants ordered to pay direct to the treasury. Only 
over the privy purse lands would the raja’s control be abso­
lute, and only these lands could he sell or mortgage, after 
informing the European officer in charge of the area.
Dent paid considerable attention to the last division 
of estate lands, those set aside for the support of the
1. Ibid. para.66-,
2. 1bf3. Para. 67.
raja:s relations, priests, etc. He pointed out that "these 
grants in all the Jungle Mahals are only considered to he 
binding on the Raja who makes them, but in general they are 
confirmed by his successor during the lifetime of the orig­
inal grantee, except where, as in many of the Mahals, there 
is an estate specially set apart for the maintenance of the 
eldest brother of the Raja who is styled variously 'Kower1 
and ’Hakeem* in which case on a new succession the new Kower 
succeeds to it as a matter of course & the former Kower is 
otherwise provided for. Such grants, Dent suggested, should 
be made by the raja in consultation with his relations* If a 
difference of opinion developed, the European officer or a 
neighbouring raja might be asked to arbitrate. He also em­
phasised the importance of redressing the grievances of the 
ghatwals, upon whose interests likewise the zamindars and 
chiefs must not be allowed to encroach by irregular demands 
and alienations. "It is of the most vital importance," Dent 
wrote, "to the general peace of the district and the main­
tenance of an efficient police that these Jageers should not 
in any way be diverted from the purpose for which they were 
originally granted, either by fraudulent alienations of the
Crhatwals themselves or the encroachments of the zemindars
2
and others which are now daily taking place." He suggested 




and recorded, the occupants, extent and site of lands and
1
amount of rent payable being all specified.
Dent also returned to the question of the excise and 
salt duties. He did not wish to go the whole way with Wilkin*?- 
son, and abolish the tax on hanria or pachai entirely, 
because he thought it would be difficult to institute a new 
tax in its -place. What he did wish to see was a low rate, 
simply appliedt eight annas on a village with 16 houses or 
less, one rupee on all larger villages. The farms of the 
abkari collections should be small, and residents should be 
preferred to strangers as their farmers. The abuses in the 
salt department he thought more serious. In Dhalbhum, he 
said, they were 1 of an extremely oppressive character and 
the patience with which these and other grievances were borne
for a long time, affords a strong proof of the forbearance
2of the inhabitants.’1 He emphasized "the injustice and im­
policy of keeping up the Dhalboom and Burabhoom salt chokies, 
which, in conjunction with the chokey in Chota Nagpore (whose 
authority extends from Patcoom to Surgooja over a frontier 
considerably upwards of 100 miles in extent) are ... to pre­
vent the introduction of Cuttack salt into Bengal or South 
B i h a r , E v e n  under the most vigilant control and supervis­
ion, the chokey officers, from the very nature and discretion 
of their duties, harassed the people in various ways. To
1. Ibid.
2. ibid. Para.76.
3. TEIcL Para. 77
prevent this abuse, he suggested that the price of salt sold 
for export from Cuttack might be increased to the level of 
the Calcutta price. This would put an end to the vast expen­
diture on chaukis, and even add to Government receipts from 
the Cuttack Tributary Mahals. It would involve some extra 
cost to the inhabitants of the tributary states, but even 
then they would get their salt cheaper than the people of 
Chota-Nagpur and the Jungle Mahals now did.
Then Dent took up the question of police for the 
Jungle Mahals. The rules in Regulation XV'III of 1805, he 
thought, were "well adapted to these Jungle Mahals; and 
where the Raja or his Dewan has been duly qualified they have 
fully answered in practice and crimes of violence and blood­
shed have greatly decreased."'*' The only change he suggested 
was to make the raja's diwan and other efficient zamindar's 
servants, jointly responsible with the raja for the due 
performance of their duty as police officers. The magistrate 
was to advise the zamindars to remove improper or incapable 
men from his services..
Two last suggestions Dent made were typical of his 
attitude. He urged that Bengali, the colloquial language of 
the hill areas should be substituted for Persian in all 
public offices, and he requested the Government to open a 
good school for the children of the jungle zamindars. Even 
with the limited society of Bankura it would only require a
1. Ibid. Para,79.
small monthly donation from Government to support an insti­
tution 7/hich "would do infinitely more to civilize and 
improve the people than the hest system of management."'*'
With the replies to their proposals of 3 June for 
reorganization of the administration "before them, and a
reminder of the urgent need for reform to hand from Dent,
2
the Bengal Government proceeded to take action* On 22 Dec­
ember 1833, the Government announced that "considerations 
connected with the present state of certain tracts of country 
now included in the Districts of Ramghur, Jungle Mehals and 
Midnapore, the nature of the disturbances which recently 
prevailed in various parts of those districts, and the char­
acter of the inhabitants had rendered it expedient to separ­
ate these tracts," and proceeded to pass a Regulation for 
"abolishing the Courts cf Dewanny Adawlut of the Zillahs of 
Ramghur, Jungle Mehals and Midnapore."-' The tracts included 
in the new charge were, in the Ramgarh district, Chota- 
Nagpur, Palamau, Kharakdiha, Ramgarh and Kunda, in the 
Jungle Mahals all the mahals except Sainpahari, Shergarh 
and Bishnupur, in Midnapur Dhalbhum. The new jurisdiction 
was placed under an officer to be denominated Agent to the 
Governor General, who would administer justice and superint­
end the police and revenue services under rules to be framedi.
1. Ibid. Para.80.
2. They would have liked to have had Wilkinson1 s comments on 
Dent's report on the Jungle Mahals unrest, but Wilkinson 
felt that he was not yet sufficiently informed to pass 
comment. Wilkinson to Govt., 14 Nov. 1833* B.C.1501/58886.
3. Regulation Kill, 2 Dec. 1833, B.C.1502/58891*
b ic * i
for the sire a. Those parts of Regulation III, 1793, and Regu­
lation XVIII, 1805, and all other regulations which had 
applied to the area were rescinded.
Until detailed instructions had been issued lay the 
Government, the Agent and his subordinates were to be guided 
by the rules in force for the conduct of all local duties at 
the moment. The Agent would exercise the same power and 
authority for the time being as were vested in a commission­
er of revenue and circuit and a civil and sessions judge. 
Until otherwise directed, he and his assistants would be sub­
ordinate to, and would conform to all orders from the Sadr 
Diwani Adalat and Nizamat Adalat. the Sadr Board of Revenue 
and the Board of Customs, salt and opium, a3 heretofore,. But 
these Courts and Boards would not normally interfere in the 
affairs of the Agency, and their powers of control would be 
ordinarily exercised by the Agent over his Assistants. Only 
one annual report would be ordinarily required from this 
area."^ "
Having thus decided the fate of the tribal people of 
this Mwild, imperfectly civilized, and occasionally very 
disturbed1 hilly and jungly area, the Government appointed 
Captain Wilkinson as the Political Agent on the South-West 
Prontier on a consolidated salary of Rs.36,000. Lt. R.
Ouse ley of the 50th Regto N.I. and Ensign P.Nicolson of the 
28th were appointed as his first Assistants at Rs.1,000 a
1. Governor - General, Minute, 6 Dec. 1832, B.C.1502/58891*
month, and Assistant Surgeon Davidson a junior assistant 
with the salary of a senior assistant because of his "super­
ior abilities”.^ It is noteworthy that no civilian officer 
was preferred for this area. The criterion seems to have been 
efficiency as a military officer in suppressing the unrest.
A number of consequential changes and adjustments 
followed from the creation of the Agency. Capt. Wilkinson 
was relieved from the command of the Ramgarh battalion, which 
was moved further south, towards the centre of the lately 
disturbed area. Bentinck also recommended that a regiment of 
native infantry should be stationed at Bankura, and he won­
dered whether an European regiment might not be conveniently
2stationed at Hazaribagh.
Copies of the new Regulation and Rules were sent to 
all the commissioners and other officers concerned, and to 
the register of the Sadr Diwani and Nizamat Adalat.^  The 
Ramgarh judge was informed that those areas of his district 
not included in the Agency would go to Bihar and Bhagalpur, 
and he was to dispose of all cases pending so that his court 
could be abolished. It would be his task, being in charge of 
the establishment and records to transfer all papers relating 
first to cases pending and then to all former cases of the 
area.^ Similar instructions were issued to Trotter, the
1. Ibid.
2. TEIcL
3. G-ovt. to Commissioners, Patna, Burdwan, Cuttack and 
Monghyr and others, B.C.1502/58891.
4. Govt, to ScR.Davidson, 9 Dec. 1833, Ibid.
officiating magistrate and collector* He was placed in charge 
of the districts transferred to Bihar, and ordered to main­
tain the records of those areas. He was also to remain res­
ponsible for the prisoners at Sherghati.^ Further orders 
dealt with the nomination of munsifft for the transferred 
areas, and for the disposal by sadr amins of the cases trans­
ferred to Bihar and Bhagalpur.
Similar arrangements had to be made, after consulta­
tion between Capt. Wilkinson and the judges and magistrates
OLoncerned, for the Jungle Mahals areas which were to be
2
transferred to Burdwan.
Within the Agency-* the existing establishments of 
munsifs, police and revenue officers were to remain for the 
present and the principal sadr amin, sadr amin and the 
munsifs were to continue to perform the same duties for the 
time being. But it was left to the Agent to limit their 
duties or to discharge any part of those establishments. 
Moreover, he was authorized to employ new men in such posts
lu Govt. to Trotter, 9 Dec. 1833* Ibid*
2. Govt* to Dick, 9 Dec. 1833, IbidT
3. Also see Govt, to Nisbet, 9 Dec* 1833, Ibid*
3. Wilkinson was asked to settle with the Eurdwan Commission­
er what should be done with regard to the town of Bankura,
situated partly in the Regulation pargana of Bishnupur, 
and partly in Chhatna pargana, which formed part of the 
Agency. They agreed in December 1833, to include Bankura 
and three adjacent villages in the Agency* P.E.Patton to 
Wilkinson, 30 Dec* 1833* Ibid. Also see Govt, to Wilkin­
son, 15 Jan. 1834, B.C.15TW5’8892.
if he thought it necessary, submitting a detailed statement 
of the establishment which he wanted to retain permanently. 
Similar stop-gap arrangement was to be made for the custody 
of prisoners, the protection of treasure and other purposes, 
while he formulated suggestions for adoption permanently. ^
The joint commission was now to be wound up, its
records being transferred to Wilkinson, who would arrange
2
for the transfer. Dent was to dispose of the arrears of 
business immediately to await further instructions.-^
Thus by the middle of December 1833> all preliminary 
consultations had been completed and Capt. Wilkinson ^  had 
emerged as the sole official head of the new administration. 
He was to set up a paternalist non-regulation system of ad­
ministration for this undeveloped area, at the apex of which 
he would stand with very considerable powers. The swing of 
the pendulum away from the complex machinery and regulations 
of Ute Cornwallis was complete.
The new Agency was carved into three divisions: 
Manbhum, consisting of those parts^which had been de-regulat- 
ionised, along with Dhalbhum; Lohardugga comprising Chota- 
Nagpur, including Tori, Barwa and the five dependent parganas
1. Govt, to Wilkinson, 9 Dec. 1833, Para.13, Ibid.
2. Ibid. Para.14.
3. ‘SairE. tc Dent, 9 Pec, 1833, B.C. 1502/58891.
4. It may be noted that besides possessing experience of the 
Deccan and of this tribal area, he was also an intimate 
friend of Major Benson, the private secretary to the 
Governor-' General, and of Major Sutherland, the private 
secretary to Metcalfe.
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of Rahi, Silli, Tamar, Bun&u and Baranda below the ghats, 
and Palamau; Hazaribagh comprising Ramgarh, Kharakdiha and 
other; estates of the Ramgarh district withdrawn from the op­
eration of the regulations but not included in the second 
division. Nicolson was appointed in the first, Ouseley at 
Lohardugga and Davidson at Hazaribagh,'*' These assistants 
were provided with necessary instructions for their guidance 
in civil and criminal justice. They were charged with the 
performance .of all the duties previously performed by the 
magistrates and collectors of their respective areas, hearing 
appeals from the court of the principal sadr amins, sadr
p
amins and munsifs. (A number of these were however dis­
charged or transferred because of their record during the 
unrest.) They were to be guided by Regulation Z of 1829 in 
the collection of stamp duties, were to pay special attention 
to the eradication of abuses in the abkari department, and 
to collect the many arrears of land revenue, keeping a 
olose watch upon the activities of the sazawals managing 
estates for minors under the Court of Wards.^ They also 
received detailed instructions about the building of suitable 
jails, the housing of the detachments of troops posted at 
their headquarters, the proper payment of villagers living 
near the Benares road who did coolie and carting services, 
and had often net been paid. But in addition to these and
1. Wilkinson to Nicolson, Ouseley and Davidson, 7 Jan. 1834, 
B.C.1502/58892.
2. Wilkinson to Nicolson* 7 Jan. 1834* Ibid.
3- Ibid.
many other detailed and local orders, Wilkinson laid down 
for his assistants certain general rules. In these the 
influence of Elphinstone or Munro seems very complete. Wilk­
inson clearly had what, in another connection has been des­
cribed as "the alassic idea of the Collector of the Munro 
school - the man with wide discretionary powers, constantly 
travelling about his district, unhampered by forms and cere­
monies, always and everywhere accessible to anyone with a 
complaint or petition.
Wilkinson laid much stress upon his assistants* 
annual tour of their divisions. The assistant was to halt 
for four or five days at convenient distances, inviting all 
the heads of estates and villages to meet him, and conversing 
on their own affairs and those of their neighbours. Thus in 
course of a year or two he would "become intimately acquaint­
ed! with the state of your distriat and condition of its 
2
inhabitants." Prior to undertaking such a tour, the officer 
was to get an English or Persian list prepared of every 
person*s name whom he had to contact. He was to send for most 
of them, and others were to be contacted in course of a 
morning or evening stroll: "you should send for as many of 
them as you could conveniently converse with, and when alone
1. Ballhatchet. Social policy, 104.
2o Wilkinson to Nico 1 son, T  Jan, 1834, Para. 14, B.C. 1502/ 
58892. Elphinstone had also "urged his Collectors to
*move about the country1, granting *easy access to all 
comers, and a ready ear to all complaints * s" Circular,
10 July 1810, Ballhatchet, Social Policy* 104.
in your morning or evening walks or before breakfast when 
sitting in front of your tent, or after dinner, talk with 
them freely, and encourage them to speak of the manner they 
had been treated, by the Darogah, Moonsif, Peeadas and Chup- 
prassies or by yGur own amlah if they had been to the Suddar 
station. Such heart to heart talk would go a long way in 
removing the fears of the people and would put a stop to the 
oppressions of the petty officials. (If charges of oppression 
were proved, the guilty were to be given an exemplary pun­
ishment.) ,:At these conversations with the people," Wilkinson 
went on, "you should not allow any of your Umlah, Chupprass­
ies or private servants to be near you, and whenever a dis­
tinct accusation is made against any of the publia officers, 
chupprassees &ca &ca, you should consider it your duty not 
to leave the odium of prosecuting him to the person who 
informs, but search for evidence and on conviction of bribery, 
exaction &ca &ca punish the delinquent, of whatever grade in 
the manner authorized in Smyth's penal code. A few examples
thus made will operate as a check on your Establishment and
2be otherwise productive of the best effects." The same 
course was to be followed at his sadr station also,
1. Wilkinson to Nicolson, 7 Jan. 1834, Para. 14, B.C. 1502/
58892. The postscript of the letter stated, "you should 
not only make enquiries about your own umlah but mine -
and that of other assistants, and if you hear that in
any one of our Establishments, one man is corrupt or that 
they are generally so, you will consider it your Duty to 
make the same known to me immediately. "
2. Ibid, Para.14.
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Tc check bribery, the a:nlas were tc be strictly
prohibited from receiving at their houses any persons who
had business in the court* All letters and reports were to
be opened and read in the preseence of the assistant, and
the readers were to be frequently changed to avoid corruption.
The opinion of the amla was never to be asked about a case
in the presence of the parties, and if voluntarily offered,
the amla was to be scolded. In other words, the public
should never have the impression that the officer was in
1
any way influenced by his amla.
To Nicolson Wilkinson wrote that he should not mind
working longer than the usual hours? "We have not been
selected for our situations for the purpose of working only
a given number of hours according to rule, but to afford
speedy and cheap justice to all who may appeal to us, and
the latter can never be accomplished'until we effectively
put a stop to our Umlahfs receiving anything from those who
come to our courts, whether as Nuzzurs, Salamie, Bribes 
2
&ca. " Eternal vigilance and superhuman effort would be 
necessary to clear this Augean stables, without them the 
rules would be dead letters; "Rules without constant 
watchfulness and great diligence are not of much use. It is 
therefore to your exertions and that of the other assistants
1. Ibid. Para.15.
2C jtUSU, Para. 16. No, doubt the strain would be great, but 
Vi1Tl5inson wanted^co live up to the ideal of an Elphinstone, 
a Munro and a Metcalfe.
that I must look for improvement in the management of the
country and condition of tho people in the new jurisdiction,
1as I do so with aonf idence . "
To bring justice to the door of the people, the
assistant on tour was to decide pending cases at places
where parties and witnesses could conveniently assemble*
Moreover, during these tours when the people would gather
at the assistants camp, "the most extensive use of Punch-
2
ayats" should be made* Similarly, to check the corruption 
in the courts of justice, the jamadar, who was to be 
appointed in the place of a nazir. would distribute and 
receive back the notices, summons, etc, (to the chaprasis, 
peadas, etc*) in the cutehery itself, maintaining a register 
and reporting to the assistant daily. No such business was 
to be transacted out of court. This would prevent the 
jamadar from stepping into the shoes of the nazir, who had 
often become famous for his malpractices.
Moreover, the peadas were also to be prevented 
from exacting money from the parties in a suit. All 
ordinary witnesses were to be reported to the assistant 
as soon as they arrived. If they arrived at night, the 
peada must bring them to the cutchery near which a shed 
would be erected for their shelter. The jamadar, on his
1. Ibid. Para.17.
2, Ibid. Para.18. cf. Elphinstone1s emphasis on panchayats. 
3d TET3. Para.20.
arrival afe the cutehery, was tc take note of their attendance 
and to report it to the assistant. Respeotahle witnesses, 
however, might he allowed to stay at night at any private 
house, not heing that of a plaintiff or a defendant in the 
suit."*" Also, the peadas were to he strictly prohibited from
overstaying in the countryside where they went to deliver
2notice of cases. For this, a scale of distances of the
different parganas was to he prepared, and a peon was to he
expected to travel six kos a day, beyond which he should be
asked to explain for any delay. Not only this, the jamadar 
and the peadas were to have no connection with money trans­
actions such as payment of subsistence money to witnesses.^
To avoid unnecessary delay in a suit and to see 
that the amlas did not fraudulently cause such a delay, the 
assistant was to maintain an English and a Bengali register 
of suits and to devote an hour a week in the presence of the 
parties or their agents over the register to discover what 
delay in the suits had been caused. The treasurer was to 
receive and take aharge of the revenue and stamps and 
the money was to he forwarded to the agent's treasury.^
It was also laid down that vakils (pleaders) were 
not to he allowed to plead within any of the courts of the 
Agency. The parties could conduct their business in the
5
Courts either in person or by mukhtar or authorized agent.
1. Ibid. Para.19.
2. TEI5.
3. Tbich Para. 21.
4. Ibid. Para.23.
5. Ibid. Para.24.
The next step taken by Yilkinwon was to draw upf 
and on 13 January to forward for approval proposed rules 
for the administration of crininul Justice In the Agency*
Ha suggested that the Agent should ordinarily possess 
the powers of control of the Hiaamat Adalat over his 
assistants and other officials subordinate to hid. l$e 
should be free to give sentence* of up to fourteen years* 
hard labour in irons| more severe sentences would require 
the sanction of the Nlauuoat aUalati. His assistants should 
have power to award hard labour in irons for up to two 
years, corporal punishment not exceeding thirty strokes 
of the rattan anti fines of up to two hundred rupees9 or a 
further year1* imprisonment in default of payment* Higher
sentence* would require the approval of the Agent* The
tribal rulers, rajas, saMindars and Ja&lrdara might 
investigate petty oases, abusive language, slander, minor 
assaults arising in their estates* They, however, would 
not have power to award any punishment*
The assistants would be "empowered to receive and 
Investigate all complaints. Information or charges brought 
before them of crimes or misdemeanours committed within 
the limits of their respective jurisdictions*** The
(I) Enclosure *i8, V'ilkinson to Govt*, 13 Jan* 183**,
!)•€• 1502/58892* Rules for Arakan served as the 
model for these rules* Far Arakan rules see Beng.Cr. 
Judl* Cons* 26 of 3 July 1828 (138/66)*
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tribal chiefs could investigate complaints, receive and 
forward a ruslnaraa if attested by two witnesses* Complaints 
made to the assistants were to be written and on oath, 
those to chiefs could be either written or verbal*
for serious crloses the assistant would Issue a warrant 
for the apprehension of the accused, for isinor ones merely 
a summons* Doth might be survod either through the raja or 
other chief, or through the Jamadar of the court* A person 
refusing to answer a summons night be arrested by the 
local, chief and forwarded to the appropriate authority*
The examination of the prosecutor, and of all witnesses 
in the assistants* court would be on oath, the answer of 
the defendant without, though recorded* The assistant 
would carefully examine any confessions to make sure they 
were voluntary ami not made either under threat or upon 
pro.iise of pardon or a reduced sentence* In no case would 
the statements or confessions of one or more prisoners 
be admitted to convict another without further proof* All 
depositions would be in Hindustani or Bengali and would 
rtquii • to be witnessed*
Those who preferred groundless or vexatious complaints 
might be fined up to fifty rupees or imprisoned for up to 
three months* ho one Gil lit bo punished on mere suspicion,
(l) Inc Insure, Wilkinson to Govt*, 13 Jan* 1834, 
B.C. 1502/38892.
or placed in preventive detention, except on proof of 
notorious bad character* i ven then one year would be 
the maxi urn period of detention*
In serious oases examined before the assistant 
indigent witnesses would be paid a subsistence allowance 
of 1} annas a day during their attendance in court* 
Similarly prisoners on release from jail would be given 
subsistence money for their journeys home* In oases 
investigated by the loeal chief® the complainant would 
be responsible for supporting poor witnesses*
All sentences would be carried into effect by the 
agent in the manner prescribed for a Judge of circuit* 
lie was empowered with or without a petition being preferred 
to him to call for the proceedings of his assistants in 
any cases decided by them, and he could mitigate or remit 
any punishment* He would submit periodical reports with 
statements of the crimes committed, the number of persons 
apprehended, convicted and sentenced, the nature of 
punisluiente inflicted, the amount of fines levied by the 
several courts* Without his confirmation, the assistants 
would not impose any fine exceeding he* 200, while the 
agent himself would not impose any fine exceeding he* 500
(l) i nclosure, Wilkinson to Oovt*, 13 dan* 183*4, 
13. C. 1502/38892.
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without the confirmation of the Government. It would ho 
the agent again who would regulate the mode of employing 
the priaonura and the place of their oonfineueut• He 
would require from hie aaslatant periodical reports of the 
number of person* apprehended and discharged as well as of 
those in confinement* and he would carefully inspect the 
jail and places of custody and would issue necessary 
instructions for the proper and humane treatment of the 
prisoners* ^
The salient features of the proposed system were once 
again the creation of a hierarchy of authority* with powers 
and responsibilities clearly defined at each level* and the 
agent at the apex of the pyramid* and the creation of 
elaborate safeguards against the abuse of authority* The 
provisions for the payment of subsistence allowances were 
particularly aimed at making an appearance in a court of 
law no longer in itself a source of loss and injury* The 
one surprising omission was the absence of any reference 
to the use in criminal cases of panchayata* for in his 
earlier reports fe'llkinson had emphasised the need to 
recognise these ancient tribal tribunals*
Much the same features were evident in the rules 
proposed for the administration of civil justice* Thore
(l) Lnclosuic, Vilklnaon to Govt** 13 Jan* 183***
B.C. 1502/58892#
6were special safeguards In cases involving the defendants 
of tribal chiefs* Americans or Europeans* or rent-free 
lands* All suits were to he tried and decided openly* 
Sui^ons to attend court in person* nominally served through 
the village headman* would be returnable with an endorse­
ment certifying' the m o w e r  in which they had been served* 
Ample warning would be given to the parties of the day on 
which the suit would be heard* and In case of illness or 
disability of witnesses their depositions might be taken 
by the nearest saunaif or darc^a* bx-parte trials might be 
held if aft<*r three weeks the defendants had failed to 
answer a sumi«ona* but the approval of an assistant would 
be required before a nunsIf might try a suit ex-part©»
as well as proof that the eumtaons had actually been served
(1)on the defendant*' '
To prevent frivolous litigation complaints would be 
submitted on stamped paper* and if a suit was shown to 
have been instituted groundlessly a fine or moderate term 
of Imprisonment might be imposed* Complaints regarding 
balances or undue exaction of rent* or dispute regarding 
revenue accounts would* however* not need to pay stamp duty 
so that even the poorest tribal cultivator would not be
(l) hules for civil Justice* Enclosure* Wilkins or* to Oovt** 
13 dan. 183*1* 13.C. 1502/38892.
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denied justice because of his poverty*
i * " . » ••
Ivory decree In a suit would specify the nastea of
the witnesses who had deposed* the ftsouni or value of the
property decreed, the coats of the suit, and whether they
were t© be defrayed by any party* But no foes or costs
whatever would be levied, except such as might be
authorised by the rules or by special order of the 
(2)Government*' ' Copies of the decrees would be provided 
within ten days after the decision*
In all cases the parties could appeal from the 
amnsif*s court to the assistant9* court and from there 
to the agent9* court, within six weeks of the date of 
the decree, specifying the grounds of their dissatisfaction 
on a startped paper* Moreover, any case could be transferred 
from a lower court by the assistant or the agent on 
sufficient grounds* Decrees would be executed by an order 
addressed to an officer of the court, or the headuan of 
the estate in which the debtor might usually reside, or 
where the property might be situated* The rajas and 
other chiefs might be exempted by the agent from attach­
ment and sale of property, arrest and imprisonment in
(3)satisfaction of the decree*w /  The agent could afford
(1) Pules for civil justice, nciosurt, Vllkinson to Govt*, 
13 Jan* 183**, B.C* 1502/58892.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid*
relief to insolvent debtors or their sureties who Might
have no Means of discharging thu amount* but if
subsequently such people acquired property, it could
be brought to sale on an application by the creditor*
Persons confined in civil jail in execution of a
decree would receive a daily subsistence allowance of
two amias, to be paid through an officer of the court,
by the party at whose suit the debtor had been confined*
One month's subsistence allowance would be realised in
advance in default of which the prisoner would be released
forthwith* Moreover, no person would be liable to personal
confinement in satisfaction of a decree, for any sum not
exceeding fifty rupees, beyond a period of six months, at
the expiration of which he would be released* However,
any personal property of such a person would be liable to
sale in the execution of the Judgment* The poor debtor
(1)was thus given all possible relief*' '
One of the most significant features of Vilkinaon9*
proposals was for the use of panchayats in civil cases*
Their use had already been a feature of llphinsone9s
(2)administration in the Bombay Presidency,' and it is very
(1) !ules for civil justice, Enclosure, Wilkin-on to Govt*, 
13 Jan* 183k, n*C* 1502/58892*
(2) Ballhatchet, Social policy. 106-109*
likely that it was Wilkinson's long stay at Nagpur, one
of the former centres of Karatha power, which had turned
* t * *
his attention to their possible utility*
Vilkinson suggested that he and his assistants should 
have the right to refer suits at their discretion for 
decision by oanchayats * after the plaint had been filed 
and the defendant's answer received* A paneUavat would 
consist of three to five persons to be selected by the 
agent or the assistant from f amongst the persons most 
conversant with the <aatter at i s s u e * T h e  Punches 
would be nominated after the plaintiff, defendant and 
witnesses had assembled, and the parties would have a 
right to challenge a punch* and their grounds being valid, 
that paneli would be replaced* But before constituting a 
panchoyat* the parties would have to execute a bond that 
they would abide by its decision* A mohurlr would be 
attacked to every panchavat to record the proceeding* and 
award* Its proceedings would be held in a part of the 
cutchery or a spot adjoining it* After taking evidence 
uanchayat would direct the ctohurlr and the parties 
to ret lie, and then it would consult and decide on the 
award* After that the teobuiiv would be recalled to record 
the decision, which, along with the signature of the
(l) Cf* Elphinstone had also emphasised the Punches'
knowledge of the matter at issue and of the personal 
character of the parties* Ibid, 109*
64'.*
members of the pane hay at. would bo delivered to the court 9 
which would paaa a decree In conformity with this award.
This would bo appealable or bcr^llable to be set aside 
only if corruption would be proved against the imnchavat* 
or If its decision would be contrary to the common law 
of the country or to the rules enacted by the Governor- 
General in council*
In case of a boundary dispute between two villages 
situated within a single esta te f the panch:tyat would be 
selected from amongst most Influential and rospso^abls 
men of adjaeent villages within the estate* They would 
decide the dispute after careful investigation of the 
boundaries and would fix permanent boundary marks* Where 
the dispute was between samlndars or la^irdars* both 
holding their setstee from the same superior* then the 
Manchayat would be constituted of leading samindars or 
Jagirdara of th# n«iehiourhoo<l. ^
In case of a boundary dispute between two large 
estates* however* Wilkinson doubted the efficacy of such 
an arbitration* In such cases the agent or an assistant 
would proceed to the spot* and after a minute investigation*
<i) Rulue for civil Justice, fncloaure, Vllkineon to (iovt., 
13 Jan. 1831*, B.C. 1502/58892.
(2) Ibid.
pass his decree* appeal lying from an assistant to the
agent. In case of a danger to the peace of the country
from such a dispute* the matter would be referred to the
Covernor-Gencral— in—Council•
The agent and his assistants would encourage all
persons to refer their disputes to private arbitration
or to panch&yats so as to avoid cases coming to the court.
The parties in a suit would bo at liberty to settle their
disputes by a r/tginarm or article of agreement at any
stage of proceedings in court* and where such a settlement
was made before the examination of the witnesses had begun,
(2)the stamp fees would be refunded.
By the use of punchavats Vilkiuson aimed at 
expediting justice* and by bringing cases befors 
neighbours* who would know the parties and the circum- 
stances* to prevent vexatious litigation. To the same 
end ha provided that no vakil would be permitted to 
plead in any of the courts, for in the Regulation 
provinces intriguing lawyers and enrichtare had done smch 
to promote unnecessary litigation. If mukhtars did conduct 
business on behalf of parties* they would not be allowed 
to recover fees through the courts.
(1) Huiea for civil justice* Enclosure* Wilkinson to Govt.*
13 dan. 183^* B.C. 1502/58892*
(2) Ibid.
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Another salutary rule proposed by Wilkinson wa® 
with regard to sale or trail®for of land in lieu of rent 
or debt* Such sales;. has boot seen, had lad to recurrent 
Msturbar.ce# in Pachet, iaipufand other par.'tanaa and 
Dent had already drawn the attention of the Government to 
this problem* Now it was proposed *to prevent the sale, 
transfer or mortgage of land®, which whether hereditary 
or not, ar® considered so by the Holders, who would them­
selves hereafter, even if consenting to transfer, sale or 
mortgage, or whose heirs would (a favourable opportunity 
offering) Make an effort to recover them by violent 
measures! also to check the Jungle Rajahs, Jagtfcrdars 
and zuiiiindars from involving themselves in debt, which 
by siortgate Acs Asa they have a facility of doing/'1 
Wilkinson proposed that no transfer of land on account 
of claims for rent, etc*, would be legal unless 
previously authorised by the agent or assistant, by 
a certificate upon the hack of the bond* Moreover, it 
should be widely announced that in future consent to 
the sale, transfer or mortgage of landed property long
held by rajas, Atn.iidskiu and other proprietors would
(X)normally be withhold*
The Bengal Government approved of Wilkinson*s
(1) M U f  for civil Justice, i cloaure, Wilkinson to Govt*
13 Jan* 103%, 0.0. 1502/55892.
v>! %-
6 4 ^
arrangement for the conduct of Judicial business* They
slightly modified his proposed rules for criminal justice,
mid in enlarging the supervisory and redwing role of the
agent, and in providing for more ready appeal from tU©
decisions of assistants* The penalties for vexatious
litigation were considerably increased* Consideration of
his rules for civil justice was, however, deferred, as at
that time hew regulations on that subject were in
preparation, many of which, they said, "will be applicable
to your jurisdiction, and it will be easy to add any that
may be specially applicable to that territory, as well
as to exclude from operation such as may be Inapplicable*"
These modifications did not change the spirit of
Vilkinson’s proposals* There was Increased emphasis on
the existing regulations as guides to both the agent and
his assistants, but the rules for Ar&kan, which had served
as s nodel for Vilklnson, had themselves presupposed the
retaining of the spirit of the regulations, though the
complexities were avoided as far as possible* As for ths
rules for civil Justice, those prepared by Vilklnson in
fact were put into operation, for the Government did not
ft)
pass the contemplated bill on the subject,' and in the
(1) Govt. to Vllklnaon, 17 Feb. 1«3«4, Para, if, B.C. 1502/
58892.
(2) Raid, uiiqi j uttlotaant : eport. Para. 56.
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absui'icit of new iegulaticna9 Wilkinson's simple cods guided
the court* ©£ the Agency until the passing ©1 the Civil
Procedure Code (Act VXXl) in 1359* The prohibition of
sulev transfer or Mortgage of land for arrears of rent or
debt thus continued until 1859* Vhat is more. Act VX119
recognising tins continued validity of the arguments for
that prohibition* laid down that "no sale of land shall
be made in the districts of Husaribagn* Lohardaga and
HunbUuMt without the sanction of the G© .hwiiorur of the
province*" Avon when **>©1 X of 1377* the Code %,£ Civil
h o  ceuurc, came into force * the rule was confined by
notifications for hasariba&h9 bohardugga* bhalbuuia9
(2)
and the non-Sengali part* of Manbhuia*' it was not 
until 1682 that these restrictive safeguards were abandoned* 
Tims Wilkinson*s salutory rule safeguarded the tribal 
people for a ^uite lon*» true* In 1853 the Assistant of 
the Lohardugga division reported that from the constitution 
of the Agency to that date no instance of the sale of land 
in execution of a decree had been recorded* J
On 15 January 183** the South-West Irontier Agency
(Mwas finally inaugurated* On o March Wilkinson established
!1) J‘*td, jjaachi cttlynmK, n•yurt', Para. 58.2) Ibid. Para. 59.
3)Ibid. Para, 60.
|t») useell to r,0vt., 15 Jan. 183'', B.C. 1502/58892.
hie new headquarters at Flark&garh* in the centre of hie
charge The inauguration of the Ag©ncy marked the
beginning of a twenty year period of peace in the tribal 
area* a peace made complete after the Incorporation of 
&lughbht&! in the Agency in i8J7*
The Court of Directors readily approved the judicious 
step of the Bengal Government in *exempting from the 
operation of the Regulation* the whole range of the
disturbed district* and placing them uraler a epeeial
(2 )commie * loner. ** % * They aleo approved the appointment of 
Wilkinson to that poet "for the dutlee of whichf hie
personal character and hie recent experience would seem
{ J)to render him eminently qualified.*N Moreover* thoy 
approved the general instructions of the Bengal Government 
and of Wilkinson to his subordinates« **We observe fro*, 
the tenor at his directions to his Assistantst that he 
justly regards it as his own and their first duty to come 
into immediate communication with the people for the purpose 
of acquiring a knowledge of their real sentimentsf and
Ih)of promoting fcaeir welfare.*' ' hast* but not least* they
(1) Wllki'ison to Govt• * 1 March 183**, Ibid.
(2) Court oi lirectora t-o Geng&l Govt.* 16 Sept. X835t 
P ra. 9, India and I’on^al Despatches, Vol.6f p.37^.
ibid. p. 377. 
^bld. p. 378.
shewed their anxiety to know wore about those tribal people 
and about the redreee of their genuine grievances*
In subsequent years Wilkinson and his assistants 
made the protection of tribal interests even wore complete* 
In Cetober 18)4 Wilkinson received permission to interfere 
whenever the estate of an hereditary proprietor was so 
deeply involved as to render such interposition desirable*" 
Thus he could adjust accounts and regulate Interest chargee 
to release mortgaged property where necessary* and to 
sequester an estate for the payment of debts* This wus so 
ealtitory a measure that Dalton* the Divisional Commission*^ 
of Chota-ka&pur declared in 1869 that in the absence of 
such a power* all the old semi-tribal samindars would have 
lost their property in favour of the non-tribal money­
lenders* Since the tribal people preferred their own 
samindars* "however ignorant* dissipated* extravagant” 
they were* to the most enlightened of interlopers* Dalton
even thought that a law of entail might well have been
(2)enforced*' 9
in 1838 Dr* Davidson* by then principal assistant* 
secured the total prohibition of ex—parte decrees* on the
very valid groumis that such ignorant persons as mindas*
!1) held* op* cit., iara* 63*2) Ibid*
6 18
eiankis and the ordinary ftols and otlur tribal folk "would* 
when served with prooossd«« abscond or conceal thawselves* 
or confess judptent, though the plaintiff had no claim 
whatever against them* from fear of th« court»#w^ ^  The 
wisdom of this measure was realised later when this 
salutary rule became obsolete after the extension of the 
Code of Civil Procedure to this area* and the execution
of numerous fraudulent ex~nnrte decrees against the tribal
(2)people car© to light* The Ohota-Magpur tenancy Act of
1^08 therefore provided for special action against such
frauds*
It was also during the period of the Agency that a 
police system was worked out* Initially police thanae 
were established at Important places» while the eawind&rs 
were put in charge of the police of their own areas* 
defraying their expenses in the beginning* But later on
it was thought expedient to curtail the powers of the
(3)s a m l n d a r s * '
The salutary rule against the enforced sale of lands 
for private debt or revenue arrears has already been
1) held* op* cit*» Para 60*
2) Ibid.. Para* *6#
3) In Dlialbhum in 1853 and in Chota~ftagpur in 1863 the
aaidndars were finally divested of their police 
powers*
referred to* In 1853# i c k e a  »o<aber of the Hoard of 
Revenue* severely criticised the uncertain and mischievous 
system whereby* In afreet * landowners vara protected from 
nil creditors by the fear that otherwise they would stir 
up their ignorant tribal r y o u  to resistance and rebellion* 
k*id | iu th« AfMUffjiAjfcf* » »“»* poiatud uut how
beside the mark were Bichette* remarks* and how justified 
Wilkinson’s rules were by subsequent experience* After 
16&2 the free sale of landed property led to a recurrence 
of serious abuses and of consequent dietux bancus * such 
as the ■ ardari har&l of tin) eighteen-oigUtlee and the 
dir salt movement of l i> 9  5-1900 • By the Chota-ftugpur Tenancy 
Act "the Government was obliged to give salutary effect 
to the principles* which the authority of the Agent 
enforced in the early days of the bouth~West frontier
.(t)-igoncy*
(l) held* o p * cit*. Para# 62*
The tribal unrout on the south-vast frontier of 
Bengal in 1831-1833* was boru nut of frustration and 
anger - frustration with the new system of Osverancmt 
and l*ws»* and ang^r at tti# people who either 
them or took undue advantage of the?**
The real tragedy of the tribal pooule of this ares 
was that their chiefs* alienated by their conversion to 
Induism r>nd the foolish administrators* born and bred 
in the tradition of agrtetiltural landlordism* had no 
sympathy with the tradition of tribal ownership of lead 
or idea of peasant proprietorship* That was why the 
farmer brought in nen-tribal settlers and the latter © 
complex dfsifiistrative machinery run by an unsympathetic 
noclety. Against these tribal people found no remedy 
except unrest and violence*
This thesis set out to investigate the origins*■
nature* pacification and outcome of the unrest* It began 
with queries about the causes of tension In the tribal 
mlmi* of their misapprehensions and proper fears* It 
beeota s clear that from two sides their traditional society
was being underminedt custom was being undermined by
O M l m t «  a barter t m o ^ r  by m mmumy coonoisy they kad 
not yet learned to h«>&dle9 divisions of the* land d*terwli#*d 
by tribal ousts* wtr« r«pla««4 by « i u ^ - t M U O t  
reiatlon#ld|j, and tribal solidarity %m» holn# destroyed 
fro* within by fch* HlndulLitton of tU» chiefs* stid 
without by th« pr««9ur#» ®f the British raj#
How far tk*st could h»T« hmmi cheeked It
is hard to say* One could not surely haw® wished to see 
th» tribal |>e»pl# completely too la tad and y f n tftnl os 
musauia or *00 specimens# Yet the introduction of mm mmny 
now things at the tlwe and Itl uathtafelag effort to
•clvl H * » f ttomm wo r«? cor to inly l m t m a t t tftl in disturbing 
their mi tula and upsetting the habits to which they wars 
adJusted*
The events leading to the ottWkrtftk of the unrest 
and its spreadinf» eo uioHly seam to surest that this 
Itrist tragv.dy could have been avoided If that peculiar 
pretltsa mt fchi* tribal area had been realised earlier 
because the task, of personally mA&knkmtaring the area 
was difficult and unrewarding ♦ The occasional* 
eccentric officer - and Nathaniel ^usith certainly ess 
eccentric * who did seek to interfere often did mm 
without real underatrndinf, end with the best of
intentions* in trying to civilize tht tribal people or
to correct their fcriminal l ^ h i U 1 caused still snore M m *1 W?T ■ $
b h e n  th e  d is tu r b a n c e ©  b«gfe ii t b s  fk rn g a l O o v s n w e n t  d id  
not at first realise that by its own Actions ~ or inaction 
it hod a partial responsibility for the disaster* 
bo Governor^ eneral, not t v«n the reforming ftetttlnsk* 
visited the area* (The Betitirjck paper* though full of 
comments by Metcalfe disclose none from H«nlinek)« Few 
cor <&1 as loners or district officers had any personal 
knowledge of Chotn—kagpur or the jungle Meitala* ^o, 
having in the past been led to believe that the tribal 
people had no genuine grievances* when they broke out* 
their violence was attributed to savagery and innate 
wickedness* Naturally* therefore* a policy of vigorous 
repression was followed* the whole area was thoroughly 
sacked and hundred* of insurgents were killed* Only 
later on when the second phase of the unrest had opened* 
did they realist* that there was something essentially 
wrong* Only tban did they rsalise that the pretests 
of the tribal people against the sale laws* the excise 
duty* the cultivation of poppy* etc** were net unjustified 
inly then did they take the decisive step of refashioning 
the administration*
Thua this aur«st| which opened the eyes of the 
Bengal Government to the peculiar administrative problem 
on the »outh»w««t frontier, was a watershed in the history 
of* this a m *  It the Government avore of the
ineffectiveness - rnlhmr futility - of sfcenv a«R«i»rc« 
and reprisals* f© that orient the object of the tribal 
unrest woe largoiy fulfilled*
It *my f*ven be argued that less terror and 
destruction would not have served the purpose* The panic 
caused in the area* west of this refior. as far as tenures 
arid in the east of it up to Col cut ta certainly had wide 
repercussions* The revorberations of the tribal nm^ara 
were heard os far as Wirsapwr in the vest, rtnd even the 
Mscyu^-observer had to take note of certain events*
The tnnny letter* which appeared in the Calcutta press wise 
a ureate that public opinion was with aroused by events*
^ot only the radical (v* g* the He-ncznX ■ \nrkarvt) but also
t' a
the Go vax'nioeu t~ spun so red newspaper (e«g* the Calcutta 
■ ■azotie) of Calcutta admitted that these areas had 
beeii utterly neglected by the Hritieh Indian administration 
There was no rap worth the neats, no clear idea about the
lay out or the potential!ties of the hill and jungle*
It was fro** ignorance that »o many blunders nud
atrocities had W e n  eastnwitted. Vlth the new knowledge 
provided by th«- constant traversing of the area, the 
unsuitability of the general regulations for this ares 
¥fts at last clearly revealed.
Fortunetsly at this live there was a reforming 
Osv«msr^>oft«rai9 and his Councillors were hitter ©nestles 
of the Cornwallis ayater^# Last, but not least* Captain 
Wilkinson, the Political Agent to tin Governor-General 
on this frontier, who had served for over a decade in 
the Tieeean and had felt the influence of th© ideas of 
? lphineton*, Munro and Malcolm, was able to influence 
Government decisions through his friends Major Benson 
and Major Sutherland, who were private secretaries to 
W n t i n c k  end ’•Jetealf© respectively*
This cumulative Influence, popular and official, 
lad to a salutary chenge, and the tribal people of this 
sir©?* received a welcome relief through Regulation ItXI, 
1 8 3 %  The special imc©rapHeated rules,, frafaed for this 
area, gave the® relief f r m  the corrupt polios, law
uC ’ . " 1 • iB^ *' i J s t '  .vi
officer and revenue collectors, from th© abuses and
levies of excise farmers and s p U  i arenas. The money-
lenders and .«ereh*mt<> also Had their claws blunted by
the provision# about debt which recognised the *
vulnerability ol the tribal people f whether raja or 
ryot. The aUtfatlf of the admialstration kab a I so 
done awcy with by the permanent residence in the t r i b a l  
Areas of the Agent and hi# assistant#* and by the friendly
informal intercourse they permit let’ on tour# The
administration of t h e  l a w  w a s  m a d #  far lea# c o u p l e s ,  a n d  
b y  the b a n  u p c m  v a k i l #  a n d  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  p e . n c h ^ v a t a  
va* prevented from becoming a* lnatim<eni In the hand* 
of the unscrupulous. ^ot only va« t h e  Company* c 
administration thus adapted to tribal needs, and its 
officers and officials node servant# rather than 
oppressive m a t e r s  o f  the tribal p e o p l e ,  but t h e  c o n f l i c t s  
within tribal society Itself w e r e  e a s e d *  if r a j a s  a n d  
dagjrdae were # ved by tfilkinson a n d  f avid e o n  fre e s  t h e
clutches of t h e  m o n e y l e n d e r ,  the r a n k l e  and
tbs junior m e m b e r *  of c h i e f l y  f a m i l i e s ,  a n d  t h e  a s i n e r  
z&sjitiirr* were s^ved from oppression by their rajas* The 
re stilt w a s  twenty y e a r s  o f  p e a c e f u l  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  t b s  
Agency* dad the s a m e  careful a t t e n t i o n  t o  t r i b a l  
needs been paid in the y e a r  a f t e r  t h e  > t u t i n y  p e r h a p s  
the agrarian disturbances w h i c h  b e g a n  » f » i «  w i t h  t h e  
abolition of the igency in \tt$k end the reintroduction 
of m  ny of the fternlations, and which c u k i m  t<*d i n  t h e  
























Brit, Vritti or 
Britta







dajtukidar, Choke edar, 
Chuar, Chooar,
The excise.
Miscellaneous cesses, imposts, and 
charges, levied by zemindars and 
public officers.
Lawc ourt.
The subordinate Indian servants.
An Indian official, employed under 
the civil courts to investigate 
accounts connected with a suit, to 
carry out legal processes as a 
bailiff, etc. Also applied to Indian 
assistants in the duties of land 
survey.
Temporary huts.





A matchlockman, guard, or escort. 
Discount.
Forced labour for which no pay was 
given.
The fifth month of the luni-solar 
year.
A title of the respectable Oraons. 
Villages managed by the raja or 
zemindar himself, not rented or 
farmed to others.
Original clearers of land among the 
Mundas.
A measure of land.
A mendicant or an ignorant vagrant. 
Land granted rent-free to Brahmans. 
Grant of land or other means of 
support to anyone, generally for 
religious purposes.
Load-carrier.




Station of police or customs.
A watchman, generally of a village.






































Head of a police, custom or excise 
station.
A popular festival in honour of the 
goddess Durga.
A grant for the worship of God or a 
gift in the name of God.
A deity.
Country, province or a district.
Branch of a tree.
Loin cloth*.
A watchman in the Jungle Mahals.
A minister, a chief officer of an 
estate.
Of or relating to a diwan, Civil as 
opposed to criminal. The right to 
receive the collections of Bengal, 
Bihar and Orissa granted to the 
East India Company in 1765*
To go about.
Interpreter.
A deed of agreement or assent.
A Muslim religious mendicant, 
subsisting on alms.
The harvest year, The era originating 
with Akbar,
The office of a magistrate or head 
of police, or criminal judge.




A tribal constable in the Jungle 
Mahals.
A land grant to the Ghatwal.
Clarified butter.
A watchman.





































Pice beer of the Mundas and Oraons. 
Indian.
Superior authority.
The person who engages, either on 
his own account or as the represent­
ative of others, for the payment of 
the assessed revenue upon a district 
or a village.
A farm of land of a village.
A farmer of land.
Justice.
A list or roll of names.
A conditional or unconditional 
assignment of land or its revenue. 
Holder cf a jagln
An assignment of the revenues of a 
tract of land for the maintenance 
of an establishment.
The rental of an estate, or a holding. 
Settlement of the amount of revenue 
assessed upon an estate, a village or 
district.
The chief or leader of any number of 
persons; a native subaltern officer; 
a police or excise officer.
A written agreement, especially one 
signifying assent, as the counterpart 




A Hindu caste of writers.
Unfarmed land.
Own.
A dress of honour presented by a 
superior authority to an inferior 
as a mark of distinction.
Maint e nanc e grant.
Original clearers of land in Chota- 
Nagpur proper.
A measure of distance.
The chief of an estate, or the son 
of a chief.







































Fee for writing or registering. 
Assistance, allowance.
The 10th month of the Hindu year.
A fiscal division, a department.
A merchant, a moneylender,
A village headman among the Oraons.
The head of a Hindu religious 
e stablishment.
Land assigned to religious persons. 




A circle headman among the Mundas. 
Rent-free Tenancy.
Chief.
Relating to the Moghul rule.
A clerk, a writer.
A written obligation, a bond.
An agent, an attorney.
A person holding land at a fixed 
rate of assessment.
A village headman among the Mundas.
An Indian civil judge of the lowest 
rank.
A village headman in Patkum.
A writer.





An Inspector, a supervisor, the 
officer of the court who serves pro­
cesses, takes depositions, and makes 
enquiries.
A present.
The administration of police and 
criminal law.
The religious head of a Munda village. 
An armed attendant, a village watchman 





Panchayat, Pune hay at , A village court of arbitration.
Pargana, A fiscal division.
Parha, A group of Munda villages.
Parwana, An order,
Pats A pass of a hill,
Patta, Pottah, A deed of lease.
Patti, A half, a moiety.
Patwari, A subordinate revenue officer.
Peada, Peon.
Puchai, A rice beer.
Pus, The ninth month of the Hindu calendar.
Patrani, Chief queen.
Qanungo, Village and district revenue officers
Rahdari, Roadcess.
Raik, Share.
Rakababandi, Measurement of land.
Raj, Estate.
Rasum. Pees, Customary payments and 
gratuities.
Rautia, A horse soldier.
Sadr, Sadar, Principal,




Salami, A complimentary present.
Sanad, A grant, a charter.
Sardar, Sirdar, A tribal chieftain, a man of 
consequence.
Sanyasi, Sunnyas i, A hindu mendicant.
Sati, Burning of the wife with the dead 
body of her husband.
Sayer, A variety of taxes and imposts, other 
than Hand revenue.
Sazawal, A native collector of revenue.
Sebundv, Sibundi, Irregular soldier.
SewaJqaatta, 
Sheristadar, Saitsih-
A deed or bond by which a person 
binds himself to servitude.
tadar, Record-keeper.
Subali, Province,
Sud or Sad, A tribal word for foreigaJU'*
Sunat, Sonat, A type of coinage.


















The lowest grade of ghatwal.
A native collector of revenue. 
Demand of revenue, salary.
Daily fee to a subordinate officer 
serving summons.
A form of Jagir.
A fiscal division.
A person of rank.




Farmer of revenue or excise.
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